

ISSN 0974 – 2514

**INTERNATIONAL JOURNAL OF
SOUTH ASIAN STUDIES**
A Biannual Journal of South Asian Studies

Vol. 3

January – June 2010

No. 1



**MADANJEET SINGH INSTITUTE FOR SOUTH ASIA
REGIONAL CO-OPERATION (MISARC)
CENTRE FOR SOUTH ASIAN STUDIES
DEPARTMENT OF POLITICS & INTERNATIONAL STUDIES
PONDICHERY UNIVERSITY
PUDUCHERRY, INDIA**

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Abstract

Climate change is real, serious, and inescapable, and its looming effects, certain and uncertain, may prove to be destabilizing on a massive scale. Stemming the tide of climate change and adapting to its far-reaching security implications must therefore rank among the most vital strategic priorities today. South Asia is warming up faster than the global average, likely resulting in more frequent and powerful extreme weather events, fuelling salinisation particularly in low-lying coastal areas. The importance of environmental security and sustainable development in South Asia continues to heighten in response to rapid growth in energy consumption, increasing dependence on energy imports and growing concerns about the potential economic and social impacts of climate change. Cleaner and more advanced energy efficient and lower emission technologies are an essential component of any approach that aims to ease the pressure of growing energy demand and to reduce growth in greenhouse gas emissions, while allowing South Asian economies to pursue a range of other policy objectives, including improving energy security and economic growth and development. Regional cooperation can play a key role in adaptation and development in the region.

Environmental conditions are rapidly degrading in South Asia; the transboundary effects of pollution and competition for natural resources are being felt throughout the region. Environmental problems are starting to reach crisis proportions, and, as a result, the governments of the region are beginning to be forced to respond domestically and—when that does not suffice—at the bilateral and regional levels as well, sometimes with extraordinary measures. The recently concluded 16th SAARC Summit in the mountainous city of Thimpu in Bhutan largely focused on issues of climate change, environment and energy security, under the sprightly banner of ‘A Green and Happy South Asia.’ The current SAARC summit emphasized the need for the various SAARC countries to collaborate and blunt the effects of these changes on the region. Some of the substantive highlights at this summit were the decision to create a convention on environment, and to have a common SAARC position at the 16th

Conference of Parties (COP) in Mexico, later this year. The countries also resolved to commission a study that would address the social, economic and environmental challenges of climate risks. In this context, this paper seeks to explore the new security challenges of South Asia, the cause and effect relationship between energy and environment. The paper examines the changing realities in South Asia in the context of climate change and takes a fresh look at the prospects and challenges for regional cooperation in the region. It also investigates how climate change is positioned within the wider field of security discourse within South Asia. The paper argues that a greater awareness of underlying worldviews and perspectives behind the range of climate initiatives is necessary for developing an appropriate strategy and regional coordination in South Asia. The paper also provides the regional security scenario and the prospects for developing sustainable security strategy for the South Asian region.

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South Asia is a dynamic and complex region that presents the world with significant opportunities and challenges to global security, stability and human well-being. It is one of the fastest growing regions in the world with an average growth rate of above 6 per cent over the past eight years and has demonstrated its potential for emerging as a significant economic entity in the world economic space. The region is home to India, the world's largest democracy and a rising power with one of fastest growing economies. It also includes governments struggling to maintain control of their countries, two nuclear powers that coexist in an uneasy and often tense relationship, and conflicts with al Qaeda and Taliban forces. All of these factors make the region a subject of considerable strategic importance to the major powers and the larger international community. South Asia includes Afghanistan, Bangladesh, Bhutan, India, the Maldives, Nepal, Pakistan, and Sri Lanka—covers 3.3 percent of Earth's terrestrial area, but supports more than one-fifth of the world's inhabitants. According to UN statistics, the region's population will rise by another 800 million people by 2050¹. It is the largest regional grouping in terms of human resources than that of EU and ASEAN. SAARC was formed in 1985 with the goal of raising the living standard of the region's poverty stricken people. But unfortunately it has not been able to leverage its full potential. Geography coupled with high levels of poverty and population density has rendered South Asia especially vulnerable to the impacts of climate change². This could compound development problems and further strain the resources needed to sustain growth, urbanization, and industrialization. South Asia is a conflict prone region subject to continuous political tensions.

Climate Change and Security in South Asia

Climate change is emerging as a new kind of security issue because of the way it affects collective human life and well-being in a fragile and increasingly interconnected

world. The rapid degradation of our environment because of global warming itself constitutes a security threat—a threat to the quality of life of current and future generations. Climate change, in particular a rise in global temperatures, threatens the basic survival and welfare needs of people around the world, including access to water, food production, health, and the use of land. Environmental degradation from various kinds of human economic activity has already increased the frequency and intensity of natural disasters worldwide. If global temperatures continue to rise at current levels, the threat to human security will increase correspondingly. Rising sea levels will lead to more coastal erosion, flooding during storms, and permanent inundation; and severe stress on natural ecosystems like forests and wetlands. Threats to human health from water-borne diseases like malaria will grow and spread over greater geographic regions, allergy sufferers will have to cope with the worsening air quality, and agriculture will decrease sharply in some parts of the world due to increased temperature and water stress. Other stark implications of climate change include armed conflicts over scarce supplies of food, water, and land, as well as economic decline and political instability in regions where sectors like agriculture are intricately linked with the environment.

Climate change is real, serious, and inescapable, and its looming effects, certain and uncertain, may prove to be destabilizing on a massive scale. Stemming the tide of climate change and adapting to its far-reaching security implications must therefore rank among the most vital strategic priorities in this century³. Climate change is one of the greatest and most complex of challenges the international community has to deal with today and in the years to come. Climate change is a grim reality. Scientists tell us that the world is getting warmer by the day. Extreme weather phenomena such as floods, droughts, heat waves and cyclones, experienced in different parts of our globe, are among the far reaching consequences of climate change, giving us a bitter foretaste of

what worse may come in the near future⁴. The link between climate change and human survival is now as clear as ever. Dramatic environmental change undeniably places the infrastructure of all countries to the test. But it also poses an even greater threat to developing countries that lack the means, the know-how and the capacity to effectively deal with this phenomena.⁵ Add to this the soaring food and oil prices, and the future for millions of people across the globe, particularly those living on the edge struck by poverty or ravaged by conflict and tension, is ominous. It is now increasingly realized that even with the currently agreed regime of emissions control, concentrations of greenhouse gases (GHG) are likely to rise over the next few decades and over the millennia. Climate change is likely to threaten all life forms on earth with the extent of vulnerability varying across regions and populations within regions.

The impact of climate change will be most pronounced in the South Asian region. The likely impacts of climate change in the form of higher temperatures, more variable precipitation, and more extreme weather events are already felt in South Asia. It has been projected that these will intensify. High population levels leads to increased resource demands on an already stressed natural resource base. With an estimated 600 million South Asians subsisting on less than US\$1.25 a day, even small climate shocks can cause irreversible losses and tip a large number of people into destitution. It is a region in which climate-induced migration will present the greatest geopolitical challenges. Sea-level rise may threaten the habitat of millions of people as 40% of South Asia's population (almost 2 billion) lives within 60km from the coastline. Much of South Asia relies on monsoon rains and is vulnerable to sea level changes and the melting of glaciers. The monsoon carries over 70% of the region's annual precipitation in a four-month period. When the rains fail, suffering and economic loss are widespread. Sea level rise poses a risk to densely populated coastlines and many low-lying islands. In the severe climate change

scenarios, a sea level rise would submerge much of the Maldives and inundate nearly a fifth of Bangladesh. The IPCC warns that "coastal areas, especially heavily populated mega-delta regions in South, East, and Southeast Asia, will be at greatest risk due to increased flooding from the sea and, in some mega-deltas, flooding from the rivers"⁶. Bangladesh in particular will be threatened by devastating floods and other damage from monsoons, melting glaciers, and tropical cyclones that originate in the Bay of Bengal, as well as water contamination and ecosystem destruction caused by rising sea levels. The population of Bangladesh, which stands at 142 million today, is anticipated to increase by approximately 100 million people during the next few decades, even as the impact of climate change and other environmental factors steadily render the low-lying regions of the country uninhabitable.⁷


Many of the displaced will move inland, which will foment instability as the resettled population competes for already scarce resources with established residents. Others will seek to migrate abroad, creating heightened political tension not only in South Asia but in Europe and Southeast Asia as well. It is estimated that India will struggle to cope with a surge of displaced people from Bangladesh, in addition to those who will arrive from the small islands in the Bay of Bengal that are being slowly swallowed by the rising sea. Approximately four million people inhabit these islands, and many of them will have to be accommodated on the mainland eventually.⁸ It is argued that the combination of deteriorating socioeconomic conditions, radical Islamic political groups, and dire environmental insecurity brought on by climate change could prove a volatile mix having severe regional and potentially global consequences.

Retreating glaciers also could pose the most far-reaching challenge. The Himalayan system influences monsoon dynamics, acts as a reservoir to sustain crops, provides groundwater recharge, and is home to a unique ecosystem with many endemic

species. With rising temperatures, the ice mass of the Himalayas and Hindu Kush is retreating faster than the global average, threatening water supplies, people's lives, and the region's economies.⁹ These conditions exacerbate and skew water availability across regions thereby the worsening conditions in regions that are already water stressed. Rapid depletion of water resource is already a cause for concern in many countries within the region. Figure 1

highlights that in South Asia alone, 2.5 billion people will be affected with water stress and scarcity by the year 2050¹⁰. Water stress and loss of agricultural productivity will make it difficult for the region to feed its growing population who will additionally be exposed to an increase of infectious diseases. It is estimated that changes in the monsoon rains and decrease of melt water from the Himalayas will affect more than 1 billion people.

Figure 1. Projected stress in water availability across regions for the years 2025 and 2050



Source: Human Development Report, 2006

South Asia already is highly susceptible to natural disasters, with almost 240,000 deaths and about \$45 billion in damages over the past two decades. Many of the most severe impacts of climate change are likely to be regional and will call for coordinated regional responses. Bangladesh has 54 shared rivers with India, so that changes in upstream runoff and demand due to climate change, could significantly impact future water availability across all these rivers. Adaptation to climate change might therefore require not just local action but also cross-boundary cooperative arrangements. The Himalayan range contains high altitude glaciers that supply water to many rivers in Asia. These rivers provide water to more than half of the world's population. Many

people in Asia are dependent on glacial melt water during dry season. Accelerated glacial melt questions the very perennial nature of many of the Himalayan flowing rivers. This is likely to have huge implications on those dependent on the resource affecting water availability for agricultural purposes. In Nepal and Bhutan, melting glaciers are filling glacial lakes beyond their capacities contributing to Glacial Lake Outburst Floods (GLOFs) (UNEP 2007). Conflicts over remaining resources and unmanaged migration will lead to instability in the region. This will also widen the wealth gap between and within countries of the region and among people. In some cases, it will even spark conflict and war by heightening competition over scarce resources and by

upsetting the cultural or ethnic order within a country or region¹¹. Unfortunately, climate change is making many of the development projects being financed by the international community in South Asia and elsewhere less effective just as it is making them more necessary. The World Bank estimates that 40 percent of all overseas development assistance and concessional finance is devoted to activities that will be affected by climate change, but few of the projects adequately account for the impact that climate change will have. As a result, dams are built on rivers that will dry up, and crops are planted in coastal areas that will be frequently flooded¹². Furthermore, the water


shortages resulting from climate change are coinciding with an increased tendency among donors and international financial organizations such as the World Bank to promote the privatization of water, which frequently raises the cost for rural subsistence farmers to a level they cannot afford. This in turn foments tension between the poorer, rural segments of society and the urban middle and upper classes by exacerbating existing economic and social inequities. The recent World Bank study shows that the impact of climate change in South Asia will not impact all countries equally (See Table 1). Resource poor communities in the region will suffer most.

Table 1: Summary of climate risks by country.

	Afghanistan	Bangladesh	Bhutan	India	Maldives	Nepal	Pakistan	Sri Lanka
Sea level Rise	–	√	–	√	√	–	√	√
Glacier retreat	√	√	√	√	–	√	√	–
Temperature increase	√	√	√	√	√	√	√	√
Flood frequency	?	√	Likely	√ (some areas)	√	√	√	?
Drought frequency	Likely	√ (some areas)	?	√ (some areas)	–	?	Likely	?
Present: √	Not Present: –		Unknown: ?					

While vulnerability to climate change is high in South Asia, the region has also emerged as a significant contributor to GHG emissions. High economic growth has fueled an insatiable thirst for energy¹³. Rising energy demand is driven by urbanization, industrialization, and prosperity, all of which are part of a broader process of development that is lifting millions out of poverty. However, increased energy consumption has

been accompanied by rising GhG emissions. On average, emissions have risen at about 3.3 percent annually since 1990—more rapidly than in any other region of the world, except the Middle East. Total emissions exceed 2.5 billion tons of Co2 equivalents. However, per capita emissions of the region are still extremely low by international standards—less than one-fifth of the developed countries (Figure 2).

Figure 2: Per Capita Greenhouse Gas Emissions by Region, 1995 and 2000

As the region strives to meet its development goals, the potential for further growth in emissions is enormous. More than 400 million people in India alone have no access to electricity. How South Asia meets the legitimate demands for energy and economic prosperity will have far-reaching consequences on global GhG emissions. Growth typically spurs emissions in rough proportion to the income it generates. Hence, South Asia like the rest of the world faces an enormous challenge to sustain its growth while addressing global warming. Reflecting the size of its economy, population and territory, India remains the largest contributor to GHGs in the region. In South Asia, energy, industry, agriculture, and to a lesser extent transports are the key contributors to GHGs.

Energy Cooperation and Security in South Asia


There are distinct advantages for South Asian countries to cooperate in the energy sector. These countries together possess vast stores of energy mostly in the form of water resources, oil, forest, coal and gas. However, these countries continue to be characterized by poor quality of energy infrastructure, skewed distribution and inaccessible and costly energy availability (Figure 2). These countries have remained largely energy importers and increasingly faced a serious energy shortfall.

The region is currently experiencing a rapid growth in energy demand, concomitant with economic growth and industrialization. And the rapid economic growth is driving energy demand in South Asia at approximately 6-8% a year. Energy consumption in each country is expected to rise steadily and significantly in order to sustain economic growth rates. Adequate energy supply is, therefore a major challenge facing the economies. Despite rapid growth in energy demand, however, South Asia continues to average amongst the lowest levels of per capita energy consumption in the world, but among the highest in terms of energy consumption per unit of GDP¹⁴. The growing demand for fuels in the industrial and transport sectors in view of industrialization and newer development projects has increased the demand for commercial fuels significantly in South Asia in recent times. The transportation sector primarily depends on oil products for fuel. The rise of middle income groups and the easy accessibility of car finance in most of the countries in the region have put forth strong pressure for personal transportation and consequent pressure on fuel demand. Although the demand for oil is higher now, South Asia's oil reserves are limited.¹⁵ Import of petroleum products to meet the growing demand of energy is going to be on the increase which will put additional pressure on the balance of payment. Such a

state of over dependency is likely to affect adversely the energy security of the countries in the region. South Asia is the region with the highest growth rates in the consumption of commercial energy. Biomass in the form of fuel wood, agricultural waste, and animal waste remains as a primary fuel for the majority of poor people in this region,

although the spread of electricity and the penetration of fuel products for lighting and cooking, has led to a gradual reduction in the share of biomass in most of these countries. Much of the imported oil products are used as fuel for the transportation sector as well as to meet some urban cooking needs.¹⁶

Figure 2: South Asia's Energy Consumption Mix



Source: Energy Information Administration, Ministry of Petroleum, Government of India; BP Statistical Review of World Energy.

SAARC and Sustainable Energy Development

Energy has been an area of regional cooperation even before the formal establishment of SAARC. In 2000 energy cooperation was brought directly under the purview of the SAARC Integrated Programme of Action. Under this programme of Action the subject was being dealt with by the Technical Committee on Science and Technology. In view of the increasing importance of cooperation in this sector SAARC established a Technical Committee on Energy in 2000. Recognizing that this vital area needed intensive attention, the 12th SAARC summit held in Islamabad in 2004 set up a specialized Working Group on Energy (Worgen) to undertake a focused

study of various possibilities for cooperation in the field of energy including the concept of an Energy Ring that would include transnational energy lines for trade in electricity, gas and oil. The subsequent induction of Afghanistan in SAARC introduced an added dimension to the issue as that country, connecting Central Asia with South Asia, can play an important role in that sector. Worgen has also been mandated to give special attention to environment friendly energy, to promote non conventional and renewable sources of energy for economic development and poverty reduction, and to place special focus on energy availability in rural areas. It has formulated the terms of reference for study on energy trade in the region.¹⁷ At the SAARC Energy Minister's conference in

Islamabad in September-October 2005, it was agreed to establish a SAARC Energy Center (SENER) in Islamabad, Pakistan. The primary objective for the establishment of SENER is to have a regional institution of excellence for the initiation, coordination and facilitation of SAARC programs in Energy. The proposed goals of SENER are defined as follows:

- To strengthen the region's capability in addressing global and regional issues in the energy by enhancing the coordination of energy strategies of the SAARC Member States.
- To facilitate intra-regional trade in energy through the establishment of interconnecting arrangements for electricity and natural gas within SAARC such as the proposed power grid and transnational gas pipeline.
- To promote SAARC cooperation in energy efficiency and conservation as effective mechanism for demand-side management.
- To promote the development of new and renewable energy resources in the region as an instrument towards stable energy development in the SAARC Member States over the long term.
- To serve as an energy information network and exchange center at both regional and global scales.
- To enhance the development of SAARC expertise in energy development and management.
- To promote private sector investment and participation in energy activities of the region.
- To undertake other related activities in connection with the above objectives.

Among the above mentioned objectives, the promotion of private sector investment and participation in energy activities of the region assumed top most priority. This is to convert the saving potentials into investments in energy projects

(electricity, liquefied natural gas) through both the public as well as the private sectors, as integrated favourable investment policy should be formulated that can attract region's private investors to invest in energy projects. The SAARC countries current dependence on outside sources for their growing energy requirements can be removed by better management efficiency and stronger cooperation amongst themselves.¹⁸ The main challenge for the region is its increasing dependence on oil imports and addressing the pernicious effects of highly volatile oil prices. Moreover, sourcing oil imports from a single region like Middle East, itself threatens the region's energy security. The most important challenge of the region is to meet the transport sector fuel needs. Access to clean, reliable and affordable energy sources would help the South Asian countries in attaining higher growth at lower costs of production.

Economic growth definitely suffers due to lack of adequate energy sources. Energy challenges in South Asia need to be viewed in an integrated and comprehensive manner to include medium and long-term perspectives. Along with immediate optimal utilization of the available energy resources, the development of resources especially renewable resources should receive priority consideration of the policy makers. The strategy needs to include augmentation of resources from beyond the region in the immediate vicinity, where high resource potential and exportable surplus exist.¹⁹ Securing long-term energy supplies to power expanding economies and meet the rising aspirations of a growing populace is no longer a concept. Rather, the need for national and regional energy security has become a compelling reality for South Asia, as evidenced by the fact that each country in the region is seriously exploring avenues and options to meet future energy demand. As the energy security of different countries improves, the energy security of the region will also improve. The energy situation in South Asia presents a great opportunity to design and implement a regional energy security strategy that fully supports the

evolving plans for such security at the national level in the countries of the region. This could be a real win-win proposition.

Conclusions

Climate change is real, serious, and inescapable, and its looming effects, certain and uncertain, may prove to be destabilizing on a massive scale. Stemming the tide of climate change and adapting to its far-reaching security implications must therefore rank among the most vital strategic priorities today. South Asia is warming up faster than the global average, likely resulting in more frequent and powerful extreme weather events, fuelling salinisation particularly in low-lying coastal areas. The importance of environmental security and sustainable development in South Asia continues to heighten in response to rapid growth in energy consumption, increasing dependence on energy imports and growing concerns about the potential economic and social impacts of climate change. Cleaner and more advanced energy efficient and lower emission technologies are an essential component of any approach that aims to ease the pressure of growing energy demand and to reduce growth in greenhouse gas emissions, while allowing South Asian economies to pursue a range of other policy objectives, including improving energy security and economic growth and development. Regional cooperation can play a key role in adaptation and development in the region. With climate change, the monsoons and their associated droughts and floods are expected to become more intense and less predictable. Coping with these mounting extremes in the river basins of South Asia will require more basin wide information to predict and warn against calamity. It will also call for more basin wide river management, with coordinated capacity to lower flood peaks and augment low season flows. SAARC has miles to go and multiple roles to perform. It has shown willingness to progress together by admitting Afghanistan as a new member and giving China, South Korea US, Iran and Japan as observer status. Despite the new dynamism

and a new sense of purpose shown by the leaders in recent Summits, regional politics and bilateral trust deficit is going to play a vital role in determining SAARC's success. The great wall of politics acts as a stumbling bloc. SAARC should learn from the success stories of EU and ASEAN in managing the new challenges. With the resolve to make South Asia not a 'nuclear flash point,' not 'the most dangerous place of earth to live in', but a South Asia of cooperation, peace, mutual understanding, so that SAARC can fulfill its basic objectives for which it was formed. Regional trade and energy cooperation should be given prime importance and steps should be taken for the full exploitation of the vast resources in the region without causing further damage to the environment.

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Politics in Pakistan: Parvaiz Musharaf's Military Rule in Perspective

Riaz Ahmed Shaikh

Abstract

Repeated military coups in Pakistan have drastically changed the structure of government and state in the country. The rules of games were designed in such a way that democratic forces were declared incompetent and non-patriotic. The country's constitution was abrogated time and again by military generals. All the state institutions found themselves under military shadow and domination. The last military coup took place in 1999, when the country's army chief General Pervaiz Musharaf removed the democratically elected government and ruled the country with an iron hand for about nine years. He had to quit the power under a wave of strong public protest. However, during his long stay in power, certain vital amendments were made in the constitution for the regularization of the army's role in the governing system of the country. He supported several undemocratic traditions including 'floor crossing', 'change of political loyalties by the parliamentarians' just to keep his kings party in power to continue his military dictatorship. Such precedences truly damaged the traditions of true parliamentary democracy. This paper would analyse the actions of General Pervaiz Musharaf during his military tenure from 1999-2008. The paper would discuss how the grip of armed forces further strengthened in Pakistan as a result of Musharaf's action and democratic forces further suffered during his tenure.

Introduction

General Pervaiz Musharaf's coup on October 12, 1999 was the fourth one in the independent Pakistan. Previously General Muhammad Ayub Khan ruled the country for more than a decade (1958-69), General Yahya Khan remained the head of state for 1969 to 1971, where as General Zia-ul-Haq remained the president and chief of army staff from 1977 till his death in air crash in 1988.

It was general opinion that the democratic process that started with the departure of military dictator, Zia-ul-Haq, in 1988 would continue and that chances of any military take over were bleak. But unfortunately, the 90s saw political instability, social divisions and continuous fragmentation of society on sectarian basis,

ethnic conflict, upsurge of religious fundamentalism and perpetual political conflict between the two largest political parties. The fragile democratic period during 1988-99, witnessed scuttling of the political process by the partial, exploitative and partisan role of the army and presidents. All the four elected governments of the decade (1988-99) remained hostage to the army's covert and overt interference and its grip on the country's decision making process got further consolidated. A game of musical chairs was endorsed for a whole decade. Two prime ministers Benazir Bhutto & Nawaz Sharif used this fragility to become prime ministers twice. However, their average tenure did not cross more than twenty-four months. Between 1988 to 1999, elected governments were dismissed either by the establishment backed president or on the

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demand of the Pakistan army. Not a single government was permitted to complete its constitutional prescribed tenure. The serial dismissals of governments in 1988, 1990, 1993 and 1996 demonstrated the capricious manner in which the powerful president applied article 58(2) (b) of the constitution. This article introduced by General Zia-ul-Haq in 1986 through his constitutional amendments, made the presidency more powerful. This was in fact a major deviation from the true parliamentary system (Khan 1998). Now the president was empowered to dismiss the prime minister, his cabinet and to dissolve parliament without consulting the prime minister. It is a fact that each dismissal of the democratic government was at behest of military establishment. Every time, while dismissing the democratic government, odious corruption and personal charges were leveled against the politicians especially against leaders of existing government. The government propaganda machinery outrightly strutted by the military establishment labelled the politicians as the extreme corrupt elements of the society (Musharraf 2007).

During his second tenure of about two years (1996-99), ex-prime minister Nawaz Sharif stringently remained vindictive towards ex-prime minister Benazir Bhutto-his principal rival. Her husband Asif Ali Zardari remained behind bars for more than 8 years. Prime Minister Nawaz Sharif's policy of political victimization weekend the roots of democracy in the country and the political process drastically failed to strengthen its roots in the country. Nawaz Sharif after obtaining absolute majority in the parliament repealed the article 58(2) (b) from the constitution to remove the hanging sword. His constitutional amendments made it nearly impossible to remove the government while using any constitutional means. His iron hand rule discouraged dissident view even in his own party. This was the reason when General Musharraf took over the reins of power, there was a sigh of relief because the people were fed up with

the confrontation and lack of understanding between the leaders of two biggest political parties (Askari 2000).

After assuming power, on 12th October, 1999, General Musharraf acquired the title of 'Chief Executive' instead of chief martial law administrator. He also used the term "emergency" for his *defacto*, martial law regime, as proclamation of "emergency" is permitted in the 1973 constitution. During his address to the nation on 17th October he clearly declared his agenda which was not about the holding of immediate election, but restructuring of the country's political culture. He announced his seven point agenda for the nation.

- Rebuild national confidence and morals.
- Strengthen the federation, remove inter-provincial disharmony and restore national cohesion
- Revive the economy and restore investor's confidence.
- Ensure law and order and dispense speedy justice.
- Depoliticize state institutions.
- Devolve power to the grass root level.
- Ensure swift and across the board accountability.

For the fulfillment of his stated objectives, General Musharraf immediately initiated several reforms (Craig & Charles 2001).

General Musharraf's coup was challenged in the supreme court of Pakistan, which under the doctrine of necessity validated his action. Another encouraging achievement of Musharraf was that court mandated him three years to implement his seven points reformatory agenda and to hold election by October, 2002. General Musharraf took several crucial decisions, which had lasting imprints on the future of the country specially the democratic process (Ali 2000).

National Accountability Bureau Ordinance, 1999

In line with his seven point agenda, for ensuring swift and across the board accountability- National Accountability Bureau (NAB) Ordinance was promulgated by Pervaiz Musharaf on November, 16, 1999. A serving Lieutenant General from armoured corps of Pakistan army, previously having no experience to deal with any such issue was appointed as its chairman. As per its mandate NAB was to initiate the accountability process from January 1, 1985. NAB was authorized to carryout investigation, in all kinds of corruption cases, corrupt practices, default cases of banks, DFIs, government departments and taxes evasions and utility defaulters as well. All the cases dealt by NAB were declared non bailable and punishments prescribed for various crimes included imprisonment, heavy fines and disqualification from holding public offices and seeking loans from government sponsored financial institutions and confiscation of property made through illegal means. Serving armed forces personnel were exempted from the accounting process as existing military laws were considered appropriate to check any such financial buglings of army personnels. NAB law had a crucial provision of detention of accused for ninety days for investigation (Khan 2004).

Despite General Musharaf's motive behind the establishment of NAB, to carryout the transparent accountability process across the board and without any bias and prejudices, NAB became controversial from the *ibinito*. It was blamed for the creation of a so called king's party- PML-Q, as NAB stopped the participation of several candidates of the major political on the pretext of corruption, whereas it not only ignored but rather 'gave clean chits' to the members of king's party even from established corruption charges. In many incidences, political opponents were pressurized by the accountability bureau to join the government sponsored King's party or to face the corruption charges. With the

start of election process for the general election in August 2002, around one hundred top leaders of two major apposition parties PPP & PML-N were going through the investigation process started by NAB. At the same time not a single member of king's party PML-Q was under scrutiny. In some cases NAB officials were accused of even harassing family members of out spoken opposition parliamentarians (Nasir 2002).

Compared to his trample policy against opposition, General Musharaf's regime remained lenient to pro-military regime politicians. The most prominent beneficiary were Chaudry Shujaat and his family, who were defaulters of several banks and could have been disqualified if the process of accountability was implemented with neutrality. Under NAB's pressure, several opposition leaders including former chief ministers, federal and provincial ministers like Riaz Fatiana, Riaz Pirzada, Azam Hoti, Sardar Ghous Buksh Mehar, Liaquat Jatoi, Hamayun Akhtar, Faisal Saleh Hayat, Aftab Sherpao and many others left their own parties and joined PML-Q under distress. Those who refused to oblige the military regime had to suffer politically. This group includes ex-chief ministers, Sardar Mehtab Abbasi, Pir Sabir Shah, Syed Ghous Ali Shah and no less than the incumbent prime minister of Pakistan, Syed Yousuf Raza Gillani.

NAB ordinance entrusted its Chairman with huge powers. He was given discretionary powers to order investigations against any person and could close the case even without assigning any logical justification. He enjoyed powers to shift any case, pending before any court of law of the country to NAB's court. He had the powers to issue arrest warrants and also could freeze the property of any accused. All these powers actually derived for the assurance of transparent accountability in the country were used very crudely against political opponents of General Pervaiz Musharaf to change their loyalties or to face the consequences (Dawn September 1, 2009).

Cases of officers belonging to Pakistan armed forces of Pakistan were either ignored or later settled through bargain. One of the prominent case was of former naval chief, retired Admiral, Mansurul-Haq. Accused of grabbing huge kick backs in several defence deals, he was released by NAB in January, 2002 after returning a bargained amount of \$ 7.5 million (Newsline March, 2002).

Very soon it became vivid to the general public and specifically to politicians that the Musharaf regime was fully engaged in a deliberate and concentrated campaign for defaming and discrediting the politicians. In this regard, millions of rupees were spent for holding debates on television, newspapers special supplements, talks at different forums to further exaggerate the alleged corrupt practices of politicians. A four month long drama serial was telecast by the state controlled television to further discredit the political opponents. Due to such biased and partial actions, the credibility of accountability process through NAB became suspect in the eye of common man. General Musharaf's policy of blaming the mainstream political parties eventually tarnished the image of opponent politicians and immensely benefited the alliance of religious parties MMA (Muttahida Majlis-e-Amal) which emerged as major victorious party in the election general of 2002.

Devolution Plan

On October 17 1999, General Musharaf announced his plan to devolve powers at the grass roots level in the country. For its implementation, the local Government plan 2000 was launched on August 14, 2000. A confusing and complicated three- tier local government plan for every district across the country was to be introduced in different phases in next one year.

Introduction of new local government system by National Reconstruction Bureau (NRB) under its chairman, Tanvir Naqvi, another retired general and a close confidant of General

Musharaf, was not a new concept for Pakistan. Previously all the military generals had used this institution to sideline and undermine the importance of main stream political parties (Cohen 2005).

The devolution at the initial stage attracted the attention of policy makers and also gained some acceptance among different segments of society. It was propagated that the highly centralized bureaucratic system of governance had completely failed to deliver and hence it required to atone it by making this people friendly. The basic motive of devolution was to create an environment where common citizens' involvement in decision making process should be ensured. It was conceived that decentralization would be a more efficient and would develop prompt delivery system of governance in which common citizen would be empowered to play a direct role in the decision making in his day-to-day affairs for the provision of basic amenities at the local level (Khan 2004).

It was also claimed that a new people friendly system would bring vital difference into the centuries old brutal system of inhuman magisterial governance introduced by the British after the mutiny of 1857 to run the sub-continent through the iron fist of civil services (ICS) (Waseem 1994). In the new system *Nazim* (mayor) was made the epicenter of all powers previously delegated to several other departments of civil bureaucracy. It was also conceived that the new system would develop an inbuilt accountability mechanism and a transparency would be ensured at all levels while promoting a spirit of bigger understanding between the common men and the different institutions of the state.

The new local government plan 2000 was made operational through the promulgation of the local government ordinance issued by all four provincial governments in August 2001 on the direction of the Federal government. As a result of elections held in different phases, elected governments came into existence in 96 districts of the country. The country's

Federal capital was exempted from this election process. This was conspicuous since the new system was designed to fully address the genuine interests of common men. It was also proudly announced that an inbuilt system of checks and balances against the misuse and abuse of official authority was also being incorporated in it, to ensure neutrality and impartiality in the actions of Nazims (Musharraf 2006).

A vital feature of this newly introduced devolution system was that the district administration was now accountable to the elected *Nazim* of the district instead of the provincial or federal government. All the powers previously concentrated in the office of Deputy Commissioner, who virtually acted as the king of the district were decentralized and assigned to different departments. He was just to act as the coordinator of 14 different departments working at the district level. This some how, proved counter productive to the cause of democracy. No role for political parties in these elections held on non-parties basis, amounted to eliminating the public agenda from the campaign. Local bodies elections on non-party basis further reduced the role of the middle class in the election process, as it was not possible for any person of this class to contest elections without the support of any political party. In the end all the elected Nazims were traditional feudal or tribal chiefs, big industrialists or members of prominent and elite political families. Hardly any intellectual or professional could make it for himself in these elections. In several cases army the manveored to get its many candidates elected to the office of *Nazims*.

While unfolding his seven points agenda, General Musharaf had promised to balance the disharmony between the federating units and federal government by transferring certain functions to the provinces from the federal government, but development took place in the reverse direction. New local government system instead of empowering the provincial government created a fragile and weak relationship between the provincial and

district tiers of administration. The new local government system attempted administratively to detach the district from the provincial government by involving the federal government directly in district affairs. The plan instead of further strengthening the provinces, undermine their autonomy. This generated to a perpetual conflict and tension between local, provincial and federal governments (Iqbal April, 2003).

As these new district governments were getting their funds directly from the federal government for development work and meeting their administrative requirements, they simply turned down the advice of the provincial governments. General Musharaf himself made reckless, extreme and headlong use of the new district governments for his election to the presidency in a very controversial referendum held in May, 2002. Again this was not a new phenomenon; previously two military dictators General Ayub and General Zia had also used these institutions for their political survival (Laporte 2005).

Referendum 2002

The seven point agenda announced by General Musharaf on October 17, 1999, made it quite evident that he had a plan to stay in power for a longer time. For ensuring his stay, he announced his decision on 5th April, 2002 to seek a mandate as president for a regular tenure of five years through public referendum. Since general elections were supposed to be conducted before October, 2002 as per the direction of Supreme Court of Pakistan, Musharaf had two options with him. Either to get him elected through direct referendum before the general election or to follow the normal procedure defined under the constitution. For this purpose, he had to submit his candidature to the next elected assembly (Hussain July, 2002). Musharaf, being apprehensive of the next election, decided to bypass the constitutional means of getting elected as president. While selecting the path of referendum, he followed the precedences of two previous military dictators General Ayub Khan and General Zia-ul-Haq.

Presenting his candidature to the next assembly was quite dangerous and risky. Previously General Yahya had failed to get his candidature endorsed by the assembly established as a result of general election of 1970 (Hussain July, 2002).

After getting the endorsement of the Supreme Court for his proposed referendum, he launched a full fledged campaign to mobilize the general public. However, his referendum became highly controversial, from *abinitio*. The Army government arranged a series of mass rallies across the country. Huge fundings were allocated at the cost of tax payers, for these rallies. The mobilization of disinterested masses put an extra burden on the state machinery. Like previous military regimes, Musharaf's campaign was also fully promoted and supported by the majority of his hand picked 2, 50,000 councilors and *Nazims* of the local governments, since they were the undisputed beneficiaries of Musharaf's local government system and their survival was also at the mercy of his future. Federal government fully complemented the efforts of *Nazims* by openly using its authority and resources to make the referendum a successful event. Following the previous precedences, thousands of public and private transport vehicles were impounded to bring the audience for General Musharaf's rallies (Ahmed 2002).

The campaign was unprecedented due to several aspects. The participation of military officers was also quite visible. The overt partisan role of General Musharaf's appointed provincial governors and top military brass could be visualized from the conduct of the commander, 4 corps, in military outfit gracing the stage of General Musharaf's rally in Lahore on April 9, 2002. Some of the corps commanders allegedly indulged in seeking support of local influential people and tribal leaders for General Musharaf. The military's direct and firm support was glittering in the shape of participation of significant number of under-training and on duty soldiers of Pakistan army in civilian dress in the front rows of the

most of the public rallies. Initially, Musharaf himself appeared in the public meetings in his military uniform, which he had to discontinue under public pressure and strong criticism for involving army in politics (Ansari 2002).

The election of General Musharaf through referendum was vehemently opposed by all the major political parties except his own king's party. The government did not permit the opponents of the referendum to hold their public meetings. All unethical means were used to disrupt the even very small agitational gathering and rallies of the opposition. Majority of the agitating opposition leaders were taken into custody. The referendum campaign got a significant moral jerk when one member of the election commission (EC), Justice Tariq Mahmood resigned from EC. Justice Tariq Mahmood while resigning in protest called the referendum exercise illegal and beyond the mandate of the EC. However, General Musharaf continued with his campaign ignoring any consciousness of guilt (Akram May, 2002).

Despite utilizing all the state machinery public participation remained very low. For this purpose, several steps were taken to ensure a dignified turnout at the referendum day. Voter's age was abruptly reduced from 21 to 18 years. While deviating from the practice, polling day was not declared as public holiday, so as to ensure maximum participation of general public. Due to lack of interest of general public, polling stations and booths were taken to voters in government offices, hospitals, private firms, railway stations, bus stops and other crowded places. These actions affected the credibility of the referendum. All major newspapers reported irregularities on mass scale, blatant incidence of casting of multiple votes with state support from across the country (Hussain 2001).

Despite all doubts and allegations, General Musharaf ensured his future role in the country's politics for the next five years through the controversial referendum, before

the holding of general elections in October, 2002.

Legal Frame Work Order (LFO)

In its judgment of May, 2000, the Supreme Court had permitted Musharaf three years to complete his reformist agenda. He was also authorized to introduce essential amendments in the constitution requisite to achieve his agenda targets. This Supreme Court order is still debated as, to how the court, which itself has no prerogative to amend the constitution may entrust any military dictator with such wild, untamed and unauthenticated powers.

In August, 2002, prior to the holding of general elections, General Musharaf's National Reconstruction Bureau (NRB) published a 58-page draft document entitled 'Establishment of Sustainable Federal Democracy in Pakistan'. It suggested 78 amendments in 29 articles of the constitution of 1973. The proposal was drafted on the perception that in the absence of any meaningful checks and balances all executive powers had accumulated in the office of the Prime Minister (Hussain 2007).

Proposed Legal Frame Work (LFO) on the basis of NRB's suggested amendments envisaged wide ranging powers for the president. It authorized the president to nominate any member of the parliament as prime minister. He was empowered with vice-royal powers to dismiss any elected prime minister and his cabinet. No advice of the prime minister and his cabinet was required for the president's extreme action. He was authorized to appoint the provincial governors in his discretion and the governor too at liberty like the president, to nominate any member of the provincial assembly as chief minister. LFO, for the first time legalized the role of the army in the political affairs of the country in the shape of the establishment of National Security Council (NSC). The President was the chairman of this council (Niazi 2002).

He also made several crucial fundamental changes in the constitution. He declared himself as the elected president for

the next five years as a result of the controversial referendum discussed earlier which also extended his tenure as Chief of Army Staff for another term. He also revived article 58(2)(b) for dismissing the government and dissolving the national Assembly. A new Article 152-A was inserted for the creation of NSC. Amendments also authorized the president to appoint all services chiefs, judges of supreme and high courts (Asghar 2003).

Such controversial amendments incorporated through LFO reflected that the amended constitution would be heavily in favour of a presidential form of government. Through LFO, General Musharaf validated all the previous acts and decrees of his government. LFO massively altered the parliamentary status of 1973 constitution into a quasi-presidential-cum-quasi military form of government. LFO not only axed the parliament's supremacy but also made it an obedient and fidelitant institution which was the negation of the normal democratic traditions (Khan 2009).

The amended constitutional and political provisions through LFO, reflects that in the coming set up civilian leadership and the parliament would have no choice but to eat humble pie by accepting the working parameters set out by the military government of General Pervaiz Musharaf. Such amendments of crucial nature which changed the shape of the constitution of Pakistan faced denunciation from all quarters. The EU observers group in its final reports observed that the parliamentary system had been weakened by the concentration of power in the hands of president. Constitutional amendments introduced through LFO badly distorted the parliamentary character of the constitution. Human Rights Watch, a New York based organization too criticized General Musharaf for his action for undermining the authority of parliament and also various methods adopted to maneuver the election results. International Crisis Group (ICG) also came out with its comprehensive document, accusing the government of tilting the

balance of power in favour of the president, resulting in the deforming of the parliamentary character of the constitution. In its report, ICG made a very bold and uncompromising observation that 'Musharaf's road map to democracy was in reality a blueprint for continuing military rule in the country' (ICG 2002).

Election Campaign and General Musharaf

General Musharaf announced reforms under LFO which provided his king's party an edge over other political parties. The entire opposition expressed its serious reservations and distrust in the whole election process. There was general consensus in the country that these elections are just a move to engender a civilian faced junta in the name of a democracy. Both before and during the campaign, military regime kept on issuing such minimizing decrees and policies which aimed at minimizing the activities of the opposition political parties and overtly supporting his own king's party (Akbar 2002).

Military government used NAB as a harassing tool against important candidates of the opposition parties. They were blackmailed and harassed to change their loyalties. Both the major parties, PPP & PML-N, were forced to contest these elections without their leadership. Benazir Bhutto and Nawaz Sharif were not allowed to return to the country from exile. This benefited religious fundamentalist parties to capture considerable seats in these elections (Ahmed 2002)

The elections in 2002 under General Musharaf were marred by controversy for all kinds of rigging and fraud. Throughout the election campaign, the military regime was blamed for using the state machinery resources and bureaucracy for the success of the pro-regime parties. *Nazims*, who were previously elected with the support of the army was given ample fundings for diverting in the favour of military backed candidates. Civil bureaucracy and police were issued with resolute instructions to mobilize support for the candidates of the pro-regime lobby.

On refusal several bureaucrats were immediately replaced. Number of foreign groups and agencies including Asian network for free elections (ANFREL) Common-Wealth, EU election observation mission to Pakistan (EUEOM) expressed their doubts on the credibility of the election results (Waseem 2006).

The military regime with its all efforts eventually succeeded in getting desirable results in these elections. The army planned for a hung parliament, as emergence of any single huge party mandate could invite difficulties for General Musharaf. Despite all election engineering, the military's king's party, PML-Q failed to get the minimum required strength of parliamentarians to form its government. General Musharaf used the army's intelligence agencies and NAB indulged themselves to encourage the parliamentarians of the opposition to shift their loyalties to the government alliances. After hectic efforts, General Musharaf ultimately succeeded in denting PPP, by purchasing the loyalties of ten of its members. Most of them were threatened by the NAB either to join the king's party or to face enquiries and live their remaining lives behind bars. Not only were they exonerated from the enquiries, but also rewarded with cabinet portfolios as to attract others parliamentarians to join treasury benches. The act was denounced by the PPP terming it horse trading. This move aspersed the regime's boast about the restoration of genuine democracy in the country. All these disgraceful acts exposed the dark side of Pakistani politics and politicians shedding old loyalties and joining the government either to enjoy the authority or to escape the accountability process (Zaidi 2002).

After the elections, Musharaf took oath the of the office of President on 16 November, 2002 to become the constitutional head of the state, while retaining the authority the Chief of Army Staff with additional powers to dissolve the parliament and sack elected government. This swearing in of an army chief as

president, while bypassing the well defined constitutional path was justified on the pretext of winning the already discussed controversial referendum. The oath to president cum army chief was administered when his own electoral college (Senate National and Provincial Assemblies) had not yet taken the oath (Hussain 2002).

For the next five years, President Musharaf used all tools of victimization against his political opponents. Heads of the both political parties and ex-prime ministers, Nawaz Sharif and Benazir Bhutto, were forced to remain in exile. Other opposition politicians were harassed and arrested on different pretext. Such undemocratic practices further deteriorated the political culture of the country. President Musharaf himself could not continue with the prime minister. In five years tenure (2002-2007), he changed three prime ministers, which reflected the immaturity of the system he developed (Syed 2002).

General Musharaf's Plan for another term

After completing his five years tenure while holding dual offices of the chief of army staff and president, he planned to contest for another tenure of the presidency (2007-2012) while retaining the charge of chief of army staff. It was announced by the president's house that he would seek re-election in uniform, between September 15 and October 15. It was a clear violation of constitution to hold dual offices and also breach of General Musharaf's previous promise about shedding his uniform in December, 2004. His candidature for presidency while holding the office of the chief of army staff was challenged in the Supreme Court of Pakistan. The court instead of giving its final verdict, conditionally permitted the holding of presidential election, but the result would not be notified till the final verdict on petition challenging the eligibility of General Musharaf was announced (Naqvi 2007).

After getting interm authorization for the holding of election for the presidency from the court, the second hurdle for him

was how to tackle the opposition parties in the parliament especially, the PPP. There was a possibility that all opposition members could resign from national and provincial assemblies, so that the Electoral College would not be completed. To overcome this problem, General Musharaf entered into a deal with main opposition leader Benazir Bhutto. After a long pain taking process of negotiations between General Musharaf's team and PPP's negotiators, National Reconciliation ordinance 2007 (NRO), was promulgated on October 5, 2007. Main aim of the ordinance was to give immediate relief to the PPP chairperson; inter alia, other people could also benefit. After the promulgation of NRO, it became possible for Benazir Bhutto to return Pakistan on October 18, 1999. Key feature of NRO stipulated that all cases registered against holders of public offices during period January 1, 1986 to October 12, 1999 would be deemed to have been withdrawn. Furthermore, such persons shall not be liable for any action in future as well for acts done in good faith before the said date (Hussain 2002).

This compromise deal benefited both General Musharaf as well as Benazir Bhutto equally. But General Musharaf's ordinance was challenged in the Supreme Court, where his case for eligibility was already pending. The court's gesture was indicative of the fact that NRO may be declared null and void and so it could be set aside. This situation could deprive General Musharaf's plan to get re-elected as president for the next tenure.

To stop the Supreme Court from further proceeding in his eligibility case, he imposed "Emergency" in the country on November 3, 2007. It stopped the court from normal functioning. He dismissed the entire judiciary and reinducted only those judges who supported his candidature and endorsed his notorious NRO (Dawn, November 5, 2007). All the judges who refused to take fresh oath of loyalty to General Musharaf were placed under house arrest along with the protesting opposition leaders. Trampling restrictions were placed on the electronic media and transmission of all news channels

was banned in the country for about a month, until things were 'brought under the control' of General Musharaf (Hussain 2007).

Despite confirmation and validation as President for second term (2007-12) by his own maneuvered Supreme Court, normalization of his relation with the largest and most popular opposition party- PPP of Benazir Bhutto, Musharaf was still reluctant to put away his uniform. This could only become possible when the US, Common Wealth and other European countries publicly refused to recognize him as president in army uniform. While expressing disappointment on the development taking place in Pakistan, a clear message was given by these influential external forces that "Pakistan's military ruler had not honored a commitment made by him two years ago to give up his role as chief of the army". There were indications that in case of further delay on the uniform issue, serious political crisis could erupt in the country and internationally the country could be isolated. This factor forced General Musharaf to relinquish his army position on November 28, 2007 and announce election schedule in the country, which were to be held on January 5, 2008 under the supervision of his hand picked caretaker government. The general elections held few weeks behind the earlier announced schedule on February 18, 2008 due to the assassination of Benazir Bhutto were not transparent (Schmid 2009). Several observers including Free and Fair Election Network (FAFEN) came up with their conclusions that the fairness of general elections was compromised. Despite General Musharaf's best efforts he could not manage this time an identical hung and puppet parliament as he did in 2002. This generated a permanent rift between him and the new parliament. The upcoming parliament decided to impeach president Musharaf. Provincial and national assemblies adopted resolutions demanding immediate resignation of the president.

President Musharaf, who often vowed never to run away from a fight, surrendered to his political foes on August

18, 2008 by tendering his resignation from presidency to escape the humiliation of impeachment, making way for Pakistan's transition to a full parliamentary democracy after a lengthy military dictatorship (The News August 19, 2008). He became the second military dictatorship to resign under public pressure. The end of his nine year rule marked a historical success for the country's political forces that sought his ouster. The acceptance of defeat by Pakistan's fourth military ruler without a promised fight in a bitter power struggle with a fledgling coalition government triggered nation wide celebrations (Dawn 22 August, 2008).

Conclusion

General Pervaiz Musharaf's October 12, 1999 military takeover was the fourth coup in the history of Pakistan. He was the only military dictator who did not claim that his coup was for the holding of fair transparent elections in the country, rather he envisaged a detailed seven point agenda in his second address to the nation after five days of his takeover. He got three years leverage from the Supreme Court to implement his agenda. He was authorized to even amend the constitution for achieving his targets. While taking copious gain from this mandate he brought very significant changes in the constitution of Pakistan.

The common mass including several liberal and progressive elements and opposition forces initially lended their full support to his agenda, as it seemed that he was very much sincere in implementing his reforms. But very soon Musharaf also started following the precedents of his predecessor military rulers. Despite devolution of powers at the district level the major issue of power transfer from centre to provinces remained unaddressed. Provincial autonomy was severely effected when their constituent district governments started working under federal government. Elections for those local bodies were also conducted by the Election Commission of Pakistan, which was also a federal organization. Hence, this transfer of power became meaning less. Musharaf claimed that elections at the grassroots level

would provide the middle class an opportunity to engender its role in the country's politics. Elections results authenticated that same elite and traditional feudal and industrialist families, succeeded in grabbing and controlling the local bodies system.

General Musharaf's agenda of accountability after few initial gains, became a tool of victimization against political opponents. NAB and intelligence agencies used blackmailing and harassing tactics to win support for king's party after 2002 election.

His referendum attempt in 2002 to get elected through direct vote, was also a vivid infringement of the constitution. Senior military commanders also involved themselves in politics by attending these referendum rallies. Billions of rupees from the government treasury were wasted on this campaign.

Before holding the general election in 2002, General Musharaf brought vital amendments in the constitution which drastically undermined the authority of parliament and prime minister and made the presidency the epicenter of powers. He always relied on National Security Council (NSC), which legalized the political role of army.

General Musharaf's action harassed the leadership of two mainstream political parties, which left the field open for religious / radical parties. Some reports authenticate that the army played a role in the victory of religious parties and eventually they successfully established their governments in two provinces. General Musharaf- despite his tall claims of promoting a clean and sustainable democracy encouraged the worst kind of horse trading for ensuring the return of his own king's party to power. All these political developments of General Musharaf's regime transpired that there was a wide gulf between his claim and what really happened in the country.

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Nepal's Dilemma: Concerns of India

Saurabh

Abstract

The current impasse in Nepal is not a peace process with warring sides, but an effort to make a multi-party democracy functional. It is not a question of who wins or who loses. It is a question of how much common ground can be found and how the Maoists can make the transition to become a political party and part of a workable multi-party democratic process. It is clear that Nepal is passing through a critical juncture. At this stage of crisis, sensitivity of all sides of Nepalese society can get sharper.

Nation-building Process

Nepal is passing through a very critical period of its nation building process. The continued impasse between the different political parties has not only affected the constitution making process but also made the socio-economic conditions of the people very vulnerable. The social, economic and governance factors have a strong bearing on the country's internal security. Groups clash when the interests clash or one's interests are negated at the cost of others. Most of the social indicators, including literacy, birth rate, death rate, life expectancy, malnourishment of populations are still at a low level. The logical end of the peace process and the making of a new inclusive constitution with restructuring of the state, are the two important issues facing Nepal. Nepal needed to have a national government of all major political parties otherwise it would be difficult to have a new constitution. It would be in the bottom quartile of the 48 Least Developed Countries in the world today.

Political 'Deadlock'

The constitution making process in Nepal has entered into the most decisive phase. All the parties were agreed to

complete the writing of the constitution by May 28, 2010. But, it's still a dream because the apathy of the Maoists leadership in the drafting of the workable constitution for the country. The Chairman of UCPN-Maoist Pushpa Kamal Dahal 'Prachanda' said his party was preparing to make the draft of the statute proposed by the Maoists public on May 29, 2010. Prachanda clarified that his party was not going to declare the constitution from the streets but would only make its draft of the constitution public. Standing Committee members of the Unified CPN-Maoist were divided on extending the term of the Constituent Assembly with or without fulfilling the conditions by the government. The politburo meeting of the party had decided to put forth two conditions to extend the Constitution Assembly's term; firstly, amendment to the interim constitution to return to the politics of consensus to form the government and secondly, the resignation of incumbent government. The coalition government has registered a bill seeking extension of the Constituent Assembly's deadline in the parliament.

The Maoist Factor

The Maoists in Nepal are organized under the Communist Party of Nepal

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(Maoists). The important leaders of the party are its general secretary Pushpa Kamal Dahal alias Prachanda and Baburam Bhattarai. The movement actually started from the remote and underdeveloped western and mid-western regions, including Rolpa, Rukum, Jajarkor, Salyan, and Gorkha districts. This was directly influenced by the Naxalite movement that originated in the nearby Indian location of Naxalbari. When Pushpa Kamal Dahal became the Prime Minister, there was a lot of hope in Nepal but there were attacks on bureaucracy, media, judiciary and religious institutions and lastly the sacking of Chief of the Army Staff in the name of the civilian supremacy. Prime Minister Dahal would have realized that the appointing authority in the present constitution is the President and hence the Cabinet should have forwarded the matter to the President. The main political party in the last election was UML (Unified Marxist-Leninist), which won 69 as an alternative to the NC, which had won maximum of the 110 out of 205 seats. The Maoist groups like the United Peoples Front (UPF) contested 69 seats and could win only 9 with 4.83 per cent of total votes polled. The Nepal Workers and Peasants Party contested 30 seats and won only 2 seats and 1.25 percent of total votes polled. It shows that at least till this election, the Maoist movement did not get any popular support in Nepal.

The Unresolved Conflict

The present crisis in Nepal is a reflection of the unresolved conflict in Nepal; between the discarded feudal order and the inclusive, democratic, new Nepal. Both the Maoists and the army suffer from a sense of inferiority vis-à-vis each other because neither could the army defeat the Maoists nor could the Maoists capture power through their 'peoples' war. However, under the peace process, both the Peoples Liberation Army (PLA) and the Nepal Army (NA) have been treated equally under the provisions of Comprehensive Peace Accord, Interim Constitution and UN Mission in Nepal guidelines. This has emboldened the PLA but left the army resentful, because

under the peace process, the Nepali army had to be 'restructured' and 'democratized'.

The present government in Nepal is a legitimate government, but it lacks credibility. The task confronting it, i.e., of constitution-making, is a difficult one and it may be beyond its achievement. Therefore, Nepal needs a national government and there is a need to work on the basis of consensus. On May 23, 2009, new government was formed under the leadership of Madhav Kumar Nepal following the resignation of Pushpa Kamal Dahal. The new government of Mr. Nepal was formed as a coalition of many political parties in Nepal including the CPN (UML), Nepali Congress, Madhesi Party and others. The Maoists, who won 38 percent of the seats, are not taking part in the proceedings of the government though they express their commitment to democracy. In a sense, a stalemate continued in Nepal.

Politics of 'Consensus'

The term 'politics of consensus' is a very popular one in Nepal. However, consensus is probably a term most used, misused and abused in the present-day political lexicon in Nepal. Political consensus continues to be an elusive concept in today's Nepal. Today of a "Trust deficit" prevails between the political parties, Maoists and the army. Perhaps, the breakdown of consensus and trust deficit were inherent in the lack of commitment and sincerity on the part of all the major players on important issues involved in Nepal's peace process and the building of a new Nepal.

People's War in the Name of 'Ideology'

Maoists believe in changing the political status quo through violence and terror directed against the state and the social elite. They describe 'the principal aim of the armed struggle as the capture of political power of the people. Maoists were once a part of the mainstream politics. Hailing from the extreme left political ideology, they had not joined the United Left Front during the democratic movement of 1990, which had established the multi-party system in Nepal.

The United People's Front of Nepal (UPFN) was its political front. The Maoists' leadership has cleverly used the different stock of Nepalese population as their base for the ongoing movement. The Maoists have set up various liberation fronts for each major ethnic group to organize it exclusively on ethnic lines.

'General Strike' as a Weapon

Political turmoil continues to manifest itself across the country in a relentless series of strikes in which all facilities, including transport, government offices, private businesses, schools, hospitals and markets, are shut down and highways are blocked. In a continuation of a pattern established from 1996-2006, Maoist insurgencies, bandhs are used by political parties, student groups, trade unions and other interest groups to highlight various demands for action or redress. Maoist Chairman Pushpa Kamal Dahal said on the last public strike that the six-day strike was only a rehearsal. "We put off the agitation for the time being to make further preparations and to give respite to the people. We will put on the real show in the days to come." The Maoists have withdrawn their indefinite strike following intense international pressure, on the day that Nepal's professional organisations and businesses staged a mammoth peace rally in Kathmandu and as resistance spread across the country. In the last general strike, it became clear that the Maoists are fast losing their initial charisma and mobilizing capability because of the violence they have perpetrated on the innocent, the forced conscription they have practiced, and increasing criminalization of the movement.

Nepal Army and the Peace-building

The combatants' induction into the security forces is a major issue that Nepal faces. Civilian supremacy over the army is an important issue but in the process the army should not be humiliated. There are various claims about the number of Maoist combatants ranging from 5,000 to 19,000. The Army in Nepal literally has not had a

test of fighting guerrilla warfare. The political situation and the command mechanism always kept the army confined to the barracks. The Maoists and the Nepal army have fought an internal war and have divergent interests. The controversy vis-a-vis Chief of the Army Staff and the fall of the government was not an isolated incident. There is a backdrop of relationships that were deteriorating between the Maoists and other actors, which contributed to the trust deficit and the crisis.

The past record of the Army especially with regard to mistakes and excesses committed, raised the issue of accountability. The Nepal Army must be regarded as the national army vis-a-vis the Maoist combatants and there can be no suggestion that there should be parity. Looking to the future, there are possibilities of a right-wing departure for which elements in Nepal Army will be more than amenable. It is believed that smooth execution of the integration issue will make the Maoists stronger and more coherent. This objective of weakening the Maoists being even dearer to the other political parties, the army will also get their ready support. Therefore, there is a convergence between the Nepali Army and the political parties against the Maoists. The old royalist network of political vested interests operating beyond and across the party loyalties and institutional affiliations has been activated to provoke and pressurise the Maoists.

Hegemonic Democratic Centralism

The Maoists do not want to establish a one party state; they want to infiltrate all state institutions with their personnel and try to establish some kind of hegemonic rule under a broad multi-party framework. Since other parties are not able to compete with the Maoists politically, they rely on outside forces like army, and to certain extent on India to check them. There is an increasing presence and influence of criminals and extortion in the Maoist movement. It is becoming difficult for the Maoists to monitor and control the large-scale extortion that is

going on in the name of the Maoist movement.

CCOMPOSA: Making South Asia 'Red'

Naxalite groups all over South Asia announced the formation of a Coordination Committee of Maoist Parties and Organizations of South Asia (CCOMPOSA) in July 2001. This was the first formal regional partnership among Maoist parties. CCOMPOSA has been launched to unify and coordinate the revolutionary process in the region. Not only the extreme left parties of India and Nepal, but even the like-minded parties of Bangladesh, Sri Lanka, and Pakistan are members of the organization. The CCOMPOSA comprises not only the Peoples War Group, Maoists Communist Centre, Revolutionary Communist Centre of India (Maoist) from India but also the Purba Bangla Sarbahara Party and Bangladesh Samaywadi Party (ML) and Communist of Ceylon (Maoist) from Sri Lanka.

Fear Psychosis in Nepal

A tremendous sense of fear, anxiety and suspicion has been injected by the violence and torture in an otherwise very well-knit Nepalese society. This would certainly damage the traditional and deep-rooted spirit of community living in the villages and hill terrain. Politically, a village society today remains largely fragmented into different forces and groups, like pro-monarchy, pro-democracy, led by national political parties and pro-Maoists. Unfortunately, all these torch-bearing groups have different agendas, diverse directions, dissimilar thinking, and dispersed approaches.

Continuous Paralyzing Economy

The economic growth rate suffered very badly as the agriculture sector grew around 1.5 per cent for some years. As tourism in Nepal has been hit hard due to constant instability and violence, and as Kathmandu is the only foreign capital which has direct air link with Lhasa, China would have to look for alternative arrangements to bring in tourists to Tibet. Additionally, trade

between the Tibet Autonomous Region and Nepal, which was witnessing a huge upsurge till recently, could quickly dwindle, affecting Chinese businesses as border towns become susceptible to violence. The government considered investment in security expenses as 'investment in peace'. In fact, besides the social services-related expenditure, defence and internal security recorded the highest growth rate of over 25 per cent during the last five years.

The loan repayment and interest components are already very high in the regular expenditure. Any pressure on the interest and loan components will drastically jack up the regular expenditure, thereby severely distracting the economy from the development process. The external borrowing will have its own conditionalities, particularly when there is a widespread apprehension about the ability of the Nepalese authorities to direct the resources to productive areas. Even in case of foreign aid, though reconstruction and rebuilding funds may be extended by the donor agencies in very near future, they would definitely attach harsh conditionalities, particularly in the arena of governance and efficient utilization. Internal borrowing would also adversely affect the fiscal deficit, which is already on the higher side. There could thus be a sharp rise in the level of unemployment. The inflationary tendency which could creep in the very near future may also affect the poverty alleviation-related activities in the economy, and also could further the already fragile competitive base of the Nepalese products in the international market.

Potential Ground for another 'Great Game' in South Asia

Increased interest of Western powers including the US and the UK in increasing the efficiency of the army, providing the soldiers with training and supplying sophisticated armoury can elevate the standard of the conflict and make Nepal another area of the great game in the South Asian region after Afghanistan. Already, the need of 'mediation' or 'facilitation' between the government and the Maoists to end the

humanitarian cataclysm is being mooted either through the auspices of the UN, thereby opening a new vista of tremendous challenge to India's long-term strategic leverage in Nepal. India is being asked to join such committees in Nepal dealing with political and security matters, along with development and economic reconstruction. India is naturally reluctant to do so, because that would curtail the strategic space enjoyed by India in its neighbouring countries like Nepal, and qualitatively change India's relations with these countries to its disadvantage.

American involvement in Nepal adds to worries, as the Americans are already in Afghanistan and some Central Asian Republics, apart from their military presence in the Taiwan Straits and the Korean peninsula. The US presence in Nepal may be of potential advantage if China has to be contained on its vulnerable western flanks, particularly the Tibet region. The facts that the CIA carried out a subversive war until 1974 against China in the Mustang region, an area presently affected by the Maoist insurgency, is not without significance in this respect. There is no doubt that China will have high stakes in a chaotic and confused Nepal. China is always appreciated for its continuous help to Nepal. The Maoists too have never criticized China's role in Nepal. But, China would definitely not want the Maoist-rebellion to spread into the mountainous districts, specially Manang, Mustang, and Dopl, with high plateaux and ethnic Tibetan population. Otherwise there will be danger of Nepalese crossing over to Tibet in search of safety and livelihood. The Chinese central leadership relies on a slow, steady approach to changes around the region.

Their diplomacy is famous for its reserve, grandeur, hospitality, and suaveness, which, generally, perplexes the other side as to what they are actually thinking and planning. This will give a dramatic advantage to Beijing's geopolitical position on the continent while causing major problems for India. Whether the future Nepal

government becomes Maoist or not, the government will likely lean toward Beijing and will allow for establishment of Chinese surveillance and listening posts that would position China's forces close to New Delhi and other vital Indian centers. It would also help China gain geo-strategic leverage over not only India but also larger areas from Central Asia. American involvement in Nepal in the context of increased violence and human rights violations is a cause of serious concern. Although the Chinese have officially said that they have found no proof, but they would want to keep extra vigil in this regard.

India's Dilemma

The domestic processes in Nepal often create concern in India, principally because India and Nepal share a long open border, free movement across the border, and open and free trade between the two countries. China also looms large as a factor in India-Nepal relations, given the common boundary between China and Nepal and their mutually expanding relationship. In the context of the Naxalite violence in India, there are often apprehensions expressed in the Indian media about its linkage with Nepal. On the other hand, there are many positive and deep-rooted linkages that bind the two countries: history, geography, culture, religion, language, traditions and so on. On the other hand, India, in fact, has been bastion of political mobilization of Maoist ideologues and followers, which had been done under the banner of the Akhila Bharatiya Nepali Keta Manch since the early 1980s. This Mancha consolidated bastion in terms of financial, logistic, intellectual, and physical support to the present Maoist movement in Nepal. India wants the peace process to come to a logical end. India wants working relationship with Maoists. Unfortunately, India has placed itself in a rather difficult predicament in Nepal. To the Maoist leaders, India is going all out to help the Government of Nepal, while to the elite of Kathmandu, India is not doing enough to help bring back normalcy.

Nepal has, in the past, and still receives, a good package of aid from India in the sectors of road and railway line construction, health, I, water resources management, education etc. There are approximately 60,000 Nepalese serving in the Indian Army, along with 115,000 pensioners dependent on the military pension branch at the Indian Embassy in Nepal. The annual remittances, plus the pensionary and welfare grants, total well over 1,000 crores in Indian currency, which has undoubtedly been a great help to the Nepalese economy.

India's Insecurity

As the Maoists in Nepal are now collaborating with some other separatist movements such as the Khumbuwan Liberation Front in the far eastern hills, the possibility of involvement of separatist movements in the northeast with that of Maoists will endanger Indian security, especially in the sensitive 'Chicken's Neck' area near Siliguri in India where a narrow strip of Indian territory links the northeast with the rest of India. The Nepalese Maoists are also attempting to establish a network in North Bengal and Sikkim. Their imperative is to develop a nexus with the PWG which is trying to build a safe corridor from Bihar to Nepal through Burdwan and north Dinajpur districts.

If the insurgency is going to spread into the Terai, as in the Bheri zone which adjoins Bahraich district of India, or even to districts like Achham which is just one district away from the Indo-Nepal border, the entire Indo-Genetic plan can be seriously affected. Maoists are believed to have obtained a large amount of sophisticated weapons from India's People's War Group. The insurgency-affected areas of Nepal in Kanchanpur, Kailali, Bardia, and other districts of the Terai are close to New Delhi – closer than any insurgency-hit area in the whole of India, and therefore, this raises concerns about India's vulnerability. If the terrorists of the North-East establish some kind of link with Afghanistan and the Golden Triangle and Mekong Valley and the state of Malacca in the east and the LTTE further

south, terrorism will pose a great threat. As most Afghan warlords are now fighting in Jammu and Kashmir, one cannot rule out the possibility of their expanding links with insurgents in western Nepal.

The growing association of the insurgents of the region with the Nepalese Maoists and with ULFA, while posing a security threat to India, may also pave the way for the one hundred thousand idle Bhutanese refugees to get motivated for a decisive insurrection against Thimpu. There were reports that Thimpu actually used ULFA to flush out the Lhotsampas in the early 1990s. It is sheer luck that a nexus between the refugees and the Maoists hasn't yet been established, but that could simply be a question of time, as the Maoists have already made an entry into Nepal's eastern districts of Sankhuwasabha, Khotang, and Jhapa. It is in Jhapa where most of the refugee camps are situated. This district is also close to the strategic 'Chicken's Neck' area where a tiny piece of Indian Territory (Siliguri and New Jalpaiguri) separates the conflict-torn states of Assam, Tripura, Nagaland, and Manipur from the rest of India. If the rebellion spreads into this region, the entire area, which already harbours one of South Asia's worst and longest-standing insurgencies, can literally go up in flames.

Conclusion

The current impasse in Nepal is not a peace process with warring sides, but an effort to make a multi-party democracy functional. It is not a question of who wins or who loses. It is a question of how much common ground can be found and how the Maoists can make the transition to become a political party and part of a workable multi-party democratic process. It is clear that Nepal is passing through a critical juncture. At this stage of crisis, sensitivity of all sides of Nepalese society can get sharper. It is up to the skill and political management of different sides to handle this, because the cost of mishandling will be too great. There is a need for more debate on a range of issues in an open manner. Political stability,

federalization and democratization are dependent on stability of the country. Consensus or willingness of all the parties to work together is an important factor. Whether it can be achieved in today's Nepal remains to be seen. A chaotic, messy, and politically confused Nepal can never be in the interest of anyone. Rather, a prosperous, stable, and friendly Nepal can be an asset for the entire region.

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Ethnic Divide and Emergence of the Tamil Question in Sri Lanka: A Historical Perspective

Santhosh Mathew and Byju P Babu

Abstract

Sri Lanka, a small island state located off the southern coast of India, has been undergoing a critical phase in its history. It has been experiencing inter-ethnic conflicts and wars since the 1980s in an intensified form. Though multi-ethnicity is the feature of Sri Lankan society, there has been a stiff religious and linguistic congruence among the two largest ethnic groups, Sinhalese and Tamils. The ethnic polarisation consequent upon the state-led policies of discrimination led to perpetual conflicts in the Sri Lankan society. The conflict that has plagued Sri Lanka since the country gained independence revolves around the Tamil campaign for a separate state in the northern and eastern parts of the country. The genesis of this struggle could be located in the Tamil resentment of the State policies that were introduced during the 1950s, 1960s and 1970s in an attempt to 'rectify' ethnic discrimination that the majority community felt they had been subjugated to under British colonial period. Ethnic groups have their own languages. Except for the northern and eastern provinces of Sri Lanka, all the remaining seven provinces have a high concentration of Sinhalese majority numerically. Sri Lanka's most important problem of survival has been due to its ethnic divide manifested in linguistic and cultural terms. The crux of the Sri Lankan conflict is the struggle by the Tamil minority for their rights and political autonomy. The language question, discrimination in jobs, university admissions and colonisation etc caused widespread protests and civil war. This article is an attempt to explore the history of the ethnic divide.

The nature and dynamics of conflicts, peace initiatives and recent events in Sri Lanka has stirred a renewed academic and domestic and international political interest on ethnic conflict in Sri Lanka. The developments in Sri Lanka proved that violent means both by the state or the extremist groups were not a perpetual solution to the ethnic conflicts.

The Tamil question in Sri Lanka, which has had a direct bearing on the country's domestic stability and peace for long, has transformed itself into one of the

major conflict-resolution challenges in South Asia. The underlying causes and the long-term consequences of the ethnic violence—between the Tamils and Sinhalese, as well as the state-sponsored programmes to alienate the Tamils—need to be examined in a historical perspective before analysing the post-Accord scenario of conflict-resolution in Sri Lanka. This paper, therefore, seeks to place the ethnic polarisation in Sri Lanka in its politico-historical context by bringing in the cultural and economic dimensions of the Tamil-Sinhalese antagonism.

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Both the Sinhalas and the Tamils are believed to have their historical roots in different parts of India (de Silva 1998; Chandraprema 1991; Gunaratna 1990). The former claimed that their ancestors were the Aryans of north India, and the Tamils insisted that their forefathers were the Dravidians of south India (Singh 1988: 8-11). To establish their roots of ancestry, each of them try to bring in their own legends and history. Buddhist mythology says that the Sinhala race was founded by Vijaya, the son of a ruler of a north Indian State. Exiled by his father, Vijaya is believed to have arrived at the island Ceylon in 500 BC, with a band of 700 companions (de Silva 1982: 156). They belonged to the Aryan race. Vijaya, with the help of local tribesmen—the original inhabitants of the island—established a kingdom which he named as Sinhala. The successors of Vijaya and his companions are known as Sinhalas. He and his companions followed Buddhism. During the time of Vijaya, Gautama Buddha visited the island thrice, and this paved the way for spreading (and the acceptance) of Buddhism as their religion.

The Tamils, on the other hand, claimed that they had inhabited the island much before the arrival of Vijaya and that Buddhism had come to the island long after King Vijaya's reign. According to them, a Tamil kingdom already existed in Anuradhapura named Elara at that time. Elam, the name of home land the Tamils claim, was derived from this Elara. However, the dispute about who inhabited the island first remains and gets wider dimensions in the context of the worsening ethnic conflict.

Besides the Sri Lankan Tamils, there were Indian Tamils who were the successors of the south Indian Tamils. They were brought to Sri Lanka by the British during the colonial rule to work in their plantations

(Senewiratne 1986: 232-33). But there is no clear evidence about the ancestors of Moors, another section of Sri Lankan population. They are found predominantly in the eastern coast, in the major trading towns along the western coast and in the hill country (Oberst 1989: 177). The Tamils are concentrated mainly in the north and eastern provinces, while the Sinhalas occupied the rest of the country.

Till the fifteenth century, there were Sinhala kingdoms in the south and east of Sri Lanka. But, in 1505, the Portuguese came to the island and set up trading posts and, later, they expanded these into colonies. In the following century, the Dutch ousted the Portuguese from these places. However, neither the Portuguese nor the Dutch could ever penetrate deep into the mainland. By the end of the eighteenth century the British expelled the Dutch and established their sway (Sieghart 1984: 4-5). By making treaties and agreements with the local kings, the British expanded their control all over the country.

Sri Lanka: Nature of Society

The Sinhalese people are the largest ethnic group in the nation, composing approximately 81.9 per cent of the total population. Tamils are concentrated in the north, east, central and western provinces of the country. The Tamils who were brought as indentured labourers from India by British colonists to work on estate plantations, nearly 50 per cent of whom were repatriated following independence in 1948, are called 'Indian Origin' Tamils. They are distinguished from the native Tamil population that has lived in Sri Lanka since ancient times. According to 2001 census, Indian Tamils makeup 5.1 per cent of the Sri Lankan population and, Sri Lankan Tamils 4.3 per cent (Sri Lanka 2005). This figure

only accounted for Sri Lankan Tamils in government-controlled areas, not those in rebel-held territories. The earlier statistics say that the Tamils (both Sri Lankan and Indian) constitute 18.3 per cent while Sinhalese form 74 per cent. There is a significant population (8.0 per cent) of Moors, who trace their lineage to Arab traders and immigrants from the Middle East. Their presence is concentrated in the cities and the central and eastern provinces. There are also small ethnic groups such as the Burghers (of mixed European descent) and Malays from Southeast Asia. Sinhala is the language spoken by the Sinhalese. Tamils and a majority of Muslims speak the Tamil language. The four main religions practiced in Sri Lanka are Buddhism (69 per cent), Hinduism (15.5 per cent, Islam (7.6 per cent) and Christianity (7.6 per cent). In short, Buddhists are mainly Sinhalese and Tamils are mainly Hindus. The Christian population of Sri Lanka consists of both the Sinhalese and the Tamils. Language is the dominant identity factor for Sinhala and Tamil ethnic groups.

The geographical setting of Tamil-speaking community is concentrated in the northern and eastern regions of Sri Lanka. The northern region is predominantly of Sri Lankan Tamils and in the Eastern region all three communities are present i.e. 41.4 per cent Tamils, 32.3 per cent Muslims and 25.8 per cent Sinhalese. Indian Tamils are concentrated in the central region of Sri Lanka. The rest of the country is populated by the Sinhalese.

The Sri Lankan Tamils enjoyed a predominant position in the public service and other professions during the British colonial rule and till the early 1950s after independence. But these positions in the services and professions began to decline in the 1950s, particularly after Sinhala was

made the official language of Sri Lanka in 1956 by the S.W.R.D. Bandaranaike government (Sivarajah 1996: 10).

The Sri Lankan Tamils were demanding autonomy for Tamil dominated areas since 1950. As opportunities for public service employment dwindled as a result of economic stagnation in the 1960s and 1970s, communal antagonism between the Tamil and Sinhalese communities sharpened. The alienation and suppression of Tamils by the pro-Sinhalese governments spread across all spheres of society. That was manifest in employment and higher education. According to Ambalavanar Sivarajah,

The leader of the Sri Lanka Tamil community complained that they were discriminated against by the Sinhalese dominated governments, in state employment, higher education, particularly in university education, the use of the Tamil language for official purposes and land settlement. In the mid-1970s they shifted their demand for autonomy to that of separation. By the 1980s, the separatist demand had become highly explosive (Ibid).

Since the early 1970s, the Tamils, in general, and the youth, in particular, had been undergoing a sense of deprivation in relative terms in the areas of university admission, employment opportunities, land alienation and on the issue of Tamil language. In fact, the youth participation and contribution to the Tamil nationalism has been a crucial factor.

Two policies of Sirimavo Bandaranaike's government, in fact, worsened the ethnic tensions in Sri Lanka that brought forth a full-fledged Tamil nationalism and the position of Tamil as the sovereign statehood by young Tamils who suffered most from the state's discriminatory

policies. The first of these acts of discrimination was Bandaranaike governments' action in introducing two systems of standardisation of marks for admission to the universities, directed specifically against Tamil students (Wilson 2000: 102). According to K.M. de Silva,

The qualifying mark of admission to the medical faculties was 250 out of 400 for Tamil students, whereas it was only 229 for the Sinhalese. Worse still, this same pattern of a lower qualification marks applied even when Sinhalese and Tamil students sat for the examination in English. In short, students sitting for the examinations in the same language, but belong to two ethnic groups, had different qualifying marks (de Silva 1984: 107).

The United National Party government of the 1970s caused enormous harm to ethnic relations (Ibid). A district quota system was put in place in 1972 in the education sector which amounted to added discrimination against the Sri Lankan Tamils. C.R. de Silva remarked that by 1977 the issue of university admissions had become a focal point of the conflict between the government and Tamil leaders. The Tamil youth, embittered by what they considered discrimination against them, formed the radical wing of the Tamil United Liberation Front. Many advocated the use of violence to establish a separate state of Eelam. It was a lesson of how inept policy measures can exacerbate ethnic tensions (de Silva 1984). Thus the disparities in vital sectors such as education, employment and language contributed to the Tamil militancy in Sri Lanka.

Tamil Homeland

The crux of the Sri Lankan conflict is, thus, the struggle by the Tamil minority

for their rights and political autonomy. These demands were not taken seriously by successive Sri Lankan governments since independence. The demands of the minorities were rejected regularly due to the pressure from the majority Sinhala-Buddhist community (Witharana 2002: 3). Senior Tamil politicians from the upper social strata were playing a major role in the struggle in its early stages. It turned violent in the late 1970s and the early 1980s. During this time, the impetus shifted into the hands of the Tamil youth who mostly came from the lower layers of Tamil society (Ibid). The civil war, which has plagued Sri Lanka for long has been fought mainly between the Liberation Tigers of Tamil Eelam (LTTE) and the armed forces of the Sri Lankan government in the north and north eastern regions. Over a period of time, the LTTE gradually gained ascendancy over other groups who represented the Tamil struggle. The 'Tamil national question' (Seevaratnam 1989) emerged as a response to the hegemony of Sinhala-Buddhist nationalism. Anton Balasingham, the theoretician of LTTE wrote in 1983:

Tamil nationalism arose as a historical consequence of Sinhala chauvinistic oppression. As the collective sentiment of the oppressed people, Tamil nationalism constituted progressive and revolutionary elements... Tamil national sentiments found organised expression in the Federal Party which emerged as a powerful political force in 1956 to spearhead the Tamil national movement (Balasingham 1983: 16).

Ethnic Divide

The increasing polarisation of the Sinhalese and the Tamils has been the most critical factor in the political development of Sri Lanka. The ethnic riots that erupted upon

this polarisation had disastrous effects on the life and property of the Tamils. The political sentiments of the two communities have, over years, come to a point from where there was hardly any scope for mutual acceptance and respect that existed in early post-independence days (Hennayake 1989: 402).

The Sinhalese believe that Sri Lanka is largely a Sinhalese– Buddhist country and all other religions or language groups are alien. Sri Lanka, they argue, is the only country of, and for, the Sinhalese people. The Sinhalese–Buddhist ideology has been quite effective in associating the Sinhalese ethnic groups with the Buddhist religion and the politico-cultural history and territory of the island. The origin of the Sinhalese–Buddhist ideology can be traced back to Mahavamsa, the grant historical chronicle of Sri Lanka written in 6 AD by a Buddhist monk named Mahama. The central theme of this ideology is that Sri Lanka is a Sinhalese–Buddhist country. The ideology that defines Sri Lanka exclusively in Sinhalese–Buddhist terms is largely a product of the Mahavamsa and pro-Buddhist–Sinhalese interpretations of it by Sinhalese politicians and Buddhist monks, both of whom benefitted by such an ideology in different ways (Ibid). To many Sinhalese, Sri Lanka is Sinhala Dipa (island of Sinhalese) and Damma Dipa (island of Buddhist teaching). Here the Tamils are seen as a group of “South Indian invaders who destroyed the Buddha Sasana” (Ibid).

Political Economy of the Crisis

Considering the political economy of the crisis in Sri Lanka in the perspective of Sri Lankan history of capitalism, one can say that spatially unequal and temporary uneven capitalist development is the root of ethnic cleavages in Sri Lanka (Ponnambalam 1983; Seevaratnam 1989). The first attack of the Sri Lankan capitalists on the Tamil working

class was through the implementation of Citizenship Act in 1948 which thereby expelled the Indian Tamils from the electoral roll. This action of Prime Minister Senanayake hit at the very root of the Sri Lankan working class. But in the 1956 election, D.S. Senanayake’s UNP was defeated and Sri Lanka Freedom Party (SLFP) came to power (Obeysekera 1984: 72). The support base of SLEP was the Sinhalese petty bourgeoisie consisting of Buddhist monks, Sinhalese educated school teachers and indigenous medical practitioners who had traditionally held respectable positions in the Sinhalese society. This class had felt neglected by the upper class westernised rulers. So, as a retaliatory measure, they forced the SLEP government to implement the ‘Sinhala Only Act’ in 1956 (Ponnambalam 1983).

The spatial distribution of the Tamils and the Sinhalese population allowed the ethnic schism to brew on the issues of the two languages as each community tried to protect and advance its own language. In a largely pre-capitalist society, issues such as language and religion become a rallying point for petty bourgeoisie. The availability of democratic institutions allowed the issues of languages and religion to widen the ethnic schism and facilitated the political parties to use it as a rallying point. The SLEP did exactly this in 1956.

Besides, in 1956 after the SLEP came to power, it was alleged that the state extended political assistance to Sinhala capital and discriminated against Tamil capitalism in the industrialisation process. Still, over a period of time, Tamil capitalists, due to the initial advantage they had over the Sinhalese, burgeoned into monopoly capitalists. This created some rival feelings among the Tamil and Sinhalese capitalists. The control of the state in the import

substitution phase and its highly sectarian attitude towards the Tamil capital were more clear in the case of non-monopoly capital. The Tamil non-monopoly capital did not emerge in the light industries in the absence of political assistance. Light industrial activity attracted primarily Sinhala capital (Suriyakumaran 1986: 95-110). However, trading and service continued to be dominated by Tamils.

With the opening up of the economy, non-monopoly capitalists in industry suffered the most, as they were devoid of special concessions because the domestic market they controlled was now overwhelmed with imported goods. And the trade was being controlled by Tamils who stood to benefit from opening up of the economy. The crisis created by the opening up of the economy manifested itself in ethnic violence. The Sinhalese non-monopoly capitalists were robbed off their markets and did not surrender to these changed circumstances. Their frustration carried them to mobilise the urban poor to carry out hostile attacks and rioting against Tamils. The Buddhist ideology of Sinhala dominance helped fan the growing frustration among the Sinhalese directed against the Tamils. Along with the economic cleavage the cultural gap created by the ruling Sinhalese class was so widened that a more political solution in terms of political and economic power became impossible. The publication of newspapers in Sinhalese and Tamil languages strengthened this tendency (de Silva 1985: 156). The colonial rule also helped the Tamils to secure a lead in their knowledge of English language (Seevaratnam 1989).

At the turn of the present century, when constitutional agitations against the British rule gathered momentum, the Sinhalese and the Tamils presented a united position. In 1919, the Ceylon National

Congress was formed by both the Tamils and the Sinhalese under the leadership of Ponnambalam Arunachalam (Obeyesekere 1984: 73). But, soon, political parties began to move along communal lines. This made the Sinhalese a strong group. Moreover, the Sinhalese increasingly felt threatened by Tamil control of business and professions and the Tamils themselves became increasingly self-conscious of their minority identity (Ibid). The gradual growing of these feelings, along with other factors, put both the Sinhalese and the Tamils at loggerheads.

In order to analyse the ethnic violence in Sri Lanka, we need to understand the meaning of the phenomenon of ethnicity. The term 'ethnicity' was derived from the Greek word 'ethnos' which denotes 'nation,' meaning a feeling of oneness among a group of people (Upreti 2001: 16). There is no single definition of ethnicity. However, it is generally conceptualised as a collective consciousness about the identity, which distinguishes (by itself or by others) a group of people from others on the basis of a common sharing of religion, race, culture, tradition, language, social patterns, ancestry and so on. Thus the common sharing of certain elements makes all the members in the concerned society a collective consciousness about their ethnic identity. However, defining one's ethnic identity in a pluralist society is problematic since there are lots of factors that include an individual into a separate group or exclude from it. It is to be noted that ethnic feeling will get currency in certain circumstances when those groups sharing common identity find themselves as 'minority' or 'majority' with a larger national grouping (de Silva 1998: 12).

Even though ethnic identity has been constructed from time immemorial, the ethnic violence is comparatively a new phenomenon. In the primordial period, all

these groups operated in accordance with their own values and traditions because ancient political systems were not so much despotic or sovereign like that of today. The sovereignty was, then, a layered and shared one, vested into various levels and groups. Therefore, there was no inter-group clash within a society. However, with the emergence of modern state system, all the ethnic groups were organised under the control of respective sovereign states. Naturally, states became the entity of centralised power that took away all the layered and shared power vested in various groups. At the same time, the state is required to provide equal consideration and opportunities to all the members of its citizen without any discrimination.

Nevertheless, in a unitary state, the situation may be different. In such systems, there is always a possibility of the dominance of the majority group over other minorities. When an ethnic group feels alienation and marginalisation within a state system, it may assume the nature of ethno-nationalism. This ethno-nationalism at the territorial base is a major problem in the contemporary world. The experience of Sri Lanka is a clear case.

The Sinhala ethnicity has been constructed around a combination of Sinhala language, Buddhist religion and the Aryan descent. As far as the Sinhalese are concerned, they are believed to have migrated from Bengal in the fifth century BC and succeeded in establishing a kingdom with its centre in the north-central areas of the island. The term 'Sinhala' was first used to indicate the royal family of the island, then extended to cover the royal retinue and, then, further extended to the whole subjects. Thus, the theory of the common origin, common language, common settlement and common allegiance led to the creation of a

distinct Sinhala ethnicity. Whereas the Tamil ethnicity is forged mainly on the combination of Tamil language, Hindu religion and the Dravidian origin, they occupy the north-eastern part of Sri Lanka.

Colonial intervention substantially reshaped the ethnic relations in Sri Lanka. For instance, the implementation of commercialization of agriculture, the registration of title to land, registration of births and deaths and proselytisation by the Portuguese and the Dutch had all led to the freezing of ethnic boundaries. This meant the consolidation of the Sinhala community in the central and south-western parts of the island and the Tamils on the eastern seaboard. Many of the South Asian experts hold that the territorial concentration of the Sinhalese and the Tamils into the two extreme parts led to the polarisation of these two peoples (Samaranayake 2001: 126).

Economic development programmes under the British control made the problem more complex. The British established coffee plantations in Sri Lanka in the nineteenth century. In order to fulfill their demand for plantation labour, a population of over one million Tamil workers was shipped from South India to Sri Lanka. They were, at first, seasonal migrants, but with the development of tea plantations the majority became permanently domiciled in the plantations. This changed the demographic equations within the Sri Lankan society. Later, it conduced to the problem of 'citizenship' that also affected Indo-Sri Lankan relations. Moreover, the British concentrated their economic development programmes on the central and western areas of Sri Lanka that left the Tamil community in a disadvantaged position. Therefore, most of the Tamils had turned to the service sector, especially in the state services. This raised the educational standard of the Tamils and their

overwhelming representation in government services including top positions (Bastiampillai 1996: 195).

The opening up of plantations and the subsequent economic boom led to the emergence of a local bourgeoisie comprised of Sinhala, Burghers and Tamils. At the same time, the Sinhala bourgeoisie found constraints from the British and Indian counterparts (Desha 2001: 146). The Sinhala professionals and the educated 'petit bourgeoisie' also felt uneasiness in so far as they had to compete with Burghers and Tamils for employment in government and private sectors. Workers at their own level found themselves pitted against migrant workers from India as well as against workers of indigenous minority groups (Phukon 2001: 1-2). Thus, the Sinhalese who had to compete with the non-Sinhala groups at the various sectors found the latter as a major obstacle in the overall development of the former. This economic antagonism mixed with ethnic elements later imparted a sense of 'Sinhala national identity', which got currency in Sri Lanka over the last few decades (de Silva 1981:65).

In asserting a Sinhala national identity and in legitimizing the control of the Sinhalas over Sri Lankan polity, the leaders of the Sinhala revivalist movement reconstructed an image of the Sinhala past using many elements of the 'origin' mythology. They claimed that Lord Buddha granted the control of the island to the Sinhalese and asked them to preserve the Buddhist doctrine in Sri Lanka. This agreement was reciprocal i.e. "the survival of the Buddhist religion is depended on the survival of the Buddhist doctrine in the Island." This revivalist ideology attempted to establish a Sinhala-Buddhist hegemony in Sri Lanka that was antagonistic to non-Sinhala and non-Buddhist groups. This

narrow-minded ideology had led to the denial of the multi-ethnic and multi religious character of Sri Lankan society as well as reluctance to accept the collective rights of the minority groups (Ibid).

The ethnic problem in Sri Lanka took a new turn with the emergence of modern political institutions. In 1931 the British constituted a state council that did not consider the aspirations of the minority groups. In 1947 the British formed a Westminster style of constitution for Sri Lanka that envisaged a unitary state system with the framing of a unity system and the installation of the Sinhala dominated government at the centre. The British thus paved the way to the state-sponsored discriminative policies in Sri Lanka. The first anti-Tamil law came in to surface with the legislation of Sri Lankan Citizenship Act of 1948. This Act disenfranchised about 90,000 Indian Tamils who had enjoyed voting right since 1931 (Phadnis 1989; Seevaratnam 1989).

As a result, the Sinhalese could win 78 per cent of seats in the Parliament. After the increase in the number of seats by 1956 with the delimitation of the constituency, the Sinhalese bagged 80 per cent of the seats in the National State Assembly. This political ascendancy gave the Sinhalese the capacity not only to enact laws but also to change the constitution in 1972 and 1978.

The Official Language Act of 1956 replaced English by Sinhalese. This Act made knowledge of Sinhalese as a necessary requirement that reduced the position of the Tamils in state services and increased the rate of participation of the Sinhalese in government services. The discriminatory policy extended to the education field also. During the 1970s, the government introduced a system of standardisation which set higher

minimum entry requirements for a Tamil student than that of a Sinhala student (Gupta 1988: 247). This standardisation policy conduced to inadequate access for the Tamils to university admissions and consequent shrinking in employment prospects.

Land colonisation was another policy that invited mass level protests from the Tamils. This was a land settlement programme of the Sinhalese in the Tamil dominated areas of the island. As a result, the Sinhalese demographic rate rose in the Tamil inhabited areas of north-eastern Sri Lanka. For instance, in the Trincomalee district, there was an increase of the Sinhala population from 20.7 per cent to 33.6 per cent in the period between 1946 and 1981 (Sriskandarajah, 2005: 344). This process of state-aided colonisation was seen not only as a threat to the political status of the Tamils in Sri Lanka, but also as a threat to the existence of the Tamil as a community with their own linguistic and cultural identity.

However, the most irksome incident came from the government's move towards the framing of a new constitution. It was in 1972 that the Sinhala dominated National Assembly passed the Republican Constitution that excluded many provisions in the previous constitution such as the clause for safeguarding the rights of the minority and the court's privilege of judicial review of the legislations, etc. As a result, the National State Assembly became the supreme instrument of state power in Sri Lanka. The language and religion of the Sinhalese found a special and foremost place in the new constitution, whereas, the minorities including the Tamils were totally marginalised in the new system. Thus, the new constitution explicitly and implicitly granted an official nod to the ongoing discriminatory policies of the government.

At the same time, the Tamils sought to counter the growing discrimination at the political level. Before independence, the Tamils demanded a fifty-fifty share with the Sinhalese in the government. Following independence, and the installation of the unitary system of government, the Tamils asked for a federal political structure that would give them a degree of autonomy in their inhabited areas, as well as adequate representation at the centre. However, the government of Sri Lanka treated it as the Tamils' move for a separate state and rejected the demand for federation. As a result, the Tamils turned towards a separate Tamil Eelam by 1976 (Karlekar n.d). For this end, various Tamil political parties were amalgamated into a single larger party known as the Tamil United Liberation Front (TULF). Subsequently, TULF became the vanguard of the Tamil Liberation movement in Sri Lanka, operating through the parliamentary democratic processes towards obtaining their goal. However, some Tamil youth dissatisfied with the non-violent policies of TULF moved towards violent means which led to the disintegration of TULF.

The breakaway of TULF marked a new turn in the ethnic problem in Sri Lanka. Thereafter, the Tamil militants occupied the political space in the island. The Tamils who realised the need for an ideological base for the 'separate Tamil State' constructed various myths such as: the Tamils are pure Dravidians by race, and thereby they are heirs to the Mohenjo-Daro and Harappa civilisations, the 'original inhabitants' of Sri Lanka and that the Tamil language in its purest form is spoken only in Sri Lanka, etc. (Gunaratna 1999: 111). These claims are being raised to demand a separate Tamil Eelam in the island. It is true that many militants use the 'Dravidian Drive' and

'Chola Charisma' to mobilise support for armed struggle (Ibid). There were five militant groups in the initial period of the violent separatist movement in Sri Lanka, such as Tamil Eelam Liberation Organization (TELO), People's Liberation Organization of Tamil Eelam (PLOTE), Eelam People's Revolutionary Liberation Front (EPRLF), Eelam Revolutionary Organization Students (EROS) and LTTE. But, later, the LTTE achieved the dominance over other groups though there were challenges within, leading to further factionalism.

Conclusion

This study is an endeavour to unearth the root-causes behind the ethnic problems in Sri Lanka. It found that the ardent process of nation building and the application of traditional security measures are the real causes behind the tensions within the small island state. At the very outset of independence, the statesmen were trying to build up a strong nation-state. Having ignored the configuration of Sri Lankan society they preferred a unitary system. Sri Lankan society was a conglomeration of various ethnic groups. But the majority group, the Sinhalese, were not ready to accommodate the minorities in the post-colonial political system in Sri Lanka. They feared the empowerment of other groups as a threat to the existence of Sinhalese state that was founded by the king Vijaya. It conduced to the socio-political and economic marginalization of other groups. Being the second largest population in the state, the Tamils were the worst affected group by the discriminative policies of the Government. The first anti-Tamil law was the Sri Lankan citizenship Act of 1948. This Act disenfranchised about 90,000 Indian Tamils who has enjoyed the vote since 1931. As a result, the Sinhalese could win 78% of seats

in the following Parliamentary elections. An overwhelming majority in the state imparted exclusive power to enact anti-Tamil laws and change the constitution in 1972 and 1978. For instance, the Republican Constitution in 1972 abandoned many clauses for safe guarding the rights of the minority, the court's privilege of judicial review of the legislations etc. As a result, the National state Assembly became the Supreme instrument of state power in Sri Lanka. Official language Act of 1956 was another blow to the Tamils. This controversial Act made Sinhalese the sole official language in Sri Lanka. The government also introduced a policy of standardization in 1970s. These twin laws conduced to the total marginalization of the Tamils both in the education sector and government services. Coupled with the above moves, the Government executed land colonization policy in the Tamil dominated areas. All these discriminative policies were emanated to strengthen the building process of a unitary Sinhalese state.

In response to the state sponsored discriminative policies, the Tamils clamoured for a federal system. The Tamils held that a federal system having a degree of representation at the centre would ensure their security in the Sinhalese dominated state. But the centre treated it as a separatist movement and curbed the plea of the Tamils.

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Educational Policies in South Asia: A Study on Primary Education of Literacy for Girls

D Parimala

Abstract

In South Asia the reduction of poverty, human development and education for the girl child have been accorded priority. However gender inequality in access to education in many regions still persists. The male/female literacy ratio is increasing which is distributed unevenly among the nations of South Asia. Sri Lanka stands on one end of the scale with highest female literacy and enrolment levels while Nepal and Pakistan making up the lower ends in adult literacy and enrolment levels respectively. The aim of the present paper is to examine the gender dimensions of policy; planning and management of EFA programme in South Asian countries, especially focusing on primary education. Literacy no doubt is the basic need of any country that leads development. Our focus is on gender equity and women's empowerment in South Asian countries. Consequently, education systems are being subjected to a plethora of reforms, innovations and remedial measures in an attempt to make them more viable and responsive to the changing needs and demands of the society. Given to this type of changing environment in our education system, many issues have emerged with specific problems related to women's literacy that demand the immediate attention and focus of our policy makers.

Background

South Asia is a historically rich region, with one of the most ancient civilizations of the world. The ancient scriptures associated with the region placed education and knowledge on a high pedestal, regarding it as the most important treasure one could have. The countries of the region, except for Nepal and Bhutan, experienced various short and long phases of colonial rule and became independent in the middle of the twentieth century. The devastating colonial impact influenced the development of education in the region. The long colonial rule uprooted the *beautiful tree* in the undivided India and transformed an advanced intermediate society of India into an illiterate society, besides converting it into a raw material appendage on the economic front.

In the beginning of twenty-first century, with the exception of Sri Lanka, South Asia is one of the most backward regions of the world in terms of educational development. The region has been described as "the poorest region," "the most illiterate region," "the least gender-sensitive region," and "the region with the highest human deprivation." It has emerged as an "anti-education society in the midst of a pro-education Asian culture" (Haq and Haq 1998, p. 42). The South Asian subcontinent poses the most serious challenges in education as nearly half the adult illiterates of the world live in the subcontinent. The rate of participation in schooling is low, and the quality of education is poor. Some of the factors prevalent in South Asia are:

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1. Education Development

Countries in the South Asian region also experienced an explosion in the number of people attending school. Between 1950 and 1997, enrolments in schools in South Asia increased sixfold, from 44 million to 262 million. The total teaching staff increased from 1.4 million to 7.2 million during this period. Enrolment ratios increased from 20 percent (net) in 1960 to 52 percent (gross) in 2000. (Gross enrolment ratios refer to the total enrolments as a proportion of the relevant age group population, while net enrolment ratio refers to enrolment in the relevant age group as a proportion of the population of the relevant age group.)

In 2001, the gross enrolment ratio in primary education in the region as a whole was impressive (about 95%). But this is only the gross enrolment ratio. The net enrolment ratio in Pakistan, for example, was only 49 percent in 2001. Universal primary education is still a distant dream for many countries in the region, except for Sri Lanka and Maldives. Despite the fact that the number of teachers has increased over the years, the number of pupils per teacher is still very high. It is 1:59 in Bangladesh, 1:49 in Pakistan and 1:48 in India. Due to lack of quality education, achievement levels of children in primary schools have been found unsatisfactory. Dropout and retention rates are also increasing. In fact, the completion rates in primary education in South Asia are the lowest in the world.

Enrolment ratios in secondary and higher education are also low in South Asia when compared to many other regions of the world. Many countries in South Asia (e.g., India, Pakistan, Sri Lanka) have emphasized vocational training in their secondary education plans, but have not succeeded. As

Mahbub ul Haq and Khadija Haq have estimated, barely 1.5 percent of the enrolments in secondary education in South Asia had taken place in vocational programs in the early 1990s, compared to six times that level in East Asia and fifteen times that level in Latin America. Secondary education has failed to provide any job-relevant skills, and as a result has served only as a transitory phase toward higher education and is not the viable terminal level of education in these nations. In addition, gender disparities in secondary education are the largest in the world.

Due to acute unemployment rates among the educated, a very small percentage of population go for higher education. Consequently, South Asian countries are considered to be poor when compared to countries in East Asia, Latin America and in many areas of the world with respect to scientific and technical manpower.

Sri Lanka and the tiny Maldives are far ahead of other countries in the region in literacy and basic education. More than 90 percent of the population in these two countries is literate. Basic education is nearly universal and enrolment ratios in secondary education are high, although Maldives does not have any higher educational institution. The problems of dropouts and grade repetition are also not so important in Sri Lanka as in other countries. With its emphasis on school education, Sri Lanka could improve the level of human development, as measured by the human development index, but it still continues to be economically backward. However, internal civil war and political unrest have had a serious adverse impact on educational development in Sri Lanka.

One of the important factors responsible for the unsatisfactory

development of education in South Asia is the low level of public investment in education. The present levels of public investment in education in South Asia have been found to be of the lowest order, even less than those in sub-Saharan Africa. For instance, Bangladesh invested 2.2 percent of its gross national product (GNP) in education between 1995 and 1997 (the corresponding investment during this period was 2.7 percent in Pakistan; and 3.2 percent in Nepal and India). It is only in the relatively rich country of Maldives that the proportion is reasonably high (6.4 percent). As a proportion of the total government expenditure, education receives a small portion in countries like Bhutan and Pakistan. Particularly during the 1990s, after economic reform policies were introduced, public expenditures on education decreased further. Political instability and the compulsion to allocate substantial resources for defense and internal security have also constrained India, Pakistan, Sri Lanka, Nepal, and Bangladesh from raising their levels of spending on education.

Though sound finances are not a sufficient condition for educational development, yet, they are a critically necessary condition for its development. For instance, high historical investments made in education helped Sri Lanka march ahead of others in literacy and school education. Education systems in most countries of the region are starved of scarce financial resources. A low level of economic development is generally believed to be the reason for a low level of public investment, but this is not necessarily true. With political and social will, some relatively poor societies could spend more on education than some relatively rich economies, even in South Asia.

2. New Discourse in Education

Most countries of South Asia have recognized the vital role of education. They have begun paying serious attention to education - particularly to basic education - as a part of the global program of Education for All (EFA). Many strategies have been adopted by South Asian countries. Non-formal education did not work due to lack of good physical infrastructure facilities, trained teacher teaching materials, language etc.

Effective compulsory basic education is still non-existent in many countries of the region. In order to promote compulsory education, laws have been initiated in Sri Lanka, and India. Even in the name of free education, poor people are not able to send their children to school as they do not have enough money to spend on purchasing books, uniforms and payment for transportation etc. Consequently, there is low participation of poor children in schools.

Countries in South Asia believe have pre assumed that EFA goals can be realized only at the cost of growth of secondary and higher education. Consequently, economic resources have primarily been confined to basic education. This may lead to imbalances in the development of secondary and higher education. But, countries like India have realized that rapid expansion of primary education demands expansion of secondary education at the same rate too. They have also realized that quality higher education is important to succeed in an increasingly globalised world.

3. Education for Girl Child

The women of South Asia have suffered neglect in the matter of education throughout the ages, seriously affecting their intellectual development and social status. The Constitution mandates universal and compulsory education for all. A number of

programmes have been implemented to improve the level of female literacy. Some countries have made remarkable progress in this direction, but some have not. It is almost axiomatic to state that a literate mother is the greatest guarantor of education for the next generation with a great bearing on the socio-economic and cultural advancement of a nation. For example in India, Article 15(3) empowers the state to make special provision for women and children even in violation of the fundamental obligation of non-discrimination on the basis of sex. This provision has enabled the state to draw up special policies and programmes to benefit women. Let us first understand the meaning and importance of Education for all – be it for male or female.

4. Importance of Education

Education has been of central significance to the development of human society. The first Prime Minister Jawahar Lal Nehru rightly remarked: “Some people seem to think that education is not as important as putting up a factory” So it is imperative to increase the literacy rate to bring about all round development. Education helps an individual to develop his/her potential to the full, to increase his/her productivity and to become a useful and productive member of the society. Education is holistic in concept and is multi-dimensional.

Education is a critical input in human resource development and is essential for the country's economic growth. Though the major indicators of socio-economic development viz., the growth rate of the economy, birth rate, death rate, infant mortality rate and literacy rate, are all interconnected, the literacy rates are a major determinant of the rise or fall in the other indicators. There is enough evidence to show that there is a high level of illiteracy rate in

South Asia as compared to other parts of world.

5. The Major Purposes for Education for all, especially for girls are:

- (i) Universal enrolment of all children.
- (ii) Provision of primary school, within one kilometer of walking distance.
- (iii) Facility of non-formal education for school drop-outs, working children and girls who cannot attend schools.
- (iv) Reduction of drop-out rates, especially in girls.
- (v) Achievement of minimum levels of learning by all children at the primary level, and introduction of this concept at the upper primary stage on a large scale.
- (vi) Increased allocation of funds for various schemes/programmes initiated for girls' education and optimum utilization of allotted funds.
- (vii) Taking up of intensive awareness generation activities for bringing about change in societal attitude towards girls' education.
- (viii) Orientation of educational policies to take care of specific needs and requirements of girls and women, particularly in their socio-economic context.
- (ix) Gearing up of economic policies to improve employment of women and their earning capabilities so that they can relieve the girls for educational activities.

6. Access to Schooling

Women's access to schooling is far from equal to that of men, with considerable variation among developing regions. Official statistics for enrolment tend to underestimate the dimension of this problem; nonetheless

they indicate that there are between 120 million and 150 million children aged six to eleven out of school. This group is mostly poor, and about two-thirds are girls. In South Asia, the Arab region, and sub-Saharan Africa, about 600 million boys and girls attend school, but 42 million fewer girls than boys are enrolled at the primary level and 33 million fewer at the secondary school, as reported in 1999. Due to low access to basic education when young, two thirds of the 900 million illiterates are women. The gender gap in literacy has been narrowing over time, except in South Asia.

If educating girls is such a win-win proposition, why are there not more girls in school? Cultural factors such as notions of a girl's proper age for marriage, anxiety about the sexuality and sexual safety of daughters, and the division of labor at home (with women in charge of domestic and childcare tasks) affect girl's enrolment and both primary and secondary school completion. In India and many sub-Saharan countries, where strong cultural norms require early marriage, parents often consider puberty as the cutoff for schooling.

7. Learning at School

In developing countries some rural families are reluctant to send their daughters to school for fear that they will learn new values, becoming less inclined to accept domestic work and more interested in joining salaried occupations. But formal education - both in developing and industrialized countries - tends to convey messages and experiences that reproduce traditional views of femininity and masculinity, with the consequence that girls do not acquire knowledge that makes them question the status quo and boys do not learn to appreciate girls' needs and conditions. The school curriculum in some subject areas

avoids dealing with issues considered social taboos. Thus, sexual education does not consider the social relations of sexuality but emphasizes knowledge of reproductive organs and, now that AIDS has become an illness of major proportions, information about avoiding risky sexual practices, primarily via sexual abstinence. Discussion of sexual orientation, a major concern in adolescence, is especially avoided for fear of promoting homosexuality. Serious and widespread issues such as domestic violence and rape are usually sidestepped in the school curriculum.

8. Policies on Gender and Equity

Many governments have made public commitments to increase the access of girls to schooling, reduce the gap in schooling between girls and boys, and reduce illiteracy, especially among women. A good example is the Education for All (EFA) initiative sought to provide universal education to all by the year 2000. By 2000 this goal had been deferred to 2015, with no firm promise that previous obstacles to policy implementation would be removed. Major international assistance agencies (notably the World Bank and the U.S. and Japanese bilateral development agencies) continue to justify support for girls' education for its value as an economic investment, downplaying reasons of social justice and individual autonomy. A number of pilot studies attempted in several developing countries have demonstrated the power of interventions such as the provision of tuition subsidies or scholarships for girls to offset their economic value to families. Unfortunately, only a handful of countries have brought these interventions to nationwide application (scholarships for secondary schoolgirls in Bangladesh, family stipends to families with daughters in primary school in Guatemala, and subsidies

to rural families in Mexico). Most governments are willing to uphold the importance of girls' and women's education, but fail to acknowledge the impact of ideological factors shaping definitions of masculinity and femininity, which in turn determine men's and women's unequal roles in society.

9. Enrolment Trends

The gaps in educational achievement of girls and boys are still wide despite recognition that education plays a critical

role in social, economic and political empowerment of women. The combined gross enrolment ratio at primary, secondary and tertiary levels have gone up for both boys and girls compared to the 1999 data in almost all countries. The following table shows that the gender gaps in literacy and average years of schooling continue to be high in all countries except Sri Lanka. Maldives and Bangladesh have achieved the gender parity as far as primary enrolment ratio is concerned.

Table 1: Combined Gross Enrolment Ratio for Primary, Secondary and Tertiary School

Year	Bangladesh	Bhutan	India	Maldives	Nepal	Pakistan	Sri Lanka
1999 (F)	33	0	49	77	52	28	71
1999(M)	41	0	62	77	67	51	68
2000-01(F)	54	0	48	78	55	31	66
2000-01(F)	53	0	62	78	67	43	64

Source: HDR, 2002 and 2004

Table 2: Male and Female Gaps in Gross Primary Enrolment Ratio, 1998-2001

Countries	Male	Female
India	111	92
Pakistan	85	63
Bangladesh	101	101
Nepal	131	104
Sri Lanka	107	104
Maldives	133	134

Source: Human Development in South Asia 2003

Even though most countries are close to universal enrolment both for boys and girls, the drop out rate is higher among girls. There is continuous prevalence of gender stereotypes in textbooks and gender differentiated choice of subjects due to which, the quality of education has become an increasing concern for South Asia educational policies.

The South Asian countries are framing up policies to (i) ensure equal access to education, (ii) eradicate illiteracy among women; (iii) improve the standard vocational training, science and technology; (iv) develop non-discriminatory education and training programmes especially to eliminate gender bias from text books and learning materials. The major goals are to allocate sufficient resources for the implementation of educational reforms, and to promote life long education and training of women and girls. This paper has been introduced to examine the gender dimensions of policy, planning and management of Education for All (EFA) program in the South Asian countries, especially focusing on primary education.


The Indian government is officially committed to the establishment of compulsory education and this is written in most of the state laws and in Article 45 of the 1950 Constitution of the Republic of India. However, Elementary Education Acts, most

of which were introduced before Independence, merely permit but do not require local authorities to introduce compulsory education. The real interest of the authorities lies in improving the higher education system. The consequences that India has had to pay for not making elementary education compulsory have been high. School attendance has been very low. 52% (82.2 million) of India's 6 to 14 year old children do not go to school. Only 4% of the children who entered the first grade

completed four years of school, and just 23% reached the eighth grade. The fact that India has a growing illiterate population is no surprise. It has been stated that the absolute number of illiterates has increased from 294 million in 1951 to 482 million in 1991 - an increase of 4.7 million per year. India is said to be the largest single producer of the world's illiterates.

South Asia has emerged as the most illiterate region in the world, by now:


Share of South Asia in World population and Adult illiteracy



The limited educational progress in many South Asian countries has not only constrained the immediate potential for human resource led development, but has also stunted the future prospects for rapid human development in the region.

The rate of adult literacy has increased in South Asia by 53 percent since 1970. Sri Lanka and Maldives have moved closer to complete adult literacy. However, rapid progress in eradicating illiteracy in India, Pakistan and Bangladesh is vital as 97% of the illiterates of South Asia belong to these countries only.





What produces students who are inadequately trained for further education and adults who are functionally illiterate?



The gross secondary enrolment rate of children in South Asia is only 43 percent. The amount of per pupil expenditure (as a percentage of per capita GNP) on secondary education in South Asia (1992) was only 16 percent compared to 53.7 percent of the Sub-

Saharan Africa. If we consider primary education as a “Glass/Beaker”, then for South Asia it is still 1/3 empty. 50 million children of South Asia have never been to school, out of which 70% are from India only.

There is only one teacher to every 60 children in the primary schools of South Asia : the highest ratio in the world. The ratio of pupils per teacher is 60:1 which is highest in the world.



Moving from primary to secondary and to higher levels of education, the female enrolment rates are found to be constantly decreasing. This affects their choices and chances of entering the labour market or of getting training which can give them wider access to employment.

The drop-out rates among girls are much higher when compared to that of boys. The main reason for this is that girls are engaged in household works such as fuel and fodder collection, fetching of water and care of siblings. The other reason could be parents lack of interest, poverty, absence of single sex schools, unsafe travel and lack of facilities in schools such as women teachers' separate toilets, etc.

In 1996, a survey was done in 188 primary schools, randomly selected from villages in Bihar, M.P., Rajasthan and U.P; regarding the condition of schools in North India. As a result, the "PUBLIC REPORT ON BASIC EDUCATION" (PROBE) came up with the following findings:

- 44% of schools did not have a playground.
- 54% of schools did not have drinking water facility.
- 55% of schools did not have teaching kits.
- 61% of schools did not have toys.
- 72% of schools did not have a library.
- 84% of schools did not have a toilet.
- 12% of schools had a single teacher appointed.
- Another 21% had a single teacher present at the time of the survey.

Thus one-third of all the primary schools surveyed were single teacher schools - where one teacher handles all five classes together, i.e. more than a hundred pupils. Recognizing the need to make available free and universal primary education is not new to India. Article 45 of the Directive Principles of State Policy declares:

"The State shall endeavor to provide within a period of ten years from the commencement of this Constitution, for free and compulsory education for all children until they complete the age of fourteen".

The **National Policy on Education** (1986) as well as the goals for **Education for All** in India (1990) reaffirm the country's commitment to universalise primary education by the year 2000.

Case Studies

Indicators of Gender Disparity in Primary Education

India is home to the largest number of children in the world. Millions are born every year, far more than in any other country. But what distinguishes India is not merely the sheer numbers, but rather the intricate and complex patterns of differences in all spheres including literacy, that emerges through gender, caste and geography.

According to population, there are 28 states, 7 Union territories, 600 Districts and 6.4 lakh villages with a total population of 1027 million. In 2001, population growth rate has slowed down to an annual average of 1.95% with a population growth of 21.34 percent in the decade 1991-2001. The annual growth rate of urban population has decreased from 3.4 percent in 1970-1990 to 2.6 percent in 1990-2003. The SC and ST population was 16.33 percent and 8.01 percent respectively in the 1991 census and population growth rate recorded an increase in Bihar and Haryana.

It is estimated that the total population of young children in the age group of 0-6 is 157, 863, 45, somewhere around 170 million which is almost 17.5% of the total population of India as per 2001 census. The sex ratio has recorded a small improvement and it now stands at 933 (women per 1000 men) in comparison to 927 in the 1991 census. However, what is disturbing in the sex ratio is the, 0-6 age group has fallen sharply to 927 in 2001 as compared to 945 in 1991. In total only 35% of children are registered at birth.

Taking into account the total literacy to be 65.38% as against 75.83% males, 54.16% females are literate. In the past decade the increase in Literacy has been 13.75%.

Pre-Primary

The total number of children enrolled at pre-primary stage in 2001 was 21,43,099, with more boys enrolled than girls.

In India pre-school attendance between the ages of 3-6 years is 35% in rural areas and 48% in urban areas, Of these 37% are in Anganwadis, 11% in Balwadi's and 34% in Private facilities and the remaining 19% in different Govt. (other) facilities.

Elementary school

The gross enrolment ratio of children in the age group of 6-11 years and 11-14 years stood at 10.2 percent and 62% respectively in 1991-92. However, it is commonly known that about half of the children entering class I drop out before reaching class V, and two-thirds do so before reaching class VIII. Regional, gender and community disparities mark the phenomena of enrolment and retention. The gross enrolment ratio is 115 (boys 115 & girls 114), it is 116 for SC students and 112 for ST. The net enrolment percent is 97% for 1999-2000.

Scheduled castes/tribes

The most educationally deprived sections in India are officially called scheduled castes. The progress of schooling among scheduled castes children (5-14 years) has been relatively poor as compared to that of the general population. School attendance rates in rural areas (where almost 90% of the population resides) in 1993-94 were 64.3 percent for SC boys. In the 1981-91 decade, SC lagged behind the general population by as much as around 15 percentage points in literacy (37% among SC as compared to 52% for general population). In 1990s, barely 41.5% of SCs in rural India were literate and only 62.5% of children in the age group had been enrolled in school at some point of time. Attention to the education of these children is of critical

importance. Barely 24% of SC women were literate according to 1991 census.

During 1971, female literacy among tribals was 4.85% at the all-India level and only 0.49% in Rajasthan. By 1981, it had increased to 8.05 percent at the all India level and 1.20% in Rajasthan. Despite massive efforts by government and non-government agencies it was still 18.19% at the all India level with the states of Andhra Pradesh and Rajasthan at the bottom of the tribal female literacy table. On the other hand, states like Mizoram, Nagaland, Sikkim and Kerala have more than 50% literacy among the tribal population (female).

Gender Disparity at Primary stage:-

Table 3: Net enrolment Primary Level (I-V) – (1951-2001)


Year	Boys (in millions)	Girls (in millions)
1951	13.8	5.4
1961	23.6	11.4
1971	35.7	21.3
1981	45.3	28.5
1991	57.0	40.4
2001	64.0	49.8

Source: Selected Educational Statistics 2000-2001, Ministry of Human Resource Development, India.

Table-4: Net enrolment Upper Primary (VI-VIII) (1951-2001)


Year	Boys (in millions)	Girls (in millions)
1951	2.6	0.5
1961	5.1	1.6
1971	9.4	3.9
1981	13.9	6.8
1991	21.5	12.5
2001	25.3	17.5

As compared to boys 36 million girls were out-of-school and 24 million boys were out of school.



If we look at drop-outs rate by sex at Primary & Upper Primary (VI-VIII) Levels 2001, then, 41.9% girls as compared to

39.7% boys at primary level and 57.7% at upper primary for girls as compared to 50.3% for boys drop out.



Literacy rates have improved everywhere and that improvement has been particularly rapid in Rajasthan, Orissa and Madhya Pradesh but not in U.P. and Bihar. It is alarming to note that in Himachal Pradesh while the literacy level has gone up and almost 98% of children in the school going age are enrolled and attending school, the sex ratio has declined from 976 in 1991 to 970 in 2001.

Literacy figures do not reveal the true picture. There are no easy answers and no one-to-one correlations. Sex ratios are rapidly declining in prosperous regions where most children go to primary schools. Many more girls are pulled out of school in Tamil Nadu and Andhra Pradesh, especially after class VI to VIII to work as wage labourers on farms (picking cotton or vegetables) and in family enterprises. Economic prosperity has improved education

access, especially for girls from not so poor and middle-income families.

Overall gender gap persists and the situation of girls belonging to SC/ST in terms of gender parity needs much greater attention. In union territories of Delhi State and Chandigarh, girls enrolment ratio is better than that for boys at upper primary level.

Status of the girls, child as reflected in the sex ratio shows continuing discrimination against the girl child. Ironically, most declines in sex ratio were in the more prosperous states of Gujrat, Haryana, Himachal Pradesh and Maharashtra. Sex Ratio is an outcome indicator that is a result of higher mortality of girls in the 0-5 age group, neglect, discrimination in food, health care and physical well being at all stages of life.

Gender disparity is evident as twice as many girls are pulled out of school or never sent to school. Furthermore, in U.P. 70% of boys aged 6-10 attend school but only 43% girls attend school. Attendance is better in urban areas.

The situation in low female literacy states (20-40%) is a cause of concern, particularly as more than half of the country's population is found in U.P., Rajasthan, M.P. & Bihar (BIMARU states). Moreover, it is a matter of concern that the rural-urban difference in female literacy has increased.

In a nutshell, what is complex and paradoxical that makes planning and implementing in India so challenging. The marked disparities between regions and social groups, between rich and poor and between sexes suggest that there is no straightforward way to overcome the obstacle and reach universal elementary education.

According to the Zakir Hussain Committee in 1937, the 'world of work' should not only be an integral part of the 'world of knowledge', but also a 'means to knowledge'. In the Gandhian notion of education, work cannot be distinguished

from knowledge since both work and knowledge are dialectically related to each other. Pedagogy is derived from this relationship. Yet, the Kothari Commission did not have any problem in viewing work experience in total isolation of the knowledge-content of the school text books. This notion has since been carried to such an extent that the only appropriate place the Indian school found for work experience was the last period of the day and the last column of the mark sheet. It was further ensured that marks given to a child in work experience do not count in her overall achievement. As if this was not enough, the Ishwarbhai Patel Committee set up in 1978 decided to ensure that work in the school would have no more than a symbolic meaning. Symbolism was important since the Indian State had still not gathered adequate courage to take up an open stand against the Gandhian notion of Basic Education. Therefore, the State readily accepted the Ishwarbhai Patel Committee report by introducing the notion of Socially Useful Productive Work uniformly in the entire Indian school system. The vast teacher community was wise enough to take the cue and further trivialized the SUPW notion by using this period for only making dolls and pin cushions!

In 1990, the government set up a Committee to review the National Policy on Education, 1986 (NPE-1986) as per a provision in the policy itself calling for a review once every 5 years. The Committee, popularly known as the Acharya Ramamurthy Committee, submitted its 400 page report to the Parliament in early 1991. As per the terms of reference given to the Committee, the report gave far-reaching recommendations for changing the policy in order to eliminate disparities and inequities from the Indian education system. The report further declared that the prevailing policy was unsuitable for achieving Universalization of Elementary Education (UEE), apart from being insensitive to the child and discriminatory towards educational needs of girls, tribals, dalits, minorities, nomads and all other disadvantaged sections of society. According to the report,

the goals as well as the content of higher education did not lead to social development nor was it capable of generating relevant knowledge regarding the major issues of critical concerns to the majority of the Indian people. The report emphasised that the issue is not of shifting funds from the higher education sector to the elementary education sector but of making higher education relevant to the society, apart from allocating a greater portion of national resources for the educational development of the poor sections of society. The report demanded basic changes in the national policy which was so drastic and therefore so unpalatable to the Indian State that the best thing it could do was to set up yet another committee to mitigate the new consciousness of the people which the Ramamurthy Committee had begun to generate. This new Committee, formally known as the CAGE Committee or the Janardhan Reddy Committee, was carefully designed.

Within three months, the Chaturvadi Committee issued its report which put ifs and buts for each recommendation of the Yash Pal committee. But the issues raised by the Yash Pal Committee could not be wished away so lightly since the issue of the over-burdened school bag touched a sympathetic chord even in the class mindset. Responding to the popular support for these recommendations, the Ministry declared that a high powered Monitoring Committee had been set up to ensure successful implementation of the Yash Pal Committee's recommendations for reducing the load of the school bag. There were only two problems with this monitoring committee. First, it had nothing to monitor, since the Yash Pal Committee's recommendations were not being implemented by any of the State governments anywhere in India. Second, the Chairperson of the Monitoring Committee was the NCERT Director whose organization was in the first place responsible for producing the over-loaded textbooks as a model for the entire country.

During the Post-Jomtien phase official discourse on education in India

reveals an alarming trend since the World Conference-on-Education for All (EFA) held in Jomtien, Thailand, in March 1990. The long-standing commitment to ensure eight years of elementary education for all children has been reduced, for all practical purposes, to five years of primary education (i.e. upto Class V) and virtually de-linked from the upper primary stage (i.e. Classes VI-VIII) from the standpoint of both curriculum, infrastructural planning and resource allocation. Such a measure amounts to violation of the Constitutional directive and a denial of the right of the child. This dilution in the policy commitment is clearly evident from the manner in which the externally funded District Primary Education Programme (DPEP), restricted to first five years of education for the 6-11 age group, is being promoted as the dominant strategy for Universalisation of Elementary Education (UEE). Further, the Constitutional obligation would be 'officially' considered to have been fulfilled even if the entire primary schooling is substituted by NFE, which NPE (1986) projected as 'equivalent through the non-formal stream'.

The National Literacy Mission (NLM) has come to include the out-of-school children in the 9-14 age group in its ambit. As a result of this development, the state's responsibility could be assumed to have been fulfilled if three (**not** even five) years of primary education for the 6-9 age group is followed by coverage of the children in the 9-11 (**not even** 9-14) group in an **adult literacy** (as distinct from **educational**) programme. In this 'educational' scenario of the post-Jomtien India, one can envisage a girl child engaged in child labour as having been 'Constitutionally educated' *if she can be **enrolled** in a non-formal stream for three years and then in NLM's adult literacy programme for the next two years, without even having stepped into the village school!* This scenario will allow the state to co-exist quite comfortably with,

- Perpetuation of child labour;
- Decreasing access to common property resources for the majority of the people,

leading to increasing load on children for gathering fuel, fodder and water and attending to younger siblings; this of course is only a introduction to further erosion of the right of the girl child in particular, owing to the child marriage practice;

- continuance of social, gender and regional inequities and disparities with respect to wages, distribution of developmental benefits and participation in decision-making;
- the local school remaining ineffective and marginalized; and
- the various segments of society having access to different layers of school streams as per their financial capacities, thereby reproducing the inequalities. The Clause 5.12 of NPE 1986 declared that education will be given to all children either through the school or through an equivalent stream of Non-Formal Education.

NFE amounts to marginalization of the formal school system. Indeed, the policy has advocated other parallel layers of school system as well, e.g. Navodaya Vidyalaya or the Vocational stream of post-secondary schools. Government's support to private schools through income-tax benefits, subsidy on land, recognition by examination Boards and provision of teachers trained at public costs etc. also falls in the same category.

This also contradicts policy's commitment to Common School System. It has meant that no serious effort will be made towards equitable education for all children.

Compared to formal school system, the successive plans have allocated resources several fold less to NFE. Is the government telling us that half of the children who do not go to schools can be educated in the NFE system at much less cost? If so, why not send all children to NFE, including the children of the bureaucrats and multi-national executives?

NFE was conceived as a farce because policy was not serious about UEE.

Further evidence comes from the fact that, instead of constituting NEEM, the government constitutes a National Literacy Mission (NLM). Remember, adult illiterates exist as a result of the failure of UEE in all these years. Instead of giving priority to UEE, the government diverts national attention to NLM.

The policy started only one programme for the direct improvement of the school system viz Operation Black Board. The VIIth Plan allocated Rs. 800 crores for NLM, but only Rs. 400 crores for Operation Black Board. Yet, the government kept on saying that they have no resources.

The government made a conscious attempt to confuse the historic lessons from the Kerala experience by focusing national attention on Ernakulum experiment, and reporting the experiment out of historical context.

NLM when crores of children were denied provision of education is rather like trying to mop the floor dry while keeping the tap on. The floor will never dry. NLM will be in business for a long, long time; because government ensures that children are not educated. What else can we have but illiterate adults needing NLM?

The post-Jomtien phase: World Bank enters the Indian education scene as part of the structural adjustment programme. Rs. 2000 crore loan succeeds in skewing national priorities in violation of Constitutional obligations.

The designs of parallel layers of educational systems have increased in the post-Jomtien phase, for example, making NLM classes accessible to 9-14 age group, institution of alternative schools by DPEP and the much acclaimed Education Guarantee Scheme (EGS) of Madhya Pradesh. It is interesting to note how hastily the Union government accepted the EGS of Madhya Pradesh as a model for the entire country and allocated hundreds of crores of rupees for introducing EGS in all States. Yet the same government refuses to undertake

any credible programme for improvement of the government schools.

Conclusion

The present education system in South Asia is marked by low access; poor quality and low standards; gender, social, and economic inequities; and low levels of public investment. The region is caught "in a vicious circle of low enrolment, low levels of literacy, low levels of educated labor force, lower rates of economic growth, and lower levels of living" The low level of educational development in South Asia has constrained "the immediate potential for human resource led development," and it has also "stunted the future prospects for rapid human development in the region" (Haq and Haq 1998, p. 34). Some countries have realized the importance of education and taken several new policy initiatives, but not all of these initiatives are necessarily conducive for the development of sustainable education systems of high quality. Cultural factors such as notions of a girl's proper age for marriage, anxiety about the sexuality and sexual safety of daughters, and the division of labor at home (with women in charge of domestic and childcare tasks) affect girl's enrolment and both primary and secondary school completion. In India and many sub-Saharan countries, where strong cultural norms require early marriage, parents often consider puberty as the cutoff for schooling. The most important factors responsible for the poor educational status of South Asian countries are the lack of political commitment to education and the lack of social will to exert pressures on the political elite. Political activism is completely lacking, though social will is slowly being built, providing a ray of hope for the betterment of education in South Asia.

The Qualitative Challenge

- The medium of instruction in school is a key factor in determining meaningful completion of primary schooling.
- If the medium of instruction in school is a language not spoken at home, particularly when parents are illiterate,

then learning problems accumulate and chances of dropping out increase.

- Education systems fail to take into account the special circumstances of working children who want to go to school.
- The key need in South Asia is not just to bring all children to school but to improve, the ability of these schools to teach children effectively. This is a challenge that all countries in the region have yet to meet.
- Teachers must be at the centre of any plan for raising school quality.
- Pre-service training of teachers must be school-based.
- A better career path for primary school teachers must be created within the primary school system.
- The status of primary school teachers must be raised increasing salaries, improving work conditions and creating career opportunities.
- The Minimum level of general academic education should be raised for all primary teachers.
- The problem is further aggravated with one sixth of the teachers untrained and poor quality teacher-training.
- Most teachers have completed less than 10 years of schooling. They have often not studied core subjects, such as mathematics and the language of instruction beyond grade 8 or 10.
- Teacher salaries in many countries are lower than those paid to cooks or chauffeurs.
- Many of the teaching problems in South Asia are a result of poor pedagogy. Teachers resort to lecture methods, rote-learning and forbid questioning.
- Pre-service programmes often dissociate subject matter (context) and pedagogy (teaching methods).

- In-service programmes rarely build on teachers own experiences.
- The entire teacher training model is often contradictory to the pedagogical model required.
- Primary school teachers are often taught by trainers who themselves have had no experience of primary school teaching.
- The curriculum in teacher education needs to be drastically altered. What is required is not more of the same - more time, more subjects, and more courses - but rather a complete transformation of the conventional teacher education model prevalent in South Asia.
- The pedagogical skills that teachers need to acquire in South Asia are quite different from those that are taught in teacher-training.
- Half of the world's education battle for females lies in India, Pakistan and Bangladesh.
- Sri Lanka and Maldives have already achieved gender parity in primary education.
- Support government policies are essential to tackle the problem of girl's education. This would include development and economic policies and specific policy measures to promote education amongst girls.
- School-related factors play an important role in motivating girls to enrol and stay in schools.
- Numerous studies show that enrolment rates for girls improve and drop-out rates reduce significantly with female teachers in schools.

Gender Gaps

- South Asia's primary enrolment gap between boys and girls at 23 percentage points, is the largest in the world.
- The male-female secondary level enrolment gap at 19 percentage points is also the largest in the world.
- Mean years of schooling for girls are one-third that of boys.
- The gender disparity in literacy was reduced by only 10% in South Asia in the last 15 years, this reduction being lower than most of the other regions of the world.

The Challenge of Engendering Education

- Investment in girls' education has the highest pay off in terms of higher income opportunities, better nutrition and health for the entire family, lower infant mortality rate and increasing decocratization of society.
- Educating girls yields a higher rate of return than any other investment.

- Other important factors are flexible school timings, toilet facilities in school and relevant and gender sensitive curricula.

Failing to Prioritise

- South Asian governments allocate an average of only 10.9 percent of their budgets to education which is much lower than other regions.
- Income poverty is no barrier to the spread of basic education.
- The high drop-out and retention rates imply that over 40 percent of the investment is wasted.
- South Asian governments have spent only \$12 billion on education during 1996 while committing approximately 70 billion to defence.
- The allocation for primary education is generally less than one-half of the total educational budget.

The Responsibility of the State

- Spending less than an additional one percent of South Asia's combined GNP can ensure universal primary education.
- Even a freeze on current military spending will increase sufficient resources for universal primary education.

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Sufism and Urbanization in South Asia with Special Reference to Medieval Rajasthan : A Case Study

Syed Mohd Amir

Abstract

The Dargahs of the Sufi saints served as a place of salvation, cure and rejuvenation for the society. Hence these places became centers of attraction. The simple structured Dargahs became complex in nature and hubs of more activities. The activities multiplied with the growth of time and society. There were changes like connected activities of complex buildings, increase in population, both floating and fixed, heterogeneous professions and more economical transactions and so on. These activities have resulted in a change of total the demography' of an ordinary village into urban centers. This process of development shows how an ordinary place got changed into urban centers due to Sufism. This paper is a modest attempt to understand these changes through case study in a few urban centres.

“Surely the noblest among you in the sight of Allah is he who is the most righteous of you”

(Qur'an: Chap.49, Verse 13)

It is a well known historical fact that in spreading the ethical and spiritual values of Islam, major and effective contributions have been made by the Sufis of Allah. It was their humanism, disposition and piety, which won over the hearts of hundreds of people. They contacted the masses directly. They served and loved them. They lived with them and inspired them in the realization of Eternal Truth. They did it all through their own great moral power, glorious and appealing character, with love and dedication to humanity, without any worldly resources of wealth, power, and force of support.

Sufism has brought many changes to the soil of India. Development of urbanization is one of them. So far as urbanization is concerned, it is the physical growth of urban areas as a result of global

change. It can also be defined as movement of people from rural to urban areas with population growth equating to urban migration. It is closely linked to modernization, industrialization, and the sociological process of rationalization. The Sufi saints felt that people should live in harmony irrespective of differences in religion, language, cast, custom, class, style etc.

They gave a healing touch to many difficult problems of life in which human society was struggling to raise its head above such trivialities. The Dargahs of the Sufi saints served as a place of salvation, cure and rejuvenation for the society. Hence these places became centers of attraction. The simple structured Dargahs became complex in nature and hubs of more activities. The activities multiplied with the growth of time and society. There were changes like connected activities of complex buildings, increase in population, both floating and fixed, heterogeneous professions and more

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economical transactions and so on. These activities have resulted in a change of total the demography' of an ordinary village into urban centers. This process of development shows how an ordinary place got changed into urban centers due to Sufism. This paper is a modest attempt to understand these changes through case study in a few urban centres.

No doubt, the role of the Sufis, in spreading the message of love and devotion, made them popular among different strata of people. Consequently, large number of people started together in and around the seat of the saint, '*Khanqahs*'. Many of the areas about Sufis have been studied by the scholars' during the medieval society. As a result, an enormous corpus of literature has emerged on various aspects related to Sufis and Sufism. One of the most significant areas where the Sufi's contribution seems to be very effective was the growth of urban centers.

Assemblage of people in large numbers at a place played a positive role in the process of urbanization. Earlier the saints preferred was to stay in remote areas but later on their popularity made these areas more populous and thus these places gradually developed into townships and big urban centers. These large settlements containing large number of people attracted the attention of the traders and shopkeepers. Even the followers of the saints themselves adopted some minor trading activities for their livelihood. Islam too accepted trade and commerce as a preferred profession. The Sufis' settlement gave it a further fillip.¹ Thus, commercial enterprise, a prerequisite for sustaining any urban centre was embedded in the Sufi philosophy and catapulted the growth of urban centers.² Those centers where the Sufis established their Khanqahs and after death their *Mazaras* (mausoleum), attracted large number of people to flock to the towns and cities, giving rise to a growing urban population.³

These dargahs became a symbol of power both *spiritual in the sense* of association with God and fulfillment of

earthly dreams through acceptance of prayer and *secular in the sense* that all people belonging to any religion or caste visit these dargahs to receive the blessings (*Barakat*) of their divine and charismatic Saints. Fulfillment of the desires of the needy and the miracles (*superhuman qualities of the Sufi saints*) were believed to be the basic force behind the evolution of those spiritual centers of worship and that rather contributed the growth of the popular and composite culture in various regions in Rajasthan. The Dargah thus plays an important socio-religious role, and has done so since early medieval times. In certain cases, the dargah has played a more significant role in the cultural integration of different religious communities in the Indian sub-continent than the Sufi saint, did in his own life time.⁴

The devotion it has commanded over the centuries is reflected in the records that have come down to us.

1. Chronicles
2. Documents
3. Inscriptions
4. Tazkiras
5. Malfuzat
6. Shajras
7. Ruqat, etc.

The two most popular urban centers, Ajmer and Nagaur were considered, as *Kaba* of Chishtiya silsila.⁵ Besides these, Fatehpur, Khattu, Narhad, Didwana, Jhunjhunu, Pali and Gagraon are the main urban centers Sufis visited or permanently settled in Rajasthan. The devotion of the Mughal rulers and local Zamindars to the saints also played a significant role in the development of a place into an urban centre. The information about Sufis' saints and their activities in Rajasthan is available in abundance.

Following are the main important urban centers of Rajasthan, where either Sufis, visited or permanently settled in -
1. Ajmer 2. Nagaur 3. Fatehpur 4. Jhunjhunu 5. Kattu 6. Narhad 7. Didwana 8. Gagraon (Sambhar) 9. Pali 10. Singhana 11. Amarsar 12. Mandal 13. Narnaul etc.⁶

The teachings of the Sufi saints had a great impact on the people of different social strata irrespective of religion caste and creed. The gathering of large number of people in and around the seat of the dargah gave boost up to the new settlement around which small trading activities were started and gradually big markets were developed as the number of devotees increased and the settlement expanded. On the occasion of annual celebrations (*Urs*) and *Muharram* large number of pilgrims from outside also gave impetus to the trading activities. The construction activities of the Mughal rulers in these areas created employment opportunities for different kinds of people. Large number of skilled and unskilled workers gathered there and thus enlarged the population of the area.

Apart from the residential houses, other construction, for example, reservoirs, *bazaars*, *mosques*, *sarais*, building tanks, wells, hospitals, *madarsa*, *maktabs*, gardens, streets and other public utility works were undertaken.⁷ The communication system both by road and if possible by river, were improved, linking the town with other major urban centres of the region.⁸ The urban course of development was also affected by the extent to which the kings wished to invest in a particular town.⁹

Ajmer: The Tomb of **Khwaja Moinuddin Chishti** is considered as the most celebrated of all Sufi shrines in India. It has become a symbol of unity & integrity. The sayings of Khwaja reveal him as a man of wide sympathies, catholic views and deep humanism. The entire structure of his thought stood on the bedrock of love and humanity and removal of suffering & distress. His shrine became a focal centre of humanistic learning of universal brotherhood, generosity, affection and hospitality to all. Today, he is called by the people as '*Gharib Nawaz*' a person who cares for poor people.¹⁰ It is worth mentioning here that a number of *Khadims* are attached & served the Dargah performing all sorts of rituals, managing the affairs of the holy place and looking after & even

guiding the pilgrims, for the past eight centuries. In this way, the Dargah of Khwaja Moinuddin Chishti since its inception had assumed the position of a great urban centre, venerated, visited by devotees from all walks of life, different caste, creeds and religions, etc.

Ajmer centrally situated in Rajasthan, was known by various names.¹¹ It was founded at the foot of the hills on which stands the renowned fort now called Taragarh. In a final battle, Prithviraj III defeated by Mohammad Ghori in 1192 A.D. and he took possession of Ajmer.¹² After a long time, Akbar obtained its possession and made it the headquarters for his operation in Rajputana and Gujarat. Ajmer enjoyed a sort of peace under the Mughal rulers.¹³ According to *Akbarnama*,¹⁴ Akbar visited Ajmer several times, and consequently the route from Agra to Ajmer developed. Large numbers of sarais were constructed and got the benefit of traders. These *sarais* were furnished with *lodging*, *wells*, *mosques*, *muezzins* and *imams*, separate boards for the Muslims and Hindus and fodder for their animals.¹⁵

The annual visits of Akbar to the Chishti Shrine at Ajmer naturally enhanced its prestige and development of shrine. The frequent visits also benefited the people settled around it. Large numbers of buildings were constructed by his order. This created employment opportunities for large number of city-dwellers. Artisans, masons, building workers, water-carriers and stone cutters got employment. Employment opportunities must have attracted large number of craftsman and skilled labours from outside Ajmer. This had enlarged the urban population of the city.

Nagaur Town: Nagaur had been a well known centre of Sufis. It is said that it reached a peak during the period of *Shaikh Hamaiduddin Nagauri* and *Qazi Hamiduddin Nagauri*. Nagore, mostly populated by Jains and Bishnois, emerged as an important centre of learning under the leadership of **Sheikh Hamiduddin Nagori**. He became a popular figure in Nagore

because of his politeness and wide human sympathies. He was very much involved for providing education to people residing in Nagaur and its suburbs. Nagaur was a place of great antiquity.¹⁶ During Mughal rule over Nagaur, during the reign of Akbar, several mosques were constructed.¹⁷ The famous saints Rehani, Shaikh Hamiduddin, Qazi Hameeduddin etc. resided at Nagaur and propagated the teachings of love and affection to all.¹⁸

Nagaur was well connected with urban centers as Ajmer. The expansion of routes in any region depends on numerous factors, particularly its geographical conditions favorable to traveling, the volume of trade, the nature of occupation of the bulk of the people and the attitude of the state. Besides these, an important element in the trade system is the travelers and the merchants, who played a vital role in the exploration of routes. There are people who made the world known by moving relentlessly from east to west and north to south.¹⁹ With the coming of the Turks and Mughals and with the industrial and agricultural development, attention was given to Rajasthan traffic, in order to join new marts, to find new roads for the marching armies etc.²⁰ Thus, the town is a good marketing and trade centre for the adjoining rural population. Muslim families of the town are also known for their expert knowledge of dyeing and printing of *chundaris* and *saris*.²¹ Its location on the Mughal highway and many trade routes also proved favorable for its development in urban centres. In *Akbarnama*,²² there are references to several routes from Agra to Ahmadabad.

Narhad Town: It was a flourishing town in the past which is clear from the old remains of temples, images and other buildings.²³ In the 14th century, the mint town itself remained a place of pilgrimage in early and later medieval period. This place was ruled by the Pathan in the 14th and 15th century and a famous mosque was built during the reign of Pathans.²⁴ The Piraji of Narhad was the Diwan of Muinuddin Chishti of Ajmer. His

name was Fariduddin Shakkerganj. During the rule of Pathans, wells were constructed for the purpose of cultivation.²⁵

Fatehpur Town: In this town, there is a dargah of Pir Haji Nizamuddin Chishti (Nazmuddin), where an annual *urs* fair is held.²⁶ Here, for commercial purpose, the famous *Churan Chatni*, ayurvedic medicines, *agarbatti*, *itar*, *zafran*, *pamasala* and candles were sold and also exported.²⁷

Sikar Town: There is a dargah of Hazrat Shah Wali Mohammad Chishti, where an annual *urs* is held.²⁸

Jhunjhunu Town: According to the sources, the family members of the Shaikh Kamaluddin dispersed and settled at different places considered as Jhunjhunu, Sikar and Fatehpur. Shaikh Abdul Qadir was contemporary of Akbar who gifted a *mauza bakara* at the distance of 3 (three) *Kos* of southern Jhunjhunu to Shaikh. A madrasa was started in Jhunjhunu town namely Qamrul-Islam, after a well known and greatly respected Muslim saints of the district, Hazrat Shah Qamruddin.²⁹

Singhana Town: The *mazaar* of Shah Ghulam Imam *nicknamed* Shaikh Manu who died 1793, is situated in the area of *qasba* Singhana.³⁰

Pali Town: The *mazaar* of Shaikh Ghulam Muinuddin *nicknamed* Chandshah, is situated in the area of Pali.³¹

Given above is a cursory survey of the Sufi activities in the different towns of Rajasthan. These centers became the place of love and affection. Adoption of local customs and traditions by the Sufi saints also played an important role in promoting the concept of brotherhood, which also became an important factor for the expansion of the Sufi areas in the urban centers.

Despite many structural changes and erosions in the landed property of dargahs over a period of time, the intensity of devotion of the people of different faith could not be diminished as evidenced by the exorbitant participation in religious activities held at these dargahs in Rajasthan and its

suburbs. Besides, dargahs also maintained the management of *musafirkhana*, which remained busy round the year. The religious sanctity of these places might have been official neglected. But when it is generally asked to the people present in these dargahs for prayers that from how long they are coming to these places, they remember their grand parents or even sometimes their great-grand parents visiting these dargahs.

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Poverty Alleviation through the Rural Non-Farm Sector Development: An Overview of Bangladesh Experiences

Biswajit Choudhury

Abstract

Bangladesh shows the important role that the rural non-farm sector has played an important role in limiting rural poverty, particularly where land ownership is skewed, labour force growth remains high, and movement of other rural areas with higher earnings potential remains difficult for sociological or economic reasons. The availability of non-farm wage or self-employment has also tended to tighten rural labour markets for landless labour and provide a floor for their wage rate. Given the scale of poverty in Bangladesh, there is a need to ensure that the poor continue to have access to non-farm activities as productivity increases. This will require that new distortions are not be introduced in rural labour markets; efforts continue to improve the access of the poor to education and health services and to credit and skills for micro-enterprises; that public safety net programmes are well targeted.)

Introduction

From the very beginning of its independence, the issue of poverty alleviation has been pursued as the major development objective in Bangladesh like the other developing countries of Asia, Africa and Latin America. Despite the considerable progress, the issue of poverty is still widespread in both rural and urban areas calling for adoption of more effective approaches in dealing with weaknesses in the policy framework and deficiencies in the implementation mechanism and associated institutional arrangements. Over the years, the anti-poverty policy framework in Bangladesh has put emphasis on the pursuit of a two-pronged strategy of accelerated labour-intensive growth and human resources development of the poor. The formulation and implementation of such a strategy require regular and comprehensive information, particularly on the nature and processes of poverty, for meaningful poverty assessment and to help in identifying the factors that contribute to and spread poverty.

Poverty alleviation and social sector development have been the core issues in development planning in Bangladesh since 1971. Among the least developed countries in Asia, Bangladesh is among the most densely populated (866 per square kilometre) countries in the world with a population of 124.8 million squeezed into 144,000 square kilometres (Rahman 2002). Urbanization is low but infant mortality rate is high. The share of manufacturing is low but the rate of growth of the manufacturing sector is high. Bangladesh is a delta, mostly plains through which the Ganges and the Brahmaputra flow to reach the Bay of Bengal.

In Bangladesh, development projects of agriculture, rural development, primary and mass education, health and family welfare, women and children affairs and labour and employment are considered under the poverty alleviation programmes. The social sector includes all poverty-related programmes minus agriculture plus education, youth and sports, mass communication, cultural affairs and public administration.

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As a pre-given idea of outer world¹, a poor person is considered as one without job, who cannot help himself or cater to his family, who has no money, farm or business. Adolescent males and females are poor if they have no parents, no education, no good food, clothes and health. A poor person is described as one who is undernourished and ageing fast, one without self confidence, looks dirty and lives in filthy environment, one who cannot cater to his family, train his children in the school and unable to pay medical bills.

The Millennium Development Goals: Bangladesh Progress Report, jointly prepared by the UN and the Government of Bangladesh, notes how Bangladesh is steadily keeping on track in meeting the UN Millennium Development Goals. For Bangladesh, the goals include lowering the poverty rate to 29.4 percent, providing 100 percent universal primary education, reducing of child mortality to 50 per thousand live births, improving of maternal health to 143 or less fatalities in one hundred thousand natal conditions, and ensuring environmental sustainability by 20 percent, all by the year 2015. The report found that the pace of poverty reduction, which registered an average of 9.2 percent during the decade of 1991 to 2000, had picked up since Bangladesh entered the new millennium with a poverty level at 49.8 percent of the population. In related fields of human development, the report showed that the enrollment rate at primary schools, including those of various denominations, rose to 82.7 percent in 2003 compared to 73.7 percent in 1992. The child mortality rate fell to 82 per 1,000 live births compared to 151 in 1990. During the last decade of the second millennium, maternal mortality per hundred thousand births had already come down from 570 to 320. Environmental sustainability went up by 1.2 per cent as the proportion of forest cover of land mass increased from 9 to 10.2 percent. Not many countries at Bangladesh's level of income can list so many of these achievements (UNDP 2005).

Poverty Discourse in Bangladesh

Although poverty in South Asian Sub-Continent was a subject of interest during the British Colonial period (Jack 1916; Siddiqui 1982), there was only one research on this issue during the Pakistan period 1947-71 (Siddiqui 1982). Poverty began to attract the attention of researchers after the famine of 1974 and the decade saw a number of studies mainly devoted to counting up the poor. Only Alamgir (1978) and Griffin (1977) tried to provide macro level analysis of the poverty process in the country. Alamgir had developed a Marxist analysis of poverty. Griffin sought to understand the problem in terms of a high level of inequality and the dominance of the rich on the state machinery. Two ethnographic studies, however, were significant in exploring rural poverty. In Jhagrapur, Arens and Beurden (1977) provided a graphic account of the livelihoods of the poor and the process of exploitation in a village of Kushtia with special focus on women from a Marxist perspective. In 1977 Siddiqui (1982) mounted a meticulous study of poverty in a village of Narail again from a Marxist perspective, which tried to link micro level poverty with macro societal processes. Hartman and Boyce (1979; 1983) undertook an ethnographic study of a Rangpur village and underscored patron-clientelism and parochialism as the key instrument that kept the poor dependent, fearful and voiceless.

A particularly speculative but influential study on poverty of 1980s was undertaken by Maloney (1986) who sought to explore deep behavioural and cultural contours in Bangladesh that led to the perpetuation of poverty in the country. Central to his analysis is the fact that the 'overall socio-economic texture' of Bangladesh society was traditional. A particular drawback of this traditional society was his notion of atomistic individualism characteristic of the Gangetic delta that impedes crystallization of collective efforts and durable organizations and thus prevents modernization from taking place. The

negative behavioural traits of Bangladeshis that he found as obstacles to development include: reliance on patronage and indulgence, personalization of authority, which causes weak institutions and policies, authoritarian administration, opportunistic individualism, low commitment to abstract ideologies, weak socialization that leads to low self-discipline and a lack of trust in modern institutions. The political institutions were not able to lift the country out of poverty. Politics was a mere contest for power without commitment to ideologies. Maloney did not rule out the possibility for development but he clearly pointed out that the task of poverty alleviation was not easy either given the enormous burden of a traditional social structure embedded in an inhospitable ecological niche. Maloney did have some disclaimers, but there is no doubt that his analysis is highly dated and represented a crude form of orientalism.

More detailed studies of poverty have become available from 1990s onward. While there are five key data sources for understanding poverty in the country, the most important is the Household Expenditure Survey (HES), which started in 1973-74 and so far 13 rounds of these surveys have been conducted (BBS 2002). But HES data have been generally reliable from 1990s (Rahman 2002). The second major data source is The Analysis of Poverty Trends (APT) undertaken by Bangladesh Institute of Development Studies (BIDS) and later on Power and Participation Research Centre (PPRC) since 1989. Under this programme four comprehensive surveys of poverty in 62 villages have been conducted in an attempt to capture the multi-dimensional nature deprivation of rural Bangladesh. The unique feature of this study is the use of panel data (Rahman 2002). A third source is the information on the nutritional status of children collected by Helen Keller International from 1990. A fourth source is the nutritional data provided irregularly by the Institute of Nutrition and Food Sciences (Rahman 2002). A fifth source is the survey of 32 villages conducted by IRRI in 1987-88 and 2000. Apart from these a number of

specific surveys and qualitative studies have been carried out with a view to understand poverty in specific circumstances and at greater depths. One product of this type of study is 19 reports published by PROSHIKA under its *The Livelihoods of the Extreme Poor Study*.

Although most of these studies have been preoccupied with counting the poor, Rahman and Sen (Rahman 1996; Sen 1996; Sen and Rahman 1999; Sen 2003) have particularly moved towards an analysis of the dynamics of poverty-the process through which poverty is created and the social mechanism that generates upward mobility out of poverty and downward mobility into it. From the above mentioned studies several broad characteristics of poverty in Bangladesh have been identified (Rahman 2002; BBS 2001; BBS 2002; Sen 2003; Mujeri 1997). These are discussed below:

- Whatever is the correct figure it is clear that poverty in Bangladesh has declined about one percent per year (Rahman 2002) or at best 1.8 percent (GOB 2002) during the 1990s which is an extremely slow improvement. The decrease has been equally slow in the case of hard-core poverty.
- It also documents that extreme manifestations of poverty such as lack of minimum clothing or basic shelter or starvation have declined.
- There has been a faster reduction of poverty in urban areas.
- There has been an increasing concentration of poverty among the female headed households. The incidence of female-headed households may be as high as 15 percent with a heavy concentration of poverty among them (Mannan 2000). HIES data, however, provides a more complex scenario. The female-headed households were subject to extreme poverty much more than the male-headed households. But there was little difference in terms of absolute poverty among male and female-headed

households. The absolute poverty was slightly higher among the male-headed households in rural areas while the opposite prevailed in urban areas (BBS 2002).

- There are significant regional variations of poverty. Rajshahi has the highest rate of poverty - 61 percent in contrast to Barisal, which has 40 percent only (Sen 2003). Poverty is more pronounced in some areas and regions of the country, which suffer from flooding, river erosion, mono cropping and similar disadvantages.
- The decline in absolute poverty has been accompanied by an increase in relative poverty. The BBS data show that inequality rose during 1990s, but at a higher rate in urban areas than the countryside.
- The non-economic dimensions of poverty have registered a dramatic change in contrast to slow reduction in income poverty. The human poverty index fell from 61.3 percent in 1981-83 to 34.8 percent in 1998-2000. The human development index had nearly doubled in three decades between 1960 and 1992. It increased from 0.166 to 0.309. The frontier of human development has expanded faster in 1990s. During 1992 and 1998-99 it increased by 8.8 percent per year. There has been significant progress in child nutrition since the independence of the country. The rate of stunting has been on decline from the middle of 1980s. One survey found that the rate of stunting fell from 54.6 in 1996/97 to 44.8 percent in 1999-2000. The literacy crossed 60 percent in 1999. The gross enrollment at primary level increased from 59 percent in 1982 to 96 percent in 1999. There has been impressive progress in the reduction of infant and child mortality. The life expectancy has increased (BIDS 2001).

Meaning of Poverty Alleviation for Bangladesh

From 1973 the successive development plans in Bangladesh have highlighted the issue of poverty alleviation for the country itself. The plans also prepared a number of strategies to face the challenge. The First Five-Year Plan (1973-1978) had laid stress more on a socialistic restructuring of the economy so that the benefits of development could be distributed more equitably among the different groups of people. In a sense, the Plan was pre-occupied more with the task of post-independence economic reconstruction and the international economic crisis arising from the oil price hike than with the poverty problem of the country.

The Two-Year Plan (1978-1980) was expected to give the country a direction for future planning and development. However it got bogged down with the task of rationalizing the portfolio of on-going projects in the face of acute resource shortage.

The Second Five-Year Plan (1980-1985) of Bangladesh focused on poverty reduction through growth of income and employment. Growth with equity through expansion of employment was expected to raise the purchasing power. For poverty alleviation, planners provided incentive to agricultural support and agro-process industries as these would contribute to the development of the rural economy.

The Third Five-Year Plan (1985-1990) of Bangladesh relegated poverty alleviation which is defined as 'satisfaction of basic needs of the people' to sixth position among eight pronounced objectives. Employment generation through the dynamic private sector, satisfaction of minimum basic need through increased supply and higher income as well as faster economic growth was expected to take care of poverty.

The Fourth Five-Year Plan (1990-1995) held poverty alleviation and

employment generation through human resource development as one of its major objectives. The plan emphasized the resilience of the poor and the disadvantaged groups to survive against most adverse circumstances. When properly organized and supported, these economically backward groups could show resourcefulness, in terms of savings, investment as well as technology adaptation and entrepreneurship. The Fourth Five-Year Plan attempted to integrate sector-based planning with socio-economic group-based planning in order to ensure greater poverty alleviation along with economic growth. According to the Fourth Five-Year Plan, it would be necessary to formulate special projects for the poor and the disadvantaged group to alleviate poverty after direct integration with sectoral programmes. Apart from the explicit recognition of the socio-economic dynamics for poverty alleviation, the Fourth Five-Year Plan was formulated under the constraints of a Structural Adjustment Programme (SAP) which adversely affected the poor and the disadvantaged.

The Fifth Five-Year Plan (1997-2002) aims to alleviate poverty through accelerated economic growth on average of an annual 7 percent to bring about a noticeable improvement in the living standard of the people by raising their level of income and meeting their basic needs. Other objectives of the Fifth Five-Year Plan were to: (a) Alleviate poverty through employment generation and to raising at least half the people below poverty line above that level (b) Develop socio-economic infrastructure with special emphasis on human resources development in a science and technology based society (c) Distribute the benefits of economic development equitably with provision of safety net for the most vulnerable people and accelerated development of backward areas and (d) Reduce gender disparity.

An overview of these Five-Year Plans of Bangladesh Government on rural development indicates that poverty

alleviation has always been a core concern of the development trajectory. It also depicts a trend of priority attachment to poverty alleviation in terms of objectives and strategies. A follow-up review of these policy statements, however, manifests that, in effect, in most cases, no serious attempts have been made to translate such policies into concrete programmes and projects within a coherent institutional framework. As a result the sectoral programmes particularly in agriculture, health, social welfare, infrastructure development, water resource development etc. were designed in isolation without having considerable focus on poverty alleviation. Even with the existing institutional framework there has been a noticeable lack of coordination in the management of the projects on poverty alleviation carried out by different agencies of the GOB as well as NGOs (Aminuzzaman and Nunn 1993).

Quibria (1997) reflects the issues like Bangladesh reforms since 1991 and its impact on self-sufficiency. Human resource development through alleviation of poverty remains one of the prime objectives of development effort in the country for which the accelerated growth and expansion of employment opportunities are highly emphasised. Income inequality, poverty trends, institutional development, equitable access, empowerment, sustainability and long term management of resources are important issues that are discussed in the book. The hardcore poor and vulnerable poor are major distinction of rural poor profile for which separate policies and safety nets are required. The poor are in a better position to realise the real opportunities to improve their quality of the life than the existing institutional mechanisms to help them. Poverty situation in Bangladesh suggests that the majority of the rural poor are marginal and landless farmers, agricultural labourers and other asset less non-agricultural workers. Generally rural workers can be divided into three categories- self employed, regular wage/salary earners and casual labourers.

Approaches towards Poverty Alleviation in Bangladesh

Since independence, Bangladesh has virtually become a laboratory for design and experimentation of different rural development models and approaches. Different agencies of Government of Bangladesh (GOB), international donors and the Non-Government Organizations (NGOs) have experimented with different models and approaches of institution building for rural and local level development (Holtsberg 1990). The goals, objectives and strategies for implementation of these experimental approaches, however, varied depending on the sponsor of the projects. But the alleviation of poverty has always been one of the core objectives of those experimental approaches. In spite of all these different institutional and experimental interventions over the years, alleviation of poverty still remains a major challenge for Bangladesh (Jahan 1991). Given the present trends in population and economic growth and the absence of a concerted plan of action at poverty alleviation, experts fear that poverty scenario in Bangladesh would be even worse in the years to come (GOB 1991; SAARC 1992; BIDS 1993).

In fact the process of institution building from the perspective of development management refers to a system that functions in relation to their environments in which organizational structures and procedures match the tasks, products, people, resources and the contexts it deals with. Institution building is intimately concerned with the exchange of resources where economic and political relationships intertwine to create varying patterns of implementation network and intervention packages (Gustafson 1994; Brinkerhoff and Goldsmith 1992; Ahmed 1992). Like many other developing countries, Bangladesh has undertaken various efforts for improving the socio-economic conditions of the poor through institution building approach. However, several issues like national and sectoral policies, inter-agency coordination and

structural requirements have hampered the institution building efforts geared to address poverty and under-development.

In the mid 1960s, the *Comilla* Model of cooperative received international fame as an alternative approach for rural development for the resource poor countries (Aminuzzaman 1985). However, in the post independent Bangladesh with the changed socio-economic and political reality, the *Comilla* model virtually became redundant. Since then given the high level of poverty and extreme dependence on foreign aid, Bangladesh practically became a veritable laboratory for rural development and poverty alleviation interventions. As a matter of fact, in the absence of a comprehensive transparent policy, rural development has become a patchwork of public and private initiatives and interventions (Willmann 1990; Siddiqui 1985; Jones 1982; Holtsberg 1992). Wide variety of intervention packages have been developed by the GOB agencies as well as the NGOs. These interventions have been mostly financed by the bilateral or multi-lateral donor agencies. All such interventions can broadly be classified under three different project approaches (Aminuzzaman 1997):

- Direct Capability-Raising Projects,
- Growth-Oriented Projects with a Strong Immediate Impact on Poverty,
- Targeted Special Employment Schemes for the Poor.

‘The Direct Capability-Raising Projects’ address poverty indirectly through enforcing higher investment in social sectors like health and education leading to enhancement of human capabilities and to the improvement of standard of living indicators. These projects, in effect do not have any direct impact on employment or income generation.

‘The Growth-Oriented Projects with a Strong Immediate Impact on Poverty’ is based on the assumption that poverty can be addressed through fostering a higher growth

process by way of complex interplay of macro-economic policy instruments suitably framed to sustain a reasonable growth in certain sectors which will have a 'trickle down' effect and thus increase the income of the rural poor.

Again 'the Targeted Special Employment Schemes for the Poor' was developed in 1984 by the Government of Bangladesh as a new Strategy for Rural Development Projects (SRDP). The strategy emphasized the inclusion of Rural Poor Projects (RPP) as a component of all future rural and area development programmes. In line with the strategy, a number of new generations of Area Development Programmes were negotiated and launched with a RPP component. Under these Area Development Programmes a targeted self-employment scheme has been implemented with varying degrees of input support such as credit, training and extension services. These schemes have been designed to promote collective ventures of the landless-poor through formation of groups and cooperatives. Under these programmes assets are transferred to the target groups on collective basis e.g. joint cultivation of land, pisciculture, irrigation, power tiller schemes run by the landless groups and cooperatives. In almost all cases Bangladesh Rural Development Board (BRDB) was assigned to implement the programme. In addition to these approaches, GOB also took some special programmes like Food for Works (FFW), Vulnerable Groups Feeding etc. to address seasonal rural unemployment and the causes of destitute women.

Moreover, the approaches and interventions for rural development and poverty alleviation in Bangladesh have been discussed under five different institutional models such as (Aminuzzaman 1997):

- Bangladesh Rural Development Board Model,
- Donor-Line Agency Collaboration,
- NGO-Government Collaboration Model,

- Poverty Alleviation Projects (PAPs) of Large NGOs,
- Small and Local NGO projects.

(a) Bangladesh Rural Development Board Model

Bangladesh Rural Development Board (BRDB) was assigned to develop the cooperative system and implement various rural development programmes. BRDB is the largest institutional set-up of the GOB which is directly engaged in organizing and managing rural development and poverty alleviation programme in Bangladesh. Eighty five percent of the BRDB efforts are carried out in the form of projects in which 91 percent of the share is contributed by different multilateral and bilateral Donor organizations (Interchain 1990). BRDB has been undertaking group-based loan operations through cooperatives. This is perhaps the largest institutional effort in the country to address the socio-economic needs of the rural people. It was initially set up for the agricultural sector; BRDB later diversified its services to incorporate the assetless men and women as well. With a two-tier cooperative structure, there are primary societies at the field level which have three-fold divisions: *Bittahin Samabay Samity (BSS)* for the landless and poorest of the poor, *Krishak Samabay Samity (KSS)* for the farmers, and *Mahila Bittahin Samabay Samity (MBSS)* for the destitute women. The coordination of activities of the above three types of societies in an area is done at the *Thana* level by the respective *Thana* level Central Cooperative Society (BRDB 1991).

(b) Donor-Line Agency Collaboration

In this approach poverty alleviation projects are designed at least on paper by the GOB and selected Donor agency. However, in reality most of these projects have been the products of different mission reports commissioned by the donor. In fact, on the whole, these projects are the manifestations of the Donors' disbelief in the capability of GOB Agencies. Under this model a specific GOB line agency is formally assigned to run the project while the Donors provide a

Project Advisory Team. The Donors usually impose elaborate project specific institutional arrangements. The project is managed by an international project management firm with highly salaried expatriate resident advisers and consultants.

There are many different variations in project design regarding the distribution of actual decision making and management responsibilities between the donor appointed Chief Technical Advisor (CTA)/ Chief Project Coordinator (CPC) and the Line agency appointed Project Director (PD). In most projects the final decision making authority lies in the hand of the CTA/ CPC. Some projects have developed a system of 'dual authority' between the CTA/CPC and the PD (Raquib 1992).

(c) NGO-Government Collaboration Model

Another emerging model in PAP is the collaboration between the GOB line agencies and the NGOs, which one study notes as a 'Promising Alternative Institutional Approach to Poverty Alleviation' (Hossain, A 1995). This approach seeks to combine the extensive experience of NGOs in group formation, awareness raising, human resource development and income generating activities with the large scale capacity of GOB line agencies to deliver inputs of technical expertise and resources. In contrast to institution and capacity building efforts from within GOB agencies, the expected benefits from this arrangement is that the capacity would be injected from outside and below. In other words the local knowledge, human resource development expertise, motivation and enthusiasm of NGO staff are expected to have a demonstration effect on GOB staff by way of their interaction with each other. And more important perhaps, the insistent and articulate demands from well organized groups mobilized by the NGOs are also expected to stimulate the responsiveness and commitment of local GOB staffs who are used to being faced with mostly a non-challenging and passive target group.

(d) Poverty Alleviation Projects (PAPs) of Large NGOs

NGOs in Bangladesh got a radical transformation and turned into agents of development in the post-independence era. The GOB had neither the capacity nor the appropriate institutional mechanism to address the volume and diversity of immediate crisis of post-independent period to handle alone. At that point of time a number of international NGOs and voluntary organizations extended their helping hands to assist Bangladesh in its striving efforts to rebuild the infrastructure and the economy. Thus, the decade of 1970s witnessed the emergence of several local NGOs and also the arrival of several International NGOs in Bangladesh. Since 1970s NGOs therefore become a part of the institutional framework of poverty alleviation in Bangladesh. The NGOs, especially the large ones in effect have infiltrated into an operational arena which has traditionally been the exclusive domain of the government. Donors have played a significant role in advocating for the NGOs as an active partner in poverty alleviation projects in Bangladesh (Sobhan and Bhattacharya 1990).

(e) Small and Local NGO Projects

This institutional arrangement aims at upgrading the capacity of small local NGOs for implementing poverty alleviation projects. *Palli Karma Sahayak Foundation* (PKSF) established in 1990 by the GOB is the leading agency in such approach. The PKSF's broad goal is to implement income and employment generating programmes for alleviation of poverty for the landless and the assetless people in the rural areas through various NGOs. The PKSF calls these as the Partner Organizations (POs). The Foundation, during the financial year 1992-93, through its 79 POs, has distributed a sum of Tk.100 million. The total sum of the direct loans as well as of the revolving loan provided by the POs have so far rendered credit support to over 70,000 landless assetless people in rural Bangladesh of which 83 percent are women (PKSF 1992). As this is a fairly new direction in institutional

experimentation for poverty alleviation, there is as yet little by way of evaluation studies assessing the effectiveness of this approach.

Linkages between the Rural Non-Farm Sector and Poverty Alleviation

Most of the literature on the linkages between the rural non-farm sector income and the rural poverty clearly indicate that there is a strong relationship between the two. In fact, when average income from the rural non-farm sources are higher than that of the farm sector (agriculture), access to the rural non-farm sector jobs represents an upward mobility improving welfare of both individuals and households. Secondly, by diversifying their sources of income rural households can augment their incomes and minimize the extent to which they are affected by adverse income shocks from farm activities. Thirdly, as the rural non-farm incomes increase the households' cash liquidity, they can buy farm inputs more easily, thus increasing their farm productivity. Finally, the rural non-farm sector offers landless households (which are unable to engage in farm activities because of their lack of land) an important option for generating income.

Since agricultural growth will provide only limited possibilities for labour absorption, because of the considerations outlined above, the burden of absorbing additions to the rapidly growing labour force must be shared by rapid employment expansion in the non-farm (non-agricultural) sector. This was the process envisaged in the classic dual economy growth models with rapid growth in the non-agriculture sector leading to progressive shifts of the labour force from the low-productivity low-income agriculture sector into high-productivity high-income non-agricultural employment. The process was expected to provide expanding employment opportunities for the poor in the rural non-farm sector, while simultaneously easing the pressure of population in agriculture, thus leading sooner or later to higher wages for those who remained in agriculture. There are obvious virtuous circles here which

could become very strong over time. As the size of the rural non-farm sector increases relative to the farm sector, its growth has a greater potential impact on poverty through a larger capacity to absorb surplus labour from agriculture (Ahluwalia 1990).

Impact of the Rural Non-Farm Sector on Poverty Alleviation in Bangladesh

The impact of the rural non-farm sector on poverty alleviation in Bangladesh is vast and varied. Some key terms related to the diversification and the rural non-farm sector address three issues like firstly, it reviews the main theories of the rural non-farm sector development and outlines a simple model for thinking about stages of diversification in rural development. Secondly, it briefly considers the diverse impacts on poverty, inequality and well-being that can be caused by participation in the rural non-farm sector. Finally, it considers policy options, outlining the choices and trade-offs that face rural planners and policymakers.

There are five different issues that need clarification before a discussion on the diversification of the rural non-farm sector can begin.² Firstly, diversification can refer to an increasingly mix or multiplicity of activities, regardless of the sector or it can refer to a shift away from traditional rural sectors such as agriculture to non-traditional often non-agricultural activities associated with the growth of the rural non-farm sector activities.

Secondly, diversification can take place at different levels of the economy. Thus diversification of a rural economy (and thus the expansion of the rural non-farm sector) is separate from the diversification of a household or individual economy (and thus the expansion of the rural non-farm sector income shares). Clearly there are links between these levels, but they are not always direct.

Thirdly, 'non-farm' or 'non-agricultural' are sectoral definitions and if we are to retain consistency between micro and macro levels of analysis the National

Accounting concepts of primary, secondary and tertiary enterprises are a useful benchmark to follow³.

Fourthly, and related to this, 'rural' is a spatial definition⁴ and includes small rural towns, growth centres and their industries. Often these are where the largest share of the rural non-farm sector is situated.

Lastly, there are other useful conceptual dimensions beyond the sector and space to consider in thinking about livelihood and economic activities. These include (a) degree of linkage to agriculture or other sectors, (b) the relations of production⁵, (c) the level of technology, capitalisation or modernisation which often has direct bearing on and (d) the levels of productivity and associated returns.

An important measure of the rural non-farm sector's performance is its impact on poverty and income distribution. Special tabulations from the Household Expenditure Survey (HES) prepared by BBS were used to investigate the impact of the rural non-farm sector on incomes, poverty and inequality in the rural economy of Bangladesh:

- The rural non-farm sector per capita income growth has been positive over the 1980s unlike the per capita agricultural and rural wage income.
- The improvement in the rural non-farm sector per capita income took place mostly in self-employment but not substantially in wage-employment.
- The rural non-farm sector was an important income source for the poor and non-poor alike.
- The incidence of poverty for the rural non-farm sector households is lower than the farm (agricultural) labourer households.
- Increasing participation in the rural non-farm sector is likely to reduce income inequality.

Participation of the Poor in the Rural Non-Farm Sector

Bangladesh shows that the rural non-farm sector has played an important role in limiting rural poverty, particularly where

land ownership is skewed, labour force growth remains high, and movement of other rural areas with higher earnings potential remains difficult for sociological or economic reasons. The availability of non-farm wage or self-employment has also tended to tighten rural labour markets for landless labour and provide a floor for their wage rate. Given the scale of poverty in Bangladesh, there is a need to ensure that the poor continue to have access to non-farm activities as productivity increases. This will require that new distortions are not be introduced in rural labour markets; efforts continue to improve the access of the poor to education and health services and to credit and skills for micro-enterprises; that public safety net programmes are well targeted.

(1) Motivation to Participate

Neo-classical economics suggests that risk-neutral farmers will divide their labour between farm and non-farm employment opportunities such that the expected marginal returns to all activities are equal. In developing countries, resource-poor farmers are usually risk-averse. Therefore the expectation is that less time will be allocated to the more risky jobs if the expected returns in each sector are the same, or alternatively, the farmer will be willing to accept lower wages in the less-risky environment. Farmers may engage in off-farm and non-farm activities to reduce the total variance of their income (i.e., the overall risk) or to increase the total returns to their labour. Participation in any employment sector depends on both *motivation* and *ability* factors (NRI 2000).

The first is the incentive - perhaps higher returns and/or less risk than the alternatives. The second concern is an individual's or household's capacity to engage in the preferred sector - perhaps reflecting certain skills or being able to make

the necessary financial commitment. It is often the poorest households that have the greatest motivation to diversify, however, these households also face the highest constraints to 'upward' accumulative diversification.

(2) Demand Pull Motivation

In rural areas many households take advantage of opportunities in the rural non-farm economy, taking into consideration the wage and risk differentials associated with each type of employment. Households may diversify into the rural non-farm sector economy to enhance their assets (e.g., to accumulate income or acquire skills), typically with the option to reverse their decisions (Swift 1998). When returns to the rural non-farm sector activities are higher and less risky than farming, 'pull' factors are at work (FAO 1998). Ellis (2000a) notes that factors that increase the return to time spent on farm activities would tend to reduce the motivation to diversify. For example, an increase in the prices of farm output or a rise in farm productivity through the adoption of new technology (e.g. high yielding varieties) would tend to reduce the motivation to diversify. Alternatively, a rise in the rural non-farm sector wages or greater opportunity to undertake remunerative non-farm employment would increase the motivation to diversify (Ellis 2000a).

(3) Distress-Push Motivation

Conversely, when farm income is inadequate and opportunities for consumption smoothing such as credit and crop insurance are missing or when input markets are absent or fail and the household needs cash to pay for farm inputs, households may be 'pushed' into the rural non-farm sector, often making irreversible decisions.

Poverty-induced participation in the rural non-farm sector may indicate that the rural non-farm sector is absorbing a residual for surplus labour that cannot be employed on-farm. Islam (1997) suggests that the ratio of non-farm to farm workers in the labour

force can be used as an indicator of 'residual' employment in the rural non-farm sector if a higher ratio leads to a relative fall in non-farm wages. Factors that lead to *distress-push* participation in the rural non-farm sector include successive droughts that depress income and hence increase the need for alternative sources of income, usually through low-skill jobs (Islam 1997). Rural populations are then forced into the rural non-farm activities at wages lower than they were earning in agriculture.

(4) Ability to Participate

The capacity of households or individuals to participate in the rural non-farm sector is not uniform. Reardon *et al* (2000) argue that the positive relationship and U-curve relationship (mixed results) reflect high entry barriers to certain rural non-farm activities, making certain activities accessible only to higher income groups. The very poor may nonetheless participate in the rural non-farm sector if there is sufficient demand for labour in low entry barrier activities. As population pressure increases, it is more difficult for the rural poor to rely on natural resource-based activities. For many livelihoods have become less secure and sources of income more varied. It is important to understand who has access to those rural non-farm sector activities that bring sustained and significant improvements in incomes or welfare for the individuals or households concerned. An understanding of the barriers to entry faced by different groups within society, or individuals within a household, to those desirable activities is therefore useful and particularly important for policy makers.

Importance and Recent Trends

World Bank (2004) study highlights the emerging role of the rural non-farm sector in Bangladesh. The contribution of the rural non-farm sector activities to employment and income generation points its increasing importance in rural areas. Growth of this sector is crucial for ensuring both economic growth and poverty alleviation in Bangladesh.

The discourse on poverty reduction strategy has most often been animated by a comprehensive wish list. The global agenda for poverty reduction was set by the World Bank in its report of 1990 (World Bank 1990). It consisted of two elements. The first was productive use of labour through better market incentives and reforms in social institutions. A decade later the Bank devised a three-pronged strategy that focused on the creation of opportunity, empowerment and security (World Bank 2000). The official poverty reduction strategy of each South Asian country has been more or less dictated by the Bank (Sen and Rahman 1999). This is ironically the ground reality, in spite of the fact that the Bank has emphasized for PRSP (Poverty Reduction Strategy Paper) to be driven and owned by each country (World Bank 2000c). The Bank has later particularly stressed on the social protection of the poor in south Asia in the face of vulnerability caused by globalization (World Bank 2002a; World Bank 2002b). This is again a wish list that does not take into account the context of institutional weakness and policy failures that plague many developing countries.

Government of Bangladesh (2002) following largely the Bank policy has outlined an anti-poverty strategy consisting of five core components such as:

- Pro-poor economic growth policy aimed at increasing income and employment opportunity of the poor.
- Human development targeted for enhancing the capabilities of the poor by providing them with more education, better health services and other necessary services.
- Focus on gender sensitive development with a view to closing gender gaps between men and women.
- Provision and expansion of safety-nets to the poor and
- Expansion of participatory governance aimed at empowering the poor and reforming the service agencies and institutions.

Indeed, poverty refers to the forms of economic, social, and psychological deprivation occurring among people lacking sufficient ownership, control or access to resources for the minimum required level of living. It is widely recognized as a multi-dimensional problem involving income, consumption, nutrition, health, education, housing, crisis coping capacity, insecurity etc. despite some progress in poverty alleviation and social sector development in Bangladesh, much remains to be done. According to the *Human Development Report, 2007/2008* of the United Nations Development Programme, measured in terms of the Human Development Index, Bangladesh ranked 140, compared with 133 for Bhutan, 128 for India, 100 for Maldives, 142 for Nepal, 136 for Pakistan and 99 for Sri Lanka (UNDP 2007).

Conclusion

The role of rural non-farm sector in the context of livelihoods of the rural poor in developing countries particularly in Bangladesh is increasingly acknowledged now a day. A better understanding of the factors and processes that affect the ability of the poor to engage in activities that are more sustainable and more remunerative will help in design of policies and interventions which increase the pro-poorness of the rural non-farm sector.

Moreover, working in more or less decentralised contexts, development organisations, governments and researchers seek to develop the rural non-farm sector find that this generates strong interest among rural poor. This in itself creates a welcome opportunity to bring different perspectives to bear on important issues of employment generation and poverty alleviation and as the work acquires a higher profile, the institutional issue may be resolved through mandate, through local-level co-operation or through the development of effective networking.

Jahan (1997) has found out the development challenges of nineties as well as the poverty alleviation strategy of

Bangladesh. The approaches are like: (a) enforcing larger investments in social sectors, (b) fostering a higher growth process, and (c) promoting targeted employment and income generating programmes are important. Again the targeted employment generation schemes and the issue of sustainability of poverty alleviation programmes in Bangladesh are remarkable. During the period of 1990's the issue of poverty alleviation was not only a development constraint but also a socio-political challenge for Bangladesh.

The World Bank (2000b) has laudably blueprinted the vision of the social protection of the poor or vulnerable so that they can manage risks better mainly through the mechanism of safety nets. But the fiscal crisis of the state and the absence of donor support undermine the realism of such vision. In fact Jeffery Sachs (2001) recently held that IMF and the World Bank were accomplices in 'grossly under funded and insufficient strategies' (Sachs 2001: 44) of poverty reduction. But even under the existing constraints there is scope for new and innovative programmes such as health insurance and disaster insurance for NGO clients, which can be funded from the savings of the poor themselves. There can be GO-NGO collaboration in protecting the poorest of the poor.

It has been argued that in order to devise a better strategy for poverty reduction there is a need to focus on a sociological understanding of poverty as a process and the poverty agenda. The elite addresses the poverty agenda in terms of crisis management and for scaling up the fragile legitimacy of the state. It has a vested interest in poverty agenda. The question of agency is extremely important for poverty reduction in the context of the neo-patrimonial or predatory state, a dysfunctional bureaucracy and predominantly rent-seeking elite in Bangladesh. More meaningful poverty reduction must search for appropriate agency which can signal a change in the rules of the game, a transformation of attitudes and

values conducive to increasing human capability and efficiency. In scaling up the fight against poverty there is need to harness the partial interests of many agents, gain more in-depth knowledge and dream up new ideas.

Hence, according to Robb (2002) the issue of Participatory Poverty Assessments (PPAs) use participatory research methods to understand poverty from the perspective of the poor by focusing on their realities, needs and priorities. A participatory poverty assessment is a method to include poor in the analysis of poverty with the objective of influencing policy. The findings are transmitted to policy makers, thereby enabling the poor to influence public policy choices.

The author is thankful to Prof. I N Mukherji and Prof. D Gopal.

End Notes and References

1. Greek philosopher Plato had used the term *Outer World* in the theory of *Forms* in his classic work *Republic*.
2. The literature on the RNFE and livelihood diversification is clouded by conceptual ambiguities, many of which relate to imprecise terminology.
3. Primary sectors refer to agriculture, mining and other extractive activities. Agriculture or farm activities are a subset of primary activities; the broadest definitions include any activity in the production or gathering of unprocessed crops, livestock, forest or fish products from natural resources. Non-agricultural then covers all other forms of activity and income including processing, transport or trading of unprocessed products. Sometimes a distinction is made between on-farm and off-farm, the former referring to livestock and crop enterprises on private land, the latter referring to gathering enterprises (like rural weekly *bazaar*) on common lands. It is not always clear if these off-farm activities fall within the non-farm sector.
4. The population density per square kilometre usually determines the distinction between urban and rural. In some literature the rural non-farm sector income is used to mean *any* non-farm income earned by a rurally located household, including that income from urban jobs and remittances. We assume rural income to mean any income earned in rural areas, whether local or not.

5. At a rural economy level this refers to the structure or scale of production; whether mainly small scale or larger scale units. At a household level this refers to whether the worker is employed or self-employed; it measures the degree to which the worker has control of the productive assets used in the activity and bears the full financial risk for the undertaking.
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Remittances and Microfinance in India: Opportunities and Challenges for Development Finance

Milly Sil and Samapti Guha

Abstract

With remittances to the developing countries reaching USD 251 billion in 2007, there has been a recent surge of interest to understand the effective channelization of this flow of remittances for providing a variety of financial services desirable to the poor households in the receiving regions, especially in rural pockets. An effective solution, by way of suggestion, especially by policymakers, has been a partnership between the formal money transfer agents and Micro Finance Institutions (MFIs). The remittances and MFI nexus is seen as an important tool for development finance for the poor remittance receiving households. This paper makes an attempt to explore the various opportunities as well as challenges facing MFIs in India in this regard and recommends certain necessary steps in order to consolidate the process of linking MFIs with other conventional formal institutions. Additionally, the paper proposes two models of remittance transfer and mobilisation that could be applicable to India as well as other developing countries facing similar situation.

Key Words: Remittances, Micro finance, Development

JEL Classification: F24, F22, G21, O15, O19


Introduction

The development potential of migrant worker's remittances, both internal as well as international, is being increasingly recognized in recent times and hence, has attracted the interests of academicians and policymakers. This is evident from contemporary literature on 'migration and development' and can be attributed to the manifold increase in the flow of remittances to the developing countries of late. The past two decades has also seen phenomenal rise

in migrant worker's remittances to India, making the country the highest receiver. Worker's remittances to India has risen from USD 2 billion in 1990-91 to USD 45 billion in 2007-2008. The total remittance receipts far exceeded not only Official Development Assistance (ODA) but also Foreign Direct Investment (FDI) in the country (RBI 2008). It is evident from Figure 1 below which shows remittances for each year since 1991, that is, post liberalisation, vis-à-vis FDI and ODA in India.

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Figure 1: Remittances, FDI and ODA in India

Source: Reserve Bank of India, *Handbook of Statistics of Indian Economy*, 2008

However, available data gives the picture of only those transfers that are through formal channels. There are huge flows through informal channels¹ as well. Puri and Ritzema (1999) cite 'convenience' as the main reason behind this 'leakage' from the formal systems of transfer. They also attribute this to inadequate banking facilities and unfavourable macroeconomic policies. However, post 9/11, high vigilance and restrictions on these informal channels (anti money laundering steps) and favourable macro situation since liberalisation in India, resulted in a greater flow of remittances through formal channels².

In case of internal transfers, that are those (transfers that take place within the country), there are no recorded facts. But considering the huge flow of migrants within states in search of employment that is evident from census data, considerable flow of money back to the native places is obvious. The amount of remittances that flow within the country may not be comparable to the huge international flows into the country from other countries, yet their significance in the lives of the poorer section of migrants in the country cannot be ignored. This is because available evidence

suggests that in case of international migration, it is not the poorest who migrate (de Haas 2005), because they do not have the resources to finance their migration. So, the monies sent back home by the relatively poorer migrants, who do so internally, does have relative impacts for their well being.

However, be it internal or international, monies sent back home by migrants play a crucial role in the lives of the families. The rise in remittances has led to several options for money transfer as well as increased competition amongst transfer agents with technological advances playing a major role. But despite all these positive aspects, a systematic delivery mechanism of remittances to a majority of rural pockets in India, which form major migrant sending and remittance receiving regions, is either non existent or is at a very nascent stage. In rural areas along with the informal agents, new generation of financial institutions like Micro Finance Institutions (MFIs) and Business Correspondence (BCs) of Banking Institutions have expressed their interests in the business of transferring remittances. However, the outreach is insignificant. Moreover, most of the MFIs in India have been involved in savings, credit and

insurance practices rather than remittance transfer. Fernando (2003) cites certain assumptions behind this, for instance, remittances, received by households, are assumed to be mainly spent on consumption for basic needs by them rather than being 'income-generating'. Hence, those remittance receivers do not belong to the target group of MFIs.

So far, remittances and its impact on macro and micro variables had been a major point of observation amongst academia and policymakers in many developing countries, especially empirical studies in Latin America, Philippines and South Asia. Last decade has seen more optimistic views on impacts of remittances, not only on the receiving countries as a whole, but on the households and communities receiving them as well. But in recent years this has gone even beyond to encompass issues pertaining to nexus between demand for financial services by remittance receivers and scope for those monies for development finance in the rural sector, of which institutions like MFIs form a 'point of intersection' (see for example Orozco 2002). Available literature has shown successful linkages between MFIs and remittances transfer wherever they exist at the global level. There are successful cases observed especially in Latin American countries (World Council of Credit Unions - WOCCU, NAFIN in Mexico, Banco Solidario in Ecuador and PRODEM in Bolivia), certain South East Asian countries like Indonesia (Bank Rakyat Indonesia), Philippines (UNLAD and New Rural Bank of San Leonardo) and also African countries (National Micro Finance Bank in Tanzania, Uganda Microfinance Union, Centenary Rural Development Bank in Uganda and Teba Bank for mineworkers in South Africa) (ILO 2000 and Sander 2003b as cited in SDC 2004).

Efforts to channelize remittances flows to and within India for development finance and savings mobilization is still at a budding stage. This owes to a variety of factors including a non-supportive regulatory framework for MFIs and other new

generation financial institutions in India, improper infrastructure, technological backwardness, lack of awareness about the formal remittance services, bureaucratic nature of the formal financial institutions and financial illiteracy. With a brief exploration of existence of a link between remittances and MFIs through available evidence, this paper *firstly*, explores the various opportunities for and challenges facing MFIs in order to venture into remittance services in India with the help of evidence on both existing as well as proposed link between remittances and MFIs. *Secondly*, on the basis of those challenges, the paper makes certain recommendations in order to overcome those challenges and transform them into opportunities for developing an effective remittance delivery system. The recommendations are an attempt to further create and consolidate linkages between remittances and micro finance in India. *Thirdly*, the paper proposes two models for remittance services targeted at the rural remittance receiving households. Excerpts from formal discussions with officials of certain MFIs and BCs, in both rural and urban areas, have been included wherever found suitable for illustrations.

Microfinance Institutions in Remittance Services

Inclusion of the nexus between remittances and MFIs in 'Remittances and Development' discourse is a fairly recent phenomenon because of the very contemporary nature of the link between the two at the global level. It is said that due to their ability to reach out to the rural communities and possessing characteristics that combine both 'formal and informal sector practices', the MFIs have been found to be capable of handling money transfers for remote rural areas where small transactions and personal relationships with the clients matter and also providing innovative financial services to the remittance receiving clientele (Buencamino and Gorbunov 2002). MFIs are said to have the potential of delivering positive returns on investments (ILO 2000).

A most cited example of a successful venture is the case of IRNet which is a partnership of World Council of Credit Unions (WOCCU) with VIGO Remittance Corporation, reportedly world's third largest MTO (see Fernando, 2003 and ILO, 2000). WOCCU developed networks of credit unions by partnering with VIGO Remittance Corporation for transferring money including attractive features, for instance, disclosing the actual exchange rate at the point of sale, lower commission charges and generous refund policies in an event of delivery related problems. This partnership proved to be successful because of the favourable network of WOCCU in rural areas (WOCCU 2004).

On the one hand we see this kind of initiatives setting examples; on the other hand we have countries where this opportunity is being explored by researchers and MFIs. For instance, in a study in Bangladesh, it was found that a large amount of remittances are transferred through informal channels. Siddiqui and Abrar (2003) have identified three types of roles that MFIs could play in attracting, transferring and administering remittances and they were, opening savings account for migrants and their families, industrial financing and other productive investments for migrant workers accounts and adequate monitoring for protection of the savings and investments of the migrants. During their interviews with leading micro finance experts, Siddiqui and Abrar (2003) found that, the major MFIs in Bangladesh did not deal with remittances. However, they mention that Bangladesh Rural Advancement Committee (BRAC) and Grameen bank see tremendous scope for gearing remittances for productive investments and savings. For example, BRAC has planned to launch a BRAC bank to curb informal flows of remittances through the *hundi* system. But certain other experts in their interviews have cautioned that until MFIs do not face a problem of funds, they would not get involved in remittance business.

However, a major impediment for MFIs in various countries to venture into

remittance business, as pointed out by such country specific studies, has been the legal or regulatory framework of the apex banks in the respective countries. In Bangladesh, all MFIs are registered either under Voluntary Society's Act, Non Governmental Organisation (NGO) Act or Trust Act and hence are prohibited from making financial transactions (Siddiqui and Abrar 2003). In Philippines, the NBFCs are not governed by the common legislation that allows for financial transfers. The power of Bangko Sentral ng Pilipinas to regulate various avenues including Overseas Filipino Worker's accounts and electronic devices overlook the fact that the migrants use of these avenues. There are regulations in money transfer market in Samoa where only limited money transfer agencies and commercial banks are allowed to participate. MFIs in Samoa are not allowed to participate in remittance transfer market. Similar situation exists in case of Indonesia, where only fully fledged commercial banks can deal with foreign exchange. NBFIs and MFIs have no permission to deal with remittances. The environment is more controlled in Indonesia due to the post Asian Financial Crisis effects in the financial sector in the country (FDC Reports 2007).

Apart from legal restrictions of MFIs, other constraints to a successful implementation of remittance services by MFIs include various aspects like financial illiteracy of migrants and their household members and technological constraints that have been mentioned in various studies. However, a comparatively unexplored area has been the successful implementation of the technology involved. Little is known in general from existing instances regarding the viability of mobile transfers or usage of smart cards or other innovative technologies involving trigger mechanisms in case of money transfers.

According to a study by Sa-Dhan (2006), 40 to 50 per cent of MFIs in India are registered as societies or trusts, another 40 percent MFIs operate as cooperatives and rest of the MFIs are registered as NBFCs. A

trend of registering MFIs as NBFCs have evolved recently as MFIs have been transformed from Poverty Lending Organisations to Profit Earning Organisations. Initially MFIs started to deliver credit and savings services. However, later on they began providing insurance services to scale up their operations. High competition among the MFIs in certain pockets in India has resulted in innovation of new financial products for the poor. Some of the MFIs like *Basix* (Hyderabad) and *Ajiwika* (Jharkhand) have been considering remittance services as a new area of need. Apart from labour migration to other countries, due to rural-urban divide internally, migration from rural areas to cities is a common and increasing phenomenon (Census 2001). This has created a greater need for domestic remittances transfer services. However, the formal financial market is not very active in the domestic transfer of remittances. Semi formal financial institutions like MFIs can explore remittance services as another viable financial product.

MFIs apparently, have considerable scope to play a major role in bridging this gap between the demand for quick and easy delivery services of rural households receiving remittances and supply of financial options in areas where commercial banks and other MTOs fail to deliver. In this respect a major player over the years had been Post Offices. They have greater outreach in rural areas compared to commercial banks, but they have been ineffective in case of money delivering services due to existence of corruption. There have been instances of long delays in delivery. Also, the officials often have to be bribed by the families of the poor migrants in order to receive remittances. In addition the charges of the money order of post offices are very high (5 per cent). This proves to be very high especially in case of small amounts sent by poor migrant workers.

Often in such cases these families prefer informal agents who are either informal money transfer operators or friends

and relatives of the family members of the migrants. But in such cases there have been thefts and cheating, hence are unsecured means of delivery. Ghate (2008) points out that in this case if MFIs are able to charge a fee that is cost recovering then it would be much lower than the postal charge. In a nutshell, MFIs seemingly have more economies of scope (Ghate 2008), so they have the potential to leverage remittances for development. Moreover, remittances business can also be an important source of funds for MFIs because income from this can reduce their vulnerability (Fernando 2007).

Moreover, in case of international remittances reaching rural families, where amounts are higher compared to internal remittances, MFIs have huge potential to take the initiative to gear the remittances for more productive purposes for these families. However, a suitable legal framework for MFIs is required to provide this service. In this regard, the next section explores the various opportunities and challenges for this intriguing relationship to develop in the Indian context.

Opportunities and Challenges for India

The Opportunities


a. High flow of international remittances as well as internal remittances

Inward remittances to India have been a significant feature since 1980's during massive labour outflows to mainly Gulf countries. But increase in inward flows of remittances has been phenomenal after 1991 due to various macro and microeconomic factors. Amongst them are liberalized exchange rate regimes, incentives for migrants in the form of various NRI deposit schemes which also influenced greater flows of remittances through formal channels, massive outflow of skilled migrants (software personnel) to high income countries which lead to higher amounts of remittances flowing in and current account convertibility. Figure-2 below shows flow of Indian remittances in comparison to the other top remittance receiving countries (Mexico, China and Philippines) since 1980's. It

shows the steady increase in remittances in India since mid 1990's till date excepting a few years (2004-06) when Mexico was the

highest recipient country. Since 2006 India had again surpassed Mexico.

Figure-2: Remittances to India in Comparison with other Top Receiving Countries



Source: Plotted from IMFData, 2008, <http://www.imf.org/external/data.htm>

Though there is no data that captures the flow of remittances within the country, yet census figures on internal migration in the country shows significant flows. Out of the total population in the country (1.02 billion), 30 per cent are migrants (307 billion). Out of the total number of migrants, a significant 14.7 per cent people migrated for work/employment reasons. Out of the total migrants again, 37 per cent males migrated for work/employment reasons (3.2 per cent in case of females; marriage being the most important reason for migration for them), rural to rural and rural to urban being the two main streams of migration. This data is sufficient enough to identify the presence of huge flows of internal remittances. Size of individual remittances within the country may not be big enough to be compared to international flows from immigrants but these small amounts may have greater significance for the poor households receiving them.

b. Large network of Bank branches, Indian Post Offices and MFIs in India

In India there exists a large network of branches of banks, POs as well as that of MFIs. But compared to banks, MFIs have greater outreach in most interior areas of the country. However, they cannot take part in providing remittance services directly due to legal obstacles. But, due to their informal nature, they can play a pivotal role in providing remittance services as intermediaries of banks and Indian Post Offices. Banks and POs are unable to reach the rural households with their remittance services at their door step due to lack of staff and formal environment of these organisations. However, with the help of local MFIs, banks and POs have the opportunity to tap this relatively under explored market of remittance delivery.

For International remittance services, several banks already have overseas branches and IPO-Western Union money

transfer scheme is relatively popular. However, these services are restricted to cities. It may be possible by banks and IPOs to make an effort to extend these services to the rural India with the help of local MFIs. It is learnt that through this international money transfer, IPOs have earned lot of foreign exchange. With the help of MFIs, IPOs might be able to earn more foreign exchange.

c. Venture into remittance market can expand the outreach of the MFIs

There has been an enormous growth in microfinance sector in India post 1992. But, at the same time, regional imbalances of the outreach have been found in this sector. It is found that around 54 per cent of total outreach of NABARD (National Bank for Agriculture and Rural Development) promoted SHG (Self Help Group) Bank linkage programme is concentrated in Andhra Pradesh whereas it is only two to three per cent in North Eastern States. In certain pockets of India, some MFIs are poaching clients of other MFIs in order to increase their outreach. Many of the MFIs are not only concerned about the increase in horizontal³ outreach but also the increase in vertical⁴ outreach.

d. Urgent demand for financial Services by remittance senders and receivers

There exists substantial demand for financial services by remittance receivers in interior regions of the country. Though this issue has not been explored extensively, yet certain cases provide evidence for existence of demand for such services in the country. For instance, two districts in the state of Uttar Pradesh, Azamgarh and Jaunpur which experience maximum emigration to Gulf countries do not have sufficient banking facilities resulting in migrant families relying on informal means (Sasikumar and Hussain 2007). Similarly, such demand exists in case of migrants moving domestically also. Initiative of 'Adhikar' to venture into remittance services to serve the poor rural migrants from the state of Orissa to Gujarat, has also proved the huge existence of such

demand for remittance services. 'Adhikar' claims that their client base in this category in Surat grew fast to 913 in 2006 within a year of extending their remittance services from Gandhidham (Ghate 2008).

e. Remittance as an alternative source of fund for new MFIs to venture and existing MFIs to expand their portfolio

In 1970s, when Micro-credit movement started in India, most of the programmes were funded by national and international developmental agencies. The outreach of the programmes were insignificant. In 1990's the success of micro finance movement had proved that the poor were bankable. At present donor agencies have changed their strategies to finance micro finance programmes. No grants or aids are presently available for microfinance programmes (Tedeschi 2006). Most of the donor agencies offer loan-funds to MFIs. Hence, it is difficult for MFIs to meet the financial needs of the poor with these funds. The financial sustainability of the MFIs is a big question in present scenario.

Existing, as well as new MFIs can possibly create a new source of income by entering remittance services as a new financial product. Established MFIs would be able to increase their loan portfolios by using the earned income from remittance services and new MFIs can design innovative products like combined products by linking credit and remittances or savings and remittances. In this way, existing MFIs may also provide options to remittance receivers from the already existing savings and investment schemes that they have.

On the one hand, inclusion of remittance services by MFIs as a new product with the help of IPOs and banks would lead to generation of a new source of income for them. The question of financial viability of such MFIs does arise but may be resolved. On the other hand, rural poor can avail of the service at their doorstep. this also would lead to the possibility of reduction in charges paid by them as they would not need to pay exorbitant charges for those services

to the informal service providers as well as they would not need to lose their daily wage to get these services. In this fashion, MFIs can design innovative need based products for those not covered by the formal sector. In other words, there is tremendous scope for banking the 'unbanked'.

f. Scope for return migrants

Managing return migration of people with skills as well as money (usually temporary workers) has been one of the important agendas in 'management of migration' (see Martin 2004 and IOM 2008). It has been widely identified and accepted by empirical studies that return migrants bring with them not only pooled resources in terms of money, but also necessary skills and innovativeness that they have acquired during their employment in the host country. Fernando (2007) identifies a scope for return migrants where they pool their remittances in deposits with MFIs and then the MFIs can generate a wide range of activities which can be helpful in cases where business development programmes aimed at return migrants fail due to lack of business acumen by the most of the returnees.⁵

The Challenges

a. Unfriendly legal framework of MFIs to provide financial services to the poor

First and foremost, the crucial challenge faced by MFIs in providing remittance services is the legal structure (see RBI 2005). It occurs that, very few MFIs can be a part of this financial service in the present circumstances. The legal limitations of the MFIs are as follows:

i) MFIs registered under Society Act and Trust Act: In a charitable institutional form, conducting micro financial activities in a for-profit mode becomes inappropriate. According to Section 45 of RBI Act, 1934, unincorporated bodies are prohibited from accepting deposits from public. Unincorporated bodies refer to those which are not registered under Companies Act 1956. These institutions

are not allowed to collect savings according to law. Tax exemption for surpluses might be challenged on the question of whether microfinance service is considered as charitable activity. Also, these MFIs are restricted from raising equity. This makes these institutions less attractive to commercial investors.

ii) MFIs registered as Not-For-Profit Companies under Section 25 of Companies Act, 1956: The above said restriction of deposit mobilisation applies to Section 25 Companies. The status of not-for-profit companies restricts distribution of dividends amongst the investors. Hence, it becomes difficult to attract investors. Even the exit route for the investors is not smooth. They are required to wait till other investors who forego the dividends on the investment are found. RBI instructions exempt Section 25 Companies from registration and reserve requirements for NBFCs, however, there is lack of clarity on the ceiling.

iii) MFIs registered as Non Banking Financial Companies: NBFCs are registered under the section 45-I of the RBI Act. This is the only type of MFI which fall under the prudential regulations of the central bank that is the RBI. Presently, some of the MFIs, registered under Trust Act and Societies Act transformed into NBFCs in order to perform the microfinance activities in a convenient way. However, to get registered, the minimum capital requirement is Rs. 2 crore (Sa-Dhan 2006). The challenge for small MFIs is to mobilise this huge amount of funds. Apart from this, NBFCs are not allowed to mobilise deposits before two years of their operation, after which they get an investment grade rating. But it is very difficult for an MFI to get this rating certificate as conventional rating agencies consider providing financial services to the rural poor as a risky affair. However, for the clients, deposits service is an attractive financial product.

Some of the socially responsible international investors want to invest in MFIs in India. However, financial sector is denied access to external commercial borrowing and venture capital investment. Foreign Direct Investment in equity is permitted but it should not comprise more than 50 per cent of the total equity of the NBFCs. The challenge for NBFCs is that they have to manage Rs. 2 crore from domestic sources before they are allowed to get the foreign equity.

iv) MFIs registered as Cooperative Banks: There are three types of Cooperative Banks under the Banking Regulation Act: State Cooperative Banks, District Cooperative Banks and Primary Cooperative Banks (Urban Cooperative Banks (UCBs)). The suitable framework for MFIs is UCBs. These banks are controlled by Registrar of Cooperative Societies and RBI. Advocates of Development have found that duality of control have created lots of managerial and operational problems. Due to the poor public image of cooperatives banks and managerial problems, UCBs have failed in different parts of India. Presently it is difficult for MFIs to obtain the new licences from the RBI due to the above reasons.

From the above discussion it is clear how lack of suitable regulatory framework hampers the operation of MFIs in India. Initially Trusts and Societies have proved that the poor are bankable through their micro-credit initiatives. However, the present legal structure does not permit them to increase their operations to raise the equities or to mobilise the savings. Section 25 Companies face similar problem in raising funds. However, it must be mentioned that Cooperative Banks and NBFCs are most suitable legal structures for MFIs to perform all the financial activities. Though, RBI has been reluctant to issue new licences to MFIs. Recently, RBI has expressed

interest to provide registration to NBFC-MFIs.

b. Financial constraints-problem of funds for MFIs

The legal issues and obstacles of MFIs in raising funds have already been discussed. Due to rigid legal structures, MFIs registered as Non Profit Organisations and Not-for profit Organisations are not allowed to raise the funds in the form of equities. Additionally, it needs to be mentioned that as the donor agencies have changed their strategy for microfinance operations, these MFIs are not able to get grants or aids for microfinance programmes. Though the representation of these MFIs is large in rural areas in India, they are not in a position to scale up their operation due to lack of funds. For instance, *Prayas*, an NGO-MFI has provided financial services to the earthquake victims in Kutchh, Gujarat. According to the fieldwork coordinator, the rural poor have three types of need-micro savings, micro credit and micro insurance. However, due to the lack of funds they were not in a position to extend services to the larger community in Kutchh⁶. If NGO-MFIs are interested to provide remittance services, they would require new legal structure. Existing structure restricts these institutions from mobilising remittances.

c. Information asymmetry and financial illiteracy

In the rural sector, information asymmetry prevails. Formal financial institutions are not aware about the extent of demand for remittance services and the rural households receiving remittances do not know about the available options in the formal sector. This asymmetric information amongst the service providers and customers provide an opportunity for the informal agencies to charge exorbitant prices for remittance services.

To provide the remittance services to the poor, there arises a need for organisations to conduct financial literacy workshops/training programmes. It was found that initially, during 1970s to early 1990s, MFIs could avail funds for the training and capacity building. But, in recent times, the scenario for developmental donor agencies has changed. Hence, funds for training and financial literacy programmes are not easily accessible. This affects the operations of the MFIs. For instance, during a survey in Sabarkantha district in Gujarat, it was found that some of the Self Help Groups under SHG-Bank Linkage programme promoted by NABARD had maintained their record books for four to five years. However, due to discontinuation of the practice of keeping records, they were denied loans from banks. Most of the groups informed that they did not attend any training programmes on record keeping or financial literacy.

d. Database on International Migration not available to Public

Unlike internal migration data, international movements are very poorly recorded. Though information on emigrants or departures are collected by Bureau of Immigration through 'embarkation cards' which is supposed to record important information on 'date of birth', 'place and country of birth' of the emigrants, yet such detailed information is neither published nor available to public for use. Also, it does not include skills or qualifications of the emigrants. Though it includes 'purpose of visit', essential information on nature and type of work is not included. This information collected is published annually as 'Immigration Control and Measures in India' but only for restricted use by government departments (UNESCAP 2006). There appears no apparent reason as to why such information may not be available for use by public.

e. Convincing migrant families about formal channels of transfer and savings mobilization

Prevalence of large and well established network of informal operators in interior rural areas creates a big challenge for formal institutions to persuade rural (usually illiterate) migrants and their families about the benefits of using formal channels of remittance delivery and savings mobilization. Though the informal institutions charge exorbitant rates, they are still most preferred by the migrants because of their informal network and usually quick services. Since remittances are strictly personal transfers, it poses a great challenge to make migrants and their families realize the importance of mobilizing their hard earned savings. It becomes, more or less, an ethical issue to interfere in their decisions to use the remittances.

f. Lack of Technological Infrastructure

To provide remittance services at the doorstep of the rural receiving households, technological infrastructure is a requirement. For instance, during a formal discussion with FINO (Financial Information Network and Operations) personnel in Mumbai, Mr. Rastogi, it emerged that the poor and illiterate people are not comfortable with the formal financial services due to the paper work involved in it. Hence, FINO attempts to offer cost effective services to the poor which involves less paper work. They are providing innovative technological solutions like Biometric Technologies to banks, MFIs, and other financial service providers, in order to serve the bottom end of the pyramid⁷ in rural and urban areas. However the outreach, again, is not significant. FINO is involved as a Business Correspondent of banks. Mr. Rastogi, also state that training programmes at the initial stage of operation had played an important role. But the major challenge for them is to convince people about the technology

like that of Biometric Technology and to assure them about the safety in the process of transferring money. Initially most of the rural people were sceptical about these technological solutions. However, he opined that continuous training programmes about the technology and finance might make the operations easier.

From a formal discussion with a manager of Axis Bank, Mr. Mukherjee, it was known that adopting Biometric Technology involves a 'humongous' cost. On the one hand, no individual bank can develop this network for domestic remittance services for the poor. On the other hand, due to KYC ("Know Your Customer") norms of RBI, poor migrant workers are not allowed to open bank accounts for availing remittance services. Banks open accounts in the name of the BCs. RBI allows BCs to certify the beneficiaries. However, there is no trigger mechanism in this BC model. According to Mr. Mukherjee, any remittance model is bound for failure if there is no trigger mechanism. As a result, the viability of this model is questionable. Another important factor highlighted by him was that acceptability of use of technology also differs across cultures. Citing an example, he said that households in Gujarat and coastal Kerala that are primarily entrepreneurial in nature have more acceptability of this technology compared to non entrepreneurial households or members. He, however, pointed out that customer base in this regard is huge and may be categorized as absolute rural poor (beneficiaries of National Rural Employment Guarantee Scheme, NREGS), rural and urban self employed people, rural blue collared workers and urban blue collared workers.

Lack of proper infrastructure for availing technological solutions is one of the reasons for insignificant outreach. This is applicable in case of usage of

mobile technology also. Mr. Mukherjee said that the Grameen Bank in Bangladesh has adopted the mobile phone technology for money transfer. However, in interior rural regions usually there are network failures or errors. Citing an instance he said, a person trying to send money using this technology ended up sending thrice the amount unknowingly due to network error. This was because his requests were accepted thrice and debited three times of the amount which he wanted to send from his account. Hence, this type of technical failures creates confusion and ambiguity.

Recommendations

1. Extend database on migration and remittances

So far, census data on international migration in India comprises only of immigrants and not of emigrants. Data on emigration is essential for research on remittances. Data on emigration from India is available from Ministry of Labour, Bureau of Immigration with plenty of shortcomings. It gives state wise data on workers granted emigration clearance. A major drawback of such data is that it does not give a holistic picture of the total number of emigrants as it gives information on those migrants who have been granted emigration clearance. A huge part of labour who are professionally qualified, holding graduate or higher degrees and diploma holders and also those who have vocational training certificates, do not require emigration clearance (UNESCAP 2006). Also data on place of birth for emigrants is not available, so migration streams cannot be identified. Also duration of stay and nature of work is not available (contract work or otherwise). On the other hand, data on inward remittances that is available from RBI is also an aggregate data. Disaggregated data on flows of remittances from states and major cities to smaller towns and

rural areas need to be collected on yearly basis. Hence one of the first and foremost recommendations would be to collect information on emigrants and remittances that give a holistic picture. This information should also be made public and user friendly for ease of researchers and policymakers. For instance, an RBI study on remittances to India, costs and time taken for transfer and their utilization by households show that remittances received by India are less frequent but more in average size compared to Latin American countries. The study which collected data from bank branches across major centres, mentions that these cities were also important corridors from where the remittances are delivered to the interior areas of the specific states (see Table-2 in RBI 2006). Data from such studies, if produced on a yearly basis (panel data), can prove to be useful for policy makers.

2. Need for research in specific areas

In order to understand the extent to which MFIs can venture in remittance business, there is a pressing need to research on various micro aspects of impact of remittances at both the household as well as the community level in the country. Macro aspects such as macroeconomic atmosphere and policies need specific investigations. Flow of remittances through both formal and informal channels needs to be tapped. The specific areas at micro level that need focus are: i) socio economic background of the remittance receiving families, ii) the size of remittances, iii) the channels and costs of transfer including investigations on informal channels and reasons for preference for this channel⁸, iv) the utilization patterns of remittances by households, v) the demand for financial services by the households and the communities⁹, vi) the scope for return migrants who intend to be future entrepreneurs, especially low skilled. This is applicable in cases of both internal as well as

international remittance receiving households.

Continuity of migration is essential for continuity of remittances. Hence, in case of international migration, considering the current global meltdown and increase in the number of return migrants (including skilled migrants) and increased immigration controls for the moment, there is a need to investigate future flows after the crisis and the countries that would be more receptive of immigrants¹⁰ and those which would have tighter immigration controls post crisis and therefore, likelihood of remittances flows.

Also, remittance behaviour of both temporary and permanent migration patterns requires investigations. For instance, if 'remittance decay hypotheses'¹¹ is sought to be tested for permanent migrants in the country, panel data on patterns of remittance flows for the same households over a period of time becomes a requirement. This kind of data is extremely crucial for a lot of investigations related to remittances.

Another area which calls for research is 'return migration' and the 'returnees'. Return migration is said to be advantageous or developmental to the countries of origin, though different theories of migration differ in their approaches to the study of return migration. For instance, the neoclassical theories conceptualize it as a failure of the migration process, whereas for the structuralists and the New Economics of Labour Migration theorists, it as a 'calculated strategy' (Cassarino 2004 and Riosmena and Massey 2004), but to understand the dynamics, there is a need to take into account the diversity of return migrants. A typology of return migration and that of migrants need to be framed (see for instance Cerase 1974 as cited in Cassarino 2004) and the ones which have the potential for development at the origin need to be identified.

3. Identify major inter-state corridors from existing census data and use them for building partnerships with existing banks in India and destination countries of migrants

Existing census data on internal migration gives lot of scope to identify major corridors of migration state wise. Major migration streams can also be identified. For instance, available census data show high incidence of rural to urban and rural to rural migration in the country in search of work/employment (give data and percentage of total migrants) between states and also within states. If this type of data is achieved state wise, we get the flows of migrants. For instance, Maharashtra is one state in India which receives maximum number of migrants from other states. And from data we know that most migrants come from the rural areas of the state of Uttar Pradesh. Similarly, this can be found out for every state, district and major urban agglomerations. MFIs venturing into the area of, especially, internal remittances can make use of the data to form partnerships with banks and other MFIs or NBFCs working in those sectors receiving maximum migrants.

Partnerships should also be aimed at feasibility and cost reduction for remitters. They can also negotiate about the technology usage and transactions cost for transfer of remittances with the foreign banks. Give example of Focus Guatemala for international partnership.

4. Designing of Innovative products for Migrants based on Research Findings

The above investigations can be utilized by the new age financial institutions to design innovative products and services like foreign currency accounts, local currency accounts and joint accounts of migrant and households (see FDC, 2007). Return migrants with entrepreneurial ability can access investment funds. Also, even though

these return migrants lack entrepreneurial skills, or if there exists unsuitable schemes for utilization of their resources, they can pool their resources in the form of deposits with the MFIs who can channelize them for entrepreneurial activities. It becomes imperative to quote Sasikumar and Hussain (2007) in this regard,

“Another important policy option for maximizing the developmental benefits of remittances is to channel remittances to small and micro enterprises through financial intermediaries as deposits rather than expecting migrants to directly participate in entrepreneur activities. This will imply that the focus of policy then would be to induce micro finance institutions to capture remittances to be in turn used to fuel productive activities, and not on migrant-centered investment programmes. The basic policy initiative would be to enable migrant’s funds to be transferred to entrepreneurs through these financial institutions. Savings and credit schemes and investment instruments specifically designed to suit migrant workers’ risk profiles could be important vehicles in this regard.”

5. Financial reforms

Till this date there is no unique legal framework for MFIs. Taking a cue from Micro-Credit Regulatory Authority Act, 2006, of Bangladesh, Government of India with the help of Reserve Bank of India can also come up with a similar Regulatory Act for MFIs. This Act should promote small and local MFIs to reach the financial needs of the rural and urban poor. If possible, the regulatory authority will allow these local organisations to provide remittance services along with savings, credit and insurance services. Government of India can allocate emergency funds for these MFIs at the time of uncertainty like

recession, drought and other natural calamities.

6. Pre migration orientation programmes

Sasikumar and Hussain (2007) highlight the ignorance of especially the low skilled migrants about formal channels of transfer, which give the agents and advantage to charge exorbitant from this category of migrants, sometimes at exchange rates that is lower than those prevailing in the market. They also state that this is one of the main reasons for their preference for informal channels. Hence, MFIs, through their remittance services products can also take the initiative to educate and provide this category of migrants (usually less educated) about the benefits transferring through formal institutions. Presently, in India, there is no policy for orientation of migrants' pre departure about these issues. Irudaya Rajan and Mishra (2007) also highlight the importance of such programmes by learning from the example of Philippines which has major orientation programmes for their potential migrants pre departure about various issues related to emigration process. Such programmes are necessary in both the cases of internal as well as international migration. Sasikumar and Hussain (2008) emphasise on the need for collaboration between financial institutions and correspondent banks in India and 'Indian community organisations' to organize such events. Similar measures can be applied in case of internal migration as well. Though internal migration is huge and difficult to track, yet as a starting move, MFIs in most migrant sending regions may take an initiative to collect information on potential migrants and educate them about remittance services and the importance of transferring through formal channels. Also, they may conduct orientations on benefits of spending higher percentage of remittances on savings and productive investments so

that families can develop their own resources of income on a sustainable basis.

7. Existing MFIs can find out the percentage of remittance receiving clients

Due to the lack of database on internal remittances, financial sector are not able to address the needs for the transfer and mobilisation of these remittances. Most of the MFIs usually conduct socio-economic survey on beneficiaries before implementing microfinance projects. From this database they could regenerate data about the remittance receivers. It could be shared with the local financial institutions. On the basis of this database, financial institutions could design need-based remittances related products.

8. Engaging Diaspora and Permanent Migrants


There are numerous instances of Diaspora organisations of countries who are involved in the development of their hometowns through collective remittances. Latin American countries are good examples in this regard (Orozco and Rouse 2007). Members of these associations are usually wealthy enough and maintain ties with their homeland. There have been proposals to divert their activities towards support and development of their communities at the origin in various ways, that is, through philanthropy, business interests, investments and also return plans. Even if permanent migrants do not wish to return, may contribute through their savings by investment in MFIs. This will have both, a philanthropic side as well as a return on investment (Sriskandarajah 2005). Members of the Indian Diaspora also have a great development potential (Maimbo and Ratha 2005). The Indian Investment Centre is said to facilitate the development of enterprises in India through mechanisms that enable collaboration of Indian companies with

Non Resident Indians (NRIs). The centre provides various investment options for NRIs. This centre could precede a step further by attracting the Indian Diaspora and/or the permanent Indian settlers abroad, who have a philanthropic side, and providing them with investment options in Indian MFIs.

9. Proposed models for remittance services for the rural poor

Considering the present circumstances, an attempt is made

to design two models where the formal agencies can provide the rural poor migrant households with remittances services by tying up with MFIs / BCs in an effective and convenient manner. It is clear from the earlier discussions that only banks and NBFCs can provide the remittances services. Hence the two proposed models¹² are as follows:



Source: Authors

Working of Model I

Figure 3 is explained as follows: All the banks in the same locality form a union/federation¹³ → RBI chooses the BC/Technology service providers and purchases technology → RBI distributes the technology solutions to every union of banks or federation → Federation provides the technology to all banks that are part of the federation → Banks/NBFCs offer remittances services → MFIs collect information about the beneficiaries who need remittance services → MFIs help the

beneficiaries to open their accounts with banks for availing remittance services → MFIs offer combination of products of remittances and savings or remittances and investment at the doorstep of their clients → The accounts of beneficiaries who are going to avail these combined products would be monitored by MFIs and banks.


Viability criteria of Model I

- Bankers should be oriented on how domestic remittances play important role in improving livelihoods of the poor.

- RBI should develop a criterion for choosing the Business Correspondents for buying the technology-solutions. They should conduct workshops on how to use these solutions for the bankers and MFIs.
- Banks would register the selected MFIs to work as intermediaries in providing remittance services after checking their records.
- Banks would monitor MFIs so that they do not compel the beneficiaries to transfer the remittances amount either in savings account with the MFIs or repay their debts by the remittances amount. If banks receive any complaints from the beneficiaries, they may cancel the registration of the MFIs.
- Banks and MFIs should design the mixed products together.
- MFIs should conduct workshops for financial literacy and usage of the technology for availing remittances services by beneficiaries.
- Paperwork should be avoided as much as possible to make the operation simplistic by the use of technology.
- Before providing the services MFIs should be ready with all information about their clients.
- Clients should be free to use the remittances amount.
- Clients pay the service charge to the banks for availing the service. However, banks should provide incentives through commissions to MFIs for providing this service.

This model has been designed in a manner which could provide remittance services specifically to the rural poor who do not have access to formal financial sector for the same services and whose livelihoods highly depend on the domestic remittances from migrant members who mainly work as labourers.

Figure 4: Proposed Model II



Source: Authors

Working of Model II

Figure 4 is explained as follows: Group of NBFC-MFIs from different geographical areas set up a bureau → This bureau will set up research and development cell which will innovate technological solutions for providing the services → MFIs collect information about their beneficiaries who are in need of remittance services and share it with the bureau → MFIs offer combined products of remittances with savings, investment and insurance → The accounts of the beneficiaries, who would avail these combined products, would be monitored by the MFIs and the bureau → The bureau will be monitored by RBI and IRDA (Insurance Regulatory and Development Authority).

Viability criteria of the Model II

- The bureau should be registered either as a private company limited or a NBFC under section 45-I of RBI registration.
- Each of the MFIs will take charge for the remittance services. Beneficiaries will be requested to keep certain amount of remittances as compulsory savings with the MFIs.
- Each of the MFIs should be monitored by the bureau. Beneficiaries can submit their complaints about the respective MFIs to the bureau directly in case of any inconvenience. In this case the bureau will be responsible for taking the appropriate steps.

This model has been designed specifically to serve those clients who belong to middle income group or higher middle income group and who need the services frequently (for instance, households receiving foreign remittances in interior rural regions). This would be a quicker process to serve those clients.

Conclusion

Migration for survival and betterment of lives has been an inevitable phenomenon in the present globalized world, of which remittances are an integral source of survival for many a poor families. However, in the present economic situation, developing countries like India, with a huge population, do not have a developed market for remittance services. This paper has made an attempt to provide two sustainable stylised models for remittance services for the rural and urban poor through a collaboration of formal financial sector, rising micro finance institutions and the providers of technological solutions for financial inclusion. In India, the micro finance movement has entered the fourth decade of its operations. Development practitioners have found that this movement has successfully reached the poor with effective financial services. Through the exploration process in this study, it has emerged that the market for remittance related services in India has tremendous scope for growth. Unlike international remittances, where the formal financial sector has shown its interests in terms of various financial gains, especially in the urban market, the market for internal remittances has been relatively neglected due to various operational, legal and political obstacles. In this context, the new age MFIs come across as an alternative option for migrants in the most interior rural pockets to avail the formal remittance services.

This paper illuminates some important issues related to MFIs and formal financial sectors in the context of possible remittances related services. For instance, on the one hand, India has a large network of banks and IPOs through which they can serve the migrants in the interior pockets without any legal obstacles. On the other hand, MFIs could bridge the information asymmetry gap between the clients and the financial service providers. Though MFIs

have legal obstacles in providing remittances related services to the beneficiaries, they could work as financial intermediaries and provide these services indirectly along with the formal financial institutions. However, sufficient homework remains to be done by various agents involving government, civil society as well as academicians for this relationship to gain momentum from the present state of affairs.

End Notes

1. 'Hawala' and 'hundi' refer to informal and illegal channels of transfer. These systems of transfer is said to have existed since long and took pace during the increased migration of 70's and 80's to Gulf countries (El Qorchi, 2002). This system works without actual transfer taking place between countries (for details see Buencamino and Gorbunov, 2002). These systems, however, are infamous for their involvement in transfers of money originating from both formal as well as illegal sources of income. They are also linked to money laundering and use by criminal agents including terrorism.
2. This was another reason for continued high rise in remittances figures in Indian Balance of Payments since late 1990's apart from liberalized macroeconomic policies and emigration of high skilled professionals.
3. increase in horizontal outreach means increase in number of beneficiaries
4. Increase in vertical outreach means increase in number of products and improve its quality.
5. For instance in the Indian state of Kerala, the state government has initiated certain schemes aimed at return migrants, but they were mostly found to have been formulated on an ad-hoc basis rather than long term. They had to be discontinued because it was found that the returnees had neither skills, nor any investment plans (Sasikumar and Hussain, 2008). Hence, even though they had the resources, yet due to a lack of vision, they could not be channelized to productive uses.
6. This had emerged during an informal discussion with the programme coordinators of *Prayas* in Kutchh, we came to know this fact. It is a part of the study taken by MFMI Chair, IRMA in 2005.
7. According to C.K.Prahlad (1998), a pyramid can be constructed about the poverty of an economy. Bottom of the pyramid indicates the poorest of the poor section of the society.
8. Sasikumar and Hussain (2008) through their investigations in areas where there are relatively few banking institutions like Azampur and Jaunpur in Uttar Pradesh that migrants from these areas to Gulf prefer informal channels because of their prompt service that never fail, minimal charges and their useful networks. They indicated that these informal agents also provide the potential migrants with money for their initial costs of migration on promise that they would in future use their services for remitting money. The migrant households were also satisfied with their services. They also state that majority of the financial institutions are located at towns and do not have outreach in rural areas, hence, in these areas informal channels were the only means of receiving remittances.
9. This has to be matched with the existing products offered by the existing MFIs. For instance, Siddiqui and Abrar (2003) in their survey find that a section of migrant workers want to put their savings in and remittances in productive investments but their financial needs do not meet the requirements of the traditional micro credit or the commercial lending institutions.
10. See 'Recession Proof Race of Highly Skilled Migrants' in Top 10 Issues of Migration <http://www.migrationinformation.org/feature/display.cfm?ID=712>
11. Remittance decay hypothesis states that the amount of remittances sent by migrants to their homes decrease as the number of years lived by them abroad increases.
12. Though these models are proposed in the context of India, they could be replicated in other developing nations as well.
13. For example, in India State Level Banker's Association or Block Level Banker's Association already exists which can work as federation or association according to our model.

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Housing Reconstruction of Tsunami Victims: An Experience from Kerala and Tamil Nadu Coastal Areas

Raju Narayana Swamy I.A.S.

Abstract

There is need for a better understanding of the housing culture and practices within the tsunami-affected communities. Focus should also be on integration of ecological and cultural concerns in planning for disaster recovery. The present work examines the housing reconstruction in coastal Tamil Nadu and Kerala and related issues. It focuses on whether the houses constructed for the victims had integrated ecological and cultural concerns in plan and addresses the role that designers had played in such a situation. Evaluation of design precedents used to renovate the natural and built environment is a positive and necessary framework for recovery. Suggestions are also made about how these elements can best be incorporated into future eco-culturally based recovery efforts.

Introduction

There has been a paradigm shift in our approach to disaster management during the last one decade. The shift is from a relief centric approach to a multidimensional endeavour involving diverse scientific engineering, financial and social processes to adopt a multi disciplinary and multi sectoral approach with stress on building up capabilities of community to enable them to work towards their own risk reduction. The role of state and NGOs in this context therefore assumes added significance. State sponsored development policies should focus on improving the quality of life for all its citizens without increasing the use of natural resources beyond the capacity of the environment to supply them indefinitely. It requires an understanding that inaction has consequences and that we must find innovative ways to change institutional structures and influence individual

behaviour. It is about taking action, changing policy and practice at all levels, from the individual to the state level and from the state level to the international level.

Natural disasters and India have had a long and unfortunate relationship together. Floods, droughts, cyclones, earthquakes and landslides have been recurrent phenomena. About 60 per cent of the landmass is prone to earthquakes of various intensities; over 40 million hectares is prone to floods; about eight per cent of the total area is prone to cyclones and sixty eight per cent of the area is susceptible to drought. The earthquakes at Latur, Bhuj and the tsunami disaster left thousands homeless. India is one of the World Bank's largest single borrowers for disaster and relief. Loan lending to the country touched \$2.9 billion in the financial year 2005, which is more than double the amount lent a year earlier. The bulk of new lending has gone to the much-needed

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infrastructure and human development projects (World Bank Report 2006). The present paper is an attempt to analyze the housing reconstruction efforts in the tsunami affected areas of Kerala and Tamil Nadu.

Objectives of the Study

1. To trace the quality of houses provided for the tsunami victims.
2. To study the nature of housing demand of the fishing community and the mismatch between demand and supply (in terms of public provision)
3. To examine whether the housing provision given by the Government and NGOs has helped to achieve the desired goals or not.
4. To trace the extent to which the ongoing housing schemes make use of the capabilities and needs of the poor fishermen.

Coastal hazard-Tsunami

Tsunamis are natural phenomena consisting of a series of waves generated when the sea floor abruptly deforms and vertically displaces the overlying water on a massive scale. Such large scale displacement of the oceanic crust take place chiefly due to earthquakes, under water volcanic eruptions, extensive landslides and meteoritic impacts in the sea and results in tsunami. The waves created by this disturbance propagate away from the source. Since these are pressure waves within the water, as opposed to wind generated surface waves, they can travel at hundreds of miles per hour. In deep water, the waves are gentle sea surface slopes that can be unnoticeable. As the waves approach the shallower waters of the coast, the velocity decreases while the height increases. Upon reaching the shoreline the waves can reach hazardous height and force, penetrating inland, damaging structures and flooding

normally dry areas. The term "tsunami" is derived from Japanese meaning harbour (tsu) and wave (nami).

Tsunami is quite common in the Pacific Ocean, less in the Indian Ocean and least in the Atlantic Ocean. However, the following table lists some Tsunamis that have occurred in the Indian Ocean.

The great Sumatra earthquake which occurred off the west coast of northern Sumatra, Indonesia on 26th December 2004 triggered the tsunami that caused unprecedented loss of life and damage to property in the coastal areas of Indonesia, Sri Lanka, South India, Thailand and other countries. The tsunami originated beneath the sea near Banda Aceh, Indonesia due to an undersea quake. This mega-thrust-earthquake, a result of subduction of the Indian plate beneath the Burmese plate, is rated as the second largest earthquake in the world after the 1960 Chile earthquake. The earthquake ruptured nearly 1200 km of the plate boundary in the Andaman & Sumatra region. The waves radiated outwards along the entire 1200 km length of the rupture. The Coriolis force and the bottom topography of the ocean were primarily responsible for the specific locations of onslaught of the tsunami. The height of the tsunami was in the range of 1.5-7.0 m in Andaman-Nicobar islands and the coastal regions of South India. Sea water was undated upto distance of 0.1-2.0 km depending upon coastal topography etc. While tremors of earthquake normally last upto thirty seconds, the tremors of this massive earthquake lasted for more than eight minutes and travelled around the world. The effects were felt as far as Africa and nearly 2,80,000 people killed across many nations. Till tectonic plates below the ocean beds stabilized, the chain of tremors continued to torment people all around the world.

Table 1.1 : Historical Tsunamies in the Indian Ocean

No.	Year & Date	Tsunami Origin/ Triggering Mechanism	Area affected/ felt	Run up level
1.	326 BC	----	India	-----
2.	April 1 & May 9, 1008	Iranian Coast	India	
3.	1524	-	-	-
4.	1618	Offshore of Mumbai (Hurricane or earthquake)	West coast of India	
5.	28 Jan 1679	-	-	-
6.	Oct 31, 1846	Nicobar earthquake	East coast of India	-
7.	Dec 31, 1881	Car Nicobar earthquake	Entire east Chennai Coast of India & Andaman-nicobar	Chennai 1 m
8.	Aug 26, 1883	Volcanic eruption at Kranatoa, Indonesia	Chennai Nagapattanam	2 m 0.6 m
9.	1884	Earthquake in western part of Bay of Bengal	Port Blair Dublet-Hooghly river mouth	-
10.	June 26, 1941	Andaman sea/ earthquake	Entire east coast of India	1.25 m
11.	Nov 27, 1945	Off Baluchistan at in Oman sea/ earthquake	West coast of India - gulf of Kutch to Karwar	12 m Kandla
12.	No 30, 1983	Indian ocean/ earthquake	East coast of India	—
13.	June 18, 2000	South Indian Ocean/earthquake	East coast of India	-
14.	Sept 13, 2002	Andaman Islands, India Earthquake	East coast of India	-
15.	Dec 26, 2004	Off Sumatra / earthquake	Countries around Indian Ocean	1-9 m

(Source: 'State of Environment Report - 2006: National Hazards of Kerala, State Council for Science, Technology and Environment, Sastra Bhavan, Pattom, 2007)

To quote from a first hand account of the field situation as narrated by Brig R.M. Mittal who landed in Port Blair on 27 Dec 2004, a day after the tsunami struck in the island and was responsible to oversee the restoration and rebuilding work in the islands, "Having struck early in the morning when most people were asleep or just starting their day, the damage caused by the earthquake and the accompanying tsunami was catastrophic. Apart from the loss of the human lives and the mental trauma of the survivors, there was large scale destruction of property and essential service infrastructure..... communication totally disrupted with most of the telephone exchanges destroyed and telephone lines uprooted. Coastal roads and bridges were washed away, runways were damaged, the ports and jetties, the lifeline of the islands, were worst hit.... At Digilpur, a habited island located in the northern part, a vertical shift of almost one meter was noticed making berthing for the ships difficult while in the southern part, there was marked subsidence of more than one meter at the Campbell bay.... The Chengappa bridge across the Austin creek in Northern Andaman which was extensively damaged and with the span displaced in all the three axes took almost 10 months of innovative methods before it was reopened to traffic." (IIT Roorkee 2009-2010).

The tsunami affected many parts of the Kerala coast also though the said coast is located in the shadow zone with respect to the direction of the propagation of the tsunami and in that sense its severity was rather unexpected. Although there are reports of some previous tsunamis (1881, 1883, 1941 to mention a few) generated by earthquakes in the Andaman-Sumatra region, there is no documented evidence of any such events affecting the Kerala coast. A 1945

earthquake of M 8.0 in the Mekran coast is believed to have generated significant tsunami run-up in some parts of Gujarat, the only documented report of any tsunami affecting the west coast.

Though the tsunami affected parts of the Kerala coast, the maximum devastation was reported in the low coastal land of Kollam, Alleppey and Ernakulam districts particularly a strip of 10 Km in Azhikkal, Kollam district. This varying effect along the coast could be attributed to local amplification of the tsunami waves in certain regions. Thus on 26th December 2004, out of the 7516 km long coastline of India, more than 4500 km stretch was badly affected by the 9.0 magnitude earthquake-triggered tsunami, resulting in the total destruction of living environment along the coast. In India, 10881 people lost their lives, more than half of whom were in Tamil Nadu. The worst affected areas along the Indian coast were in Tamil Nadu, Kerala, and Andhra Pradesh, out of which Tamil Nadu suffered maximum loss with the damage concentrated in 4 districts.

Asset losses

Almost 154,000 houses were either destroyed or damaged entailing losses of about Rs.994.0 crore or \$228.5 million¹ (Tables 1.1 and 1.2). In the hardest hit state, Tamil Nadu, housing losses are estimated to reach 130,000 units. Pondicherry, though small in coastal exposure, suffered disproportionately higher damage due to its high population density, with an average 2,029 people/km² versus the 324 people/km² average for India (Annex IV: Housing (year not mentioned, p.49)).

Loss of Houses

Since the study is concentrating on the house reconstruction after the tsunami we will be discussing more about it. The type of

housing affected varied widely from state to state. While almost all the affected housing in Kerala was indicated to be *pucca*², it was less than half in Andhra Pradesh, and only an estimated 13 percent in Tamil Nadu. The rest was thatched huts or mud wall houses with thatched roofs. While specific numbers for Andhra Pradesh, Pondicherry and Kerala were not available, in Tamil Nadu 24,222 of the damaged houses were located in urban areas, mostly in Chennai, but also in the district towns of Cuddalore, Nagapattinam and Kanyakumari (Annex IV: Housing (year not mentioned, p.49)).

Based on information and discussions with the state governments, and the estimated unit costs, the total damages to the housing units could amount to as much as Rs. 840.0 crore, of which Tamil Nadu accounts for Rs. 718.0 crore (Table 1.2). In

addition, the loss of personal property is estimated to account for an additional Rs. 154.0 crore or \$35.2 million

Table 1.2: Estimated Number of Damaged Houses

State/UT	Pucca	Kacha	Total
Andhra Pradesh	216	266	482
Kerala	13042*	0*	13,042
Pondicherry	1312**	8749**	10,061
Tamil Nadu	16957*	113,043*	130,000
Total	N/A	N/A	153,585
* Estimated by the mission based on the state government's indications.			
** Due to lack of detailed information the same share for pucca housing was applied as in Tamil Nadu.			

(Source: Annex IV: Housing (year not mentioned), www.adb.org, p.50. accessed on 5th March, 2010)

Table 1.3: Estimated Housing and Personal Property Damages (Rs. crore)

State/UT	Fully	Partially	Total	Losses	Total	\$ million
Andhra Pradesh	1.0	1.0	2.0	N/A	2.0	0.45
Kerala	51.0	28.0	79.0	13.0	92.0	21.15
Pondicherry	39.0	2.0	41.0	10.0	51.0	11.73
Tamil Nadu	677.0	41.0	718.0	131.0	849.0	195.17
Total	768.0	72.0	840.0	154.0	994.0	228.50

(Source: Annex IV: Housing (year not mentioned), www.adb.org, p.50. Accessed on 5th March, 2010)

Assumptions

The average cost of pucca housing was assumed to be Rs. 120,000 in Andhra Pradesh and Tamil Nadu, Rs. 180,000 in Kerala and Rs. 160,000 in Pondichery. The cost of a kacha house was assumed to be equal to 30 percent of the cost of a pucca house in the respective state. In Andhra Pradesh, Pondicherry and Tamil Nadu, all kacha houses were assumed to be fully

damaged, while half of the pucca houses were assumed to be only partially damaged. Kerala provided a specific break up between partially and fully damaged housing units. The cost of a partially damaged house was assumed to be equal to 35 percent of the total cost of a pucca house, except in Kerala where the specific numbers were provided by the state (Rs. 35,000 in the case of major damage and Rs. 25,000 in the case of minor

damages). The costs of lost household items were assumed to be Rs.10,000 per family on an average and to have occurred to all families whose houses were affected.

Immediate Steps after tsunami

The various state governments carried out immediate emergency steps with regard to housing - partial compensation for housing damage, provision of temporary housing, debris removal, salvaging and so on. In most areas, the process of community consultation and participation, through village/community associations and leaders, and some NGOs, has been initiated to consider broader immediate to medium term recovery requirements.

The basis for estimating the housing reconstruction needs are the proposed programs prepared by the state governments. Different states have proposed varying house sizes and unit costs. These are: Kerala 430 sq ft, Andhra Pradesh 200 sq ft, Tamil Nadu 250 sq ft and Pondicherry 300 sq ft. The respective state estimates of cost per sq ft are Rs.698.0, Rs.200.0, Rs.234.0 and Rs.333.0. Due to the large housing needs in Tamil Nadu in absolute terms and in Pondicherry in relative terms, it was estimated that during the immediate phase (i.e. the first year) it would be possible to provide temporary housing and repairs to partially damaged houses and build about 20 percent of the new permanent housing. The remaining 80 percent of the new construction was estimated to be finalized during the medium term. Based on these parameters, the estimated costs, including temporary housing, land and infrastructure is Rs.696.0 crore or \$160.0 million.

Socio-economic Profile of Fishermen Community

According to 2001 census, the fishermen population in Kerala is 10.85

lakhs. The political base of the fishermen in Kerala as a whole is weak; but during elections this community forms a large vote-bank which is easily tapped with a few promises. No political party or leader is bothered about the miserable conditions of this community. The people in the fishing community are socially controlled by their religious leaders (Suja Beegam 2006). Traditional fishermen in Kerala belong to the most economically backward communities, their living standard depending mainly on the earnings from the fisheries sector. Stagnation in the production levels had worsened their living standards (Kerala Development Report 2008).

Tamil Nadu has a long coastline of 1076 kms, sustaining the livelihood of 7.60 lakhs marine fishermen population. The livelihoods of many of these households were vulnerable even before the tsunami (Appraisal Report). Fishermen of Tamil Nadu live in thatched huts in densely populated hamlets on the shore. They belong to the lowermost section of Tamil society and traditionally have to live outside the villages inhabited by the upper and middle class people. Fishing is the only source of income for these downtrodden and powerless people who constantly live under the threat of big-boat owners, moneylenders and merchants. Their huts are located one behind the other or in a scattered manner to form a small settlement called "Kuppam". They are very closely spaced in order to provide mutual shade to face the severe heat. Coconut mat walls facilitate airflow through the living areas to create a comfortable living space inside. There are a large number of people living in such huts and they constitute the largest section of the Tamil society in the tsunami affected districts of Tamil Nadu. These people were badly affected due to the tsunami (Vasudha Gokhale 2005). Building

stock along the coast generally consists of non-engineered and semi-engineered constructions, built with locally available materials like mud, coconut thatch, bricks, wood etc. A typical fisherman's hut is a small unit consisting of 1-3 rooms. It has small openings with wide overhanging roof to face the severe climate, and consists of a living space and a semi-covered cooking space, the floor of which is finished with cow dung coating and mud to provide a cool and soothing environment inside.

The efforts made by the respective governments are outlined in the various documents brought out by them. To quote from a document brought out by the govt of Kerala, (Tsunami Emergency Assistance Project: 1.6.2005 – 31.10.2009 A Review.)

"Buildings, roads, bridges, electricity and water supply systems, ports and harbours were either completely washed away or substantially damaged by nature's wrath..... One of the major objectives of the project was to restore and augment the disrupted water and electricity supply, modernization of ports and harbours, renovation, restoration and reconstruction of roads and new bridges. Besides restoration of the lost and damaged means of livelihood of the fisherfolk, solely dependent on the sea, development of alternate sources of earnings for them in view of the depleting fish wealth was also another objective of the project."

The livelihood programmes include among others

- (a) Ornamental fish production unit
- (b) Mussel farming
- (c) Sea food kitchen (handling cooked fish with value addition)
- (d) IT Kiosks

The document also speaks of testimonies to resilience - success stories of educated women to whom projects such as super markets and fish kiosks came as a safety net and as an epitome of self sufficiency and sustainable income once the tsunami waves receded.

In the state of Tamil Nadu too, the government document, outlines the specific measures taken:- ('Tiding over Tsunami')

- (a) houses being built have disaster resistant features and are insured for ten years against 14 hazards
- (b) shelter belt and mangrove plantations have been restored and improved
- (c) emphasis has been given for strengthening coastal roads, bridges, health care facilities and water supply which can prove to be life saving in times of emergencies
- (d) a large number of self-help groups have been formed and assisted so as to broad base livelihoods and increase incomes
- (e) continued focus is being given on UNDP supported Disaster Risk Management Program which will update village level disaster management plans and train communities to be prepared.

The document also talks of village level and taluk level coordination committees that were formed to monitor and help rescue, relief and rehabilitation activities so that "glimmerings of hope shone through the darkness of utter devastation and misery and panic-stricken minds, flooded with repeated thoughts of that fateful day, found hope in the quick and pro-active relief efforts." The document also outlines the attention given to health, psychosocial support, child protection, shelter, water and sanitation, education and the like and to permanent reconstruction measures including

restoration of fishing harbours and roads. As regards the approach to fishermen, the document claims that "fishermen were able to bounce back to a productive work life earlier than their counterparts in other tsunami-affected countries thanks to the swift flow of assistance, timely introduction of policy and guidelines for compensation of asset loss and equally swift restoration of fisheries- related ecology as well as infrastructure."

The Tamil Nadu document also talks about early disaster warning systems such as that installed in Thazhnguda in Cuddalore district which enables quick flow of information to warn fishermen of impending disaster. The

system comprises of a high featured VHF radio integrated with a public system connected to the main network of the district. The District Collector using his mobile radio can call village heads individually or collectively and disseminate information in case of emergency. In Nagapattinam district, a wireless communication network using kenwood two-way radios and repeater stations was installed, enabling the district administration to connect with all 19 coastal panchayats to communicate and advise communities in case of emergency situations Indian Coast Guard has handed over Distress Alert Transmitters to fishermen, making it easy to locate and rescue fishermen who are in distress while out at sea.

Table 1.4: Components of Disaster Management Cycle

Disaster Preparedness	Monitoring Prepare evacuation plans Disaster training exercises Preparation of a disaster plan Informing/training population Communications and control centre Anticipating damage to critical facilities Forecasts/warning/prediction of disasters Damage inspection, repair and recovery procedures
Disaster relief	Mass media coverage Maintaining public order Rapid damage assessment Search and rescue operations Evacuation, setting up shelters Co-ordination of international aid Implementation of disaster response plan Establish communication and infrastructure Food and medical supply, disease prevention
Rehabilitation & Reconstruction	Reconstruction planning Defining areas of reconstruction Repair/demolition of buildings Improve disaster mgmt plant

(Source: 'State of Environment Report - 2006: National Hazards of Kerala', Kerala State Council for Science, Technology and Environment, Sastra Bhavan, Pattom, 2007)

As regards housing, the Tamil Nadu government document speaks of Phase I housing wherein 53660 houses were taken up (31032 by NGOS and 22628 by government) of which 43679 have been completed and 39782 handed over. Under Phase II, construction of 24823 houses have been taken up of which 8154 have been completed. The scenario in Kerala is summarized in the following table:

Table 1.5: Tsunami Rehabilitation Program

Approved items	Target	Completed	Balance
CHRP	8500	1354	7146
Special Pack	2556	1467	1089
Total	11056	2821	8235

(Source: 'Tsunami rehabilitation program', Govt. of Kerala) *Status as on 31st January 2010

Temporary shelters for tsunami victims who lost their houses were constructed by the Kerala government in four clusters in the tsunami affected wards of Alappad. The construction began in February 2005 and the last relief camp was disbanded by April 2005. In Arattupuzha too the shelters were constructed in four clusters. The cost per shelter is estimated at Rs. 20,000 and over 1000 shelters were built at Alappad and about 500 at Arattupuzha. Occupancy in Alappad was about 650 and Arattupuzha housed about 300 families. All shelters were built on cement platforms raised about two feet above ground level.

Shelters built in Alappad were of corrugated tin sheets. Water supply was provided from overhead tanks. One shelter had a kitchen (10'x4') at the entrance opening

to a room 10'x13.5'. The gap between the partitions and the ceiling (outside) was covered with nylon nets to prevent scavenging birds from entering the shelter. The kitchen had a firewood cooking arrangement with a chimney and slots for three utensils. A running water tap was provided for every two shelters. Toilets and bathrooms were built in rows, a few metres away from the shelters. Two light bulbs and a three pin plug point were provided. But one cluster situated at Srayikkad had low lying land and was prone to water logging. Moreover, the heat of the sun striking the tin roofs was a real problem. Mosquitoes continued to plague the affected folk as well.

The shelters in Arattupuzha were long halls with plywood partitions without kitchen facilities. Inhabitants had to cook on cramped corridors. The shelters were full of smoke. The occupants were not even given chairs, beds or fans. Lack of proper access roads to the shelters made matters worse. To add to their woes, most water taps in the shelters did not work and complaints of leaking roofs were rampant.

In Andaman and Nicobar islands, Town and Country Planning Organization, Ministry of Urban Development, Govt of India took up the preparation of Layout Plans for Permanent settlements for 72 locations. It was envisaged that these settlements should come up as model townships with all facilities. The layout plans are based on the cluster concept and include provision of rain water harvesting pits, garbage dumps etc. 9565 intermediate shelters were constructed. About 15000 MT materials for construction of shelters were transported to different islands despite severe constraints. Traditional houses were built for Onges/ Andamanese.

The material specifications in construction are as follows:

Foundation		RCC
Super structure		Steel frame
External walls		Wooden Planks
Internal Partition		Processed Bamboo Board
Flooring	Stilt	Processed Bamboo Board
	Non stilt	C.C. Flooring
Doors & windows		Processed bamboo board/ bamboo jute composite
Roof		CGI sheets

Out of 9797 permanent shelters to be constructed superstructure has been completed in 5263 (54%) only as on 28.2.2009.

Tsunami Rehabilitation – Current Scenario

Our study has found that the situation in Tamil Nadu is in no way different from that outlined in the Humanitarian exchange magazine (www.odihpn.org)

"The assumption that fishermen live in independent nuclear families is also reflected in the design of the proposed houses, which have a standard size of about 32-24 m² divided into three or four rooms. None of the spaces is sufficiently large to allow an average family to stay together in one room. In general, houses have no veranda or only a very small one. The new houses are constructed in rows on plots that are too small to allow for future additions.... Villagers are often forced to demolish their old houses and to surrender their land to make space for the construction of the new village. The social tensions emerging out of these processes are already tangible, as families whose houses were not damaged by the tsunami try to resist demolition. Many companies require completely clear ground before starting construction, necessitating

removing all trees. In a climate where temperatures typically reach 40 degrees centigrade, it is hard to imagine how people will manage to live in their tiny flat roofed cement houses without any shade."

The said study concludes with the following observations:

"There is a growing awareness.... that the employment of construction companies in post-disaster housing reconstruction is not necessarily the most effective and sustainable option. When people have the capacity to build their own houses, it may be better to limit the role of external agencies to the provision of financial and technical assistance."

Another study worth mentioning here is the one made by the Institute for Applied Sustainability to the Built Environment (Bareustein and Pittet 2007). According to them, "prejudices towards vernacular housing and building practices combined with an unprecedented availability of private funding for reconstruction led to a massive replacement of environmentally and culturally appropriate housing with RCC houses." By considering

- (i) a post-tsunami NGO built house with RCC flat roof

- (ii) a coconut thatched roof house
- (iii) a straw thatched roof house
- (iv) a traditional tiled roof house &
- (v) a Mangalore tiled roof house

they concluded that coconut and straw thatched houses may be considered the best option in terms of economic viability, environmental impact and comfort. The study says that RCC houses built by humanitarian agencies within the framework of post-disaster recovery projects represent the least viable option which is most expensive, offers the lowest level of comfort and has the highest environmental impact. A most interesting observation made by them is that "in Tamil Nadu neither the government with its technocratic based reconstruction policy framework nor NGOs paid any attention to the socio-cultural and environmental context of their housing reconstruction programmes, to the importance of preserving the pre-disaster built environment and to the potentially severe social and environmental impact of their mass housing projects."

Add to all these the woe contained in the words "Shifting us away from the sea and denying us access to the coast is like taking away our life" and the picture is complete.

In "an analytical study of living environment in the tsunami affected areas of Tamil Nadu", Vasudha A. Gokhale, (2005) also pointed out that "many temporary shelters designed without considering the severe heat and space requirement have failed to serve the purpose. A box-like temporary house made of ferrocrete walls and tin roof have resulted in inside temperatures rising to 300-500C which is much higher than the

desirable temperature. Absence of adequate openings for light and ventilation have created highly uncomfortable and unhygienic indoor environment."

Reports from human right activists across the world also present the same side of the story. To quote a posting of 'abc news' (2007),

"Thousands of tsunami victims on Andaman and Nicobar archipelago are still living in temporary shelters. A plan to build nearly 10000 permanent houses has crawled past several deadlines with work even at a showpiece project near the capital of the islands progressing lazily making victims despondent in their filthy tin shacks that bake in the tropical sun. They are the forgotten victims of one of the worst disasters mankind has known, due to what aid groups say is the combined onslaught of bureaucratic ineptitude, avarice, natural hurdles and the physical and psychological distance from the mainland."

The situation in Srilanka as outlined in a posting on wsws.org dt 29.12.2009 also depicts the scenario, of victims living in misery. It quotes a fisherman as follows:

"No house we received in this area was built to the required standards. Even with a little rain, every corner gets wet. The door frames started to shake after a few months..... Contractors earned huge profits by building substandard houses.... There was no official mechanism to supervise the standards."

No wonder why cracked walls and damaged doors and windows are common, not to speak of faulty wiring and the resultant risk of electric shocks.

Design and Specifications for Permanent Shelters

S. No.	Design/ Specifications	South Andaman (Non-Tribal)	Little Andaman (Tribal)	Little Andaman (Non-Tribal)	Car Nicobar	Nancowrie Group of Islands	Great Nicobar (Tribal)	Great Nicobar (Non-Tribal)	Comments of the Administration
1.	Housing Typology (Machan Type House)	Houses may be without stilts but on raised platform and with cement concrete flooring	Houses may be the same as that of the prototype house built in Hut Bay by the MOUD on raised platform with cement concrete flooring	Houses may be the same as that of the prototype house built in Hut Bay by the MOUD on raised platform with cement concrete flooring	Houses may be on stilts having a clear stilt height of 8 ft. i.e. Machan type house was preferred	Houses may be without stilts but on raised platform and with cement concrete flooring	Houses may be without stilts but on raised platform and with cement concrete flooring	Houses may be the same as that of the prototype house built in Campbell Bay by the MOUD on raised platform with cement concrete flooring	Covered machan with open side may suit life style of the tribal such as Nicobari, especially for day/night activities or to store fuel/folder, etc. Machan type house on stilt having a clear stilt height of 8 ft. may be considered for Car Nicobar and in other Islands for both tribal and non-tribal houses may be, without stilt but be on raised platform and with cement concrete flooring as desired by beneficiaries.
2.	Location of Permanent Houses	Some beneficiaries desired to have permanent Houses on their own land. Especially farmers. For others, suitable site identified.	Location of permanent settlement may be near to existing intermediate shelters	Beneficiaries desired that independent house sites may be given to them by the Administration where as settlers desired to build their houses in their own agriculture farms	The Members, of Tribal Council were unanimous in their view that permanent houses should also be built in the same area where the intermediate shelters have come up so that new areas need not be cleared for the same. However, they mentioned that there is a need for careful layout planning at each location for permanent houses by Town planners of TCPO.	The leaders of Tribal Council agreed to construct the permanent houses at new sites i.e. other than sites of which intermediate shelters have come up	The leaders of Tribal Council agreed to construct the permanent house in new sites.	It was agreed that A & N Administration, after due discussion with the stakeholders would finalize the sites for permanent shelters. This is significant in view of the fact that many villages in north-south road located along the coast have been affected severely due to Tsunami and resulted in large scale displacement of people residing in those villages	<p>Car Nicobar By and large permanent houses may come up in same area where intermediate shelters were constructed.</p> <p>Nancowrie group of Islands Beneficiaries should identify suitable locations for permanent houses.</p> <p>Great Nicobar (Tribal) Tribals indicated that they would prefer permanent houses in Great Nicobar and Little Nicobar island in their own area at 8 locations which would be indicated to the administration when survey would be undertaken.</p> <p>Great Nicobar (non-Tribal) Settlers who are farmers, indicated that their permanent houses be built either in their farm or somewhere near their farms.</p>

We also feel that scientific innovations should be properly adopted in the field. For instance 'science daily' has reported that an MIT/Harvard team has developed a solution to the problem of how to build homes in tsunami prone areas (Science Daily 2005). The team is even reported to have produced an architectural model for a Sri Lankan house that essentially would allow a powerful ocean wave to go through the houses instead of knocking it flat. Such studies should find its impact on housing schemes. It is in this context that we are looking for the housing rehabilitation scenes in the coastal areas of Kerala and Tamil Nadu.

Methodology/approach

In order to explore the housing reconstruction efforts in Kerala and Tamil Nadu in the aftermath of the 2004 tsunami, the survey is conducted as a case study. The efforts of the governments of Kerala and Tamil Nadu and several NGOs are explored and critiqued. The Mudakkara settlement and Aalappad from Kollam district have been selected for the purpose of this study. In Tamil Nadu we conducted our study in Kovalam (Thirupurur block), Chemancheri (Shoynganelloor block) Puthunimadikuppam (Thirupurur block) from Kanchipuram district located in Chennai municipal corporation. In addition to the primary data collected, a structured interview schedule and focused group discussions were also carried out in the tsunami affected areas. Purposive sampling procedure was adopted to conduct the structured interviews in the study areas. Relevant secondary data on the topic were collected from published sources such as reports, websites, newspapers, books, and periodicals etc.

Significance of the study

This study makes a systematic attempt to analyse the relief and rehabilitation activities for the tsunami victims, especially the houses allotted. The findings and the plan of action expected from the study would be useful for undertaking development activities by GOs and NGOs.

In this context, the findings of the survey carried out in the thirteen tsunami affected districts of Tamil Nadu in Aug 2007 by DHV India Pvt Ltd with assistance of Asian Development Bank are significant. According to the findings of the study

- (a) Average size of family = 3.81
- (b) 80% are most backward castes and SC/ST
- (c) A third of the families are 'vulnerable'
- (d) 60% of the recipients said that govt assistance was adequate
- (e) Availability of water has improved from 81.45% to 83.01% and of toilet facility from 39.57% to 58.31%. (Source: Tiding over Tsunami, October 2008, Disaster Management and Mitigation Department, Govt of Tamil Nadu, Annexure Seven)

Selection of Respondents

The respondents were selected based upon the list of the tsunami victims from Government records. We also selected areas where houses were constructed by the government, NGOs and contractors. So in this way a stratified random sampling method was adopted. A suitable interview schedule was constructed. In addition to this, focus group discussions, observation techniques etc. were also adopted as supplementary methods in this research. The Research Design adopted for this study was Descriptive cum Diagnostic Design with an overtone of ex post facto description.

Data Processing Technique

Primary data collected from the respondents were statistically processed through application of simple statistical tools and techniques, like averages and percentages for the analyses and interpretations. The reference period of this research was December 2009.

Data Analysis and Interpretation

The discussion in this section is based on the household survey. A sample was drawn from the housing stock of two districts from Tamil Nadu and Kerala. Further 2 panchayats were selected from each district. Settlements which were constructed with the help of government, NGOs and financed by the government were selected for the study. For the above, three settlements were selected from one panchayat from each district. A sample of fifty from each district was selected. The following section will discuss about the socio-economic profile of the respondents.

SOCIO ECONOMIC PROFILE OF THE RESPONDENTS

Table 1.6: Personal Particulars Age and Sex - Wise Distribution

Respondent's Age	Kerala (in Nos.)	Tamil Nadu (in Nos.)
20-30	9	5
31-40	9	17
41-50	14	20
51-60	10	5
60 above	8	3
Male	74%	30%
Female	26%	70%

(Source: Survey data)

The above table shows the personal particulars of the respondents. The sex wise distribution of the respondents depicts that majority (74%) are males compared to (26%) females in Kerala. In the case of Tamil Nadu seventy percent of the respondents are females. Age of the respondents were also given in the table above. Therefore it is concluded that, males and females are almost equally represented which are mostly from the age group of 41-50.

Table 1.7 Educational and Occupational Status (in per centage)

Education	Districts	
	Kollam	Kanchipuram
Illiterate	20	87
Literate	80	13
Occupation		
Fishing	86	86
Non-fishing	14	14

(Source: Survey data)

Table 1.4 reveals the educational and occupational status of the respondents in the study areas. It reveals that the majority (80%) of respondents in Kollam are literates while in Kanchipuram district of Tamil Nadu 87 per cent are illiterates. 86% of the respondents in Kollam district are involved in fishing occupation. Similarly eighty six per cent from Tamil Nadu also depend on fishing for their livelihood. The rest of the respondents were found working as coolies. Therefore, it is concluded that majority of the respondents are involved in fishing as primary occupation.

Table 1.8: Structure of Family (in percentage)

No: of members in family	Districts	
	Kollam (Kerala)	Kanchipuram (Tamil Nadu)
4 or < 4members	48	58
4-6 members	38	26
Above 6 members	14	16
Total	100	100

(Source: Survey data)

Table 1.5 reveals the structure of family; a vast majority of the respondents in Kerala live in nuclear families. According to district wise comparison, in Kanchipuram district eighty four per cent of respondents have upto six members in their family compared to eighty six percent is Kollam district. Therefore it is concluded that in both the districts all the respondents are married and majority of the respondents live in nuclear families. The coastal social structure reveals the nuclear family as the preferred type.

Table 1.9: Nature and Ownership of House after Tsunami

Ownership of house	Districts	
	Kollam	Kanchipuram
Government	17(34)	17(34)
NGOs	17(34)	17(34)
Financed by Govt.	16(32)	16(32)

(Source: Survey data)

For the convenience of study we had gone for taking data on houses constructed by government, NGOs and financed by government equally. So a sample of

seventeen each from government provided houses, seventeen from NGO constructed houses and sixteen from agency financed houses were selected.

Table 1.6 reveals the ownership of houses of respondents in the two districts. In the study it was also found that all the respondents (100 per cent) were staying in pucca houses. Both the government and NGOs have provided pucca houses for rehabilitation. Also it was noticed that the houses constructed with the financial aid of government were also pucca. It seems that the fishermen communities have been forced by the government to change their life style and they are depending more on concrete houses than their traditional houses made of coconut leaf, mud and bamboo. The details of ownership of house shows that the houses were constructed by World Vision and Amrithananda Mayi Ashram in the case of Kollam district and World Vision, RARP in the case of Kanchipuram district. Therefore it is concluded that, all the respondents' houses are pucca and houses are built by the joined effort from government, NGOs and by financial aid from the government.

Housing conditions have a direct and positive impact on health status, attitudes, and values of the population concerned. In the study we have measured the size of the houses in terms of the number of rooms, number of bed rooms etc. The following discussion will be on the above.

Table 1.10: Number of Rooms Allotted (Kerala) (in percentage)

No. of Rooms	2	4	5
Govt. constructed	–	100	-
NGOs constructed	35	65	-
Financed by Govt.	-	75	25

(Source: Survey data)

Table 1.11: Number of Rooms Allotted (Tamil Nadu) (in percentage)

No. of Rooms	1	2	3
Govt. constructed	100	-	-
NGOs constructed	70	30	-
Financed by Govt.	-	62	38

(Source: Survey data)

In the study we found that the houses in Kerala had more rooms than those in Tamil Nadu. All the houses had bedrooms, kitchen, and bathroom. But in Kanchipuram district in Tamil Nadu the government-constructed houses had only one multi-purpose room. The NGOs-built houses on the other hand had both one room houses and two room houses. Those who built houses with financial aid managed to have two rooms for them (62 %) and rest (38%) with three rooms.

Table 1.12: Number of bedrooms allotted (Kerala) (in percentage)

No. of Bedrooms	1	2	3
Govt. constructed	-	100	-
NGOs constructed	24	76	-
Financed by Govt.	-	81	19

(Source: Survey data)

Table 1.13 : Number of bedrooms allotted (Tamil Nadu) (in percentage)

No. of Bedrooms	1	2	3
Govt. constructed	-	-	-
NGOs constructed	40	-	-
Financed by Govt.	-	62	38

(Source: Survey data)

Housing quality

The quality of individual houses is assessed primarily on the basis of materials used for their structure, residential space, facilities and amenities, and present condition. As far as individual households are concerned, the house quality reflects the residential economic and social status. The quality of houses in a region, on the other hand, is an indication of the economic status, social attitudes, and economic relations that exist there. Political ideology of the government, its institutions, rules, and priorities often reflect in the housing situation of a country. However, in a modern society, since every member strives to improve social status, the richer sections break out of the rural social milieu by accepting urban lifestyles. Superficially, it appears that modern and urban styles of living are the order of the day among the respondents of the study region and that modern tastes and preferences are visible in the choice of building materials - for roof, walls, and floor materials of the sample housing units.

All the houses constructed by government in the study area were found to have concrete (RCC) roof. The government had constructed flats for the fishermen. Thirty two per cent of the respondents from Kerala complained about the poor quality of materials used for construction. Nevertheless, houses sponsored by NGOs had tiled floor in Kerala. But during the interview many of them complained about the low quality of materials used for house construction. In the Tamil Nadu context, the government and NGO provided houses were all found to have cement floors. Thirty eight per cent of the respondents from Tamil Nadu complained about low quality materials used for construction.

Size of houses

An exploration of the area utilized for house construction, land occupied, size of Veranda etc reveals the following:

In Kerala, the government has provided flats. The traditional fishermen houses have verandas. This was found not available for the families living in flats. The Amritha settlements (Kollam district) on the other hand had small verandas attached to their house. It was found that 71 per cent of the households had thirty sq.ft. verandahs and 29 per cent houses had 40 sq.ft. verandahs attached to their houses. An analysis of houses which were constructed by the family with Government aid shows that 44 per cent of the households had verandas with 40 sq.ft. and 56 per cent had houses with 60 sq.ft. verandas. Data from Tamil Nadu shows that 78 percent of the houses had no verandas while 22 percent had a small veranda attached to their houses.

Land occupied

Land occupied by the respondents' shows that in Kerala, the government had given them flats which deprived them of their usual traditional land holding while the Amritha settlements were found to have given land to the respondents. Those who had land in their name had less than ten cents of land, in which they constructed houses with government support. The lack of property title appears to be one of the aspects of the poverty trap faced by the low-income fisher men communities. All their assets are related to fishing, which have value only as long as they have access to a near-by beach to keep their boats. However, without the title they cannot sell their property. A detailed table showing the land occupied by the respondents is given below.

Table 1.14 : Land occupied by respondents in Kerala (in percentage)

Agency involved	<5 cents of land	5 to 10 cents
Govt.	-	-
NGOs	24	76
Financed by Govt.	75	25

(Source: Survey data)

Table 1.15 : Land occupied by respondents in Tamil Nadu (in percentage)

Agency involved	<5 cents of land	5 to 10 cents
Govt.	100	-
NGOs	96	4
Financed by Govt.	94	6

(Source: Survey data)

The area taken for the house construction shows that the Amritha settlements were constructed in a plot area ranging from 400 to 600 sq.ft. and houses built by the respondents itself ranged from 350 to 500 sq.ft. in Kerala. In Tamil Nadu the houses allotted by the government were 217 sq.ft., NGO constructed houses were in the range of 310 sq.ft, and houses constructed with financial aid had not more than 350 sq.ft. area. So what we conclude is that in all the houses that were constructed (whether government or NGOs), the area taken up was very small. While formulating programmes for construction of these houses, however, it is necessary to resist the temptation of imposing urban values. In this context, it is necessary to clarify certain urban myths about rural poor housing. There is a tendency for planners, to fix up some square metre area per person while designing

fishermen houses. The fishermen normally use the veranda and the open space outside the house for sleeping, maintenance of fishing nets etc. The inner space is used for storage, cooking, sleeping etc. The desirable layout, the number of rooms, the design of the house etc, for the fishermen are therefore much different from that which has been designed for them in Kerala and Tamil Nadu.

Very often flawed construction techniques, low quality construction materials or negligence, results in uninhabitable housing. In both Kerala and Tamil Nadu context people complained of cracks in the walls and leaking roofs. An analysis in this way is as shown in Table 1.13.

**Table 1.16: Condition of houses
[Kerala/Tamil Nadu] (in percentage)**

Condition of house	Kerala	Tamil Nadu
Walls		
Cracked	32	38
Not cracked	68	62
Door/window		
Unfixed/bad condition	36	41
Comfortable	64	59
Floor		
Cracked	34	38
Not cracked	66	62
Roof		
Leaking	38	27
Not leaking	62	73

(Source: Survey data)

Irrespective of the agency involved in house construction, in both Kerala and Tamil Nadu we found that many houses were

in dilapidated condition. Many respondents from Kerala and Tamil Nadu, especially women complained that toilets were not provided with doors. The doors were also found not fitting with the walls. Most of the doors in the closed condition had gaps from the walls. During heavy rainy season even if the doors are closed, rain water enters the house. During monsoon, this is a cause of great concern. In some of the houses the researcher had found the windows were in bad condition. Most of the windows also had no glass frame attached to it. The plastering of roofs of some houses was gone and the floors cemented were also found displaced. The quality of the materials used for the houses irrespective of the agency involved in house construction needs to be re-examined. The State's distinctive 'product' at the level of the local State is a basis for widespread fraud, springing from social unaccountability. Corruption is the surface phenomenon, the way most people encounter, visualise and discuss the local state.

Strict and close monitoring of construction processes and materials as well as the insistence of techniques like "weathering" could have prevented these problems from arising within a few months of construction.

A house can be considered habitable only if it provides all basic necessities and accommodates people's essential requirements. The researchers' interaction with most of the respondents brought out their concerns over the kitchen. Women came with the complaints (Kerala and Tamil Nadu) that the kitchens are not spacious and that they were not supported with slabs for cooking. Additionally the women (staying in the flats) had to cook outside the house since the design of the kitchen was not conducive for cooking with firewood. For Marykutty

from Mudakkara settlement, the problem is more acute as she is an Asthma patient staying in the fourth floor of the building and she has to come daily to the ground floor for cooking. She said during the monsoons cooking in the ground further adds to the problem. In some of the houses (in Tamil Nadu) it was found that separate space was also not allotted for kitchen (multi-purpose single room apartment). Hence part of the living room was used for cooking. Participation of the people in the planning of their houses has significance with the kind of livelihood strategy adopted. Here the design of the house had given least significance to the needs of the people.

In the context of participation, it is noteworthy that effective participation has not taken place. In the study area respondents were asked about the agency involved with the house construction. It was found that in Kerala 68 percent of the respondents said their houses were constructed by contractors while 32 per cent said panchayats have taken initiative for house construction but contractors were also involved in the house construction. Three percent said that their houses were planned in consultation with the family while 97 per cent said neither community nor families were consulted while designing their houses.

In Tamil Nadu, contractors were found involved in building houses. 100 per cent of the houses were constructed with the help of contractors. Five percent of the respondents said they were consulted about the construction while ninety five per cent lamented that they were not consulted.

Sanitation facility

As in the case of kitchens, most respondents said that toilet facilities were far from adequate. Ninety nine per cent of the respondents from Kerala had toilets attached

to their house. In several houses the toilets were not functioning. In some of the houses bathing areas had not been built properly. The slope of the floor is not properly constructed and hence water remains blocked in the toilet. In Mudakkara(Kerala) settlement the main complaint with the new houses was the faulty drainage in the bathroom and the fact that the leach pit in the toilets would clog up regularly. In Tamil Nadu only 11 per cent of the houses had separate toilet facility while 89 per cent had no toilet facility in their houses. The government constructed houses had only one multi-purpose room and they had to defecate in the open space. Women respondents from Tamil Nadu came up with demands for toilets.

Drinking Water Facility

Given the indivisibility of all human rights, the failure to secure the right to water results in reciprocal cycle of deprivation, impeding the enjoyments of right to food and the right to health. Our main finding was that while water was available in some quantity, it was not sufficient, and generally available in common taps for merely a few hours a day. The government still has not provided separate water connection for each house. In the Kerala context seventy two percent of the households depended on water from common taps while 28 percent had individual water connection with them. In Tamil Nadu 34 per cent of the people were found taking water from a common tap. Since the taps were leaking they had to struggle hard to get water from the leaked portion. It seemed like a fountain for the researcher and the women were struggling hard to take water from it. During the peak summer season there is shortage of water. Sixty six per cent of the house holds depended on tanker lorry water supplies. In

short we could say that water facility is improper both in Kerala and in Tamil Nadu.

Conclusion

Immersed in the housing construction process are various issues raised by the people on a day-to-day basis. It was found that house construction was worked out in a hurry without giving due importance to a sustainable architecture for disaster prone areas. One of the important findings from Kerala and Tamil Nadu was that affected people's right to participate in rehabilitation planning and implementation was not being considered. In many cases especially the Mudakkara of Kollam district in Kerala the complete absence of people's involvement has resulted in a feeling of hopelessness and destitution. However the NGOs' involvement in housing reconstruction was found to be a ray of hope. Active participation of everyone, including women within the affected communities, at every stage of relief and rehabilitation is the key to ensuring that all the affected persons are well represented, respected and protected.

Suggestions

- While immediate attention must be paid to restoring basic living conditions and re-establishing local infra-structure, long-term efforts must focus on capacity building, increased resilience, disaster management and community empowerment. In the aftermath of the devastating tsunami, many communities are in need of coordinated and well planned models of redevelopment to ensure sustainable change and meaningful recovery.
- Rehabilitation must recognise and uphold the affected people's interest.
- Right to life, livelihood, health, food, water and participation have to be ensured.
- Rebuilding should be based on a comprehensive assessment of needs, including those of women.
- Equal attention must be paid to rebuilding people's lives and livelihoods by not ignoring the environmental, psychological and socio-cultural dimensions of the community.
- The central and state governments need to play a more active role in preventing corruption in housing constructions.
- Housing designs and resettlement site plans, including information on size, material, technology to be used, location, funds received and amount disbursed have to be met with the participation of real stakeholders who are the beneficiaries out of it.
- The government must take the responsibility for ensuring that adequate land is made available in a timely manner for permanent housing to all disaster affected people.
- All agencies involved in house reconstruction must operate on the principle of co-operation and transparency and must be accountable to the constituencies they claim to be working for.
- Scientific innovations should be properly adopted in the field.

End Notes & References

1. For the purposes of currency conversion an exchange rate of Rs 43.5 / US\$ is used.
 2. In India, the terms *pucca* and *kachcha* are used to denote, respectively, permanent and light/temporary structures.
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Hegemonic Masculinity and the Idea of “Feminist Counter Hegemony”: The Case of International Relations

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Abstract

The continuing dominance of Man in all social organization is a serious academic issue being discussed in contemporary debates in Social Sciences. The entry of the feminist criticism is very late when compared to other fields of Social Sciences. The article attempts to narrate how masculinity is being produced by capitalism in various ways and how it becomes a hegemonic force. The possibilities of a feminist counter hegemony have been explored.

The explanations that had been given by the pre-capitalist social formations for the subordination of the females were based on non scientific reasons - concepts of chastity, purity and divinity of the female body. The ongoing system of production which made use of the scientific revolution could understand the realities of nature with a secular perspective. The social change that followed capitalism was not a result of a deliberate attempt for it, but it was a change in the feudal social relations that was necessary for the legitimization of the capitalist production relations. If it is admitted that the inferior status of the female is not natural but social or that gender inequality is an ideology that the ruling class possesses at both macro and micro levels, it becomes one among the few primordial values that was unaltered in a progressive way by the capitalist system. Theoretical projects for the further development of the social system did not give any representation to the female gender and it was not necessary also¹. The Marxist and other critical theories of modernity, while picking up the social issues for the construction of the social theory did not or could not give representation of the women's question.

The countries of the world used to relate to each other even before the emergence of capitalism. But the interactions at the time of capitalism are totally different. Since capital is a global formation, the International Relations itself is an epiphenomena of the capitalist production relations. Male domination which goes beyond the modes of production was remoulded by capitalism. After the industrial revolution, the states in Europe became laizez fair states and its role became minimum and represented the dominant capitalist class. The control over the means of production was left with this class. One major issue relating to this class which was unattended by Marx was the male centric nature of capitalism. Women in the society had no control over the means of production; it was controlled by a minority of men.

Conservative theories that investigated into the ontology and epistemology of capitalism tried to bring out theories for the better performance of the system. The knowledge produced by them always contributed to the existing knowledge system. Therefore almost all the theories of international relations other than Critical

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Theories are either conservative or reactionary. Among the theories of IR, the Realist School that considered state as the central category of analysis had dominance over other conservative theories.

Morgenthau explains the observation that nations seem to be constantly embroiled in conflict with reference to what he calls “elemental biopsychological drives” characteristic of human beings. Two of these drives are particularly important: The first is “an elementary egoism which arises from the competition for those scarce material and ideational goods that enable human beings to survive.” The second is the human will to power, or, as Morgenthau puts it, “the desire to maintain the range of one’s own person with regard to others, to increase it, or to demonstrate it.” While “there is in selfishness an element of rationality presented by the natural limitation of the end,” since any human being or state only needs a finite amount of resources to survive, the will to power is, according to Morgenthau, both infinite and irrational. In the thought of Morgenthau, the “tendency to dominate” that is apparent in “all human associations, from the family . . . to the state,” that omnipresent human “aspiration for power over man,” is “the essence of politics.” Inhabited by selfish and self-aggrandizing beings, the realm of international politics becomes a realm of evil, characterized by constant struggles between selfish and self-aggrandizing states, seeking power both as an end in itself as well as a means to all their other ends. This is how the classical realists assimilate, for purposes of creating a realist theory of international relations, “the core argument offered by previous realists, namely that the egoistic nature of man is the cause of all political strife.”¹ The egoistic and aggressive nature of man is viewed as a natural creation by Morgenthau but the Radical Theories treat it as social constructions.

The dominance of the realist paradigm and the state centric definition of politics define war and peace as issues

between the sovereign units. The cultural practices, forms of government and levels of democratization differ from state to state, but the leading role in all the states are taken up by men. Patriarchy, even if it is not a single grand force, can be treated as a form of power that is present in all human associations. In international relations the discourses of security and peace are discussed within the paradigm of male power. International politics – the confrontation between different national interests – is often seen as a field where the actors are supposed to be highly clever and strong. Both cleverness and strength are associated with the male factor by almost all cultural specificities. The manliness of the texts of social sciences and philosophy were challenged by critical female agencies from the very beginning itself. The attack on the male domination by female critiques became much strong with the emergence of radical feminism in the continent. The feminist intervention in IR was very late when compared to other fields of social sciences.

Feminist scholars claim that gender differences permeate all facets of public and private life, a socially constructed divide which they take to be problematic itself; IR scholars, however, may believe that gender is about interpersonal relations between women and men, but not about international politics³. The feminist position in IR is not simply for recognition or representation. They fight both academically and politically for the recognition of women as a crucial site of knowledge. In this context Sharoni argues that

we need to explode the artificial distinctions between ‘women’s issues’ and ‘international politics’ by making topics such as the social construction of gender identities and roles, the interconnectedness of militarism and sexism, and the complex relationship of colonialism, nationalism and feminism, integral parts of IR [inter- national relations] scholarship (Keyman 1995).⁴

The Private/ Public divide that was created by modernity limited the scope of the female gender into the family space. Different principles and rules for the private and public emerged out of modernity. The liberal values of modernity were enjoyed by the individual actors in the public space, most often, men. The narrations and theoretical explanations given by critical social theories were also based on the experience of man. The anti slavery movement in the US, the anti colonial movements in India and other parts of the world were explained from the perspective of the glorified male emancipator. The young militant nationalists of the Indian freedom movement were always illustrated as the great sons struggling against the alien (masculine) forces to free their 'Mother' land. The protests up to the end of the colonial period were between man and man. Both the winner and the loser as narrated by the mainstream history were men. The academic investigations that went beyond the binary logics of the modern social theories and criticisms provided a space for identity of gender which was marginalized by both socio-political and academic practices. The second development was the negation of the grand identity of gender. Patriarchy in its confrontation with the female would have different forms; at the same time in the public space it takes the form of a hegemonic force. The male dominance is associated with the knowledge system and modes of identifying truth. Since the knowledge systems and the ways of realizing the truth differs, the working styles of (male) power also varies from context to context.

The reason for the formation of the social classes can be traced out from the emergence of the idea of 'private' and the economic structures. But identities like gender falls beyond the class categories, even though it is a socio-economic construction. The pro capitalist and 'neutral intellectuals' often glorifies the role of capitalism in emancipating the women. Capitalism as Marx points is definitely the most dynamic system that humanity has ever

witnessed. The male domination that existed in all the previous social forms was not totally removed by the new production system, rather capitalism reproduced patriarchy in a different form. The importance of the concept of purity came down along with the growth of capitalism. But the subordination of the female was repeated with its commodification. Purity is a moral value that portrays the female body as sacred and weak and something that has to be protected from contamination. This concept has worked as the major tool of suppressing the other sex. Commodification of the female body on the other side, to a greater extent disturbs the conventional moralities, but here the female body is a sex object and a marketable good. In this way capitalism provided a space for the females in public sphere. In my observation the concept of purity or chastity of the female body does suppress both the male and female sexualities and the (market) potential of the female body as an object of sex lies in this suppression. Therefore the total removal of the pre-modern concepts of sex and gender relations will decrease the demand for commodities in capitalism.

Patriarchy is a form of power that existed in different forms in the society prior to the emergence of capitalism. Capitalism was a mediator through which different systems of knowledge were related worldwide. The origin of the discipline of the academic discipline of International Relations was in parallel with the globalization of capital. The narration of history was (is) based on the experience of man. The construction of the systems of knowledge or the modes of identifying truth were male centric in all societies.

The role of the woman is limited to the domestic sphere. The hegemony of the male power has explained the woman as weak and emotional and both the qualities have no role in international politics where fierce competition is going on. Masculinity is a quality that is necessary for a political unit that engages in international politics. Gender

Studies is not just about women; it is about men and masculinities also. This is an important point the feminists in IR should take into consideration, if the social construction of masculinity and the manliness of the actors of IR are studied from a feminist perspective, more critical results can be obtained. The major unit of study and analysis in IR was the State up to the post World War II period. State is an institution that represents power, means the state represents a section of the society that controls the production and the social relations. Thus the academic discipline of IR becomes a knowledge system that is produced out of the interactions between states. The Marxists view the state as an executive of the bourgeoisie, for them IR can be an area where the bourgeois interests compete as a result of the globalization of capital. The feminist interpretation of the IR deviates from both the conservative and Marxist understandings of IR. The state is a masculine force, it does not represent the female voice and IR becomes a “Man Vs Man” game. Since the male power goes beyond the modes of production, the Marxist criticism of the IR becomes incomplete. With an ontology based on unitary states in an asocial, anarchical international environment, there is little in realist theory that provides an entry point for feminist theories, grounded as they are in an epistemology that takes social relations as its central category of analysis. The IR feminists investigate how military conflict and the behaviour of states in the international system are constructed through, or embedded in unequal gendered structural relations and how these affect the life chances of individuals, particularly women. These very different foci evoke the kind of questions introduced above which is the legitimate subject matter of the discipline.⁵

The context of the birth of masculinity is argued to be social by the feminist ideologues. Masculinity has a dual meaning, being masculine means the power of a male body to bring the female body under control and secondly the capability to

monopolize the female body and possess it as private property. The possession of the private property along with attempt to expand control over the feminine alienated the female from the humane being. Woman was reduced to the scope of body and man became the agency and power that moves history. Aggression and conquest are the fundamental qualities that make a man manly.

War is a physical confrontation between man and man; the winner rapes the women of the defeated country. The country itself has a feminine gender and the occupation of the country by an alien force is treated as surrendering the mother to an outsider. This psychological construction leads to the moral defeat of men in the defeated territories. Gender is an important category in war, but the meaning and scope of it is always defined by the male mainstream culture. Therefore the real victims of a war are always women.

Military combat in the pursuit of war is a clear example of how international relations help to shape men. War has been deemed central to the discipline itself and has historically played a large part in defining what it means to be a man in the modern era, symbolically, institutionally, and through the shaping of men's bodies. First, the symbolic dimension: the argument that men take life while women give it is a cornerstone of one powerful ideology of gender differences. This ideology has been central to modern warfare and underpins the masculinity of soldiering and the historic exclusion of women from combat. In symbolic terms, engaging in war is often deemed to be the clearest expression of men's enduring natural “aggression,” as well as their manly urge to serve their country and “protect” their female kin, with the one implying the other. The popular myth is that military service is the fullest expression of masculinity, and in 1976 there were about twenty million men under arms in about 130 standing armies worldwide, compared with only two million women.⁶

Ehrenreich's argues it is not men that make war, but war that makes men lead us to the social construction of masculinity. The small fights and clashes in the primordial period where transformed into organized attacks and wars in organized social life. Since war became a part of the social life, masculinity was defined in terms of physical strength. Under capitalism masculinity is not limited to the male body. The reach of masculinity has gone beyond the male body. Under capitalism more, than the individual man, the state itself is masculine.

The suppression of sexuality can be seen in all the social configurations, suppression extends to both the females and males. The transformation of the female body as an object of sex and its privatization-an object which is supposed to be pure - brings serious social controls over sexuality. The divinity of the female body becomes a strong socio-psychological construction. Therefore rape is a psychological victory over the males of the defeated country; it questions the masculinity of the men of the defeated country. They are proven incapable of protecting the divine bodies of women. The rape of women of the defeated territories by military is the episteme of wars from the earliest social systems to the present. The women who were raped by the alien males are most often evicted from the traditional communities; and most of the victims end up in prostitution.

In case of Japan the organized prostitution for the military personnel started for two reasons, one was to prevent venereal diseases of the soldiers and the second, the military sought to halt Japanese soldiers from attacking women in colonized territories and in war fronts. Indelibly marked on the minds of the Japanese leaders was the negative international coverage of the Nanjing massacre when Japanese soldiers raped and assaulted Chinese women. After the defeat in the World War II, the Japanese state organized prostitution for the benefit of the US soldiers. John Lie writes...

"After the defeat in the Second World War Japanese state organized prostitution to serve the occupied U.S. military force. In so doing, the state, along with the U.S. military presence, stimulated the revival and expansion of the sex industry in post war Japan. The state's motivation was to protect "innocent" Japanese women and to placate the occupying U.S. force. Although the beneficiaries shifted from Japanese to American soldiers, and the provider of sexual service from Korean to Japanese women, there was a remarkable continuity in the activity of the Japanese state.... The Japanese state organized and promoted sexual work in the 1940s. During World War II, the military was instrumental in recruiting Japanese and Korean women into "comfort divisions" to serve officers and soldiers within and outside of Japan. After Japan's defeat, the state organized Japanese women to serve the occupying American soldiers sexually. In short, the Japanese state functioned as a pimp in the 1940s."⁷

From a realist point of view security is understood in political/military terms as the protection of the boundaries and integrity of the state and its values against the dangers of a hostile international environment. Neo-realists emphasize the anarchical structure of the system, which they liken to the Hobbesian state of nature, rather than domestic determinants as being the primary contributor to states' insecurities. Sceptical of the neoliberals claim that international institutions can mitigate the dangerous consequences of anarchy where there are no restraints on the self-interested behaviour of sovereign states, realists claim that wars occur because there is nothing to prevent them.⁸

The international institutions are mechanisms to manage the capitalist completions. The argument that institutions like the United Nations Organization can bring international peace and security is a highly romantic and superficial statement. The Vietnam, Korean and the Gulf wars were fought in the very presence of the UN. The larger power structures like state and international organization are results of larger practices like capitalism. Different regimes in the capitalist production system have given rise to different models of state and non-state actors. Since capitalism has not radically changed patriarchy institutions that came out as results of the capitalist process can never bring a progressive change in the social relations.

Questioning the role of states as adequate security providers, many feminists have adopted a multidimensional, multilevel approach. Feminists' commitment to the emancipatory goal of ending women's subordination is consistent with a broad definition of security that takes the individual, situated in broader social structures, as its starting point. Feminists seek to understand how the security of individuals and groups is compromised by violence, both physical and structural, at all levels. Feminists generally share the view of other critical scholars that culture and identity and interpretive "bottom up" modes of analysis are crucial for understanding security issues and that emancipatory visions of security must get beyond statist frameworks. They differ, however, in that they adopt gender as a central category of analysis for understanding how unequal social structures, particularly gender hierarchies, negatively impact the security of individuals and groups. Challenging the myth that wars are fought to protect women, children, and others stereotypically viewed as "vulnerable," feminists point to the high level of civilian casualties in contemporary wars. Feminist scholarship has been particularly concerned with what goes on during wars, especially the impact of war on women and civilians more generally.⁹

The institutional practices of European colonialism have also helped to consolidate hegemonic and subordinate masculinities on a global scale. Backed up with pseudoscientific theories such as craniology, which linked skull size with intelligence and personality, the ranking of masculinities according to race was organized around the dimension of embodiment. In 1849 the craniometrist Samuel George Morton used skull measurements to rank Caucasians at the top of the scale, blacks at the bottom, and Amerindians and Asians in the middle, women ranked with blacks, but this was in terms of "intelligence". The Caucasian group was further subdivided, with Anglo-Saxons and Germans at the top, Jews and Arabs intermediate, and Hindus lowest. As well as skull dimensions (which were later proved to be linked to nutrition, rather than intelligence), other body parts were deemed important, with black Africans in particular being seen as super-muscle-machines suited to heavy labor. In local differentiations, paler races tended to be ranked above darker ones, and taller above shorter ones¹⁰.

The domination of the white male and the subordination of the females of all the races and the blacks is a socio economic construction. The practice of both local and international politics is run on the logics of the clear cut interests of the dominant male. Therefore the ongoing practice of IR cannot be progressive at all. The reach of the IR or Political Science as academic disciplines are limited to a particular section called the universitarians. The criticism of the practice of IR remains a part of the academy; but at the same time the practice of politics creates a different type of knowledge in the society. The journalistic reports criticize the policy decisions of the state from realist perspectives most often. Even when the media opinions conflict each other, the entire analysis of the mainstream print and visual media works very much within the realist epistemology. The criticism is focused on the incapability of the state to defend and fight for its interests. The incapability is

always associated with femininity. Thus the popular knowledge of IR becomes a highly masculine one. The production of the popular knowledge gives rise to male mainstream common sense and this common sense makes patriarchy a hegemonic force in politics.

The popular media operates largely through a symbolic link between men and IR. The Hollywood movies of the cold war period are the best examples of this. Television, radio, films, books, newspapers, and magazines disseminate a wealth of popular iconography that links Western masculinities to the wider world beyond the borders of the state. The Rambo and the James Bond movies are good examples of this iconization of the white English male.

Sport is another major medium through which the hegemony of masculinity is established. At the symbolic level, international sporting competitions, particularly in gender segregated team games such as football, rugby, and cricket, also mobilize and fuse national feeling, masculine identification, and male bonding among players and spectators alike. All these games are understood as games of men even if there are women's foot ball and cricket teams. Swimming or Badminton are not as male centric as aggressive games like soccer or rugby. While the dominance and aggressiveness of the male body is projected in soccer or cricket, the sexualized female body is exposed in swimming.

The mechanisms used by the male power to maintain its position are diverse. War, pornography, prostitution, purity, chastity etc are different practices and conceptualizations used by different masculinities to suppress the females at different times and spaces. Masculinity itself is multiple. A man who works in an industry and is paid fewer wages is a victim of capitalist exploitation; but when he comes back to his home he becomes the centre of power. The family relations are considered as personal relations that lack political

relevance by the social theorists before the emergence of feminist thought in France. The feminist movement and thought became vibrant in Western Europe and America during the 1960s and the 1970s, but feminism entry into IR was much late. Since the personal is political, or since the domination of the male over female is the first form of social power, the personal is international.

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In Search of Common Identity: A Study of Chin-Kuki-Mizo Community in India

Ayangbam Shyamkishor

Abstract

The Chin-Kuki-Mizo is a group of community having similar cultures and traditions. They accept that they are one and the same race, having the same culture, tradition, customary practices including marriage and the law of inheritances. In spite of settling in three neighbouring countries of the world i.e. Bangladesh, India and Myanmar, they like to live under one administrative unit. The leaders of these communities tried hard to unite them, however they have failed till to-day. The processes of unification among the Chin-Kuki-Mizo people however bring more problems than the solution. Every clan or tribe wishes to maintain its unique culture and tradition. The people are not ready to sacrifice or surrender their ethnic names or dialect for a common cause. So, the dream for unification under one nomenclature for the Chin-Kuki-Mizo groups looks unlikely to be realized in the foreseeable future.

Introduction

India is a multi-ethnic society having many religions, cultures and traditions. Northeast India is another mini-India in terms of its unique diversity. The ethnic heterogeneity of the region brings a complex problem of identity of the communities. The problem is more in the Chin-Kuki-Mizo groups than in other ethnic communities of the northeast. These groups mainly settle in Mizoram, Manipur, Assam and Tripura in the Northeast India. They also settled in Chittagong Hill Tracts of Bangladesh and Chin Hills of Myanmar. They are identified as Khongsai or Kuki in Manipur. In Mizoram they are 'Mizo' but some people identify themselves as Zomi. In Assam and Tripura they are normally identified as 'Kuki'. In Myanmar they are 'Chin'. In this paper the primordial approach¹ will be used in order to

study the ethnic identity of the Chin-Kuki-Mizo groups in India. The primordialist believes that ethnicity has to be analyzed by its common descent and culture as the bases of identity formation. The identity of an ethnic group has to be reconstructed from its past culture and tradition and its relationship among the group. An attempt has been made in this paper to trace the common origin of these communities. It will also study the efforts and the processes to unite them under one nomenclature.

Origin of the Chin-Kuki-Mizo

Although, historically the Chin-Kuki-Mizo groups were free from foreign domination, subsequently they were dominated by the British who colonized them. After the British left the subcontinent, the area of their inhabitant were divided

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politically into three countries namely Burma (Myanmar), East Pakistan (Bangladesh), and India. As a result they are now dispersed in different parts of the world. Not only that, they were known by different names during the colonial times and were also influenced by others. Traditionally they were identified by the clan or the village names. When outsiders came into contact with them, they called them in the way they saw or understood them. The western writers recorded them as Chin in the Chin Hills in Myanmar, Lushai in the Lushai Hills (the Present Mizoram) and Kuki in other parts of the Northeast India.² Even though they were known by different names, they accept that they are one and the same race, having the same culture, tradition, customary practices including marriage and inheritance.³

Chin

The word 'Chin' is officially designated as an ethnic group in Myanmar who settled in and around the Chin Hills. The term was popularized after it was used by the British in an Act called as 'the Chin Hills Regulation Act, 1896.' After the Act, the Chin Hills is popularized as a hill country being populated by the Chins.⁴ In the Regulation the term includes Lushais, Kuki, Nagas and Chin in the Chin Hills and its adjoining areas and also Burmese who adopted the Chin language and custom.⁵ But, scholars have different understanding on the meaning and origin of the term. To some 'Chin' means 'little'⁶ and to some 'Chin' means people who carry basket. According to Luce, Chin is the modern form of archaic Burmese Khyang (In Burmese, the combination of k and h is pronounced as ch in English). Khyang is still used in the Arakanese dialect of Burmese meaning 'allies'.⁷ But to Carrey and Tucker, the term 'Chin' is a corrupt Burmese word of the Chinese 'Jin' or 'Yen' meaning 'man or

people'.⁸ According to Lian H. Sakhong, a prominent contemporary Chin Scholar, the word 'Chin' had been used from the very beginning not only by the Chin themselves but also by neighbouring peoples, such as the Kachin, Shan and Burman, to denote the people who occupied the valley of the Chindwin River. While the Kachin and Shan still called the Chin as 'Khyan' or 'Khang', the Burmese usage seems to have changed dramatically from 'Khyan' to 'Chin'. Early writers variously referred to what is now called and spelled 'Chin' as 'Khyeng', 'Khang', 'Khang', 'Khyang', 'Khyan', 'Kiayn', 'Chiang', 'Chi'en', 'Chien' and so on.⁹

The theory of the origin of the 'Chin' is based on the myth and oral tradition based on the folksongs, folklores and legends. According to the mythology, the Chin people emerged from the bowels of the earth or a cave or a rock called 'Chinlung' in this world. The term Chinlung is spelled differently by different scholars based on various Chin dialects and traditions as 'Chinglung', 'Ciinlung', 'Jinlung', 'Sinlung', 'Shinlung', 'Tsinlung', etc. According to Lian H. Sakhong, the traditional accounts of the origins of the Chin are generally agreed by the modern scholars, researchers, political and other organizations of the Chin. They all accept the Chinlung tradition not only as a myth but also as a historical fact.¹⁰ The literal meaning of the Chin-lung is 'the cave or the hole of the Chin'. However, it is also translated as 'the cave or the hole where Chin people originally lived' or 'the place from which Chin ancestors originated'. And the word 'Chin' without the suffix 'lung' is understood simply as 'people' or 'a community of people'.¹¹

The Chin is a group of people settled in an around the tri-junction of India, Myanmar and Bangladesh. They are

classified and also identified under different nomenclature in these countries. The Myanmar government identified 53 sub-ethnic groups under the Chin nomenclature. They are Anu, Anun, Asho (plain), Awakhami, Chin, Dai(Yindu), Dim, Gunte(Lyente), Gwete, Haulngo, Ka-lin-Kaw (Lushay), Kaung Saing Chin, Kaungso, Khami, Khawno, Kwangli (sim), Kerlshin, Lai, Laizao, Lawhtu, Laymyo, Lhinbu, Lushei (Lushay), Lyente, Magun, Malin, Matu, Meithei (Kathe), Mgan, Mi-er, Miram (Mara), Naga, Ngorn, Oo-Pu, Panum, Rongtu, Saing Zan, Saline, Sentang, Taishon, Tangkhul, Tapong, Tay-Zan, Thado, Tiddim (Hai-Dim), Torr, Wakim (Mro), Zahnyet (Zanniet), Za-How, Zizan, Zo, Zo-pe, Zotung.¹² Many of these spelling are different from what the local used it. For instance, they used Meitei as Meithei, Thadou as Thado, etc. This nomenclature is totally different from the nomenclature of the Indian people especially by the northeasterners. The Naga and the Meitei did not claim themselves as Chin though they included in the Chin sub-ethnic groups in Myanmar. But, they all belong to the Tibeto-Burman stock and speak the Tibeto-Burman languages like the Chin.

Kuki

The term 'Kuki' refers to a group of people who are settled mainly in the southern part of Manipur and they are officially recognized as a Schedule Tribe under the Indian Constitution. The Kuki clans also live in the Chittagong Hill Tracts and South Sylhet in Bangladesh, Tripura, Manipur, Mizoram and Assam in India. The term is spelled differently by European writers as 'Kuki', 'Kookee', 'Kookies' and so on. The designation 'Kuki' is never used by them.¹³ It was not recognized by the people of this community before but nowadays they decided to live with this term i.e. Kuki.

Moreover, the term 'Kuki' is recognised as a Schedule Tribe by the Government of India from 2002.¹⁴ Some scholars have the opinion that the term was given by the Bengali from Cachar in Assam, Tripura and Chittagong Hill Tract as well as by the Assamese in Brahmaputra valley to identify the hill people. According to A. S. Reid, Kuki is, "a Bengali word meaning hill-men or highlanders."¹⁵ But, there are many ethnic hill tribes in this region apart from the Kuki. So if the Bengali and others called the hill people as 'Kuki' in this region then it has to include other communities like the Cacharies, Dimasha, Naga, Tripurians, etc. who also settle side by side with the Kuki. When the Bengalis call the hill people as Kuki they do not include all the hill people settled in and around the Brahmaputra Valley and Barak Valley. According to Captain T.H. Lewin, "the Bengallees distinguish hill men into two classes. The friendly tribes living close along the Chittagong District border they call Joomahs; and all other hill men, more especially if unable to speak the vernacular of Bengal, are distinguished as Kookies."¹⁶

The term first appeared in Rawlins (1787:187) as "Cuci's or mountaineers of Tripura."¹⁷ According to Thangmawia they were called as Kuki since 1761.¹⁸ But, the British heard the term only in 1777, when the British official in Chittagong wrote to Warren Hastings, the then Governor General about Kuki.¹⁹ There are many theories regarding the origin of the 'Kuki'. These theories are based on the oral traditions which were handed down from their forefathers through generations and recorded by the British. They also believed like the Chin that they came out of a bowel of the earth or a cave called 'Chinlung' or 'Sinlung' or 'Khul'. The location of this area is believed to be somewhere in China.²⁰ It is

generally believed that they moved out of China during the reign of Chinese emperor Chinglung or Chie'nlung around 200 BC. A Mizo historian, Zawla claimed that Kuki came out of the Great Wall of China in about 225 BC during the reign of Shih Hungti.²¹

There are also some other theories other than the British and European writings. The Indian historians believed that the Kuki settled in the Indian subcontinent from the prehistoric times. Indian historians like Majumdar and Bhattasali refer to the Kuki as the earliest people known to have lived in prehistoric India. In the *Pooyas*, the old literature of the Meitei (the Manipuri) mentioned that two Kuki Chiefs namely Kuki Ahongba and Kuki Achouba were the allies to the Nongta Lairen Pakhangba (the first historically recorded King of Manipur) in 33 AD.²² The Royal Chronicle of the Meitei King (*Chietharol Kumpapa*) also records that in the year 186 Sakabda (264 AD) Miedingu Taothingmang, became the King of Manipur.²³ Actually, the name 'Taothingmang' is a Kuki name and they still used the term to name a Kuki individual. Gangumei Kamei, a renowned historian of Manipur, opines that some Kukis migrated to the Manipur hills in the pre-historic times along with or after the Meitei advent in the Manipur valley.²⁴ The theories which come from the Indian historians are totally different from the European writers on the subject. These theories are yet to be proved. It may not be possible to prove without any written literature or evidence to support their claim. This shows that no one knows exactly from where they come from. Whatever the theory may be, there is no doubt that they all belong to the Mongoloid stock speaking Tibeto-Burman language. The Kuki consists of Aimol, Chothe, Chiru, Koirang, Kom, Purum, Anal, Lamgang, Moyon, Monsang, Maring, Gangte, Vaiphei, Simte, Paite,

Thadou, Hmar Zou, Lushais, Raltes, Suktes and Thadou.²⁵ Some tribes like Anal and Moyon are already identified as Naga. The Anal and Moyon are actually more closer linguistically with the Chin-Kuki-Mizo people.

Mizo

The people of Mizoram are known as Mizo. The term 'Mizo' is a generic term meaning hillman or highlanders. It consists of Lusei, Hmar, Paihte, Ralte, Pawi, Lakher etc. The Mizo also believed like the Chin and Kuki that they came out from 'Chhinlung' meaning a covering rock. This theory is similar with the theory of the Kuki origin. But, the term 'Mizo' is of recent origin. It originated in the 1940s and popularized with the emergence of the 'The Mizo Common Peoples Union'²⁶ on 9th April 1946. Before the origin of the term, they were known mainly as Lusei.²⁷ The word Lusei is also spelled differently by the Western writers as 'Lushai', 'Looshai', 'Lhoosai' and so on. The words 'Chin' or 'Kuki' or 'Mizo' describes a particular group of people not to different people. Some European writers and leaders of Chin-Kuki-Mizo people believed that they were of the same race and they used these term synonymously. For instance, Capt. T. H Lewin used the term Kuki and Lushai as 'the Lhoosai or Kookies'.²⁸ Capt. O. A. Chambers believed that the Lhoosai are commonly called as the Kookies.²⁹ A. Campbell wrote in 1874 that the "Looshais were best known to us for a long time in India under the denomination of Kookies..."³⁰ He further quote the Lieutenant-Governor of Bengal from a Minute, dated 18th May, 1871 as "Kookee is the larger word of somewhat wide applications, while 'Lushai' is a more restricted term; all Lushais being Kookees, but not all Kookees are Lushais..."³¹ According to Sing Khaw Khai, the words

Kuki and Chin are synonymous and both primarily used for many of the hill tribes in general. Major A. G. McCall also thought that Kuki, Chin, and Lushai belong to one stock.³² But among themselves some wants to use as 'Zomi' instead of Mizo or Kuki or Chin. A. S Reid also believed that the Lushais call themselves as "Zao".³³

The Unification Processes and its Problem

The Chin, Kuki and Mizo think themselves as one group of people having common culture and tradition. Their culture and tradition are more or less the same. Linguistically, they are closely related. Some of them do even communicate with each other by speaking their own dialect. For example, a Paite can communicate by speaking Paite with a Thadou and vice versa. Similarly, a Hmar can understand a Paite and vice versa. With all these common culture, tradition and the linguistic relation among them, they were not be able to identify themselves under one nomenclature. Many people put their best effort to unite them under one proper nomenclature but failed. The leaders of Chin-Kuki-Mizo have to diagnose the real problem(s) and then search for the solution. They have to work out a common platform for all the communities to share their views and opinions. For this, a common language is necessary. It means, all the clans have to accept a language whether it may be Mizo or Thadou or Hmar or invent a new language which is acceptable to all for a common cause. It means if any clan's dialect is not acceptable to other clan as their language then it needs to evolve or discover a new language which is acceptable to each and every community. There is a need for a common lingua franca.

The word Kuki and Chin are older than the 'Mizo'. Both were used and professed by the European ethnographers

and writers. The term 'Mizo' was of recent origin. It was discovered with a view to unite them under one nomenclature for those who settle in the erstwhile Lusei district (Mizo Hill District) of Assam, the present Mizoram and its surrounding areas. Unfortunately, it could not cover the entire ethnic group of Chin-Kuki- Mizo. It became only an umbrella organization for the entire ethnic group living in Mizoram. It didn't however, include the same community living in Manipur and other areas like Paite, Thadou, Hmar etc. In Manipur, Hmar do not accept themselves as Mizo or Kuki. Instead they wanted to be identified as Hmar. And the Thadou speaking people in Manipur are identified as Kuki. The word Mizo might have evolved with the intention of including all the communities under one name. But it failed to achieve the desired result. The reason may be due to rigid adherence to respective clan identity. The Hmar and Kuki of Manipur didn't accept themselves as Mizo. They want to retain the nomenclature of Hmar and Kuki. All the effort to bring them under one name has not succeeded till date.

The process of unification among the various ethnic groups of Kuki-Chin-Mizo people however started during the British period. They wanted to live under one administration. The Chin-Lushai Conference which was held at Fort William, Calcutta on the 29th January 1892 expressed the desire to live under one administration. The Mizo Union submitted a memorandum in 1947 to the British Government, the Indian Government and the Indian Constituent Assembly. In the memorandum the Mizo Union sought the rights of the Mizo people for territorial unity and integrity of the whole population scattered in and around the Lushai District (Mizoram) with full self-determination. It also stated that they were

wrongly identified as Kuki. It further says that Mizo are a numerous family of tribes, closely knitted together by common tradition, custom, culture, mode of living, language and rites. It is only the word 'Mizo' which stands for all these groups.³⁴ After the Mizo Union, the Mizo National Front (MNF) tried to bring all the Mizo tribes under one administrative unit from the 60s. Reunification of all Mizo inhabited areas under a single administrative unit is one of the most important aims and objectives of the MNF even today.³⁵

Some people however wanted to use as 'Zomi' in place of 'Mizo' as they think that they all belong to 'zo' community and preferred the word 'Zomi' to 'Mizo'. Some people think that this is a matter of prefix and suffix.³⁶ The 'zo' leaders try their best to unite all the Chin-Kuki-Mizo people under the name 'Zomi'. The Zomi leaders formed an organization called 'Zo Reunification Organization' (ZORO) in 1991 with an aim to unify the 'zo' (Chin-Kuki-Chin) people. They represent the 'zo' communities at the UN Permanent Forum on Indigenous Issues beginning from 1999. The ZORO work tirelessly to unite its people. The ZORO believe that the 'zo' people need to work together culturally, educationally and linguistically in order to come up with a common language. They want their common language to be 'zo' language comprising of different dialects of Chin-Kuki-Mizo people. They believed that working for unification under the name of Chin or Kuki or Mizo will not succeed. They urge that the 'zo' people to join hands in order to achieve unification. When unification is achieved they think that the new identity of the people can be made by any name.³⁷ They wanted to name the land of 'Zo' as 'Zoram'.

There are some people who didn't accept the term 'Mizo' or 'Zomi' as their

ethnic name especially in Manipur. In Manipur some ethnic groups from Kuki-Chin-Mizo wanted to identify as Kuki specially the Thadou speaking group. To them the word 'Mizo' is equally foreign like the term 'Kuki'. T. S. Gangte a well known scholar and writer from Manipur even think that "the term 'Mizo' is no less derogatory and foreign than 'Kuki'".³⁸ Some other again wanted to identify their clan names as their ethnic nomenclature. For example the Hmar in Manipur and Assam never identify as Kuki or Mizo. Instead they identify themselves as Hmar. But a section of Hmar in Mizoram is identified as Mizo and some do not identify as Mizo.³⁹ The problem of ethnic identity in Manipur became more complex after the Naga-Kuki clash in the 1992-2000, particularly among the Chin-Kuki-Mizo groups. In the Naga-Kuki clash only the Thadou speaking group were fighting against the Naga. The Thadou speaking groups felt upset when the non-Naga of Manipur didn't help them in the clash.

During this time a question was raised among the Kuki-Chin-Mizo communities regarding the Kuki identity. Some ethnic groups no longer wanted to be identified as Kuki. They are afraid to identify themselves as Kuki, because the Naga may attack them. The Kuki tried their best to bring all the non-Naga groups in Manipur to bring under their common ethnic nomenclature. In the process, a conflict occurred between the Paite and Kuki groups in 1997-98. The conflict was mainly between two underground organizations, one represented by the Kuki [Kuki National Front (KNF)] and the other by the Zomi [Zomi Revolutionary Army (ZRA)]. This conflict was mainly over the issue of nomenclature. The Paite-Zomi accused the KNF for using force to induce the Zomi

community to accept the Kuki as their ethnic nomenclature, propounding that the term Zomi is a misnomer.⁴⁰ As a consequence the relation between the Kuki and Paite got strained.

The relations between the Kuki and Paite and Kuki and Hmar were not very good from the mid 40s onward in Manipur. Ethnic and identity consciousness among the hill people of the Northeast India begins with the introduction of western education in the early 20th century. As a product of ethnic consciousness, many ethnic based organizations emerged in the hills of Manipur. For instance, the Vaiphei National Organization and Hmar Association emerged in 1944 and 1945 respectively. In 1946 Mizo Union (MU) was formed in Lushai Hills, an erstwhile hill district of Assam, (the present Mizoram) as an anti-Chief party and also with an aim for Mizo integration. The MU did spread its influence very fast and reached its neighboring areas especially in the Southern part of Manipur Hills. During the time another organization called Kuki National Assembly was established in Manipur in July 1947. These organizations brought a sense of ethnic identity and consciousness among the tribes. When people were conscious of their ethnic identity they want to protect their unique culture and tradition. In the name of protection they started establishing various organizations on the ethnic lines like the Hmar Congress (1954), the Paite National Council (1956), the Gangte Tribal Union (1958), the Hmar National Union (1959) and Baite National Union (1962). In the 1959-60 there was a series of confrontation between the Hmar and Kuki. The Paite on the other hand tried to establish Chin solidarity. In the 60s three distinct groups emerged in the non-Naga tribal politics of Manipur—the Kuki, the Chin and the Hmar. The Hmar wanted to

consolidate the Hmar inhabited areas of Manipur, Mizo Hills District (Mizoram) and North Cachar Hills into a single administrative unit.⁴¹

The Hmar from different regions of India however tried to join the MU with a hope of integration with Mizoram in the late 1940s. The Manipur Hmar even boycotted the first General election of 1948 to join the *Mizo sorkar* (Mizo Government). This had never materialized. The Hmar again joined the MNF movement on the promise of a 'Greater Mizoram' which means the integration of all areas inhabited by the Mizo in northeast India under one administration. But the 'Mizo Peace Accord' (1986) which was signed between Government of India and MNF did not mention about the integration of Hmar inhabited areas with Mizoram. The Hmar felt disillusioned with all these false hopes and promises. In order to fulfill their dream the Hmar formed their own organization called the 'Hmar People's Convention' (HPC) in 1986. It demanded for an autonomous self government covering north and northeast Mizoram. The HPC took up arms and waged an armed struggle for autonomy. The movement gained momentum within a short span of time. During the time the HPC signed a memorandum of settlement (after eight years of armed struggle) on 27th July 1994 with the Mizoram Government. In the settlement the Mizoram Government agreed to initiate measures to introduce Hmar language as a medium of introduction up to primary level, to recognize Hmar language as one of the major languages of the state of Mizoram, to take various steps to promote and preserve the Hmar culture etc. More importantly the Mizoram Government agreed to set up Sinlung Hills Development Council for the development of the north and northeastern parts of Mizoram so as to have social,

economic, cultural and educational development. The Mizoram government accepts the unique culture and tradition of the Hmar. However, dissatisfied with the implementation process, a section of the cadres parted ways with the over ground HPC and formed Hmar People's Convention (Democracy) [HPC (D)] in 1995. The HPC (D) has been spearheading the underground movement for the creation of Hmar homeland in Mizoram.⁴² The objective of the outfit over the years has shifted to have an independent Hmar State (Hmar ram) consisting of the Hmar inhabited areas of Mizoram, Manipur and Assam.⁴³ The processes of unification among the Chin-Kuki-Mizo people bring more problems than the solution. Every clan or tribe wishes to maintain its unique culture and traditions. People are not ready to sacrifice or surrender their ethnic names or dialect for a common cause. So, the dream for unification under one nomenclature for the Chin-Kuki-Mizo groups seems difficult to realize in the foreseeable future.

Concluding Remarks

The northeast India is a multi-ethnic society having a number of culture and tradition. This region is not a homogeneous society as people from other part of India do believe. Every state in this region is inhabited by different ethnic groups. Some ethnic groups are settled in different parts of the northeastern India. For the Naga, they live in Assam, Arunachal Pradesh, Manipur and Nagaland. Similarly, the Chin-Kuki-Mizo also settles in Assam, Manipur, Nagaland, Mizoram and Tripura in India. They also live in Bangladesh and Myanmar. They are known by different names. In India they are known as 'Kuki' or 'Khongsai' in Manipur, Assam and Tripura and 'Mizo' or 'Zomi' in Mizoram. In Myanmar they are known as 'Chin'. These terms are also used

synonymously by scholars. The Chin-Kuki-Mizo people are the same people having similar race, culture, tradition and law of inheritance. They all believed that their forefathers come out from 'Chhinlung' or 'Sinlung' or 'Khul'. They were named differently by different people. The Bengali called them as 'Kuki'. European writers called them as Chin in Burma (Myanmar) and Lusei to Lushai Hills (Mizoram). But they called themselves as 'eimi', 'laimi'/'Mizo' etc.⁴⁴ The Chin-Kuki-Mizo people however, consider themselves as belonging one race. So, the leaders of these communities work tirelessly in order to unite them under one administration with a common nomenclature. All their efforts went in vain. It didn't produce the desired result till date. The problem lies within the Chin-Kuki-Mizo people. The processes of unification rather divide the community on sub-ethnic line. During the British times though they were known by three names (Chin, Kuki and Lusei), there were no differences among them. In the post-British period especially from 50s onward the Chin-Kuki-Mizo people were divided on clan or tribes names. The division started after the introduction of western education to them. The education brought ethnic consciousness among the people. Once they were conscious of their ethnic identity they didn't want to surrender or compromise their unique culture and tradition and dialect. During the time some organizations emerged based on clan or tribe. Such organizations were Vaiphei National Organization (1944), Hmar Association (1945), Hmar Congress (1954), Paite National Council (1956), Gangte Tribal Union (1958), Hmar National Union (1959) and Baite National Union (1962).⁴⁵

The ethnic identity consciousness among the Chin-Kuki-Mizo brought a tussle between ethnic identity and sub-ethnic

identity. This confrontation was clearly seen after the Naga-Kuki clash (1992-02) in Manipur. In fact, it began since the late 50s. The relations between Kuki and Paite and Kuki and Hmar were weak from the 1950s in Manipur. The relation between Hmar and Mizo was good before the Mizo Accord (1986). The Hmar expected a lot from both the MU and MNF (as an insurgent organization and political party) and felt that the Hmar people scattered in the three states of India will united under one administration. The dream of the Hmar remains unfulfilled. As a consequence, the Hmar people formed their own organizations [HPC and HPC (D)] in order to realize their dream. The HPC (D) is still fighting in order to achieve its objective. This disturbs the relation between the Mizo and Hmar.

The stained relation among the Chin-Kuki-Mizo communities creates a problem in the process of unification. If people from different communities want to live under one administration with a common nomenclature, then the relation has to be reestablished. Leaders from different communities have to join together by leaving their differences behind. They have to discover a common language which is acceptable to all. While discovering the common language the tribe dialect should be allowed to grow and flourish. Moreover, the Chin-Kuki-Mizo people have to find out a proper nomenclature which satisfies all. All the leaders of these communities have to share a common platform to solve all the obstacles which arise in the process of unification.

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Goddesses, Women and Agency: Reading the *Shashthi Vrata-Kathas* of Bengal

Namrata Rathore Mahanta

Abstract

The term vrata carries connotations of a vow/restraint/prayer performed for the fulfillment of specific desires. The vratas for women are different from those of men. The women's vratas, are the product of the confluence of the high brahmanical and indigenous cultures. This combined with the congregational character of the meyeli vratas, becomes a powerful agency of religion, which seeks to cast and reinforce the "ideals of womanhood." The paper argues that goddess worship is a continuation of the old pre-vedic religions which, unlike vedic religion were not oriented towards specific masculine goals. Bengal being outside the brahmanical influence up to the Gupta period, was home to a thriving tradition of pre-vedic goddess worship. Although there is no historical or textual evidence of any direct brahmanical intervention in the meyeli vratas, this gradual yet lasting change in the social fabric brought about corresponding changes in the women's world. This paper makes a narrative analysis of the Shashthi vrata-kathas of Bengal. Although the Shashthi vratas are primarily for the glory of motherhood and longevity of offspring, the vrata-kathas serve to reinforce codes of morality and model behaviour for women in other spheres as well.

The earliest literature of India does not depict 'the Goddess' on par with the great male gods. The embodiment of the goddesses in the ancient Sanskrit texts is ornamental rather than intrinsic. Many of the vedic goddesses such as Sri, Ushas and Aditi simply disappear in the popular Hindu tradition of worship and most of the goddesses of this tradition cannot be traced back to Vedic literature. Popular goddesses like Parvati, Durga, Kali, and Radha are not among the vedic goddesses. While there is clear evidence of goddess worship from Mohenjo Daro and Harappa, the tradition of goddess worship has not been identified as a central feature of the Vedic period. The wiping out of the cult of the goddess can be attributed to the changed concerns of the Vedic period. From around 1500 BC to the

initial part of the Christian era, there is no prominent evidence of goddess worship. However, after a hiatus of nearly 2000 years from the coming of the Aryans, the goddess reappeared and from the 3rd century onwards goddess worship once again became a feature of popular religious practices. This resurfacing of the goddess has been variously interpreted. R.G. Bhandarker was the first to argue in favour of a local or native element in the constitution of Rudra's consort (Bhandarkar 1929). The two thousand year hiatus is attributed to the fact that all writings of that period are in Sanskrit. The non-Aryans did not write in Sanskrit. Daniel H. H. Ingalls viewed the Aryan-Sanskrit culture, as being strongly oriented towards masculine goals; there was little importance given to women.

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The earliest Sanskrit hymns to the goddess which appear at the end of the above period are thus not innovations but a continuation of an old pre-Aryan religion. By the third century AD a two way confluence between Sanskrit and pre-Aryan worship had taken place. Sanskrit became the universal language of letters and pre-Aryan worship had spread amongst the Aryans. Consequently the goddess became a part of the Hindu written records. (Ingalls xv) This view is endorsed by R.C.Hazra (1963), Alain Danielou (1963) and Sudhakar Chattopadhyaya (1970).

The first attempt to incorporate non-Vedic goddesses in the brahminical fold was made in the *Mahabharata*. D.D. Kosambi's analysis of the *Skanda-Tarakasura* episode in the *Shalya-parva* of the *Mahabharata* refers to the one hundred and ninety two mother-companions who came to aid *Skanda*. Kosambi stresses upon the fact that they spoke different languages and represented varied native traditions. Moti Chandra's study attempts to establish that the brahminical goddess *Sri* also belonged to the Pre-Aryan India and was later absorbed into the brahminical fold. The study of the origin of *Durga* is an important case in point. Sukumar Sen argued on the basis of the *Taittiriya-aranyaka* that *Durga/Durgi* was like *Uma*, a non-aryan mountain goddess. The process of the assimilation of *Durga* was carried forward in the *Puranas* until the synthesis reached its zenith in the *Devi Mahatmya* section of the *Markandeya Purana*.

Bengal remained outside the brahmanical influence for a very long time. It was only with the Gupta period that the brahmin influence penetrated into Bengal. By this time the goddess cult was so strongly established in Bengal that it demanded

recognition. In an effort to adjust with the strongly prevalent tradition of goddess worship the careful brahmanical construction of the *Shakta* theology took place. The Bengal brahmanas accepted the goddess cult and moulded it through the *Shakta* theology to turn it into a tool for the transmission of brahmanical culture. Thus the cult of the goddess was transformed into *Shaktism* through the *Puranas* by the twelfth and thirteenth centuries. (Chakrabarti 2001)

The *Puranas* chose certain local goddesses and declared them to be a part of the *mulaprakrti*, thus making them superior to their local counterparts. For example, in the *Brahmavaivarta Purana*, II. 45-46 and in the *Devibhagvata Purana*, IX. 47-48, the genesis of *Mansa* is drawn from the snake sacrifice performed by Janamejaya in *Mahabharata*. Also, in the *Brahmavaivarta Purana*, II. 43.25-26 and in the *Devibhagvata Purana*, IX.46.25-26 *Shasthi* is said to be the wife of *Skanda Karttikeya*. However *Mangalachandi*, another popular goddess in Bengal is not given an important brahmanical lineage.

The assimilation of the local goddesses into the brahmanical tradition also gave the brahmanas the license to participate in their worship and thus be in a position to influence it, to be able to lay down the rules that prescribe and/or regulate the behaviour of the people. For the successful imposition of the brahmanical social order, channels of entry into the social fabric had to be found. Thus there arose the need to find ways to disseminate the *Puranas* which had, by then, already amalgamated the brahmanical and the local.

Public religious performances offered the ideal medium for this transmission. The fasts and feasts held for the local goddesses (many of whom had

already been brahmanized) provided the opportunity. The antique term *vrata* which can be traced back to the *Rg Veda* was used for this purpose. P.V. Kane describes the journey of the *vrata* from the *Rg Veda* to the *Puranas*: In *Rg Veda*, the term *vrata* is related to the dual idea of obedience or duty, and law or command. The *Srautasutras*, *Grhyasutras* and *Dharmasutras* associate the term with an appropriate code of conduct and fasting. In *Mahabharata*, a *vrata* is a religious undertaking or a vow involving restrictions about food or behaviour. In the *Puranas*, the *vrata* constitutes restriction of two kinds: the restriction of ease, hence *tapas* and the restriction of the senses, hence *niyama*. In the *Puranas*, the sense of the *vrata* is derived from the medieval *Smritis* which detailed *niyamas* regarding its performance (Kane 1974).

In the *Puranas*, the description of a *vrata* begins with the legend of its origin and a few *niyamas* are detailed. The only extra *niyama* that the *Puranas* add is that the performer of the *Vrata* must listen to the *Puranas*. These *Puranic vratas* are elaborate and profuse with *niyamas*. There is another category of *vratas* known as the *asastriya* or *meyeli vratas*. These *vratas* have a singular objective of fulfilment of simple wishes. These *vratas* have simple *niyamas*. The *meyeli vratas* consist of *aharana*, i.e. collection of common items, *alpana* i.e. drawing of motifs, *chada* i.e. recitation of simple verses expressing the desire/wish of the *Vratini* and *Katha* i.e. listening to the story of the *vratas*. Women are the transmitters as well as participants in these *vratas*. The rites and rituals are simple imitations of nature.

The incongruence of the *meyeli vratas* and *puranic vratas* has led to the view that the *vrata* was originally a non-brahmanical rite which was appropriated by *Puranic* theology

to fulfill certain definite goals. This view has been variously delineated by Abanindranath Tagore, Niharrajan Ray and R.C. Hazra. Ashutosh Bhattacharya holds that the non-brahmanical gods and goddesses have been introduced to Bengali households by non-brahman brides through their *vrata* form of worship (613). Bhattacharya further cites the vernacular *Mangalakavyas* of medieval Bengal wherein the brides Sanaka, Behula, Khullana are devotees of Manasa and Chandi but the men folk were antagonistic to these goddesses (451-52)

In the popular *Jaimangalvar meyeli vrata katha* the bride Jayavati worships the goddess *Mangalachandi* while her husband Jayadeb mocks Jayavati and is inimical to the goddess. He causes Jayavati endless trouble to test the power of *Mangalachandi*. In the end Jaidev too becomes a devotee of the goddess and the couple goes to heaven. In similar fashion, the agency of women can be seen at work in bringing the indigenous local worship within the purview of the *vrata*. The close connection between women, local goddesses and *vratas* raises many questions:

1. What position was accorded to women when they were made the chosen agents of brahmanical transmission?
2. What was the position of the women who attempted to transmit non-brahmanical worship to the brahmanical homes they married into?
3. At the confluence of the brahmanical and the local, what happened to the woman who was the 'site' of this confluence?

In an attempt to find answers to these questions, this paper attempt to explore the texts of the *Shashthi Vrata Kathas* of Bengal in the light of the following factors-

- (a) Establishment of the printing press.
- (b) Use of local language.

- (c) The Indian response to colonial culture embodied in the 19th Century Women's Education Movement in Bengal.

II

For the purpose of this study the *Shashthi Vrata-kathas* have been selected. These are primarily eight in number. The *katha* of the *Neel Vrata* performed on the

sixth day of the full moon in the month of *Chaitra* and popularly accepted as *Neel Shashthi* is also added, thus making it nine. The *Shashthi Vrata* is performed by married women to invoke the blessings of the goddess *Shashthi* to obtain the glory of motherhood and longevity of children.

1. Month of <i>Jyestha</i>	–	<i>Aranya Shashthi /Jamai Shashthi Vrata</i>
2. Month of <i>Sravan</i>	–	<i>Loton Shashthi /Lunthon Shashthi Vrata</i>
3. Month of <i>Bhadra Vrata</i>	–	<i>Chapda Shashthi /Manthan Shashthi</i>
4. Month of <i>Ashwin</i>	–	<i>Bodhon Shashthi /Durga Shashthi Vrata</i>
5. Month of <i>Agrahayan</i>	–	<i>Mula Shashthi Vrata</i>
6. Month of <i>Paush</i>	–	<i>Patai Shashthi Vrata</i>
7. Month of <i>Magh</i>	–	<i>Sheetal Shashthi Vrata</i>
8. Month of <i>Chaitra</i>	–	<i>Ashok Shashthi Vrata</i>
9. Month of <i>Chaitra</i>	–	<i>Neel Vrata</i>

All the nine stories or *kathas* associated with these *vratas* are told by an unknown omniscient narrator. The tone adopted by the narrator is conversational.

The diction alternates between informal and didactic. The story begins with an informal diction and ends in rhetoric. This pattern is strictly adhered to in all these stories.

The characters in the story can be broadly classified into five dichotomous groups-

1. Biological	–	male/female; young/old
2. Social	–	famous/obscure; popular/unpopular
3. Political	–	king/subject
4. Moral	–	virtuous/errant
5. Economic	–	rich/poor

Aranya Shashthi has male presence in the form of the seven sons of the youngest daughter-in-law. *Lunthon Shashthi* has the character of the brahmin son devoted to his mother. His attitude towards his wife is governed by that of his mother. In these two stories the male agency makes no direct contribution to the plot but by mere presence/absence, strengthens/weakens the moral image of the women characters. The male characters in other seven stories make direct contributions to the plot.

The merchant in *Manthan Shashthi* has a dream vision of Goddess *Shashthi* in which the Goddess tests his devotion by ordering him to slit the throat of his best loved grandson. The merchant suffers a great dilemma but follows the order of the Goddess. The grandson is restored to life by the Goddess and the merchant becomes the agency through which the goddess reveals her powers and blessings. In *Durga Shashthi*, Narad, Shiv, Shani, Kartik, Ganesh are all divine male characters around whom the plot

is structured. In *Mula Shashthi* the Brahmin and his son complicate and resolve the plot respectively. A male brahmin priest in *Patai Shashthi* presides over the vrata ritual. In *Sheetal Shashthi* the old brahmin and his sixty grandsons have important roles to play. An ascetic *muni* and a king are prominent characters in *Ashok Shashthi*.

The male characters are linked through which the female characters perceive the public sphere. The female characters invoke the blessings of *Ma Shashthi* and consequently enhance the status, wealth and popularity of the male members of the family. Large scale pujas and feasts, donations and marriage alliances are always brought about by male agency.

The dichotomy of the young/old is uniformly maintained in all the stories with a few exceptions. Age is associated with wisdom and knowledge. The goddess herself invariably chooses to appear in the form of an old woman. This is reminiscent of the tribal tradition wherein the old woman (*buri*) was revered as an ancestress. The only exception is *Sheetal Shashthi* where the old grandmother forgets to serve the goddess while the young grand daughters-in-law pay due reverence. The old woman is suitably reprimanded by the goddess through the example of the grand daughters-in-law.

The majority of characters are socially obscure, common people with ordinary vocations. Only one character is a king (*Ashok Shashthi*). However no mention is made about his kingdom. All characters, except two are brahmins. The king in *Ashok Shashthi* and the merchant in *Manthan Shashthi* are the only non brahmin characters.

In these stories, adherence to the prescribed code of conduct leads to enhancement of social status only with the blessing of the goddess. The 'virtuous' characters are put to test time and again by the Goddess whereas the 'errant' ones are corrected through punishments. The rich merchant in *Manthan Shashthi* in spite of being deeply religious, becomes socially

unpopular because water did not rise in the pond that he had got dug. People considered him to be a sinner of sorts till he was absolved of this insinuation by the intervention of the goddess in a dream vision. The old grandmother in *Sheetal Shashthi* becomes unpopular by offending the goddess unwittingly and thus causing misfortune to her family. The daughter-in-law in *Aranya Shashthi* becomes unpopular due to loss of offspring. By the grace of the goddess she not only becomes popular but also gains a superior status by teaching the *vrata* to other women.

In the *Shashthi Vrata-Kathas* the popularity of a woman is directly proportional to the number and longevity of her offspring. A childless woman or a woman whose children die in infancy is the epitome of misfortune. Motherhood determines the social status of the woman. While wealth and caste determine the position of the male, the female is valued for her biological capacity to reproduce. The male offspring is valued more than the female. In *Sheetal Shashthi* the fantasy of female reproductivity and the yearning for numerous male offspring can be observed at its zenith. The lucky daughter-in-law delivers a sac containing sixty sons. When the proud grandfather goes to look for brides for his sixty grandsons, he finds a woman with sixty daughters lamenting her fate on account of numerous female offspring. Although most of the stories have lucky/popular women with five sons and a daughter or seven sons and a daughter, a large number of daughters are considered undesirable.

Authority in the form of a male brahmin priest or king is rare in the *Shashthi Vrata-Kathas*. There are only two such examples one being the male priest in *Patai Shashthi* who presides over and controls the puja performed by the greedy daughter-in-law. The other is the king in *Ashok Shashthi* who orders all his subjects to perform the *Ashok Shashthi Vrata*.

All the characters are moderately well off. A few older women are shown to have a control over the finances and/or the

liberty to spend money. The brahmin lady in Lunthon *Shashthi* has money of her own. Other older women organize modest pujas. The only woman who is shown to be poor is the mother of the sixty girls in *Sheetal Shashthi*. However the prescribed code of conduct does not permit women to indulge themselves in any manner. A woman having a hearty meal is the object of disapproval and contempt. The daughters-in-law in *Aranya Shashthi* and *Patai Shashthi* steal food in their own homes and are labelled as 'greedy'. Self denial is projected as a virtue for all women.

The biological, social, economic, political agencies are used to create a definition of morality for women. Although the *Shashthi Vratas* are primarily for the glory of motherhood and longevity of offspring, the *Vrata-Kathas* serve to reinforce codes of morality and model behaviour for women in other spheres as well. The virtuous are put to test by the goddess and rewarded. The errant are meted out terrible punishments.

The nature of the punishments administered by the goddess is unique in that they are invariably transient. The goddess being of a kind disposition withdraws the punishment and restores happiness as soon as the errant woman shows signs of repentance. Ironically, the *Shashthi Vratas* generally do not prescribe any rules for child rearing. The only exception is *Aranya Shashthi* in which the mother is instructed not to curse or hit her children with her left hand. Child bearing is given prominence in all the *kathas*. The transmission of the *vrata* to the children is the only demand made upon the mother.

Many other codes of behaviour for women are projected through negative reinforcement. Terrible predicament the errant women characters serve to create a fear of breaking the moral code in the *Vratinis* or the women who perform the *vrata*. *Aranya Shashthi Vrata-Katha* explains the value of self denial through the example of greed and its attendant misfortune. *Lunthon Shashthi Vrata-Katha* seeks to reinforce humility by showing that pride

arising from righteousness is also punished. Frugality is extolled in *Patai Shashthi Vrata-Katha* through the character of the childless glutton. Similarly, the need for care and precaution in observance of *vratas* is advocated through the example of the careless Ashoka in *Ashok Shashthi Vrata-Katha*.

The height of misfortune for a woman in the *Shashthi Vrata Kathas* is to be childless, to lose her children / husband / family or to be proved an evil woman and be thrown out of the house. The height of good fortune gained through the worship of the goddess is motherhood, numerous children, preferably male, the affection of the husband, the praise of neighbours. Seen in the light of the *Shashthi Vrata Kathas* the role of the *vrata* ritual in the life of women needs to be reassessed. At the confluence of the brahmanical and the local, *asastriya* or *meyeli vratas* are totally weighed down by masculine goals and brahmanical structures even though there is no historical or textual evidence of any direct brahmanical intervention in the *meyeli vratas*,

Originally the *meyeli vratas* belonged to an oral vernacular tradition whereas brahmanism was transmitted through written Sanskrit texts in the Bengal *Puranas*. Hence the way in which it seeped into an exclusive women's domain must essentially be an extremely subtle one. The appropriation of the *meyeli vrata* ritual paved the way for laying down and consolidating brahmanical codes of social conduct. This led to a gradual transformation of local traditions and social structures. This gradual yet lasting change in the social fabric brought about corresponding changes in the women's world. Consequently the concerns of women also underwent considerable change. Accordingly the *meyeli vrata kathas* underwent gradual transformation to accommodate the changing concerns of women.

With the coming of colonial rule and the printing press, the *meyeli vratas* and *vrata kathas* underwent a further change. Traditionally recited by professional

kathakas, the *vrata kathas* came into print at the beginning of the 20th century. The earliest printed version of the *Shashthi Kathas* was authored by Kathakachundamadi in 1909. In 1926 Asutosh Majumdar's *Meyeder Vratakatha* was published followed by Asutosh Mukhopadhyay's compilation under the same title in 1931. Presently there are varied road side tracts brought out by popular printing press being sold as *vrata-kathas*. A comparative study of the standard and the popular versions can be made to delineate the impact of later twentieth century socio-cultural factors on the *vrata kathas*.

The need to transform the oral tradition of the *meyeli vrata kathas* arose out of the late 19th century mission of women's education in Bengal. In order to arrest the onslaught of a foreign culture, urban centers decided to use the magic of the written word to define their native culture. Inevitably the woman and her role as a preserver and transmitter of culture became the focus of attention. Numerous domestic manuals encompassing all aspects of domestic life were published in Bengal. The compilation and publication of the *Meyeder Vratakathas* can thus be seen as a part of this effort. Its instructional role overpowered its participatory nature. It no longer remained an exclusive private space of women's sisterhood. Nor did it remain the symbol of the exclusive power of women to bring prosperity to their family/village through their intervention in the form of worship.

The *Shashthi Vrata Kathas* shows that the *meyeli vratas* regressed into a 'performance' through which women would strive to hold on to the remnants of the fast eroding female centrality in social structures and be seen in the public sphere as striving aspirants in quest of social goals and codes of conduct already laid down for them.

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Table 1: Details of Vratha

Month	Vrata	Genesis of Vratha	Principal Characters	Virtue extolled	Negative reinforcement
Jyeshtha	Aranya Shashthi or Jamai Shashthi	Through a character of the Vratha katha	Brahmin Lady, the greedy daughter in law, the pet cat, Goddess Shashthi	Self denial	Greed leads to misfortune
Sravan	Lunthon Shashthi or Loton Shashthi	Ancient-already in practice at the time depicted in the katha	Brahmin Lady, Daughter, Daughter in-law, Goddess Shashthi	Humility	Pride arising from self righteousness is punished.
Bhadra	Manthan Shashthi or Chapda Shashthi	Ancient – already in practice at the time depicted in the katha	The Merchant, his wife, his youngest grandson, Goddess Shashthi (dream vision)	Unwavering faith in the goddess	Devotion and honesty are no guarantee for blessings The goddess tests the devotees time and again.
Ashwin	Durga Sasti or Bodhon Shashthi	Through the divine characters of the Vratha katha	Durga, Shiv, Kartika, Ganesh, Shani	Belief in the divine plan	Pride, haste
Agrahayan	Mula Shashthi	Ancient – already in practice at the time depicted in the katha	Brahmin, Son, Daughter-in-law, low caste servant girl	Devotion to the goddess	Carelessness begets misfortune.
Paush	Patai Shashthi	Ancient – already in practice at the time depicted in the katha	Brahmin widow, greedy daughter-in-law	Self control	The offspring of gluttonous women die after birth.
Magh	Sheetal Shashthi	Ancient – already in practice at the time depicted in the katha	Brahmin and his wife, the daughter-in-law, sixty grandsons, sixty grand daughters-in-law, Goddess Shashthi	Careful observance of rituals & worship of the goddess	Failure to observe rituals & worship the goddess leads to grave misfortune (death of the entire clan)
Chaitra	Ashok Shashthi	Through a character in the Vratha katha	Ascetic–muni, baby girl – daughter of a deer, the king and his clan.	Extreme care in observing vrata rituals	Complacency and dependence on others leads to breach of ritual. The unknowing errant is punished.
Chaitra	Neel Vratha/ Neel Shashthi	Through a character in the Vratha katha	Brahmin and his wife, Goddess Shashthi	Humility	Arrogance is punished by the misfortune of childlessness.

Concept of Social Movements: A Critical Analysis

Arpita Das

Abstract

Research on social movements has changed enormously over time. Even with regard to movements such as those in 19th century Europe demanding better conditions for workers, the right to vote etc., most scholars avoided study of political action outside of normal, institutionalised channels. They saw them as dangerous mobs who acted irrationally, blindly following demagogues who sprang up in their midst. These attitudes changed in the 1960s, when many privileged people became sympathetic to the efforts of the downtrodden to demand freedom and material improvement. The works of Mancur Olson, John McCarthy and Mayer Zald mark this change of thought among scholars as they demonstrated the changing face of social movements and the ways in which multiplicity of identities get together under a common social vision, such as that which energized the civil rights movement. This paper attempts to chart out the evolution of movements critically over four decades and across continents to conceptualise movements as they exist today and their course in the years ahead.

Introduction

“The idea of conscious collective action having the capacity to change society as a whole came only with the era of enlightenment. Social movements are genuinely modern phenomena. Only in modern society have social movements played a constructive role in social development.”

(Neidhart and Rucht 1991)

Research on social movements has changed enormously over time. Until the 1960s, most scholars who studied social movements were afraid of them. They saw them as dangerous mobs (the likes of Le Bon) who acted irrationally, blindly following demagogues who sprang up in their midst. In the 19th century, the crowds that attracted the most attention were those that periodically appeared in the cities of Europe demanding better conditions for

workers, the right to vote, and other conditions we now take for granted. For more than a hundred years, most scholars feared political action outside the normal, institutionalised channels.

The 1960's and the 1970's were decades of change throughout the world. It was at this time that masses in the developed world opposed the Vietnam War and came out to protest in large numbers. The 1960's also witnessed the famous invasion of the former Czechoslovakia by the erstwhile USSR which toppled the active government and brought in a puppet government to strengthen the communist giant's rule. Referred to as the 'Prague Spring' of 1968, this is probably also the most written about phase of student movements outside established political channels. For these dual reasons, the decade of the 1960's is considered a very important turning point for the study of social movements. Without surprise, attitudes towards social movements

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changed in the 1960s, when for one of the first times in history, large numbers of privileged people had considerable sympathy for the efforts of those at the bottom of society and demanded freedom and material improvement. First was an economic turn when in 1965 an economist named Mancur Olson wrote - *The Logic of Collective Action*, in which he asked when and why individuals would protest if they were purely rational. Within a few years, John McCarthy and Mayer Zald (McCarthy and Zald, 1976) worked out another economic vision of protest, taking formal organisations as the core of social movements and showing that these SMOs act a lot like firms. The changing shape of social movements in recent years raises a problem of activism. As how is an organized Left engage with identities and social practices so at odds with the once familiar formations of party, state, and class? And if these formations familiar from the era of industrialism are abandoned, what happens to the project of directed social change? Cultural transformation may be all for the good, but when do the multiplicity of identities get together under a common social vision, such as that which energized the labour movement in its time, or the civil rights movement? How do the multivalent movements which seem to have emerged under post-industrialization pool their forces in order to effect basic changes in social institutions and public policy? And what happens to people and communities once the movement's active phase is over or the basic premises of the movements are no longer able to hold the fancy of people? This paper aims to critically analyse the concept of social movements as it has evolved from being detested to being an accepted means to achieve social change in societies across the world.

Social Movements

From being considered potentially dangerous forms of non-institutionalized collective political behaviour, which if left unattended, threatened to disrupt the established ways of life, social movements were encountered a change in attitudes in the

1960s and 1970s as the world witnessed a gamut of movements. This included the civil rights movements in America and student movements in almost all parts of the western world.

India too at this time witnessed movements of various groups separated in ideologies as well as target groups. But what was common to all these movements was the voice of the oppressed which rose against the injustices perpetrated by an all powerful and step-motherly state and an equally unsympathetic and centralized governance system. It was in such an India that major movements rose as the voice of the antagonized. Some of the major movements included the Naxalbari movement and the anti emergency movement led by Jai Prakash Narayan.

Defining A Transient Social Phenomena

Movements have been for long used interchangeably with unions or organisations. The term movements gained currency in Europe in the early nineteenth century which was a period of upheaval in Europe with monarchies giving way to nation states. Then on, there has been an attempt to define social movements. Definitions of social movements are readily provided in texts, academic papers, articles and encyclopaedia relating to the topic. However, while differences exist in terms of what is emphasised or accented, most are based on three or more of the following axes: collective or joint action; change oriented goals or claims; some extra institutional collective action; some degree of organisations; and some degree of temporal continuity (Snow *et al.* 2004). This implies that social movements are principal social forms through which collectivities articulate and press for their interests and claims (*ibid* 2004). Social movements, then, are populated by individuals sharing collective goals and a collective identity which engage in disruptive collective action. It is the individuals who make a social movement, even though a movement is much more than an assembly of individuals.

A stream of thought prevalent in the Western world of the 19th and early twentieth century was that they saw the initiators of social movements as those having a void in their life or a failure on personal fronts, overall generally disillusioned persons who were at odds with the world and hence participated in movements to vent out their frustrations. This theory got its biggest jolt with the rise of the new Left. The rise of the new Left and several of the movements of the decades of the 1960s-1970s were the ones which gave a whole new perspective and much needed positive connotation to the concept of movements. But sociologists, particularly of the structural-functionalist and Marxist schools had worked on movements. In this regard, two distinct schools emerged on either side of the Atlantic. In the classical European tradition, from von Stein, Marx, Sombart and onwards 'social movement' meant organisations, focussing on major social issues, related to major social forces (or classes). In American sociology 'social movement' has been used more empirically, meaning voluntary groups organising around a social, political or cultural issue (Olofsson 1988). If they become large or popular enough they can be regarded as 'movement' (IESS 1968). This conceptual duality labelled as 'European-American' comprises competing analytical dimensions:

- a. Type of issue (central-marginal)
- b. Goal/ issue-relation (comprehensive-single issue)
- c. Organisation (permanent representation of interest) versus campaign (momentary mobilisation) (Olofsson 1988).

However, in India, the study of social movements by and large has been the forte of the sociologists and historians post 1960's (Shah 1990:14). Political scientists have concentrated more on the political institutions like legislature, executive and the judiciary. The study of the polity of the masses, their aspirations, demands, the articulation of their problems and their modus operandi in the assertion of their demands outside the formal institutional

framework, while maintaining their political autonomy and sometimes overthrowing the existing state power, is by and large ignored by the political science academia (*ibid* 1990). The reasons for these as Shah maintains are:

1. The replication of the British model of political science where the questions of why do people dissent is ignored.
2. The concept of politics adopted is very narrow and is confined to rule making, rule application and rule adjudication.
3. The focus is more on the structuralist-functionalist approach, thereby on maintaining equilibrium and harmony rather than on conflict and change. The emphasis is on peaceful and constitutional obedience and issues of power and social change through conflict are ignored (*ibid* 1990).

This could also be a reason why no attempt till date has been made to define the concept in the Indian context (Chandra 1977).

However, for the sake of attempting to conceptualise social movements, a definition needs to be introduced at this juncture.

Sidney G. Tarrow (1994) defines it as:

- a) a movement which mount disruptive action against elites, authorities, other groups and cultural codes.
- b) done in the name of the common claims against opponents, authorities and elites.
- c) rooted in the field of solidarity or collective identity.
- d) sustaining their resulting collective action so that contention turns into a social movement.

As a social phenomenon, social movements are characterised by important components such as objectives, ideology, agenda, programmes and leadership. These components are interdependent and influence each other. These will be discussed in the next section which will also

enable us to distinguish between revolts, rebellions, reform, revolution and movements.

Characteristics of Social Movements

Having defined movements, the next task at hand is to distinguish movements from other forms of collective behaviour which cannot be considered as movements. When collective action is somewhat distinct from a sporadic occurrence, it takes form of a movement. This collective action, however, need not be formally organized, but should be able to create an interest and an awakening in a sufficiently large number of people. Hence, a social movement involves sustained collective mobilization through either informal or formal organization (Rao 1984).

Secondly, social movements are characterized by the objective or quality of change they try to attain. Movements are generally oriented towards bringing about change, either partial or total, in the existing system of relationships, values, norms although there are efforts which are oriented resisting change and maintaining status quo. The latter are more in nature of counter attempts which are defensive and restorative rather than innovative and initiating change (Rao 1984). In this regard revolts are aimed at overthrowing governments while rebellions are attacks without aiming to seize power. Reforms are attempts to change the existing situation without challenging the existing political structure by means acceptable within the institutionalised structures. A revolution is an organised struggle not only against established government structures but also against socio-economic structures by an alternative social order (Shah 1977). At this juncture an interesting definition of movement emerges:

“A social movement is a deliberate collective endeavour to promote change in any direction and by any means, not excluding violence, illegality, revolution or withdrawal into utopian community (Wilkinson 1971).

These two aspects of collective mobilisation and change orientation are agreed upon by almost all sociologists. The rest of the characteristics are the ones upon which there is not much consensus (Rao 1984).

Ideology is a very important aspect of social movements. In the absence of an ideology, a strike or a sit in remains a one-off and isolated incident. Thus, only in the presence of an ideology does an organised attempt on the part of a section of society to bring about partial or total change in society through collective mobilisation become a social movement (Rao 1984). Marx located ideology within the class structures while Mannheim considered it as a means of discrediting an adversary (Rao 1984). Geertz (1964) gave a comprehensive connotation by viewing it as a system of interacting symbols. As a symbolic system, it acts as a bridge between source analysis on one hand, and consequence analysis on the other. It interprets the environment and projects self-images. It codifies and organises beliefs, myths, outlooks and values, defines aspirations and interests and direct responses to specific social situations. Thus, it is not only a ‘framework of consciousness’ but also a source of legitimising action (Rao 1984). It is in this regard that the Marxian class ideology has become the core of most of the movements in India like the agrarian movements. Another ideology based on relative deprivation is the Millenarian ideology visible in several tribal movements. Here the future state of affairs is seen as the way to overcome the past based on relative deprivation in the new millennium (Fuchs 1965). Ideologies also establish identity vis-à-vis other groups especially the reference group and sharp distinctions are drawn between the groups creating a situation of ‘us’ versus ‘them.’ Hence, ideologies mark a movement or an event within a movement from otherwise isolated incidents of dissent. Ideologies give participants a distinct way of identifying and locating the ‘other’ and deciding the course of action to be followed against them. Ideologies largely determine membership of movements as also the

trajectory and means of protest which would be followed by the participants.

Very closely associated with the ideology is the agenda or the programme of the movement. It is true that social movements are but one route of social change. Why a collectivity chooses to protest over other means is an important factor in the emergence of social movements. It is the dialectics of historicity (past experiences), social structures (present day conditions) and the hope for a better future with either reformed or complete new structures which guide the programme a movement follows (Oomen 1990). Hence, a social movement does not come into existence with a rigid structure and organization already established. Rather these are developed in the course of a movement. So the movements should be viewed from this temporal perspective. In the beginning a movement is loosely organized and often characterized by impulsive behaviour, restlessness and collective excitement. As has been mentioned earlier, ideologies often direct the way a movement proceeds but with time, movements do alter their course. So while the labour and agrarian movements were initially based on the Marxian class struggles, later on in India, they often became the bastion of political parties. The response of the state post the initial negative reaction to a challenge towards its legitimacy is also instrumental in deciding. A brutal repression may terminate the movement before it can actually take off, while soft paddling and leniency involving dialogue and negotiation can fan the movement or rub of its dynamic stand (Frank and Fuentes 1987).

Finally, collective mobilisation in a movement is related to the nature of leadership. Leadership in Indian movements is often either charismatic or collective. The process of recruitment is contingent upon leadership. Mobilization tends to be spontaneous in case of charismatic leaders but in most other cases recruitment is diversified. Normally, social movements tend to develop a loose federal structure with

central and regional associations being held together by relationships of autonomy and external links based on common interest (Rao 1984). Commitment levels can also vary between the leaders and other participants ranging from faith to fanaticism. Commitment is manifested in the adoption of the belief system, willingness to volunteer in performing various tasks, readiness to take risks of different kinds all of which bring with them a certain degree of rewards. In the process of collective mobilisation, leaders tend to exploit pre-existing kin, caste and linguistic ties of individual recruits and use the traditional institutional framework. They also operate through idioms and symbols familiar to people, besides carrying new units of organisation. The leaders are also responsible for combining different elements to form or modify an existing ideology (Rao 1984). Often the way the leaders perceive the situation in the larger context and their assessment of resources or capabilities to meet the challenges determine the course of a movement. The leaders also legitimise the new values, structures and relationships based upon the ideology prescribed to (Rao 1984). Hence, leadership forms an integral aspect of social movements.

Having discussed the characteristics of movements which distinguishes them from non-movements, the next section is on the theories of social movements and social movements themselves.

Theories of Social Movements- Changing face of organised collective behaviour

Each theory of social movements was developed for the analysis of a distinct kind of social movement, unique to the socio-political and economic structure of that period of time. A positive correlation between the nature of social movements and structure of society with its institutions, values and norms can be seen as an underlying thread common to these theories (Jha 2003). So where the collective behaviour approach analyses totalitarian movements like fascist and communist, resource mobilization approaches analyses movement for citizens' rights. New social

movement theories analyse movements based on identity. So where old social movements wanted a share of the power structure, new social movements want to shape policies without sharing power. No longer are the theories centred solely on economic motives, but more on recognition of identity of individuals and collectivities. Foucault argues that the main objective of these struggles is to attack not so much an institution of power, or group or elite or class but a form or technique of power. This accounts that new forces are individualising without being egoistic, they oppose concentrated forms of power and they are preoccupied with defining individual and collective identities (Foucault 1980). Foucault's argument is at loggerheads with orthodox Marxism. Therefore, the very existence of movements indicates that differences exist regarding possession of power or rather exercising capability of power. The meaning of reality has been changing and at the core of the contests over meaning are differences regarding conceptions of power. What is it? Who has it? Who does not? Who ought to have it? While movement actors attempt to raise and answer these questions, institutional elites seek to maintain 'their hegemonic ideology' by sustaining their definitions of the situations by shaping perceptions, cognitions, and preferences in such a way that people accept their role in the existing order of things by controlling the agenda (*ibid* 1980).

1. Societal Breakdown

Breakdown theories owe their name to the underlying assumption that social movements are epiphenomena of societal change and of the breakdown of social arrangements and bonds associated with social change. Traditionally the names associated with this approach are names like Le Bon (1960), Herbert Blumer (1951), William Kornhauser (1959), Neil Smelser (1971), and Ted Gurr (1970) and concepts such as strain, stress, mass society, emotion, irrationality, contagion, alienation, frustration or relative deprivation. Herbert Blumer (1951) set forth a typology of social

movements where his main distinction is between general and specific social movements, which differ according to the degree of their focus and organization. Of these, two have had an impact on social movement theory. They are:-

a. Smelser's theory of collective behaviour:

Neil Smelser worked with the Parsonian model though he was also one among the very few functionalists who had a good reading of conflict. The strain theory (Smelser 1962) treats structural strain as the underlying factor leading to collective behaviour. Structural strain occurs at different levels of norms, values mobilization and situational facilities. Smelser's analysis is in the structural-functionalist framework. Smelser considers strain as the impairment of relations among parts of a system leading to malfunctioning of the system and includes deprivation under strain. This theory emphasizes that six stages must combine according to a certain pattern, i.e. value-added-logic to produce an instance of collective behaviour (*ibid* 1962). The six stages then are:

- i. Structural Conduciveness- this is to say that the structure has to allow. This cannot happen in totalitarian regimes but only in a set up which is democratic to allow for some kinds of collective behaviour and not others.
- ii. Structural Strain- this refers to something of a disagreement with the present structure which causes a feeling of deprivation, anomie, inconsistency etc.
- iii. Growth and spread of generalized beliefs (ideology formation) - generalized beliefs identify the source of strain, attribute certain characteristics to this source and specify certain responses to the strain as possible and appropriate.

- iv. Precipitating Factors: it can be one trigger event which sets the ball rolling for movement to start.
- v. Mobilization of participants for action.
- vi. The operation of social control: these are the processes that work at all stages to inhibit and contain collective behaviour before and after it take place.

b. Relative deprivation:

The theory of relative deprivation developed on two different lines: social mobility and social conflict. The first was developed by Merton and Runciman (Rao 1984). In this approach, relative deprivation is the basis of study of social mobility as occurring through emulation and positive reference group behaviour (Runciman 1966).

The basic idea of this theory is that people rebel in response to injustice. So those who are weak and marginalized get together to protest the perceived injustice meted out to them. Ted Gurr has worked on it more. He says deprivations are of four types as a gap between expectations and perceived capabilities involving three general sets of values: economic conditions, political power and social status (Gurr 1970). Combinations based on these are worked out as follows:

- i. Persisting deprivation: capabilities constantly below expectations.
- ii. Aspirational deprivation: expectations increasing, capabilities constant.
- iii. Decremental deprivation: expectation constant, capabilities decreasing.
- iv. Progressive deprivation: capabilities increasing but less than expectations (Gurr 1970)

But what is equally important is that Gurr has specified a whole set of factors that mediate between deprivation and political violence. Discontent, creates the potential for political violence. Three groups of factors

mediate between deprivation and political violence. These are:

- i. Normative justification for violence.
- ii. Utilitarian justification for violence.
- iii. The balance between coercive and institutional resources of the rebels vs. the state (Gurr 1970)
- c. Hans Toch's social psychology of social movements:

Toch says that a person can become susceptible to a movement provided it is a vehicle for the resentment he or she feels. In other words a person who has encountered a problem will join a movement (Klandermans 1997).

A question then arises is whether social movements always emanate from negative conditions of relative deprivation and strain. Wallace posited that social movements develop out of a deliberate, organized, and conscious effort on the part of members of a society to construct a more satisfying culture for themselves. Wallace analysed the dynamics of revitalization movements into four phases:

- Period of cultural stability
- Period of increased individual stress
- Period of cultural distortion and Consequent disillusionment (Wallace 1956)
- Period of revitalization.

The revitalization theory propounds that adaptive processes are employed to establish equilibrium situations. However, social movements serve a dual purpose of expressing dissatisfaction, dissent and protest against existing conditions and also providing a positive programme to remedy the situation.

As against this, Marx and Aberle developed the concept of relative deprivation emphasising the elements of conflict. Theorists of this school do admit that mere deprivation is not sufficient for a movement. Relative deprivation only provides the

necessary conditions. Sufficient conditions are provided by the perception of a situation and by the estimate of capabilities of certain leaders that they can do something to alter an existing situation (Rao 1984). However, the relative deprivation theory emphasizes conflict element which is productive of change, and does not consider conflict as leading to the malfunctioning of the system. The next set of theories moved on from where relative deprivation left. The essential argument was that movements are never caused by empty stomachs; rather they are caused by half filled stomachs.

2. Resource Mobilization Theory

Unlike the societal breakdown theories, resource mobilization and political processes start from the assumption that insurgency constitutes a set of rational collective actions by excluded groups to advance their interests. This school of social movement analysis, developed from the 1960s onward, has been and remains the dominant approach among sociologists, though it has increasingly been challenged in recent years. This theory was born and propagated by the American school of thought on social movements. Central to this is the resource mobilization theory which says that while deprivation is also important, but mere deprivation without adequate resources cannot start a movement. A rapidly expanding literature argues that such willingness does not develop automatically from structural conditions-however favourable they may be-but must be constructed socially. That is, situations must be defined as unjust; grievances must be transformed into demands; and people must come to believe that the movement can succeed in changing the situation (Turner 1969; Gamson *et al.* 1982; McAdam 1982; Snow *et al.* 1986). Resource mobilisation theory stresses upon the ways in which movements are shaped by and work within limits set by the resources (especially economic, political and communications resources) available to the group and the organizational skills of movement leaders in utilizing those resources. It is especially

interested in direct, measurable impacts of movements on political issues, and less interested in the expressive, ideological, identity-shaping and consciousness-raising dimensions of movements. More recently, the attention of scholars in this school has been turning slowly toward some of these more cultural questions. An important pioneering work in this latter vein is Aldon Morris, *Origins of the Civil Rights Movement* (1984), which stresses African American church language and church music as cultural resources drawn upon by the early civil rights movement (<http://www.wsu.edu/~amerstu/smc/glossary.html>).

This rather than questioning the deprivation, question what makes people protest. The answers have been sought in three different directions:

- i. At the individual level in the perceived costs and benefits of participating.
- ii. At the societal level in the availability of resources, especially indigenous organizations and social networks.
- iii. The political level in the presence or change of political opportunities.

3. Political Process Theories

The form of social movement analysis stresses the ways in which the wider political system, especially the federal government in the US, opens up and closes down opportunities for organizing resistance. An example of the opening up would be the positive Supreme Court decision against segregation in *Brown v. Board of Education*, while an example of closing down would be the infiltration and repression of Black, Red, and Brown Power groups in the late 1960s and early 1970s by the FBI and other state agencies. The most influential example of this approach is Doug McAdam, *Political Process and the Development of Black Insurgency, 1930-1970* (1982). Political process theory is closely connected to Resource Mobilization Theory but looks more broadly at the political context in which movements mobilize their resource (<http://www.wsu.edu/~amerstu/smc/glossary>).

html). The central focus of political process theory is the relationship between institutional political factors and protest. In challenging a given political order, social movements interact with actors who enjoy a consolidated position in an order. This approach succeeded in shifting attention towards interactions between new and traditional actors, and between less conventional forms of action and institutionalized system of interest representation. In this way it is no longer possible to define social movements as anti institutional which is what by and large was being done earlier. However, after almost twenty years as the dominant social movement theory in the U.S., Political Process Theories face growing criticism. A fundamental problem with Political Process Theories is its tendency to overextend key concepts, like political opportunity and mobilizing structure, so far as to become tautological and analytically useless. In the context of Political Process Theories, virtually anything that, in retrospect, can be seen as having helped a movement mobilize or attain its goals becomes labelled a political opportunity (Goodwin and Jasper 1999).

But none of the above movement theories paid attention or could explain the rise of new movements which were not political in nature but were in search of an identity. This whole new angle was being developed in Europe and is termed as the new social movement theory.

4. The Marxist School of Thought: Old and New Social Movement Theory- in Search of an Identity:

Karl Marx's Conflict theory and Talcott Parsons System's theory both deal with the structural pattern of society. While Parson was a champion of the structural functionalist school of, he worked on social change which was also the core area for Marx. However, while Marx spoke of conflict, Parson emphasised equilibrium at all costs. Parson's based on the three major trends of societal analysis, biological sciences, and evolutionism and principles of

adaptability presented his own understanding of social system. The core of a social system is the patterned normative order through which the life of a collectivity is organised. The observance of norms and values gives rise to a value orientation. The value orientations contribute to integration within the social system through the process and a structure. Once the value orientations are structured and internalized, they lead to shared values which lead to value consensus in a society which leads to a common commitment and a common set of goals. Thus, according to Parsons, there exists complete harmony within the system and there is no conflict within the sub-systems in the system. As a result there is no scope for internal differentiation. The differentiation happens when the system is adjusting to the demands of the external environment to achieve equilibrium. Hence, this theory leaves no room for emergence of conflict and hence for phenomena of movements which implies change.

Marx has been the most closely identified with the conflict model. The conflict theory explains change in society and hence, is a theoretical explanation for movements. Society according to Marx, comprised a moving balance of antithetical forces that generate social change by their tensions and struggle. Marx's vision was based on an evolutionary point of departure, strife, and struggle and social conflict was the core of historical process. According to Marx, every social order is marked by continuous change in the material forces of production. As a result of this change, the social relations of productions are altered and transformed and come into conflict with existing property relations. In this entire process, social change plays a pivotal role. According to him, the human history is the process through which human beings change themselves even as they strive to dominate nature. Subsequently, they also transform themselves. According to Marx, social movements occur in a society symptomatic of masses who are dissatisfied with the prevalent order. The sense of community is the basis of any social order. Kuechler,

Dalton and Burklin (1990) argue that collective action must visibly explain a collectivity of people united by a common belief (ideology) and a determination to challenge the existing order in the pursuit of these beliefs outside institutionalized channels of interest intermediations.

Social movements in Europe were not seen as politics by other means, but as people in search of a new collective movement. The students' movement, the homosexuals movement, the women's movement were all examples of this identity. Social movements became the sponsors of meaning and carriers of identity. The social construction of meaning became a central part of social movement theory as new studies began to be published.

The structural paradigm approach or the New Social Movement (NSM) theory of the European scholars argues that the new movements are the result of increasing domination of the system over the life. It is not a unified body of thought. New social movement theory developed as a critique to Resource Mobilization and Marxist approach to explain collective action (Shefner 1995). These proponents of the NSM approach criticized orthodox Marxism for its economy centric views and the failure to recognize the fundamental shift that had taken place in the post World War II Western capitalism. Drawing on the Marxist tradition and at the same time differing considerably from it, these social scientists have explored the connections between contradictions, crisis and social movements (Somerville 1997). In the post-industrial society, Touraine argues that social movements replace the organization of labour as the focus of political action. It means that intellectuals, new professionals and students replace the working class as the agents of revolutionary change (Touraine 1971). Consumer capitalism and the welfare state create social regulation through mass culture and welfare intervention extending the state into the social and personal sphere. To Habermas, this form of colonization of the life, world leads to a generalized legitimating crisis and

that provokes new forms of resistance outside the political channels of institutional politics. These resistances are as much against dominant rationalities as they are against institutional control (Habermas 1976). Claus Offe categorizes the social base of NSM into three fold: the new middle class, elements of old middle class, and decommodified groups outside the labour market (Offe 1985). NSM theorists value symbolic action in civil society or the cultural sphere as an important form of collective action alongside instrumental action in the state or political sphere (Cohen 1985; Melucci 1989). This European School believes that the social movements are of the anti-institutional orientation and spontaneity is a positive feature of the formation of the movement. NSM theory puts importance to the processes that promote autonomy and self-determination of movement rather than striving for influence and power maximization (Habermas 1987). The role of post-materialist values - not the conflicts over material resources - is the key to the social movement (Dalton and Kuechler 1990).

The new social movement theory tries to subsume under what has been called identity paradigm. This identity paradigm is argued to be better suited to understand the new struggles, which are focused on everyday democratic life, communicative action and an autonomous definition of community identity rather than being only state or economy centred (Cohen 1985). The NSM theory also recognizes that a number of submerged, informal and temporary networks help to organize collective action (Mueller 1994).

The NSM theory has raised debates and intellectual concerns in four areas, as Steven M. Beuchler argues:

The first concerns the meaning and validity of designating certain movements as new and others (by implication) as old. The second debate involves whether new social movements are primarily or exclusively a defensive, reactive response to larger social forces or whether they can exhibit a

proactive and progressive nature as well. The third debate concerns with the distinction between political and cultural movements and whether the more culturally oriented new social movements are inherently apolitical. The fourth involves the social base of the new social movements and whether this base can be defined in terms of social class (Buechler 1995).

Olofsson however has critiqued the new social movements. The new social movements theory has been a major and much publicized component in the political landscape of the 1970s and the early 1980s. Sociologists and social theorists try to explain these movements as the outcome of and new answers to the present crisis of Western European societies or modern civilizations as a whole (Touaine 1981). The movements that are said to be the relevant solutions to a crisis of the modern world are in contrast small, unstable and even ephemeral organisations. It seems unlikely that these will be the answers to the current day situations the world is facing (Olofsson 1988). He also discusses the concept of old wine in a new bottle when he questions whether there is anything completely new in the new social movements or are they remakes in a different context. The peace movement in the early 1980s have their parallels in the pre First World War era as also in the 1960s (Olofsson 1988). In earlier social movements there was a series of activities and organisations that could be labelled 'subcultural', forming consciousness and activities around class issues and organisations. The modern cultural revolutionary activities are more open and indeterminate, more generally countercultural than specifically sub cultural (Olofsson 1988). He makes a very important conclusion when he states that the chances for the survival and continuation of the new and old social movements are contingent on the political traditions and political system. This very point has also been stressed by Shah (1990) and Oomen (1990) when they say more open, flexible and adaptive a political system, the less chance of the development of an autonomous new major

social movement, and the greater the possibility of selective acceptance of new themes and issues among the already given political forces (Olofsson 1988). There may be a coalesce of movements across the Atlantic but it is equally probable that different parts of these new organising potentials can become allied to already given socio-political formations, through their reshaping and interpretive capacity (Olofsson 1988).

Mobilisation to Institutionalisation: Movements in Transition

From initial stirring of individuals, movements in their career go on to excite masses. The more the membership, more is the popularity of the movement. However, as time goes on, there is an inevitable change in the pattern of movement dynamics. Some movements achieve their aim and are disbanded. Others just lose steam. Still others may be brutally repressed and members forced to go underground. But there is a possibility that movements get institutionalised. This then becomes contradictory to the stance of movements conscious commitment to change, low degree of formalisation of its organisation, normative commitment and participation. This is an inevitable challenge which every movement faces (Oomen 1990). Movements happen when people who share a common ideology and activity come together. But as Oomen (1990) points out, all movements have a share of institutionalisation in the form of a network of stable interactions, normative structure, gradation of participants, without which no movement can attain stability. Movements thus, can be viewed as institutionalised collective actions guided by ideology and supported by organisational structures (Oomen 1990). This demarcates a movement from mob behaviour and other collective behaviours. However, the lack of an absolutely impulsive behaviour marred by amorphous objectives to begin with, mobilization related behaviour and thinking are largely under the dominance of restlessness, makes it different from formal organizations. However, over formalisation

by itself can spell doom for movements because with it comes bureaucracy and an opposition to change.

The recognition of the linkage between mobilisation and institutionalisation also is proof of the relationship between the ideology and programmes of the movements. Movement ideology is often formulated by the leadership and the intellectual elite in abstract terms. It will remain a mere verbal articulation of lofty ideals which can sensitise people but fail to bring about any change which is actually required. Hence, ideology as an input needs to be translated into problem-oriented, issue centred programmes, taking into account the existential conditions of the specific social category which is sought to be mobilised into collective action. The success of a movement is hinged upon people perceiving a link between ideology and programmes of the movement. It has to appeal to the people to elicit effective, purposeful and continuous mobilisation of the masses (Oomen 1990). As time passes, a social movement develops a structure of its own. An events or an interaction with other groups determines the course of action to be followed. A set of events centred round an issue constitutes a phase, and the course of a movement consists of several phases but an analysis of why a movement takes a particular course and not another in the context of relevant alternatives need to be done. As formalisation sets in, schisms appear based on personal rivalries, ideological differences which may lead to splinter movements. Even without these, a radical ideology is not sustainable and establishment almost always becomes a must. A movement may reject existing structures but it will have to create its own structures to function effectively. In any case, most movements lose their dynamic nature as they become formalised (Rao 1984). Movements may die, remain dormant and move onto topics of new interests, or become even more radicalised. In any case, the larger political context is crucial. If the existing structures incorporate what the movement stood for, then the movement loses its relevance (Rao 1984). Movement

life cycles are an entirely separate topic for discussion which is beyond the scope for this paper. Institutions and movements are related in three ways:

- Institutions and structures are *cleansed* by movements (*sic.*). Movements try and restore institutions to their ideal state from the current state of regeneration. Institutions on the other hand tame movements or contain rebellious elements (Oomen 1990).
- Movements deliberately create institutions to fulfil present day visions and aspirations. Institutions on the other hand may float movements to sustain their legitimacy (Oomen 1990).
- Movements tend to redefine old institutions, the effort being not simply to purify and renew institutions or abandon them completely in favour of new ones but to recreate them. Institutions on their part, tend to revitalise movements in such a way that the balance between stability and change is maintained (Oomen 1990).

Conclusion

The concept of social movements has been rapidly changing. It is a reflection of the changing times we live in. From complete neglect and fear in the early twentieth century, the decades of the 1960s and the 1970s witnessed movements like never before. The interest of the academia both in the Western world and in India escalated with books, articles, journals, seminars and conferences being organised on the theme. However, with the fall of the Soviet Union in 1989, we are witnessing a unipolar world. Post the cold war stage, countries across the world have given up the race of being aligned to either a capitalist or a socialist bloc. The Non-Aligned Movement has become weak. While there is no race to join a bloc, the lack of choices have made the global south aim towards what USA dictates. The international institutions like the IMF and the World Bank with their ancillaries have toed this line. In such a scenario, the need for protest and dissent against anti

people policies has become even more urgent. Ironically, the number of protests has dwindled. People's movements which acted as pressure groups have been sidelined. Programmes like SAPs have strengthened the developed world and brought the Global South to their knees. In such a scenario the visibility of the movements has reduced. But a point which needs to be mentioned here is in a rapidly globalising world, the issues have outgrown the narrow confines of mere economic considerations and class struggles. In this respect new social movements theory is trying to address the new issues though its biggest advantage is that remains largely west centric. Movement theories evolve over time. They no longer blame the individual nor do they see the individual as a mere stooge in the hands of resources. It views grievances, resources, opportunities and identity boundaries as not given but as socially constructed. It also aims at questioning the structures and processes which form the reasons for movements. Hence, not a single theory is exhaustive in its attempt to explain the phenomena and a set definition, like all social and transient phenomena continues to elude us. But it is safe to say that the research on movement can only go forward and with the changing definitions of individuals and structure quit viewing the latter as sacrosanct and beyond the reach of the masses. American and European schools of thought of research movement vary and keep on innovating constantly. The American school of thought on social movement had become constantly detached from the social movement themselves. But with emerging movements, the movement relevant theory is seeking to unite the ongoing battle where variables are pitted against each other to give a concept which transcends these schisms. Europe on the other hand was the birthplace for a lot of new collective identity based movements and hence there the research has also largely focused on individuals as players in the movement. Hence the social psychology of protest in terms of people carrying out a movement often not against the political structure but as a means to ensure acceptance

for diversity has given movement research a new dimension. While it is not saying that movements' studies cannot be limited to individual participants alone, one can no longer just shun away the participants as those being at loggerheads with failures and frustrations in their personal lives. Far from accepting this, rapporteur of contention affirms that movements are rooted in contention politics. This goes on to say that unless the individual is contended in oneself, he or she will never join a movement. Hence it is imperative to understand that why a collectivity chooses to act together is very important.

Movements studies in India are yet to develop their own specific framework suitable to India. By and large, except for the phase of the 1980s which saw social scientists study movements, current day studies on movements are very few and far in between. Most of which are available, study the historical movements and not the ongoing ones. Hence, while movements are ongoing, they fail to garner interest of academicians who rarely undertake an empirical study in this area. The possible exception is the Dalit Movement which has generated a lot of literature. A reason for this is scholars do not risk studying the institutional phase of movements which are often the result of earlier mobilisation efforts. Hence, historical movements are mostly available. In not studying movements empirically, the danger of ignoring that a very important source of social change remains. As the New Left sweeps power in Latin America and insists on breaking away from the American hegemony, academicians here should chronicle our own grassroots level movements against the exploitation of the state and international agencies as well as the local elites. We are at a crucial juncture in time, when we see the Western world as fragile and not invincible and the Global South attempting to throw away the shackles of domination. Hence, it is the need of the hour to understand movements in their new forms using contemporary means to focus on contemporary issues.

Movements are neither mere accidents nor entirely the resultants of manipulations by leaders and demagogues, but the consequence of conscious efforts of men to change systems in the light of their past experiences, avoiding pitfalls. The continuous occurrence of movements implies that man is not imprisoned by present structures and no moratorium on his creativity can be imposed (Oomen 1990).

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The Role of Ethnic Elite in Community Formation: The Case of Paite¹

S Thianlalmuan Ngaihte

Abstract

Ethnicity is not the exclusive affairs of individual members of a community. Nevertheless, there are always individual or groups of individuals that organise and lead all ethnic and nationalist movements. They are the ethnic elite that emerged within the community. The emerging elite not only articulate interests relevant to majority of the community they claim to represent, but they also nurtured the ideas of 'they' and 'we', which are essential to creation of a community. To understand the nature of ethnic identity assertions and the dynamics of ethnic movements, it becomes essential to comprehend the role of the ethnic elite. The proposed paper attempts to analyse the role of the Paite elite in the construction of Paite identity. The study is based on material and information collected from both primary and secondary sources. The paper is expected to contribute to our growing knowledge about the nature and dynamics of ethnicity among smaller ethnic communities. Apart from its academic significance, the study will also have implications for policy-making. By providing information about the political processes that take place among smaller ethnic communities, the work provides the policy makers enough knowledge about the problems and dilemmas of the smaller ethnic communities and helps them devise appropriate measures to pre-empt the possibilities of these communities taking to militancy.

Is ethnic elite really related to ethnicity? The answer can be yes or no depending upon the conceptual or theoretical stand that one takes. Ethnicity is not the exclusive affairs of individual members of a community. Nevertheless, there are always individual or groups of individuals that provide leadership and guidance to the ethnic community.² They are the ethnic elite that emerged within the community. The emerging elite not only articulates interests and issues relevant to majority of the community they represent, they also nurtured the ideas of 'they' and 'we', which are essential to creation of a community. To understand better the link between ethnic elite and community formation, it is

necessary first to conceptualize the key terms used in the paper and to relate to some significant ideas on the subject. This will be followed by a case analysis of the role of the Paite elite in the formation of Paite identity.

Concepts: Linking Ethnic Elite to Community Formation

An ethnic community is seen as a self-conscious political entity already drawn into the process of modernization. Community consciousness presupposes prior existence of 'self-identification' among the members of a community. The 'self-identification' of an ethnic community is marked by the presence of objective cultural markers such as language, myth of common

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origin, common customs, etc. These aspects of culture are used by the ethnic community to differentiate themselves from other communities. Any group of people, which uses cultural symbols to create internal cohesion and to differentiate themselves from others is a subjectively self-conscious political community.³ However, in ethnic politics what is considered important is the socially relevant features and not the cultural differences that are 'actually there'.⁴

Within the ethnic community there are always individual or group of individual that contribute to social and political awakening of the people. There are also people that organise and provide leadership to the community. They are the elite that emerged from within the community. One may be regarded as a part of the elite in a particular sphere – academic, professional, doctors, and the like; yet in another walk of life one might not be so placed and as such, rated among the masses. With changes in a given value system classification of elite are likely to vary. For the present paper, it will be suffice to say that the term elite refers to ethnic elite that emerged within the community and are organically linked to it. The ethnic elite are, thus, those individuals who play considerable role in the identity politics of the community. The ethnic elite are such persons who comprise of a broad spectrum of influential people within the ethnic community, such as traditional chiefs, religious heads, politicians, bureaucrats, intelligentsia and students / youth leaders. In the name of building community solidarity among their community members, community leaders / elite make use of identifiable and non-identifiable ethnic features and transform them into subjective feelings.

Collective feelings and collective identities are pursued through organisations. Organisations reinforce community solidarity either through the ethnic goals they pursue or through the homogeneity of the ethnic membership. As communities become more conscious of their rights and identity, the importance of ethnic organisations grows

to articulate their interests inside and outside the ethnic boundaries. Besides the efficient pursuit of collective interests, ethnic organisations also serve as one important markers of the group with its homogeneous membership.⁵ The ethnic elite make use of ethnic based organisations to generate political consciousness among the community members, and through them propagate and articulate the interests and values essential for the survival of the community.

As language is intrinsic to the expression of culture any discussion on identity has to take into account the question of language in identity formation. A number of scholars have acknowledged the crucial role of language and literature in the emergence of subjectively conscious political community. One of Benedict Anderson's main argument on people's ability to imagine themselves as members of a community (it could be even a nation) centers round the critical role of language, especially script language that became popular with the emergence of print-capitalism.⁶ To use the word of Benedict Anderson, "Nothing perhaps more precipitated this search, nor made it more fruitful, that print-capitalism, which made it possible for rapidly growing numbers of people to think about themselves, and to relate themselves to others, in a profoundly new ways."⁷ To Anderson, print languages laid the bases for national (community) consciousness in three distinct ways. First, they created unified fields of exchange and communication above the spoken vernacular. Secondly, they gave a new fixity to the language, which in the long run helped to build that image of antiquity so central to the subjective idea of the nation (community). Thirdly, they created languages-of-power of a kind different from the older administrative vernaculars. Certain disadvantages dialect lost caste due to their unsuccessful (or only relatively successful) to have their own print form.⁸ Adrian Hastings in *Construction of Nationhood*,⁹ also consider literary development of a spoken vernacular as (almost) certainly the most influential and widespread single

internal factor in shaping community consciousness.¹⁰ Hastings writes that translations of religious texts (such as Biblical texts) into a range of vernaculars significantly altered and extended the existing identities, and to an extent created new ones.¹¹

According to Paul R Brass, the process of development of ethnic communities involves three stages. The first stage involves the movement from ethnic category to community, which entails creation of a self-conscious language community out of a group of related speakers, the formation of a caste association, or a community of believers.¹² Brass relates development of such a phenomenon to the early stages of modernisation in multi-ethnic societies where languages have not yet become standardised, where religious groups have not become highly structured and compartmentalised, and where social fragmentation is prevalent.¹³ Language becomes not merely a means of communication, but a priceless heritage of group culture. The second stage in the transformation of ethnic groups, according to Paul Brass, involves articulation and acquisition of social, economic, and political rights for members of the group or for the group as a whole. Depending upon the perceived needs and demand of the group, its size and distribution, its relations with other groups, and the political context, the demands of the group in question (may) range from a relatively modest civil, educational, and political rights to / and opportunities for individual members of the group or for recognition of the group's corporate existence as a political body or nationality.¹⁴ He also pointed out that the movements from ethnic group to community is a transition that some groups never made, that others made initially in modern times, and still others undergo repeatedly at different points in time. If an ethnic group succeeds by its own efforts in achieving and maintaining group rights through political action and political mobilization, it has gone beyond ethnicity to establish itself as a

nationality. To Brass, the politicised ethnic elite, who constitute the most articulate and dominant section of the community, becomes the social agents of identity construction.

Among the tribal societies of Africa, Asia, including northeast India, most of the spoken dialects of the tribal communities were transformed into a script language by the emerging elite or intellectuals. Put this way, the intervention of elite in the identity discourses of the tribal communities coincided with the arrival of modernisation, especially Christianity and formal education.¹⁵ These intellectuals could be outsiders such as Christian missionaries or European anthropologists. The local emerging elite were also intimately involved in the process and, where it was possible, they work hand in hand with their European counterparts.¹⁶ L Lam Khan Piang, a scholar from the northeast India writes that the introduction of print culture transformed various dialects of the Zo people into print language. Some of the Zo tribes have population below ten thousand, yet every tribe whether small or big tried hard to have the Bible translated in their dialects. Having the Bible translated in their dialects became the social confirmation of their assertion of separate identity, of the distinctiveness of the tribe.¹⁷

Making of Paite Identity

Having outlined the broad conceptual framework, an attempt is made to examine and analysis role of Paite elite in the formation of politically conscious Paite community. As Paul Brass understanding of ethnic community formation suits the case of Paite, the analysis begins with Paul Brass formulation and ends with a passing reference to Anthony D Smith views on contemporary resurgence and power of ethnicity.

Elite, Script Language and Paite Identity

In the year 1903, a Welsh Calvinistic Foreign Missionary Rev. David E Jones and T Vialphung (1889-1936) prepared Paite Primer.¹⁸ In Tedim region in Chin state of Burma, under the initiative of Rev. J H Cope,

Christian missionary, who was also a linguist, Chin Primers was prepared in Tedim (Paite) dialect.¹⁹ The arrival of one H Nengzachin on the scene during the last part of the 1930s had set a new trend in the development of Paite language.²⁰ H Nengzachin owned a Remington typewriter that he used in his literary work.²¹ In the year 1944 he started translation of the New Testament of the Bible with Psalms in Paite. In the year 1945 he prepared Paite Primer *Sintung Bu*. Talking about it, he said, "To learn Paite, I wrote *Sintung Bu*".²² He also corresponded with Rev. S T Haugo of Burma,²³ as he believed that the Paite people living in India and Burma have common language and literature. Besides H Nengzachin, T C Tiankham and T Gougin also wrote some of the early books in Paite.²⁴ As different persons were involved in developing the script for the Paite, one could see differences in spelling and writing.²⁵ Notwithstanding such limitations of the script, the very development of a script in Paite had facilitated the ethno-consolidating role of the language, thereby strengthening their consciousness as a political community. Once a significant vernacular literature comes into existence with translation of the psalms, summaries of the gospels, it fulfills religious as well as secular needs of the people. In this connection, the remark made by Andrian Hastings on the impact of script in shaping the consciousness of communities hitherto untouched by printing is worth noting. Hastings writes "the effect of a relatively small increase in the number of books in a community which has, hitherto, had none or very few is far greater than people in a world used to a surfeit of books can easily realize, and its extends far beyond the literate. Thus, the impact of a vernacular literature in shaping the consciousness of communities hitherto untouched by printing in, say late nineteenth and early twentieth century Africa (Paite community)²⁶ could be enormous."²⁷

Elite and Language Politics of the Paite

To further elaborates the role of language and literature in Paite identity

formation, the language politics of the Paite leaders / elite is analysed under two broad heads viz.

- i) To achieve 'common literature', which means adoption of common script for all Paite speakers of India and Burma;²⁸ and
- ii) To ensure introduction of Paite vernacular subject in schools and colleges in Manipur.

In the seventies, a movement developed, insisting on the introduction of Paite as vernacular subject in schools in Manipur. Different Paite organisations presented a number of memorandums to the Government of Manipur. Initially, the Paite vernacular was introduced in 1975 from class I to class V in Manipur.²⁹ Since the academic year 2004-2005, the Paite vernacular paper has been introduced as a subject at college level also. Many Paite considered this recognition as one remarkable achievement in the history of Paite.³⁰

Several attempts were made by Paite leaders to bridge the differences in script. Moreover, many contemporary Paite leaders and writers have come out strongly advocating 'common literature'. John K Ngaihte, the present President of Paite Literature Society (PLS) writes in 2000 that the international boundary runs cutting their traditional territory. By the time they become conscious of their status, they were already living in two separate countries, India and Burma. He further says that the adoption of a 'common literature' (in the context of Paite-Zomi) is an easy thing to achieve; it does not go against anybody's laws, it has no boundary, no government on earth can oppose it, and the day when the people agreed to say yes and adopt it is the day one achieves a 'common literature'.³¹ Rev. T Jam Khothang, one prominent Paite church leader writes that language keeps on growing and the speaker of a language knows what is best and acceptable to him/her.³² In a joint meeting of different Paite organizations held on October 15, 1983, Rev. T Jam Khothang says, "We are the best person to develop good, correct and appropriate language and literature. In order to have common script

with the Tedim people of Burma, we should have a 'common goal', discuss among ourselves, and come out with a systematic script. Any means that will integrate our literature is good."³³

Paite leaders also took a number of decisions and steps. For instance, in 1982 a joint meeting of different Paite organisations was held on the theme "If the people do not follow their language they will become slaves."³⁴ The meeting unanimously agreed that all Paite should use uniform scripts. One of the outcomes of the meeting was the preparation of a guidebook for a correct writing of Paite language.³⁵ On March 27, 1984 PLS, India and the Zomi Christian Literature Society (ZCLS) of Burma had a joint seminar at Moreh, Chandel district³⁶ and came out with a resolution known as 'Moreh Resolution'.³⁷ As a result of the Moreh meeting, similar school textbooks for beginners was published. In Tedim, Burma, the book is known as *Zo Lai Sim Bu Tan Langh* and in India, it is *Laisimna Bu*.³⁸

In the year 1988, the PLS passed a resolution on issues related to the use of alphabet 'c' and 'ch'.³⁹ Under resolution 3 (III) of November 6, 1988 the Board of Directors of PLS agreed to give freedom to Paite writers to use either 'c' or 'ch' depending on their personal choices. Students opting Paite vernacular paper were at a liberty to use either of the two letters and this was even spelt out in the introductory note in Paite vernacular textbook. From time to time seminars, writers' conferences, and orientation courses for teachers were organized by PLS in collaboration with other organizations. In a recently held meeting in November 2009, PLS took the decision to set up the Library and Research Centre. The meeting also decided to publish quarterly journal. Sub-committee for each was formed to follow up the decisions.⁴⁰

Constructing Identity by Promoting Vernacular Writings

The exposure of the Paite community to typewriters, printing machine, computer and off late the internet has

promoted a gradual growth in Paite vernacular writings, newspapers, magazines and periodicals. There are also books written and published by individual persons or with assistance from friends, NGOs and the government. A survey on the development and growth of Paite vernacular writings show that the number of books including magazines and daily newspapers in Paite has increased considerably both in the secular and non-secular field.⁴¹ From the available vernacular literature, one came to know the history, custom, tradition and culture, and origin of the Paite. Vernacular texts also speak about the dominating contemporary thoughts and ideas of the elite. As such, the development and growth of Paite vernacular writings serves as a link between the past and the present. Besides vernacular language writings, there are also some English literary works on Paite-Zomi. While English literary works serve the English literate section of the community, vernacular literature fills the gap by disseminating information to the non-English literate masses, thereby contributing to wider circulation of ideas among the Paite-Zomi masses. In fact, language and literature becomes the instrument through which Paite writers and leaders publicise their thoughts and ideas to their general masses.

Elite, Organisations and Paite Identity

Among the Paite people, one can see the emergence of different Paite organizations having varied intentions in their endeavour. One of the first organisations formed among the Paite was a student organization - Siamsinpawlpi (SSPP)⁴² on January 13, 1947.⁴³ The desire to involve student community in the affairs of the community prompted the Paite leaders to form the students organisation. The other reason is to safeguard and promote the identity of the Paite. The SSPP pledged to be non-political and its stated objectives are social, economic, and academic in nature.⁴⁴

In 1949 another organisation known as Paite National Council (now called Paite Tribe Council) was founded at Tanguam village, Churachandpur, Manipur. The

founder members of Paite National Council (PNC) were T Thangkhai, T C Tiankham, Rev Siamkung, Val Lalau, T Tualchin, L Nengzatun, Thangau, H Lianzamang, Thangzachin Tombing and some others. Its first President was T Thangkhai- village chief-cum-church leader. In course of time, PNC emerged as the political platform for all Paite speaking people.⁴⁵ H Kamkhenhang writes that the official adoption of the name Paite with the formation of PNC was necessitated by a heavy pressure to include the Paite people under either Kuki or Lushai categories.⁴⁶ According to the Constitution (original) of PNC adopted on June 27, 1949 'Pai' means to go, 'Te' is a plural suffix-equivalent to 's' added after a noun in English. 'Paite' therefore, means those who go or went. They are called so because they moved away from their kith and kin in their original home, Chin Hills, now in Myanmar. The term Paite, in the view of the PNC, included all communities in the state of Manipur and Mizoram minus the Meitei and the Nagas of Manipur and Lushai in the Lushai Hills. The argument for this was that they all come from Burma especially from Chin Hills. It further defined Paite as those inhabiting all parts of Chin Hills in Burma, some parts of Manipur and some parts of Lushai Hills.⁴⁷ The objectives of the PNC as provided under article 3 (1), (2), (3) of the constitution (original)⁴⁸ were clearly political in nature. They are - (i) To resume or reorganize their Council as it was before the British rule; ii) To introduce or establish government of the people, by the people, for the people; iii) To preserve and develop their culture, customs and usages and to achieve the betterment of their economic and political status (sic);⁴⁹ iv) To integrate and reunify the Zo people under one political administration; v) To strive unitedly for the development and security of the Zomi.⁵⁰ The other important organisations that emerged within the Paite community are the Young Paite Association (YPA) that came into existence on March 3, 1953. YPA is a voluntary and non-political social organisation.⁵¹ PLS formed on May 10, 1954 was the other important organisation.⁵² With

the establishment of PLS, the language of the Paite has been institutionalised.

It may be inferred from the above description that the emergence of different Paite organisations reflects the desires of Paite leaders to promote and strengthen the identity of the Paite. These organisations become a platform through which Paite leaders / elite propagate the interest of the Paite within and outside the social boundary of the community. Moreover, PNC envisaged Paite as an overarching identity. The PNC clearly also identified the Meitei, Nagas, and Lushais and the Kuki as the 'others'. Apart from aspiring to secure economic development and political status for the community, it appeared that the leaders imagined Paite as a nation or at least, aspired to make it into one. Hence, they added the expression 'National' to their organisation's name. The use of the term 'nation' by the tribal communities of Manipur gives us the impression that they are either ignorant of the meaning and connotation of the word 'nation' as interpreted by political scientists;⁵³ or, despite their awareness of the real meaning of the term, by using the expression, "nation", they are showing their desire to uphold their status as independent people.

Demand for Tribe Recognition

According to Paul R Brass, the second stage in the political formation of a community involves articulation and acquisition of social, economic, and political rights for the members of the group or for the group as a whole.⁵⁴ The Paite leaders were not satisfied with the mere awareness of their community member of their cultural identity, they also consider political recognition as essential in order to promote and safeguard the interest and identity of the community. Desire for political recognition was also driven by their fear of losing their identity in the midst of larger ethnic communities with which they interact. It may be noted that in the year 1951 the President of India issued the list of India's scheduled tribes as authorised by the Constitution. The President's order listed three-scheduled

tribes in Manipur viz. Kuki, Lushai and Naga. The same year (1951) in which India conducted her first General Elections (Parliamentary Elections) the PNC nominated T Thangkhai, a village chief cum church leader to contest the elections as Paite from the Outer-Manipur constituency, which was reserved for the scheduled hill tribes of the state. However, his candidature was rejected by M N Phukan, the returning Officer on the ground that the tribe to which he claimed to belong was not in the scheduled list of tribes recognised by the Government of India. Hence, to avoid disqualification, the candidate was advised to declare himself as a Kuki or Lushai or Naga. But the candidate declared that a Paite was neither a Kuki nor a Naga nor a Lushai but a distinct tribe. Hence his candidature was rejected. The Paite leaders considered rejection of their candidate as denial of Indian citizenship to the Paite community⁵⁵ and worked for the interest of the Paite.⁵⁶

To achieve political recognition of Paite as a distinct tribe of India, Paite leaders and PNC initiated peaceful and democratic means to convince the Government of India that the Paite has a distinct identity and language.⁵⁷ They also presented a memorandum to the Government of India in the year 1955.⁵⁸ The memorandum stated that Paites have their own customs, language and literature, and identity different from the Kuki, Lushai, the Meitei and the Nagas.⁵⁹ The memorandum sought promotion of Paite culture, customs, and language and demanded all benefits and safeguards be guaranteed to the tribes under the Indian Constitution. Ultimately, in the year 1956 as a result of their continued pressure tactics, the Paite was recognised as a distinct tribe (community) of India.

Paite National Council Becomes Paite Tribe Council

After more than fifty years of formation of PNC, PNC Chief Executive Council meeting of 1996 accept 'Zomi' to be its nomenclature under vide resolution number 4 (1).⁶⁰ The term Zomi is derived from two words 'Zo' and 'mi'. 'Zo' is

perceived as the common ancestor of the different Zo tribes (Kuki-Chin) and 'mi' stands for man or people. The descendant of Zo came to be known as Zo people (Zomi). In 1997, Zomi Council (ZC) apex Zomi organisation in Manipur was formed and PNC became one of the constituent members of the Council. Believing that only one tribe (read Paite) cannot be a nation, but combination and amalgamation of different tribes formed a nationality (read Zomi), the 48th Annual General Assembly of PNC, 2003 rechristened PNC as Paite Tribe Council (PTC).⁶¹ In other words, upon realisation of the real meaning of 'nation' (in the context of Zo people), thereby subscribing to the idea that Paite together with other Zo tribes such as Vaiphei, Simte, Zou, etc form the 'Zo nation', the Paite leaders renamed PNC as PTC.⁶²

Conclusion

In the making of a politicised ethnic community, perceived cultural unity on the part of the people and the political interests and role of ethnic elite are important. The symbolic objective cultural features or 'border guards' (to use Barth terminology) maintains the socio-cultural boundary of the group differentiating one community from another.⁶³ Community life or community interests are not determined by individual / personal choice. Objective material conditions in which they live determine the nature and dynamics of the community. In addition, all major social, political, cultural / identity assertions and movements of the people at local, regional and global level are led by certain leaders / elite, who emerge from within. They guide and lead the movements supported by all or majority of the community members. In the social, political, and cultural discourses of the Paite identity, it is also seen that the Paite elite played active roles as agents in the construction of the Paite identity. The development of a Paite script and the progress of Paite literature facilitated the ethno-consolidating role of the language. This process in fact begins with the intervention of the emerging Paite elite under

the impact of forces of modernisation especially Christianity and formal education in the first part of the twentieth century. The formation of different Paite organisations was another factor, which testified the crucial role played by the most awakened section of the community. The emergence of Paite centric organisations reinforced the social boundary of the ethnic community with its homogeneous membership. In the process of constructing a Paite identity, objective cultural markers such as language and literature were used by the community / leaders to distinguish themselves from others. Initially, the emerging Paite elite developed script for the community and gradually standardised it. Subsequently they demanded official recognition of the community's rights and identity and language. The Paite community / leaders have succeeded in achieving political recognition of the community. They also succeeded in gaining recognition of their language and literature through the introduction of Paite language in schools and colleges in Manipur. All these initiatives by the Paite elite have helped in strengthening and consolidating the social, cultural and political base of the community. In spite of such achievements, for a collectivity of people that have shared ethnic features such as linguistic affinities, common origin myth, folklores and folktales, etc.⁶⁴ but had experienced what T K Oommen called 'ethnification process',⁶⁵ the process of identity redefinition may continue. The ethnification processes laid emphasis upon the people's sense of identity so much so that in course of time, fissiparous tendencies leading to the emergence of distinct feelings / groups had taken place within the group.⁶⁶ However, at a certain point of history, the group may reassert their collective identity by re-delving deep into its social, cultural and historical ethnic past / ties. David Vumlallian Zou, a scholar from northeast India, has observed this point when he says "it became quite common to hear historical narratives about the partition of the Zo 'nation' (encompassing the Chin, Kuki and Lushai) and their current 'minority status'

within the nation-state of Burma, Bangladesh and India. After the discovery of this 'problem, an irredentist line of thinking prescribes the solution as "ethnic unification".⁶⁷ This is what has been observed among the Paite community. As claimed by Paite leaders / elite, renaming of Paite as a tribe within the Zomi nation has social, political and cultural linkages, thereby is tantamount to acceptance of their primal name 'Zo'. The Paite-Zomi experience reminds us of Anthony D Smith's explanation of the resurgence and power of ethnicity in the contemporary world. In *Myths and Memories of the Nation*, Anthony D Smith's writes that ethnic communities and nations have the same quest to discover a true identity, and he contended that the roots of a nation and its unique identity reside in its origins and genealogy.⁶⁸ He further pointed out that "the ethnic myth became a charter for creating new political communities on the basis of a sense of community derived from historic memories and a myth of common descent. Where previously, these myths were utilised to uphold cultures and kingdoms, today they can just as easily be made to serve the interests of forgotten and submerged communities aspiring to national status and territorial recognition."⁶⁹ Such reassertion of collective identity need not be a new entity, but a rediscovery and an acceptance of primal identity perceived to be deeply rooted in the social and cultural milieu of the group in question.

End Notes

1. The Paite a transborder community of India and Burma are recognised scheduled tribe community in Manipur and Mizoram. They are also found in Chin state of Myanmar. The Paite belong to the Kuki-Chin linguistic group of family. In recent years, the Paite, Vaiphei, Simte, Gangte, Zou, Kom, Mate, Thangkhal have called themselves as Zomi.
2. Malcolm Yapp, 'Language, Religion and Political Identity: A General Framework', in David Taylor and Malcolm Yapp (eds.), *Political Identity in South Asia*, Curzon Press, London, 1979, p. 17.
3. Paul R Brass, *Ethnicity and Nationalism: Theory and Comparison*, Sage Publications, New Delhi, 1991, p.19.

4. Thomas Hylland Eriksen, *Small Places, Large Issues: An Introduction to Social and Cultural Anthropology*, London and Chicago, Illinois, 1995.
5. Benjamin B Ringer and Elinor R Lawless, 'The We-They Character of Race and Ethnicity', in Harry Goulbourne (ed.), *Race and Ethnicity*, Routledge, London, Vol. 1, 2001, pp. 49-73.
6. For details, refers, Benedict Anderson, 'Imagined Communities', in John Hutchinson and Anthony D Smith (eds.), *Nationalism*, Oxford University Press, New York, 1994, pp. 89-96.
7. Ibid., pp. 89-90.
8. Ibid., p. 94.
9. Adrian Hastings, *The Construction of Nationhood: Ethnicity, Religion and Nationalism*, Cambridge University Press, Cambridge, 1997.
10. Ibid., p. 31.
11. Ibid., p. 148.
12. Paul R Brass, op. cit., p. 22.
13. Ibid., p. 34.
14. Ibid., p. 23.
15. Refer, A K Baruah, 'Communities and Democracy: A Northeast Indian Perspective', *North East India Studies (NEIDS)*, Vol. 1, No. 1, June 2005, pp. 13-30.
16. Leroy Vail, 'The Creation of Ethnicity in South Africa', in John Hutchinson and Anthony D. Smith, *Ethnicity*, Oxford Press, Oxford, 1996, pp. 229-235.
17. L Lam Khan Piang, *Kinship, Territory and Politics: The Study of Identity Formation amongst the Zo*, Unpublished Ph.D Thesis, Jawaharlal Nehru University, New Delhi, 2005, especially pp. 129-143.
18. Pu T Vialphung, a native of Kaihlam village, Lamka, Manipur attended mission school at Aizawl. During his stay in Aizawl, he prepared Paite Primer with the assistance of David E Jones. See T K Muana, *Nominal Phrase in Paite and English: A Contrastive Study*, PhD Thesis, Manipur University, Imphal, 1998, p. 30. In the year 1904, Grierson's linguistic survey was published which included the language specimen of the Paite.
19. H Chinlang and some Paite brought the Tedim Primer, songbook and the New Testament of the Bible to Manipur which were used in mission schools run by NEIGM in Churachandpur, Manipur.
20. H Nengzachin was a close associate of the missionaries of the NEIGM. He passed class X from Shillong in the year 1934. With the assistance of H H Coleman, NEIGM leaders/missionary H Nengzachin went to America to study in a Theological Seminary in the year 1936.
21. H Nengzachin used his Remington typewriter for writings, especially religious book and commentaries.
22. H Nengzachin, *He Leads Me (An Autograph Anecdote)*, trans. T Gwite IPS (ret'd), Imphal, 2003, p. 15.
23. S T Haugo was one of the leading Paite-Tedim (Paitedim) Zomi leaders of Burma.
24. T C Tiankham a contemporary of H Nengzachin was the first graduate among the Paite-Zomi of Manipur. He was a member of Manipur Constitution Drafting Committee, first Speaker of Manipur Assembly. T Gougin became an important trendsetter of Zomi politics in Manipur. T C Tiankham, *English-Paite-Manipuri Words Book*, Imphal, 1948; T Gougin, *English-Hindustani-Paite Primer*, Shillong Printing Press, Shillong, 1950.
25. Although songs, poems, folklores and folktales of the Paite-Zomi of India and Burma are same, one can see differences in script. Differences in scripts can be compared to that of American English and British English.
26. Inside bracket is mine.
27. Adrian Hastings, op. cit., p. 23.
28. Refer, John K Ngaihte, 'Paite Nam Lailam Politics' (Language Politics of the Paite), in S Ngulzadal (compiler), *Paite Zoumite Laipau (Paite Zoumi Literature)*, Convention Press, Lamka, 2000, pp. 292-293.
29. Paite vernacular for Classed 1-V was introduced in the year 1975 (vide Government letter No. 18/6/73-SE (Pt), dated 15-10-74 and 27-7-1975); for Classed 1X-X in the year 1988; for Classes VI-VIII in the year 1992; for XI-XII from 2000; for TDC from 2004.
30. This view was expressed by Paite elites. Interview conducted by the author from December 2007 – February 2008.
31. John K Ngaihte, op. cit., S Ngulzadal (compiler), op. cit., p. 293; als see Tualchin Neihsial, 'Common Writing System Mainawtna', in S Ngulzadal (compiler), *Paite Zoumite Laipau (Paite Zoumi Literature)*, Convention Press, Lamka, 2000, pp. 156-165.
32. T Jam Khothang, cited in M Vumhau, 'My Observations about Pu Chinlam Tawmbing's Literature, Culture Policy and Modern PLS Policy', posted on the internet on Wednesday, August 13, 2008 in http://zogam.com/index.php?option=com_content&task=view&id=4973&Itemid=211 (Visited on January 14, 2009).

33. T Jam Khothang expressed this at the 3rd Joint Meeting of Paite organisations held at YPA Hall, Lamka on October 15, 1983. The meeting was chaired by T Phungzathang.
34. Joint meeting of the PNC, PLS, YPA, SSPP, dated October 2, Oct 30 and Nov 1, 1982, Lamka, cited in S. Ngulzadal (compiler), op. cit., pp. 17-37.
35. Joint meeting of Paite organisations held on October 15, 1983 accepted *Paite (Tedim) Pau Gelh Dingdan*, a guidebook for correct writing of Paite written by H. Kamkhanthang (resolution 2). The guidebook was changed to *Zoulai Gelhdan* in the year 1992 with the aim to make it more inclusive in its application.
36. Joint Literary Meeting-cum-Seminar between the Paite Literature Society (PLS), India and the Zomi Christian Literature Society (ZCLS), Burma, dated March 27, 1984, Moreh, Chandel district.
37. For detail information on the Moreh meeting and resolutions, see S Ngulzadal (compiler), op. cit., pp. 123-125.
38. John K Ngaihte, op. cit., S Ngulzadal (compiler), op. cit., p. 295.
39. The use of alphabet 'c' and 'ch' becomes an issue as some writers prefer to use only 'c' while other prefer 'ch' as for instance in 'Chin' and 'Cin', 'Ching' and 'Cing', etc.
40. 'Paite Literature Hahkat Sem Di'n Kisa', posted on the internet on Sunday, November 30, 2008, http://zogam.com/index.php?option=com_content&task=view&id=4973&Itemid=211 (Visited on January 27, 2009).
41. Surveys on the growth and development of Paite vernacular literary works was made by the author during December 2007 to January 2008.
42. Siamsinpawlpi was formerly known as Paite Students Associations'. The Bukpi Conference of 1953 changed Paite Students Association to Siamsinpawlpi (SSPP).
43. Founder members and their designation at the time of formation of Siamsinpawlpi: H. Nengzachin- matriculate-educated, went to America in 1936, NEIGM pastor; T Thangkhavillage chief and NEIGM worker; H. Tualvung; T C Tiankham- graduate and first speaker of Manipur Assembly; T. Thangkhogin- educated, NEIGM worker, teacher; Phungdal, Ngulthong, T. Jam Khothang- passed VII (later graduated, went to America, etc).
44. According to the Preamble to the constitution of Siamsinpawlpi, the aims and objectives of the organisation are "to educate ourselves in various fields of learning; develop our skills; encourage ourselves towards manual work; train ourselves in various constructive games and sports; faith in behaviour, labourious, truthful and God fearing; work for the good of the society; commit ourselves to the nation; cooperate with other student's welfare organisation; strive forward unitedly...(sic).
45. T Liankhohau, *Social, Cultural, Economic and Religious Life of a Transformed Community: A study of Paite Tribe*, Mittal Publications, New Delhi, 1994, p. 10.
46. H. Kamkhanthang, The Paites: a tranborder tribes of India and Burma, Mittal Publications, New Delhi, 1988, p. 9; also see Thuamson Hangzo, 'Paite National Council', *Siamsinpawlpi Annual Magazine*, op. cit., 1996, pp. 346-349.
47. Constitution (original) of Paite National Council drafted on January 13 1947 and adopted on June 27, 1949. Here after cited as PNC original Constitution, 1949.
48. PNC original Constitution 1949.
49. Aim and Object 3 (1), (2), (3), PNC original Constitution 1949.
50. Refer, *Paite Tribe Council Ki-ukna Dan (11-vei puahphatna)*, 2004, Paite Tribe Council (HQ), Lamka, Manipur, 2005 (reprint).
51. The aims and objective of YPA as spelt out in the preamble to the constitution reads, "We, the Paite Young People, having solemnly resolved to adopt and impart to ourselves and to our people the spirit of altruism in line with and in implementation of Sacrosanctity of Christian values; rural development and reconstruction; relief and rehabilitation; and creative utilisation of leisure hereby constituted ourselves..." refer, *YPA Ki-ukna Daan Bupi (The Constitution of the Young Paite Association)* (Paite and English), Manipur, 2003 (amended).
52. The objectives of the PLS are (i) to adopt basically and as far as practicable Roman characters to write the Paite language and where necessary to adopt others characters and signs; (ii) To cooperate with the government in production of Paite literature and (iii) to endeavour for the improvement of Paite literature (sic). Refer, *Paite Literature Society Limited Bye-law*, Lamka, Manipur, December 12, 1992, p. 3.
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Television Production on Domestic Violence: An Approach

Amitosh Dubey and Uma Tripathi

Abstract

Domestic violence as a violation of human rights is being strongly felt worldwide nowadays. The discussion about problems related to domestic violence is the key issue in many parts of the world. Both developed and underdeveloped countries are suffering from this problem. It is the prime duty of any government to make people more aware of the need to find solutions to domestic violence. Here comes the role of media in domestic violence. Media has to execute a much larger responsibility in fighting domestic violence in the same manner as it successfully pays attention to a wide range of health and other social problems. Only a broad approach in television programmes can significantly help prevent and reduce domestic violence. This paper is an attempt to briefly examine what issues and approach should be included as content for effective production of anti domestic violence television programmes, messages and films. The study has been designed as a descriptive survey.

Key Words: Domestic Violence, Television Production, Anti Domestic Violence Programmes, Opinion of Target Audience.

Introduction

Domestic violence as a violation of human rights is being strongly felt worldwide nowadays, although violence in homes has been going on since hundreds of years all over the world. The discussion about problems related to domestic violence is a key issue in many parts of the world. Both developed and underdeveloped countries are suffering from this problem “Globally, up to six out of every ten women experience physical and/or sexual violence in their lifetime. A World Health Organization study of 24,000 women in 10 countries found that the prevalence of physical and/or sexual violence by a partner varied from 15percent in urban Japan to 71 percent in rural Ethiopia, with most areas being in the 30–60 percent range” (UNIFEM 2008).

It is the prime duty of any government to make people more aware of the need to find solutions to domestic

violence. Here comes the role of media in domestic violence. Media may perhaps play a larger role in fighting domestic violence in the same manner as it has successfully attended to a wide range of health and other social problems. In a report entitled ‘Media: The untold stories of violence against women’ Gutierrez and Boselli (2010) reported that- According to the Italian Under Secretary of Foreign Affairs Vincenzo Scotti, “communication can be one of the most powerful tools” in the fight against this type of violence. They also reported that -in “Changing cultural and social norms that support violence”, the World Health Organization (WHO) confirms that media – which have been successful in addressing a wide range of health issues – could play a bigger role in fighting violence.

An expert group meeting on ‘Good practices in legislation on violence against women’ organized by ‘United Nations division for the advancement of women’, and

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'United Nations office on Drugs and Crime' held at Vienna, Austria, 26 to 28 May, 2008 proposed a frame work for legislation on violence against women. This frame work contains recommendations on what should be included in legislation on violence against women. Part III, chapter 5 - Prevention (d. Sensitization of the media) says "Legislation should encourage the sensitization of journalists and other media personnel regarding violence against women. Media representations significantly influence societal perceptions of acceptable behaviour and attitudes. Training journalists and other media personnel on women's human rights and the root causes of violence against women may influence the way in which the issue is reported and thereby influence societal attitudes" (United Nations division 2008).

The role of technology as a tool in these processes is also being felt by different social organizations, NGO's and associations. Bangladesh National Women Lawyers Association (BNWLA 2009) has organized the workshop titled "Roles of Media to address Domestic Violence". Journalists from print and electronic media (local and national levels), academics and women activists discussed the role of media in eradicating domestic violence. Some of the recommendations are:

- » Privately owned media should be more sensitized and they should be more sincere about publishing incidences of domestic violence.
- » Documentary on domestic violence should be prepared and telecast through the electronic media.
- » Reports covering the incidences of domestic violence should be considered seriously by the print media- and the Editorial Policy should be more specific on the said issue.
- » Journalist should be trained on gender discrimination and domestic violence.

From the above observations, one can understand that the use of mass

communication technology plays a very important role in the prevention of domestic violence. Television is a very effective broadcast media of mass communication with great qualities and capabilities for influencing learning and education. Television has the potential to reach the farthest corner of the country with quality programmes. It bridges the gap between the rural and urban, the poor and rich. With the help of television we can bring domestic violence prevention programmes to the doorsteps of our target audience.

India is a very big and highly populated country. The target audience belongs to different categories such as poor and rich, educated and under-educated, privileged and underprivileged, those living in metros and those on small villages of only few houses. Therefore, the understanding and need is also very different in nature. The anti domestic violence campaigner and the public health educators have to use different strategies, approaches and style of television production for a specific target group. The media, particularly television has the opportunity and flexibilities to make programmes in different categories looking into the need and requirements of the target audience. Producers and directors of such programmes have got more flexibility by these formats of programmes.

Rationale of the Study

In order to inform and educate the people about domestic violence and to impart qualitative information about laws and acts, implications and remedies etc., the government is taking the help of media of mass communication. Television as one of the most effective medium of mass communication is being used to fulfill the purpose. Only a broad approach in television programmes for greater impact can help significantly to prevent and reduce domestic violence. This study focuses on what, issues and approach should be included as content for effective production of anti domestic violence television programmes, messages and films. What comprehensive approach should be taken by the producers, planners

and the authorities of anti domestic violence programmes on the existing problems and the right of women to live in a household free of violence? Many aspects and problems related to domestic violence can be included in the television series, including showing the prevalence of abuse as well as the current lack of knowledge on this issue among the victims, administrators and the whole society. It is high time to find out the approaches of television programmes on domestic violence. It is also important to know the opinion of the target audience on the would be approaches. These approaches will include how anti domestic violence programmes can be made more effective, to increase the understanding and overall perception about domestic violence. The study of the opinion of the recipient group will also help to introduce corrective measures for improvement of the programmes. In view of the above facts the study has been entitled, "Television production on domestic violence: an approach."

Need of the Study

Almost all countries are using or planning to use, communication media to prevent domestic violence. A huge amount of money and time are needed for production and telecast of these programmes. So it will be quite useful to see what subject should be included as content for effective production of these programmes. Approaches of any television programmes can be made more effective when it is based on what the target audience and the society think, feel and need. Knowledge of all this will lead to a well designed communication strategy, hence the study undertaken.

The study would help the authorities of domestic violence prevention agencies, health educators, government authorities, production planners of television and producers of such programmes to adjust their production techniques. This would also help to incorporate various inputs on quality improvement, telecast strategies, and evaluation effectively.

Objectives of the study

The study was carried out to achieve the following objectives:

1. To develop a scale which includes the content for general awareness, learning objective, and objective fulfillment of anti domestic violence television programmes.
2. To study the opinion of the target audience towards approaches of television programmes on domestic violence.
3. To compare the opinion of rural and urban audience towards approaches of television programmes on domestic violence.
4. To compare the opinion of male and female audience towards approaches of television programmes on domestic violence.

Hypotheses

Generally speaking the formulation of the hypothesis is the basic necessity of a research work, big or small. So the investigator has proposed to conduct his present research work on the basis of the following hypotheses:

- The opinion of target audience is favourable towards approaches of television programmes on domestic violence.
- There is no significant difference of opinion of rural and urban audience towards approaches of television programmes on domestic violence.
- There is no significant difference of opinion of male and female audience towards approaches of television programmes on domestic violence.

Delimitation

1. The study is delimited to target audience of only one district (i.e. Sagar) of M.P.
2. The study is delimited to the scale constructed for the purpose.

Research Methodology

Following are the methodological details of the present study:

Design of the study

The study has been designed as a normative survey.

Instrumentation

Any educational or informative television programme or programme related to general awareness must have certain instructional points based on the content of the subject they are dealing with. Television programmes can be made more effective by incorporating these points. The aim of the research is to lay emphasis on exploring the issues of effectiveness of anti domestic television programmes. According to the purpose, the research project was to be carried out in two stages. Stage one involved the construction of a scale which consists of points which can be included as a content matter for production on anti domestic television programmes. In stage two, the researcher, found out the opinion of the target audience towards this scale.

Stage One

In the first phase to achieve the objective no.1 the researcher constructed a scale which included the content approaches of television programmes on domestic violence. For the construction of new research tools, the investigator has to prepare suitable items with the help of the literature available. Each item must be prepared meaningfully by paying serious attention. The objective was to develop a scale which includes the content approaches of general awareness, learning objective, and objective fulfillment of anti domestic violence television programmes. "The choice of an item depends, in the first instance, upon the judgment of competent persons as to its suitability for the purposes of the test (Garrett 2005:362)." For the above scale construction, the programme (educational films) producers, experienced personnel of production team, content experts, methodologists, sociologist, psychologist,

experts of distance education, communication experts, health educators, law enforcement agencies, higher education students and other members of the society were consulted. The collection of the items was mainly done from them and suitable items contributing to a particular area were constructed.

Collection of the Items

The respondents were asked to write a few sentences or a few points on what they want to be included as content in anti domestic violation television programmes:

- a. Liking and disliking of the anti domestic violation television programmes.
- b. The things which motivate or discourage them in watching anti domestic violation television programmes.
- c. How do the films help the learner to understand about domestic violence?
- d. How will anti domestic violation television programmes create awareness of the subject?
- e. How will anti domestic violation television programmes discourage viewers to indulge in domestic violence?
- f. How does the film leave an impact on learning in terms of content?
- g. The utility of anti domestic violation television programmes.

Experts from different fields were requested to furnish few sentences or statements describing the common viewing practice of anti domestic violation television programmes, and their perception towards anti domestic violation television programmes. The list of items collected from various sources was then combined and compared with the characteristics of educational impact.

Selection of the Items

The second step followed by the researcher was comprised in to decide the relevancy of a particular item to the anti domestic violation television programmes. The items were thoroughly screened and

edited. Some of the items which were overlapping with one another were examined critically. Those items which were suitable enough and carried the clear idea were selected. The language of some of the items were edited and made suitable to convey the idea clearly. Several principles were followed in the selection of the items. The statements should be short and free from ambiguity, simple, clear and having just one meaning. The statement should belong to the dimensions under deliberation. One important consideration, which guided in preparing these scale, was that the scale should be appropriate to the various levels of knowledge, interpretation, evaluation and application. Finally 25 items were selected. They are as follows:

1. Television programmes should be capable in creating awareness about domestic violence.
2. Television programmes should condemn strongly the act of domestic violence.
3. Television programmes should create hype about domestic violence.
4. Every programme must increase the understanding of the subject- domestic violence.
5. Television programmes should take mentoring initiatives on domestic violence issues.
6. Television programmes should also explore the consequence of domestic violence in a healthy family system.
7. Television programmes should influence the critical thinking of the target audience.
8. Television programmes/coverage should be well researched in terms of content.
9. Television programme should also include the real stories of victims to create more impact on audience.
10. Emotional involvement of the target audience could also be promoted through such television programmes.
11. Television programmes should show the actual facts and figures instead of propaganda on the subject.
12. Misleading statistics will lead to misunderstanding the solutions of the problem related to domestic violence.
13. Television programmes on domestic violence can develop concerns of the audience by giving the actual rate of domestic violence.
14. The television programmes related to domestic violence and other serials, drama, films etc. should not portray the act in fashionable manner.
15. Television should broadcast short messages related to domestic violence frequently.
16. Television programmes (News) should also cover domestic violence 'crimes'.
17. Television programmes should speak about the role of communities in preventing domestic violence.
18. Television programmes should tell about the laws and acts of domestic violence.
19. The television programmes should also bring up the role of well wishers of family in domestic violence.
20. Television programmes should be able to create anti domestic violence consensus in the society.
21. Television programmes should see the domestic violence as a social issue and not as an individual cases or events.
22. A variety of formats (documentaries, fiction, news events, interview, expert panel discussion, talk shows, quiz etc.) should be utilized for different nature subjects of domestic violence.
23. Musical features is also very effective for such type of programmes; hence this format may also be used.
24. There may be a different approach of programmes for both literate and illiterate viewers.

25. The role models of the society may be used to deliver anti domestic violence messages.

Stage two

In the second phase, to achieve the objectives no 2, 3 and 4 of the study, a survey research was conducted using the instrument which was developed for the purpose. The scale consists of above mentioned 25 items covering the objective of the study and is a five point scale.

Scoring

Instructions for administration and scoring procedure were finalized. The scoring pattern was 5, 4, 3, 2, 1 for strongly agrees, agrees, undecided, disagrees and strongly disagrees responses. After that five point scale was reduced to a three point scale merging the strongly agree to agree and strongly disagree to disagree. The mean score, above 62.5 will show favorable opinion towards approaches of television programmes on domestic violence.

Sample of the study

A total of 500 respondents were taken from Sagar district of Madhya Pradesh as a sample of the study. The sample includes academicians, professionals, higher education students (male and female), house wives, working women, and farmers. Care has been taken to include the rural and urban audience, which can represent the entire state. The sample was drawn through purposive sampling technique. Purposive sampling can be very useful for situations where you need to reach a targeted sample quickly. The schematic representation is given in the following Figures:

Data collection

The scale constructed for the purpose was distributed to the samples individually by the researcher himself. The other version of the same scale in Hindi was used for non English speaking backgrounds and rural samples. Though the instruction for filling up the scale was printed on the front page, once again the purpose of

administering the scale was fully explained to the samples.

Figure 1: Area wise distribution of sample (N=500)




Figure 2: Gender wise distribution of sample (N=500)





Figure 3: Job wise distribution of sample (N=500)



It was made clear to them that this was purely a research work. They were assured that answers and information given by them through these scales would be kept confidential. It was also told to them that they should answer freely, honestly and correctly without any hesitation or fear. After half an hour the filled scale was collected.

Statistical technique

The data obtained related to objective were analyzed by mean, median, standard deviation and p-value. 't' test were applied to see whether significant differences existed between the means. The frequency of responses against agreement and disagreement of the respondent was also found out and converted into percentage. The calculation was done with the help of computer, using software, SPSS. The analysis led to the following findings:

Analysis and interpretation

The results obtained and their interpretations for objective 2, 3 and 4 are given below:

Table 1: Opinion of target audience towards approaches of television programmes on domestic violence

N	Mean	Median	SD
500	82.41	83	7.61

Table.1 shows the mean, median and SD of audience towards approaches of television programmes on domestic violence. The mean scores of students are 82.41, median 83 and SD 7.61. The mean score shows that the audience have favourable opinion towards approaches of television programmes on domestic violence. In the light of this, the first hypothesis, namely 'The opinion of target audience is favourable towards approaches of television programmes on domestic violence' is not rejected.

Table 2: Difference between the opinion of rural and urban audience towards approaches of television programmes on domestic violence

Variables	N	Mean	Median	SD	't' value
Urban	270	84.5	85.0	7.57	6.77
Rural	230	79.9	80.0	7.47	

df =498, P< 0.0001

Table 2 represents the difference between the opinion of urban and rural audience towards approaches of television programmes on domestic violence. The mean scores of urban and rural audience are 84.5 and 79.9, median 85.00 and 80.00 and SD 7.57 and 7.47 respectively. The 't' value of the two groups is 6.77 (df=498 and p<0.0001), which is significant. It indicates that the difference between the opinion of rural and urban audience towards approaches of television programmes on domestic violence is significant. Urban audience are more favourable opinion towards approaches of television programmes on domestic violence. Thus the second hypothesis namely 'There is no significant difference of opinion of rural and urban audience towards approaches of television programmes on domestic violence.' is rejected.

Table 3: Difference between the opinion of male and female audience towards approaches of television programmes on domestic violence

Variables	N	Mean	Median	SD	't' value
Male	270	83.5	84.0	8.19	3.41
Female	230	81.1	81.0	7.24	

df =498, p=0.0007

It is observed from table 3, that the opinion of male and female audience towards approaches of television programmes on domestic violence have mean 83.5 and 81.1, median 84.0 and 81.0, standard deviation 8.19 and 7.24 respectively. The 't' value of the two groups is 3.41 (df =498 and p=0.0007) which is significant. It indicates that the difference between the opinion of male and female audience towards the approaches of television programmes on domestic violence is significant. Male audiences have more favorable opinion towards approaches of television programmes on domestic violence. Thus, the third hypothesis namely 'there is no significant difference of opinion of male and female audience towards approaches of

television programmes on domestic violence' is rejected.

Findings of the Study

1. Television programmes should be capable in creating awareness about domestic violence. Most of the respondents (70%) are agree with this statement.
2. Television programmes should condemn strongly the act of domestic violence is the view of most of the respondent (74%).
3. A large number of respondent (59%) are of the view that television programmes should create hype about domestic violence.
4. Most of the respondents (61%) are agreeing with the statement that every programme must increase the understanding of the subject- domestic violence.
5. Major number of respondents (61%) responded that television programmes should take mentoring initiatives on domestic violence issues.
6. Television programmes should also explore the consequence of domestic violence in a healthy family system according to the opinion of 57% of the respondent.
7. Television programmes should influence the critical thinking of target audience according to the view of 53% of the respondent.
8. Sixty one percent of the sample responded in agreement that television programmes/coverage should be well researched in terms of content.
9. Television programmes should also include the real stories of victims to create more impact on audience as per 51% of the respondents.
10. Emotional involvement of the target audience could also be promoted through such television programmes is the view of 58% of the respondents.
11. Fifty eight percent of the respondent agree with the statement 'Television programmes should show the actual facts and figures instead of propaganda on the subject.'
12. Misleading statistics will mislead to the solutions of the problem related to domestic violence according to most of the respondents (51%).
13. Giving the actual rate of domestic violence television programme can develop concerns of the audience according to the response of 55% of the respondent.
14. Most of the respondents (52%) are of the view that the television programmes related to domestic violence and other serials, drama, films etc. should not portray the act in fashionable manner.
15. Fifty three percent of the respondent agrees that television should broadcast short messages related to domestic violence frequently.
16. Television programmes (News) should also cover domestic violence 'crimes' according to 53% of the respondent.
17. Television programmes should speak about the role of communities in preventing domestic violence according to 57% of the respondent.
18. Television programmes should tell about the laws and acts of domestic violence. 54% of the sample responded positively about this statement.
19. Fifty six percent of respondents are of the view that the television programmes should also bring up the role of well wishers of family in domestic violence.
20. Television programmes should be able to create anti domestic violence consensus in the society. Most of the respondents (59%) are agree with the statement.
21. Television programmes should see domestic violence as a social issue and not as an individual case or event according to 52% of respondent.

22. A variety of formats (documentaries, fiction, news events, interview, expert panel discussion, talk shows etc.) should be utilized for different nature subjects of domestic violence according to 52% of respondent.
23. Musical features is also very effective for such type of programmes; hence this format may also be used according to 61% of the respondent.
24. There may be a different approach of programmes for both literate and illiterate viewers. 47% of the respondents agree with this statement.
25. Most of the respondents (61%) are of the view that the role models of the society may be used to deliver the anti domestic violence messages.

Discussion

Practices to be Avoided: Media have been spreading a greater than ever number of public awareness messages and programmes over the past several years. Constant vigil and feedback for evaluating the programmes is very important. By this we not only can improve the quality of the programmes, but also see how these programmes are being interpreted by our target audience. The media of mass communications and the broadcast media in particular, should produce programmes in such a way that these can influence the understanding of audience related to social problems. Media images should not glorify domestic violence against children and women. Let us see how some programmes related to domestic violence can be misinterpreted because of there presentation design:

1. In a special report, 'Women in Peril: A Look at TV's Disturbing New Storyline Trend' the Parents Television Council found that storylines depicting violence against females are increasing and being shown more graphically and in ways that have not been seen in the history of television. Findings show 120% increase in depictions of violence

against women on television since 2004. (In the same time period, violence that occurred irrespective of gender increased by only 2%). The report concluded that by depicting violence against women with increasing frequency, or as a trivial, even humorous matter, the networks may be contributing to an atmosphere in which young people view aggression and violence against women as normative, even acceptable (PTC 2009).

What we see and hear in the entertainment media or television influences our beliefs about the world around us. Today's youth are deeply wrapped up in popular culture as it is conveyed through various forms of media. Another example of confusing interpretation of programmes related to domestic violence is:

2. In a report "Domestic violence as fun and games" Stephanie Hendrick tells about a video. It positions domestic violence as a game. The video 'Hit a bitch' is a screen cast of an actual game by a Danish anti-violence NGO who wants to 'stop the cycle of abuse' by having players beat a woman until she is sobbing on the floor. The only 'reinforcement' that the player received that what he or she is doing is wrong comes at the end of the game when the woman is sobbing on the floor. Then the statistics about domestic violence scroll by while the woman continues to sob. But by then, do they not act more like the credits to the end of a movie – which few people actually watch. (Stephanie 2008)

One can understand from above examples that though the motives of the programmes were good, the treatment of such programmes resulted in negative impact. So, one has to take care of all these problems related to production of anti-domestic violence programmes.

Conclusion

Preventing domestic violence is very important to everyone involved in the search for solutions, including policymakers, law enforcement agencies, administrators, researchers and society as a whole. Media has come to play an increasingly important role in public awareness campaigns of social issues due to their wide reach and ability to influence behaviour. The television has undoubtedly evolved and become more active over the years. So it will be quite useful to produce and telecast more programmes and messages in television channels, related to domestic violence issues to awareness on the society.

In a report "Using the media to reduce domestic violence" Robert Walker (2009) has concluded that "Serial dramas are not the only answer to violence against women; battered women need physical and social support networks, and governments need to crack down on domestic violence offenders. But in places where social norms perpetuate domestic violence by making it an acceptable part of life, serial dramas offer great potential by showing people that it is never right. More support and follow up research is needed." The anti-domestic violence campaign will be truly successful only if media efforts are coordinated with initiatives that strengthen one another in homes, and communities.

To create publicity awareness on this issue, the campaign should comprise all types of communication media from traditional media (the use of traditional media is still prevalent in Indian society) to new media (Internet, websites, computer-multimedia, computer games,) to deliver anti-domestic violence messages. Its objectives should be "universal," aiming at all the members of society. One has to keep in mind that domestic violence is a very critical process and there should be a carefully planned consistent strengthened prevention programme by the media and well wishers including parents, teachers, friends, relatives, and mentors. To eliminate domestic violence completely the

government and domestic violence prevention campaigner have to work hard. Messages and channels through which they are being delivered are adapted for specific regions, cultures, and age differences among members of the target audiences. Most importantly good quality (content, aesthetic and technical aspect) programmes should be made. Quality has become the keyword in the present world due to globalization; there is no existence without quality. In general, quality in these types of educational programmes will facilitate higher viewer ship.

Limitations

The instrument specially developed for the study was merely based on certain rational, and are not standardized ones. This study is limited to a sample of 500 audience of Sagar district of Madhya Pradesh; hence the result obtained might not be the same if the sample had included the rural and urban areas of the whole state of Madhya Pradesh and other states.

Recommendations

1. It is recommended that before the actual domestic violence prevention, television production, formative research of each and every production (barring a few, like news) should take place. It is also recommended that the formative research team should include the researcher, programme producer, the victims, subject experts and most importantly individuals from our target audience.
- 3 A variety of formats (documentaries, fiction, news events, soft stories, interview, expert panel discussion, talk shows, etc.) should be utilized for different nature subjects of domestic violence.
4. The Weightage on different formats should not be randomly determined. It should be based on a need survey of target audience.
5. The time of telecast of domestic violence prevention programmes should also

include the 'prime time' of the television channel, to help reach more audience.

6. Care should be taken to broadcast the complete programme regularly without break if domestic violence film or programme is in a series form.
7. Since these domestic violence prevention programmes are meant for both literate and illiterate viewers, technical words (about the acts and laws) should be accompanied with the regional language synonyms as far as possible.

Education Implications

To obtain the full benefits of media, especially television campaigners, authorities, media planners, producers of domestic violence programmes and owners of television channels should include these approaches in their anti domestic violation television programmes and come forward collectively to fight against this violation of human right.

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India's Prosperity Paradox and the Mass Media Disconnect

Sathya Prakash M R & B K Ravi

Abstract

In the last two decades the performance of the Indian economy has been phenomenal. The Indian economy has been growing at a healthy rate in the recent past. But the benefits of this growth have not percolated to the man in the lowest rung of the society. The urban-rural divide is a stark reality in India. Farmers' suicides, atrocities on dalits, minorities and women, human rights violations, poverty, hunger, unemployment, and displacement, deficiencies in education and health sectors, environmental degradation and other issues are demanding policy makers' attention. Mass media which is expected to act as a catalyst in the process of social development needs to bring these issues to the centre stage. Does the mass media which serves advertisers' interest more than the readers, offer any hope for the people of this country? This article analyses the role of mass media in India's social development.

Introduction

In the last two decades the performance of the Indian economy has been phenomenal. In fact India, along with China, is now considered as one of the fastest growing economies of the world and is also predicted to be one of the key players in the world economy in the coming days. Economic reforms ushered in the early 90s of the last century are now bearing fruits in a big way. Barring agriculture, other sectors of the economy are on the fast lanes of growth. Service or knowledge sector has been the driving force behind India's phenomenal performance in the last two decades. India is also undergoing the process of transformation, with more and more infrastructural projects being implemented on a regular basis across the country. Apart from agriculture and manufacturing sectors, information intensive sectors like telecommunication, information and communication technologies (ICT), entertainment and media industry have also

been making significant contributions to Indian economy. For pro-reforms economists, the last two decades have been "the best of times."

It is a fact that the Indian economy has been growing at a healthy rate in the recent past. But the benefits of this growth have not been able to percolate to the man in the lowest rung of the society. Disparities in the social development sector are acknowledged by the government itself. On the one hand reforms have been able to produce highly successful entrepreneurs; on the other hand it is also creating more number of below poverty line (BPL) card holders. The urban-rural divide is a stark reality in India. Extreme social movements like Naxalism, and democratic movements like Narmada Bachao Andolan (NBA) have been reminding us of the misplaced notions of development discourses and practices in India. That is exactly why; these are also "the worst of times."

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Clearly there is a dark side to India's growth story. The "Shining India" is faced with many crises, which are more the result of lacunas in policy matters and flawed handling than anything else. Farmers' suicides, atrocities on dalits, minorities and women, human rights violations, poverty, hunger, unemployment, and displacement, deficiencies in education and health sectors, environmental degradation and other issues are demanding the attention of policy makers. The mainstream media have failed to bring these issues to the centre stage and assert their commitment in identifying, selecting and presenting issues of importance with necessary emphasis on them. Does the mass media which serves advertisers' interest more than the interests of readers and viewers offer any hope for the people of this country?

Instead of covering issues of social importance, the mainstream media have been chronicling India's so called economic success story. The mass media, which is expected to act as a catalyst in the process of development, seems to have forgotten their role and looks contented with their vertical and horizontal growth, thereby ignoring the larger part of the population living in the countryside. The media organisations have been focusing mainly on increasing advertising revenues and showing little concern towards social problems. Circulation and television audience measurement (TAM) figures have been touted by these media organisations to attract advertisers. Profiteering by hook or crook has now become a well accepted model in the media business. Newer players have been entering the media business to grab their chunk from the advertisers. And this is leading to growth in the media industry. In the following paragraphs, figures related to such media growth is presented.

The Media Growth Story

Indian media have been witnessing contrasting developments in recent times. Media audiences are growing in good measure with television and print media scaling new heights with more subscription

and higher circulation and readerships. Cable and satellite television and Indian language newspapers are fuelling growth in the media industry. Higher literacy rate is also creating newer audiences for the ever expanding media.

According to Indian Readership Survey (IRS) 2007, in the last four years, India's population has grown by 92 million i.e. a growth of 12.5%. Out of this, the media audience have increased by 86 million i.e. a growth of 18.4%. High growth in television- cable and satellite subscribers and FM radio listeners is driving the growth in media audience as per the IRS. According to the provisional results of the 2001 census, the literacy rate in the country stood at 64.84 per cent, 75.26% for males and 53.67% for females. And as per the National Readership Survey- 2006, literacy rate in India stood at 71.1% as against 69.9% a year before.

Print Media: According to Pricewaterhousecoopers' (PWC) latest report (Indian Entertainment and Media Outlook, 2009), the Indian print media industry has grown at a healthy rate of 13.3% over the last four years. However, due to global economic slowdown, Indian print media industry recorded a growth of only 7.5% over the previous year (2008).

Newspaper publishing, which constitutes around 87% of the segment, grew at 7% in 2008, whereas the magazine publishing, which contributes remaining 13% of the segment, grew at a higher rate of 10.6%. On an overall basis, the print media industry stood at Rs. 162 billion in 2008, an increase from Rs. 151 billion in 2007. Circulation revenues for newspapers grew by 3.1 % in 2008 over 2007 and stood at an estimated Rs. 58.3 billion in 2008. The magazine publishing industry grew from Rs. 19 billion in 2007 to Rs. 21 billion in 2008, registering a growth of 10.6%. PWC report predicts that the Indian print media industry is expected to grow at a Compound Annual Growth Rate (CAGR) of 5.7% for the period 2009-13 to reach Rs. 213.6 billion from Rs. 161.8 billion in 2008. Newspaper publishing,

which constitutes around 87% of the segment in 2008, is expected to grow to Rs. 184.8 billion in 2013. Magazine publishing is expected to grow to Rs. 28.8 billion in 2013 from Rs. 21.0 billion in 2008 at a CAGR of 6.5%. Print industry circulation CAGR is expected to grow at a minimal rate of 1.1 % to reach Rs. 61.6 billion in 2013 from Rs. 58.3 billion in 2008.

Television: According to PWC's data, the Indian television industry has grown at a rate of 17.4% over the period 2004-08. However, as compared to 2007 when the industry grew at 17.1%, in 2008 the industry has grown at a rate of only 9.3% owing to the economic slowdown. It stands at Rs. 245 billion in 2008.

In 2008, television distribution contributed 61% to the television industry's revenues. The growth in the distribution industry over the period 2004-08 has been contributed by a 12.4% increase in the subscription (pay) TV homes in the last 4 years. Television advertising industry has grown by 15.1 % over the last four years. PWC observes that this high growth rate has been achieved by the television advertising industry primarily on account of growth of the overall advertising industry, which in turn has benefited significantly from the surging growth in the Indian economy. It stands at an estimated Rs. 84 billion in 2008, which is up from Rs. 78 billion in 2007. Television content segment has maintained a steady and healthy growth rate of 16.5% from 2004-08. Its share in the television industry too has not changed materially and stands at 4% in 2008. In 2008, it stands at an estimated Rs. 10.1 billion in 2007, which is up from Rs. 9.4 billion in 2007. Growth achieved by the television content industry is on account of significant increase in the number of television channels in India. The Indian television industry is projected to grow by 11.4% over the period 2009-13 and is projected to reach an estimated Rs. 420 billion in 2013 from the present estimate of Rs. 245 billion in 2008.

Radio: As per IRS 2008/2009 radio listenership has increased dramatically. Total

listening has increased in some cities to as high as 22 hours per week. Average time spent on radio as per the IRS has increased from 70.4 minutes to 81.1 minutes for radio in 2007-08.

As illustrated in previous columns, notwithstanding the global slowdown, both print and electronic media have managed to grow at a healthy rate. Since 2004, the growth in media industry has been phenomenal. In the last five years (2004-2008), the industry recorded a cumulative growth of 16.6% on an overall basis. The industry reached an estimated size of Rs. 563.9 billion in 2008, which was up 10.3% from Rs. 511.3 billion in 2007. By any yardstick, this growth is clearly huge.

Media Responsibility Question

What does this stupendous growth mean to the audience or people of this country at large? Does this growth help in giving more space in newspaper columns and more airtime in television channels for some of the contentious social issues plaguing India? What does it mean to the deprived classes? Has the mass media which are sometimes termed and believed as 'magic multipliers' made any difference to the lives and times of rural and underprivileged classes of India? Is the mass media fulfilling its social obligations or is it just looking the other way? Or is it too much to expect from the media organisations which at present runs more like corporate enterprises than anything else?

Development communication theory and democratic participant theory would imply that the mass media act as a catalyst in the process of development (Watson 2003:103-104). The facilitator role of mass media in the process of development is widely acknowledged across the developing world. In fact the government machinery employs tools of mass media to create awareness about its policies. However the industry which believes in the laissez faire model does not commit itself beyond advertisers' interest. Even if it does, it would not be more than a mere tokenism.

More and more television channels and more newspapers have been launched over the last five years. *Colours* a general entertainment channel from Network 18, *NDTV Imagine* from NDTV, *UTV World Movies* from UTV, *Neo Sports* and *Neo Cricket* from Nimbus are just a few examples. But these new channels and newspapers have hardly made a significant difference to the media diversity in terms of content and presentation. Barring few exceptions, more television channels are producing the same programmes in different garbs. Newspapers are looking similar across the board. Some of the television channels do not even bother to produce original content; ever so happy to re-telecast popular programmes from other channels (a channel from SAHARA bouquet does it). An analysis of program patterns of popular television channels and news content in mainstream print media, (especially English newspapers) would reveal that the news stories are predominantly urban centric, pro-reforms and celebrity obsessed. There is a lack of imagination and commitment in addressing the real issues plaguing the country.

India's Inequality Story

Although India has been able to achieve sustainable economic growth over the last two decades, its performance in social development front is not something to be proud of. While significant strides have been made in some of the social sectors especially with regard to the areas of education, literacy, there is still a long way to go in ensuring the fullest development of human potential. In the following paragraphs India's performance in some of the important aspects of social development is analysed with the backing of necessary statistics.

Social Development: India's performance in the social development sector has been very poor. On the one hand India is producing successful entrepreneurs, while on the other hand creating more and more poor people. Academic and writer Prof. Sunil Khilnani terms this as "paradox of India's new

prosperity." He believes that there is too much of obsession with growth and not enough being done to use it to reduce the yawning urban-rural and rich-poor divide. Khilnani observes that the "GDP figures touted by economists 'disguised' the social tensions bubbling under the surface. Growth must be backed by policies aimed at ensuring that the benefits of the economic boom percolated down" (Khilnani, 2009).

Have a look at the following statistics: India ranks 134th in the Human Development Index (HDI)¹ included in the United Nations Development Program (UNDP)'s Human Development Report released on October 05, 2009. Countries like Jamaica- 100, China- 92, Bahamas- 52, Cuba- 51, Trinidad and Tobago- 64, Coasta Rica- 54, are above India in HDI. It simply means that these countries are better places to live than a country like India, which boasts of annual economic growth in excess of 7%. It also implies that life expectancy, literacy, education and standard of living in India are grossly inadequate. In the following paragraphs specific areas of concern pertaining to social development are analysed.

Health: India's record in healthcare sector is also very poor. The Union Ministry of Health and Family Welfare acknowledges the fact that "India's performance on social development front was not commensurate with its economic growth story." The Ministry has officially accorded top most priority to inclusive social development which includes the war on under nutrition, ill-health and ignorance. To pursue its policy of inclusive healthcare, the Government of India launched National Rural Health Mission (NRHM) in April 2005 with a clear objective of providing quality health care in the remotest rural areas by making it accessible, affordable and accountable. But the data released by the same ministry in May, 2009 speaks of large deficiencies in healthcare sector. The following table clearly brings out these deficiencies.

Table1: The State of Public Health in India

Indicator	Source and Year	The National Picture
1. Infant Mortality Rate (IMR)	Sample Registration System RGI's Office 2005	58 for the country with a low of 14 for Kerala and a high of 76 for Madhya Pradesh
2. Maternal Mortality Ratio (MMR)	Sample Registration System 2001-03	301 for the country with a low of 110 for Kerala and a high of 517 for UP & Uttarakhand in the 2001-03 period.
5. Average medical expenditure per Hospitalization	National Sample Survey 60th Round 2004	Rs. 3238 in Government Hospitals compared to Rs. 7408 in private Hospitals in rural areas.
6. State of Health Facilities	DLHS and Facility Survey coordinated by IIPS 2003	<p>If adequacy is defined as having at least 60% of the required inputs, only 76% of First Referral Centres (FRUs), and 63% of Community Health Centres (CHCs) have adequate infrastructure, 61% of the FRUs and 46% of CHCs have adequate equipments, 32% of FRUs and 24% CHCs have adequate supply and 37% of FRUs and 14 % of CHCs have adequate staff.</p> <p>During the three months preceding the survey only 58% of the Primary Healthcare Centres (PHCs) conducted deliveries, 6% conducted MTP, 22% provided Neo natal care, and 65% did IUD insertion and 41% conducted sterilizations.</p> <p>If the percentage of PHCs having adequate staff is more than 90% in Tamil Nadu, Maharashtra and Kerala, it is less than 20% in Orissa, West Bengal and Bihar.</p>
7. Anaemia among children and women	National Family Health Survey 2005-06	79.1% 6-35 month children are anaemic. 56.1% Ever married women aged 15-49 are anaemic.
8. Immunization	UNICEF's Coverage Evaluation Survey 2005	Only 54.5 % children are fully immunized.
Compiled from NRHM Report, 2009, Ministry of Health and Family Welfare, GOI		

According to United Nations World Population Prospects report, during the period 2005-2010, India stands at 143rd position in the world with an infant mortality rate of 55 and Below 5 year mortality rate of 78.6, which is far below than countries like Tunisia (95th rank) which has an Infant Mortality Ratio (IMR)² of 19.8 and Below 5 year IMR of 22.2, neighbouring Sri Lanka (59th rank) which has an IMR of 11 and below 5 year IMR of 12.9, and Cuba (28th rank) which has an IMR of 5.1 and below 5 year IMR of 6.5. According to 2008 report of the UNICEF, maternal mortality ratio (MMR)³ in India from 2000-2005 stood at 300, which is above other South Asian

countries like Srilanka which has MMR of 43 and Maldives which has MMR of 140. This shows that the maternal care facilities available in the country are not on par with these small neighbouring countries.

Farmers' suicides: P Sainath (2007) observes that "on an average, one Indian farmer committed suicide every 32 minutes between 1997 and 2005. Since 2002, that has become one suicide every 30 minutes." Citing the study of K Nagaraj of Madras Institute of Development Studies (MIDS) based on the National Crime Records Bureau (NCRB) P Sainath presents depressing data with regard to farmers' suicides in India.

Table 2. Farmers' suicides from 1997- 2005

Year	Maharashtra	Andhra Pradesh	Karnataka	Madhya Pradesh	Yearly total of four states
1997	1917	1097	1832	2390	7236
1998	2409	1813	1883	2278	8383
1999	2423	1974	2379	2654	0430
2000	3022	1525	2630	2660	9827
2001	3536	1509	2505	2824	10374
2002	3695	1896	2340	2578	10509
2003	3836	1800	2678	2511	10825
2004	4147	2666	1963	3033	11809
2005	3926	2490	1883	2660	10959
Total 1997-2005	28911	16770	20093	23588	89362
Source: National Crime Records Bureau, Ministry of Home Affairs, Govt. of India					

Although NCRB data confirm an appalling 89362 farm suicides between 1997 and 2005, the figure is probably much higher. "Worse, the farmers' suicide rate (FSR) — number of suicides per 100,000 farmers — is also likely to be much higher than the disturbing 12.9 thrown up in the 2001 Census." "...While the number of farm

suicides kept increasing, the number of farmers have fallen since 2001, with countless thousands abandoning agriculture in distress" (Sainath 2007). This clearly shows that the government's policy and action towards agriculture and farmers are also faulty on many respects. The government has been content with crisis

management rather than addressing the root causes of farmers' suicides. The Union government's special package to Vidharbha, known infamously as a 'suicide zone of the country,' is a case in point to support this argument. The government's package given to Vidharbha has failed to provide relief to the farming community of the region.

Crime against Women and Children:

According to NCRB, a total of 1,85,312 incidents of crime against women were reported in the country during 2007 as compared to 1,64,765 during 2006 recording an increase of 12.5% during 2007. These crimes have continuously increased during 2003-2007 with 1,40,601 cases in 2003, 1,54,333 cases in 2004, 1,55,553 in 2005, 1,64,765 cases in 2006 and 1,85,312 cases in 2007.

NCRB's report also throws light on crime against children. As per its report, a total of 20,410 cases of crimes against Children were reported in the country during 2007 as compared to 18,967 cases during 2006, suggesting an increase of 7.6%. Cases of buying of girls for prostitution increased by 14.3% during the year 2007 (28 to 35 cases). Cases of buying of minor girls were also increased by 9.5% (231 cases in 2006 to 253 cases in 2007).

Crime against SC/STs: With regard to the crime against scheduled castes, NCRB notes that the year 2007 has witnessed an increase of 10.9% in crime against Scheduled Castes as 7,070 cases reported in 2006 have increased to 30,031 cases in 2007. Uttar Pradesh and Rajasthan accounted for 20.5% and 13.9% of the total cases (30,031) reported in the country followed by Madhya Pradesh (13.7%).

A total of 5,532 cases with reference to crime committed against scheduled tribes were reported in the country during 2007 as compared to 5,791 cases in 2006 showing a decline of 4.5% in 2007 over 2006. However an analysis of the number of cases between 2006 and 2007 would reveal that there is not much of a difference.

Human Rights Violations: *India Human Rights Report 2009* published by the Asian

Centre for Human Rights (ACHR) reveals that widespread human rights violations continue to take place across India.

ACHR argues that the Union government must find new answers to the growing security problem arising out of Naxalism. Finding faults with the government's security driven responses, the report says that these responses may even be counter-productive. The report suggests that the root causes of Naxal violence, discrimination, marginalisation and exclusion must be addressed. The report also documents very high levels of societal violence and discrimination faced by religious and ethnic minorities, indigenous and tribal peoples and members of the dalit community. The report reveals the failure of the Central government and state level authorities to address these violations. The abuses include the failure of the state to address economic and social grievances.

Displacement: War, conflicts, human rights abuses and forced relocation have created a high level of internal displacement in India. Political causes, including secessionist movements, identity-based autonomy movements, localized violence, environmental and development induced displacement are the four broad categories of internal displacements in India (Lama 2000: 24- 25). According to the figures provided by the Indian Social Institute, the 21.3 million development induced internal displacements included those displaced by dams (16.4 million), mines (2.55 million), industrial development (1.25 million) and wild life sanctuaries and national parks (0.6 million). Analysing the government's stand on rehabilitation of displaced people, Lama observes, "The government has taken a firm stand that rehabilitation would not be a prime consideration when acquiring land for 'public purpose' (the definition of which has not been made public)." That is why rehabilitation would always imply cash compensation for the displaced persons and not reconstruction of their livelihoods.

Although these disparities are explicit and visible, mass media have chosen

to largely ignore them, by providing only a token service to such causes. Presently, the mass media are more influential in terms of reach and scale, than ever before. So the onus of representing people's causes and acting as a catalyst in the process of social development rests with mass media. But can the mass media take up this challenge? If not, what are the factors that are blocking it in doing so?

Role of Media in Social Development - Select Instances

In the following parts an attempt will be made to track the role played by the media in facilitating development and bringing about constructive change in the society. Present media practices in this regard would also be put under the scanner. However, these are only some of the select instances pertaining to development and social change and the review in no way claims to be exhaustive in nature.

Indian media, especially Indian press and Public Service Broadcasting units like *Doordarshan* and *All India Radio* (AIR) have been making important contributions towards social development. In fact some of the stated objectives of Prasar Bharati are as follows:

- Inform freely, truthfully and objectively the citizens of India on all matters of public interest, national and international.
- Provide adequate coverage to the diverse cultures and languages of the various regions of the country through appropriate programmes in the regional languages/dialects.
- Promote social justice, national consciousness, national integration, communal harmony, and the upliftment of women.
- Pay special attention to the fields of education, and spread of literacy, agriculture, rural development, environment, health and family welfare and science and technology.

Both *Doordarshan* and *AIR* have made significant contributions to the cause of social development. Satellite Instructional Television Experiment (SITE) is one such initiative aimed at social development, which needs a special mention here. But presently Prasar Bharati is troubled with funding and manpower issues. It is not only supposed to compete with the other players in the market, but at the same time expected to act as a bridge between the government and the citizens of the country. It is finding it difficult to remain as a key player in the media market. Nevertheless, both *Doordarshan* and *AIR* continue to work towards the holistic social development of the country, albeit in a limited manner of their own.

Indian Press also has a rich history of contributing to the cause of social development. Right from the inception of journalism in India, over the course of history, many newspapers and journalists have shown great concern towards the upliftment of their fellow human beings who were languishing in distressful conditions. Press as we all know has acted as a platform for organizing and spreading the messages of freedom across the country.

Press during Freedom movement: Apart from acting as a platform to support the cause of freedom movement, newspapers were also used as instruments of social change. Mahatma Gandhi's *Young India* and *Harijan*, Dr. B R Ambedkar's *Mooknayak* and *Bahishkrit Bharat*, Rajaram Mohan Roy's *Sambad Kaumudi* and *Mirat-ul-Akbar*, Tilak's *Kesari* and many other newspapers were in the forefront of bringing about social reformation, with each newspaper contributing to the cause in its own limited ways. Most nationalist leaders were laying stress on journalism and for them journalism was a powerful tool for social change.

Chhatera Experiment: The Chhatera experiment carried out by *Hindustan Times* from 1969 to 1977, is one of the most important projects taken up by an Indian newspaper after independence. "Rural reporting came into its own with a

pioneering fortnightly column 'Our Village, Chhatera,' a hamlet of some 1,500 souls in Haryana 25 miles from Delhi. This opened a window to country life and farming and rural development, with the *Hindustan Times* as its mentor and diarist (Varghese 2009)." With the objective of opening an urban window on rural India, the *Hindustan Times* started a regular fortnightly column depicting life in a typical north Indian village from February 23, 1969 under the stewardship of B G Verghese.

Although the village Chhatera is only 40 km away from Delhi, the village was cut off from civilization for a major part of the year due to the existence of flood water drain. The village, which had a population of 1,500 made up of the land owning communities', the Brahmins and the landless Harijans, or the lowest caste. It was primarily an agricultural village. Yields and incomes were low when the project started as new high-yielding seeds and techniques of cultivation had not reached the village. The lowest castes were not even assured of two square meals a day.

The project began with the objective of purely reporting rural India to highly urbanized readers. It was on February 23, 1969 that "Our Village Chhatera" made its first appearance as the cover story of the *Hindustan Times* Sunday magazine. The plan of action was that a team consisting of two reporters and a photographer would visit the village every alternate Sunday. The stories and pictures would appear the following Sunday. The editor would himself accompany the team during two out of every three visits. The schedule was maintained for nine years. With the change of editor, the Chhatera project was dropped in 1977.

Besides highlighting the problems the stories would also tell as to how the villagers celebrated their festivals, marriages, and there were also stories about the change of seasons, village fashions, old traditional jewellery, the aspirations of the young and how they looked to the future – all human interest stories. As stories about the problems started appearing, the authorities and others

began to take a serious note of it. As a result gradually health centres, schools, post office and other infrastructural facilities came to Chhatera. Although the Chhatera experiment was dropped after a successful run of nine years, it showed the Indian Press as to how it could play the role of catalyst in rural development. In fact the experiment inspired a committed set of journalists and media organizations to emulate the formula devised by B G Verghese and his team. 'The Eighteenth Elephant' experiment carried out by Kannada newspaper *Udayavani*, one of the leading dailies of Karnataka, from 1981 to 1984, is one such example.

The Eighteenth Elephant Experiment: The following is the advertisement published by *Udayavani* on January 02, 1981: "*Udayavani* has taken up a novel scheme to identify a backward village (Kugrama) for studying the impact of numerous Central and State government sponsored schemes since independence. Readers' involvement is of paramount importance. They are encouraged to identify two backward villages, one in their taluka and one in the district. To help you, a proforma listing the ten basic infrastructural facilities has been provided. These have been identified based on Government of India census report." And thus began its experimental project 'The Eighteenth Elephant.' Playing a catalytic role, *Udayavani* brought the experiment to a fruitful end in April 1984. *Udayavani's* catalytic role helped the backward villages in identifying developmental problems and finding solutions to them. The newspaper made a comprehensive assessment of the existing development projects of the time.

This experiment is documented in a volume titled 'The Eighteenth Elephant' by the project coordinator Ishwar Daitota and a media scholar B.P. Sanjay. *Udayavani* had made it clear to the villagers that it would not go beyond reporting of their problems and that only they should take the initiative in solving them.

The authors write that three years is too short a period to gauge the long term implications of how development works can

be initiated, sustained and in some cases abandoned. In the short time span transportation, medical facilities and educational needs were identified as the major problems in all the villages. Mike Ehrhardt whose report is also included in the book 'The Eighteenth Elephant,' opines that "their (*Udayavani*) method for assisting local development efforts never went beyond the newspaper's means or purpose. No elaborate funding drive, no adopt-a-child program, no scathing editorial, just basic news reporting. It was this disposable tabloid that *Udayavani* offered to the villages of Kannada as their eighteenth elephant" (Daitota 1990). But it did have a telling effect on the development front, at least in identifying major problems faced by these backward villages. Bringing such problems to the public sphere and thereby attracting concerned authorities' attention towards it, is one of the most important aspects of development oriented mass media. *Udayavani* did exactly that, albeit for a very short period. And this experiment is also not a bad model for development journalists to emulate.

The Mass Media Disconnect

What do these instances indicate? It only brings home the point that it is possible to use newspapers, and other mass media for bringing in social change and inclusive development. It is possible to use mass media for the betterment of the larger neglected communities of the country. It is possible to support people at large to help them gain the benefits of governmental initiatives meant for their welfare. But then why the mass media is not taking up this responsibility? What are the factors that are holding it back?

Sainath (2007) says, "The fundamental characteristic of our media is the growing disconnect between mass media and mass reality." That is why 70% of India's population don't make news and the media are not bothered about them. The mass media which are funded and controlled by advertisers would only remain loyal to them. As Chomsky and Herman (1994) puts it in their propaganda model, five filters- elite

ownership, elite funding (advertising), elite information sources, elite flak⁴ and elite ideology (corporate ideology or consumerism)- always control mass media. As a result the media effectively serves elite interests in terms of selection and distribution of topics, framing of issues, disparity in emphasizing, and the filtering of information.

That is simply why the media have been reduced to such a trivial level like providing 'coverage packages' to candidates during elections.

"The assembly (Maharashtra assembly election held during October, 2009) saw the culture of 'coverage packages' explode across the state. In many cases, a candidate just had to pay for almost any coverage at all. Issues did not come into it. No money, no news. This effectively shut out smaller parties and independent voices with low assets and resources. It also misled viewers and readers by denying them any mention of the real issues some of these smaller forces raised" (Sainath 2009).

The Press, which is expected to act as the fourth estate of democracy, is destroying the very basis of it by indulging in selling news stories and more so by misleading the readers during the process of electioneering. Most of the newspapers and television channels are obsessed with politics, crime and entertainment based content. Development oriented issues hardly make news. Even the success stories have failed to grab editors' attention. The mass media have constructed their own elite news frames and hardly go beyond them. "The education correspondent, for example, is largely looking at campuses, neglecting primary education. The labour correspondent has made way for the corporate affairs correspondent" (Sainath 2009).

The mass media appears to be more than happy to follow the agenda set by advertisers and political leaders. These are the times wherein a leading English daily of India publish "news you can use." These are

the times wherein newspapers compete with one another to sell even editorial pages. And these are the times wherein all the mainstream English television channels scroll the same "exclusive stories."

What happens to the prospects of a company selling bathing soap, if it disrespects its customers? Will it be able to survive in the market? The answer is no. Similarly in the market place of ideas, if a media organisation doesn't accord due respect to its audience and their sensibilities, there is every possibility of it getting drowned in the market. The laissez faire business model doesn't necessarily guarantee them a safe place in the market. Unfortunately the media has failed to understand this plain truth. If the mass media doesn't understand its social responsibility, it may lose its credibility as the Fourth Estate of democracy. As the mass media and journalists are exposed to pressures of all kinds from all corners, can the people expect any positives from them?

Optimism: It is not that the mass media is filled with people who believe only in profit making. The mainstream Indian media also possess a committed bunch of journalists, working tirelessly for the betterment of the people by covering issues like farmers' suicides, water crisis, famine, displacements etc., Although their number is less, they have been able to bring some of these neglected issues to the forefront. The 2007 Magsaysay award recipient P Sainath from *The Hindu* for instance, has been writing extensively about the problems of rural India. There are other important journalists and writers like Kalpana Sharma, Ammu Joseph, Harsh Mander, Arundhati Roy, Mahasweta Devi, just to name a few, who have been advocating and arguing for inclusive growth. *The Statesman* had instituted awards for excellence in rural reporting in 1979 in order to encourage journalists to cover rural India. Some of the journalists, working in the regional language newspapers have been encouraged by their respective media organisations to indulge seriously in development journalism. In fact Indian

language newspapers have been doing better than mainstream English newspapers in terms of providing space for the development stories in the last two decades. Specialised journals like *Grassroots*, *Yojana*, *Economic and Political Weekly* are also providing substantial space to development issues. Non-governmental organisations (NGOs) like Charkha foundation have been practicing development journalism in order to encourage the active participation of the affected people in their own affairs.

Sainath optimistically says, "We're blessed with good young journalists, and there's also a new phenomenon - of people from non-journalistic backgrounds coming into media and bringing a completely different lens, especially online." (Sainath 2007). Online sites like www.indiatogether.org, www.countercur-rents.org, www.thehoot.org etc., are making a difference by addressing the all important issues of development in recent times. So, one can still expect good things from the media, especially the new media and community media. The void created by mainstream media in development journalism can be filled by community media as well as online interactive media.

Concluding Remarks

There is clearly a yawning gap between urban elites and rural masses in the country. There are issues like lack of healthcare and education facilities, farming crisis, displacement, human rights violations, atrocities against women and children, increasing crimes against SCs and STs, the list is endless. Instead of focusing on these real issues, the mainstream media have gone the easy way of unabashed praising of reforms and shallow growth rates; the economy's high growth rate of 7% to 9% not necessarily reflecting the human development ratio of the country.

For media to play its distinguished role as a watch dog and act as a catalyst in the process of development and social change, it needs to be free of the five elite filters mentioned above. The mass media need to understand its role and

responsibilities in a democratic society and work towards the goal of inclusive growth of the country. To further this cause, a sizeable media space for development issues has to be provided to motivate the active participation of the affected people in their own affairs, without letting others to decide their fates.

Besides acting as a facilitator in the process of development, the mass media can keep a vigilant eye on the affairs of social development as well. As demonstrated by Chhatera experiment and SITE experiment took up by *Hindustan Times* and *Doordarshan* respectively, there is a wide audience for such initiatives also. But, will the mainstream media choose to tread this arduous path of success? Or will it continue to serve the interests of the advertisers? People cannot expect great things from the mainstream media, until it remains satisfied in the shadows of the advertisers and other funding agencies.

End Notes

1. Human Development Index (HDI) is a comparative measure of life expectancy, education and standards of living for countries worldwide. It is a standard means of measuring well-being, especially child welfare. Developed by Pakistani economist Mahbub ul Haq and Indian economist Amartya Sen in 1990, it also measure the impact of economic policies on quality of life.
2. The Infant Mortality Rate (IMR) - Annual number of deaths of infants under one year old per 1,000 live births. This rate is often used as an indicator of the level of health in a country. The current world infant mortality rate is 49.4 according to the United Nations.
3. The Maternal mortality rate (MMR) - Annual number of deaths of women from pregnancy-related causes per 1,00,000 live births (UNICEF).
4. Elite flak- Negative responses to a media report in the form of a letter, phone call, petition, speech, parliamentary action, or withdrawal of advertising.

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External Sector Liberalization and Its Impacts on Current Account Balance of India

N Kubendran

Abstract

External sector reform promotes economic growth by leading to a maximum utilization of its available resources. The consequences of economic liberalization on the balance of trade front are typically ignored because it promotes faster import growth than export growth leading to unsustainable trade deficit of India's Balance of Payments. This paper uses time series secondary data to estimate the effect of external sector reforms on the performances of both merchandise and invisibles in the current account of Balance of Payments of India that have adopted full fledged economic liberalization policies since the 1990s. The major findings of this study are that external sector reforms or trade liberalization has stimulated export growth, but has raised more import growth leading to worsening of the trade account which threatens current account of India's Balance of Payments. Recently, Increase in net invisible surplus could not compensate the high rate of trade deficit which increases current account deficit of the Balance of Payments of India.

Section 1

Introduction

The role of the external sector in the development strategy has undergone a radical change as the Indian economy evolved from inwardness into an emerging growth centre with openness. Liberalized trade and payments is the locomotive of the new growth strategy. Alongside the importance of external transactions in economic activity, there have been fundamental shifts in the policy approach. In this panorama of developments, the unprecedented balance of payments crisis of 1991 marks a watershed in the treatment of the external sector within the macro economic framework at academic and policy levels.

To restore the international confidence and to restructure BOP position, Indian government adopted a macro economic stabilization programme that includes a wide ranging reforms in fiscal policy, foreign investment policy, foreign trade policy, industrial policy, exchange-rate policy, financial sector reforms etc. These elements put together, constitute new economic policy or external sector reforms or economic reforms. Under this new reforms, there is a greater role for private sector because government undertakes outward looking strategy, withdrawal of subsidies, abolition of obstacles in the way of investment by relaxing provisions of MRTP act and also attracting the flow of foreign direct investment in India by removing restrictions imposed by FERA and later

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current account liberalization to encourage invisible flows. Considering this, the study seeks to analyze the impact of external sector liberalization on current account variables of India's balance of payments after the BOP crisis.

Issues Relating To Liberalized Current Account Flows

Two group of Economists [or] analysts viewed liberalization of current account flows in two different manners. One group of analysts hails the success of reforms and seeks full implementation of the remaining issues on the reform agenda. The important supporting contributors in this area are Jagdish Bhagwati [1994], Vijay Joshi and Little [1996], Kirit Parikh [1999], Montek Singh Ahluwalia and Little [1998], T.N. Srinivasan [1998], Rakesh Mohan [1999], among many others. Also some other schools are more critical of the approach to the reforms that include Deepak Nayyar [1996], Jayati Ghosh [1997], Prabhat Patnaik and Chandrasekhar [1995], Nagaraj [1997], and include this some other famous analysts like Ashok Parikh [2004], Amelia Santos-Paulino and A.P.Thirlwall [2004], Egor Kraev [2005], among many other Economists views relating to liberalization [or] liberalized trade is focused on both positive and negative effects. Generally, positivism is not a problem in any economy but it is necessary to take the adverse effect of any policy issue for analysis.

The huge deficit in current account of the Balance of Payments remained a regular phenomenon of the Indian Economy throughout the history till the early 1990's.¹ Trade and greater openness, may confer benefits on countries, but it may also impose costs, particularly in the short-term, if trade liberalization leads to a faster growth of imports than exports leading to unsustainable

Balance of Payments deficits². Trade liberalization leads to a faster growth of imports than exports, this can have serious implications for the Balance of Payments of countries that may constrain growth below the growth of productive potential³. Trade liberalization promotes growth in most cases, the growth itself has a negative impact on Trade balance and this in turn could have negative impacts on growth through deterioration in trade balance and adverse terms of trade. So that trade liberalization could constrain growth through adverse impact on Balance of Payments⁴. Trade liberalization leads to an increase in import demand that exceeds the corresponding increase in export, the results will be either a persistent increase in trade deficit or a permanent reduction in GDP⁵. The good productivity performance in the Asian economies has been associated with outward-oriented, but distinctly not liberal trade regimes⁶.

Against this Background the Present Study Attempts:

- [a] To evaluate the impact of liberalized trade on Trade deficit of India's Balance of Payments since 1991,
- [b] To examine the role of invisibles on current account deficit of India's Balance of Payments,
- [c] To assess whether the liberalization policies have succeeded in improving the current account position and
- [d] To identify the factors affecting current account balance and suggest suitable policies for the improvement of current account position.

The paper is structured as follows: Section1 is Introduction and objectives of the study. Section 2 gives data and methodology of the study. Section 3 provides the

performances of visible Trade account of India's Balance of Payments. Section 4 presents the performance of the Invisible trade account of India's Balance of Payments. Section 5 provides overall performances of current account of India's BOP.

The Conclusion and the main findings of the study are provided in the final section.

Section 2

Data and Methodology

The present study is based on a time series secondary data which has been collected from various published sources of Government of India. The data have been collected from various issues of Economic survey report, Government of India, Ministry of finance, New Delhi and the Handbook of Statistics on the Indian economy, Reserve Bank of India, Mumbai. The data have been collected in rupee term for analysis.

Period of Study

To study the impact of liberalization on current account of India's Balance of Payments, the study broadly covers the period of nineteen years from 1990-91 to 2008-09. The study period has been taken from 1990-91 onwards, because of three important reasons. First, the BOP crisis of 1991, Second, the implementation of full fledged economic reforms and its impacts (1991-2009) and Third, the Reserve Bank of India has revised Bop data in 1990-91. The purpose of choosing the entire period is to examine the impact of external sector liberalization on current account of the Balance of Payments of India.

Techniques of Analysis

The present study takes a simple technique called year-on-year growth rate model to find out the actual variations in its

components and also it takes GNP at factor cost to analyze its contributions to the national output. It is necessary to explain the reason for using GNP at factor cost data. The study is mainly based on the performances of current account balance. In order to find out the actual performances of current account requires GNP at factor cost data ($\text{GNP @ factor cost} = \text{GDP @ market prices} - \text{indirect tax} + \text{subsidies} + \text{net incomes from abroad}$).

Measuring Performances

The export and import of both visible and invisible items show irregular changes during the study period are considered as a form of performances. These changes and its effects due to liberalization are analyzed in terms of year - on - year growth rates and GNP growth rates or GNP performances.

Section 3

Merchandise Trade Account

Exports of goods

Trade liberalization with regard to quantitative restrictions has been unidirectional since 1991, although year-by-year comparison in the licensing regime are somewhat complicated by changes in the system of trade classification undertaken since full fledged economic reforms. Broadly speaking, at the 6 digit level of the harmonized system of trade classification, about 4000 lines were subject to import licensing out of over 5000 lines. Initial phase of economic reforms, some 3000 tariff lines, lowering raw materials, intermediates and capital goods were freed from licensing restrictions. By April 1999, more than 75 per cent and nearly 10,000 tariff lines were freed from licensing restrictions. Another 9 per cent of tariff lines could be readily imported through special import license, which are earned by various categories of exporters

based on export performance. At present, nearly 10 Per cent of tariff lines were remain under licensing restrictions that is only for consumer goods.

Liberalization of the trade since 1990-91 has led to the proportion of trade in GNP has going up steadily from 16.4 percent in 1990-91 to 24.8 percent in 2000-01 and 43.6 percent in 2008-09 [Table 1], in the post reform period as a result of Inwardness to openness.

As a result of this openness, there was considerable buoyancy in exports and the year-on-year growth rate is shown only a positive change during the post reform period. India's total exports have increased during the study period from Rs.33153 Crores in 1990-91 to Rs.798956 Crores in 2008-09. However, this increase has not been uniform and smooth. From 1990-91 to 2008-09, the year-on-year growth rate of exports are more than 10 per cent except three years of 1997-98, 1998-98 and 2001-02 respectively. Within the study period, the annual growth rate of exports averaged at 25.2 per cent and the highest rate of growth rate exports by 60.7 percent has achieved in 2008-09 and the lowest is 2.6 per cent in 2001-02. Continuous growth of exports of agricultural and allied products (Rs.45,500 crores in 2003-04 to Rs.110811 crores in 2007-08): Gems and jewellery (Rs.48,586 crores in 2003-04 to Rs.79,227 crores in 2007-08): Ores and minerals (Rs.10,884 crores in 2003-04 to Rs.36,716.9 crores in 2007-08) and manufactured goods exports (Rs.2,22,828 crores in 2003-04 to Rs.4,14,457 crores in 2007-08) are the reasons for highest growth rate of total exports in 2008-09. India faced low growth rate of exports by 2.6 percent in 2001-02 in the post reform period. The weakening of global demand and the appreciation of Real

Effective Exchange Rate [REER] affected export performance during this year.

Imports of goods

A country on the way to development through planning has to necessarily import capital goods for development purposes. While the exports of a country depend upon the demand for goods in foreign countries, the imports depend upon the nature of planning for development and the government policy for imports. India's imports have increased tremendously during the study period from Rs.50086 crores in 1990-91 to Rs.1341069 crores in 2008-09. In the post reform period, India's imports were positively increasing and the average annual growth rate of imports was at 37.4 per cent. Indian imports recorded the highest growth rate by 155.1 per cent in 2008-09. The steep increase in import of non-oil goods since 2005-06 and increase in the import of gold and silver are the reasons for highest growth rate in 2008-09. The new foreign trade policy of 2004-09 has provided various incentives pertaining to duty free import of gold and jewellery are also the important reason for high import growth in 2008-09.

India faced lowest growth rate of imports by 1.4 per cent in 2001-02. The fall in oil imports from 30 per cent in 2000-01 to 6 per cent in 2001-02 and the weakened global economy activity are the reasons for 1 percent growth rate of imports in 2001-02.

The opening of the Indian economy in early 1990s has successfully raised the share of trade in GNP from 16.4 per cent to 43.6 per cent in seventeen years [1990-91 to 2008-09]. Exports and imports have increased from 6.5 per cent and 9.9 per cent of GNP in 1990-91 to 16.3 per cent and 27.3 percent in 2008-09 [Table 1]. During this period, the import share has been higher than

that of export share. As a result of this, Trade balance as percent of GNP has gone up steadily from -3.3 per cent in 1990-91 to -11 per cent in 2006-07. From 1990-91 to 2006-07, India's Trade gap [exports – imports] increasing, particularly from 2000 onwards the gap is extending enormously [Graph-1].

For the last one and a half decade, the oil import bill of India was increasing in a slow pace and non-oil import have also been increasing abnormally, particularly since 2000. These posed a strain on India's merchandise trade account after the structural reforms.

Section 4

Invisible Trade Account

After the implementation of economic reforms, Invisible Trade GNP ratio rose steadily from 5.4 percent in 1990-91 to 22.1 per cent in 2008-09 (Table 2). After the BOP crisis of 1990-91, there was a tremendous improvement in invisible receipts and there was only a positive growth rate since 1990-91 [Graph-2].

During the study period, the average annual growth rate of **invisible receipts** is 24.7 per cent. Within the study period, the highest growth rate is 75 per cent in 1991-92 and the lowest is 7.3 percent in 1990-91. Drastic changes in receipts of Travel, Transportation, Insurance, Government not included elsewhere (maintenance of foreign embassies and international institutions in India), miscellaneous, official as well as private transfers produce better performance or high growth rate of (75 per cent) invisible receipts in 1991-92 because all the above items show more than 30 percent of growth rate during this period. In 1990-91, India faced a very low growth rate of invisible receipts by 7.3 percent. During this year, almost all the variables in invisible account had shown a very bad performance.

Particularly, Investment Income, transfer receipts and Government not included elsewhere (G.n.i.e) because these items are provides negative growth rate in 1990-91.

The annual growth rate of **invisible payments** averaged at 21.3 per cent during the post reform years. In the study period, the highest growth rate stood at 45.7 percent in 2004-05 and the lowest was 1.1 percent in 2001-02 and also there is a negative growth rate of 3 per cent and 2 per cent in 1996-97 and 2003-04 respectively. Fall in Travel, G.n.i.e and Miscellaneous payments in 1996-97 and a decline in the payment of Transportation, G.n.i.e, Miscellaneous and Private transfers in 2003-04 are the major reasons for negative growth rate of invisible payments in the post reform period. An account of Travel, Transportation, Insurance, G.n.i.e and miscellaneous shows more than 40 percent of growth rate in 2004-05 are the important reasons for high growth rate of invisible payments in 2004-05 and this posed strain on India's Balance of Payments.

Invisible receipts as percent of GNP have continuously increased from 2.6 percent in 1990-91 to 15.2 per cent in 2008-09, the invisible payments shows an oscillating trend but the rate of increase in invisible receipts is higher than that of increase in invisible payments during the reform period. As a result of this, Net invisibles as percent of GNP have been increasing positively except the crisis year of 1990-91.

It is very important to point out that the average annual growth rate of invisible receipts from 2001-02 to 2003-04 is 18.4 percent and the average growth rate of invisible payments during this period is just 5.1 percent. The sustained rise in India's invisible surplus has significantly minimized the risk to the external payments position. Furthermore, the persistent of current

account surpluses together with significant capital inflows enabled further easing of payments restrictions on current account and capital account transactions both for individuals and corporate. The invisible balance has provided a modicum of stability to the current receipts as the invisible balances as ratio of GNP have witnessed relative stability. So the better performance of invisible receipts from 2001-02 to 2003-04 are the important reasons for current account surplus in India's Balance of Payments during these years.

Section 5

Current Account Performances of India's Balance of Payments: 1990-91 to 2006-07:

The current account is that part of the Balance of Payments which can be related to national income from external transactions. A current account performance of India's Balance of Payments over the last nineteen years shows many interesting results. During 1990-91 [BOP Crisis period], net invisibles became negative to the tune of Rs.433 Crores (-0.1 per cent of GNP) for the last forty years and high trade deficit of Rs.16934 Crores (-3.3 per cent of GNP) [Table 3]. As a result of this, India's current account deficit rose to 3.4 per cent in 1990-91. In order to reduce such current account deficit, Indian government enunciates structural adjustment measures called economic reforms.

From 1991-92 to 2000-01, India's invisibles has increased considerably and Trade Deficit has also increased but in a slow pace (avg of 3.1% of GNP). Continuous rise in invisible balance and constant trade balance brings overall current account deficit from 3.4 per cent in 1990-91 to 0.6 per cent in 2000-01. The years 2001-04 are the golden years in the BOP front of the Indian economy, because of these three years India's trade balance declined to the average

of less than 2.5 per cent of GNP and invisible balance has increased to the average of more than 4 per cent of GNP. As a result of this, current account deficit turned to a surplus of 0.8 per cent of GNP in 2001-02, and 3.7 per cent of GNP in 2002-03 and again it increased to 5.1 per cent of GNP in 2003-04. However, after 2004-05 there was a huge trade deficit of more than 5 per cent of GNP on account of an unprecedented increase in our imports, although our exports also increased in a slow pace. There is no doubt about our invisibles, it showed a massive growth of more than 5 per cent of GNP but the rate of increase in Trade deficit is much more higher than that of the rate of increase in invisibles [Graph-3]. This is an unhealthy development, but since the same reckless policy of import liberalization is being pursued in 2005-06 and after, the situation worsened further and current account deficit increased to the extent of 2.7 per cent of GNP in 2008-09.

Section 6

Conclusions

First objective of the study is to evaluate the impact of liberalized trade on Trade deficit of India's Balance of Payments since 1991. The study finds that trade liberalization did not produce any desired results in India's trade deficit. During the time of Balance of Payments crisis (pre-reforms), India's trade deficit was at 3.3 per cent of GNP, after 1991-92 to 2003-04; nearly thirteen years it has shown an average of 2.8 per cent of GNP. Then after 2004-05 to 2008-09, it has increased to the average of 7.9 per cent of GNP. So Trade liberalization failed to reduce trade deficit in India.

Second objective of the study is to examine the role of invisibles on current account deficit of India's Balance of Payments. The result of the study shows that

the role of invisibles is highly necessary to reduce the current account deficit because, in 1990-91, India's net invisibles became negative and it is also one of the important reasons for Balance of Payments crisis during this period. From 2001-02 to 2003-04, India's current account is in surplus and the net invisibles has increased to the average of more than 4 per cent of GNP, which shows the role of invisibles is highly necessary to curb the effect of trade deficit and current deficit in India's Balance of Payments.

Third objective of the study is to assess whether the liberalization policies have succeeded in improving the current account position of India's Balance of Payments. The study finds that the liberalization policies produces desired result in the net current account balance. During 1990-91, the current account deficit has reached a record level of 3.4 per cent of on GNP. After 1991-92 to 2001-02, India's current account deficit has continuously declined and after 2001-02 to 2003-04, it turns to surplus (avg of 3.2% of GNP). Finally, again it turns to deficit since 2005 onwards.

Fourth objective of the study is to identify the factors affecting the current account balance and suggest suitable policies for the improvement of current account position. The study finds that bulk import of goods is one of the important factors which causes trade deficit since trade liberalization. The study also finds that trade liberalization leads to a faster growth of imports than exports. This can have serious implications for the balance of payments. So, government intervention is needed to curb bulk import of consumer goods and to increase merchandise exports. Government should encourage export oriented units (EOU's) and to attract export oriented multinational corporations (MNC's) by creating strong infrastructural

facilities, subsidies to export oriented units and other export promotive measures.

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Table 1: Merchandise Balance of India

Year	Exports of goods (f.o.b) (Rs.Cr)	Rate of change of Exports #	Imports of goods (c.i.f) (Rs.in Cr)	Rate of change of Imports #	Trade balance (Rs. Cr)	Trade GNP Ratio	Exports as % of GNP@ factor cost #	Imports as % of GNP@ factor cost #	Trade balance as % of GNP@ factor cost #
1990-91	33153	17.4	50086	23.2	-16934	16.4	6.5	9.9	-3.3
1991-92	44923	35.5	51417	2.7	-6494	16.5	7.7	8.8	-1.1
1992-93	54761	21.9	72000	40.0	-17239	18.9	8.2	10.7	-2.6
1993-94	71146	29.9	83869	16.5	-12723	19.9	9.1	10.8	-1.6
1994-95	84329	18.5	112749	34.4	-28420	21.6	9.2	12.4	-3.1
1995-96	108481	28.6	146542	30.0	-38061	23.8	10.1	13.7	-3.6
1996-97	121193	11.7	173754	18.6	-52561	23.6	9.7	13.9	-4.2
1997-98	132703	9.5	190508	9.6	-57805	23.3	9.6	13.7	-4.2
1998-99	144436	8.8	199914	4.9	-55478	21.5	9.0	12.5	-3.5
1999-00	162753	12.7	240112	20.1	-77359	22.7	9.2	13.6	-4.4
2000-01	207852	27.7	264589	10.2	-56737	24.8	10.9	13.9	-3.0
2001-02	213345	2.6	268300	1.4	-54955	23.2	10.3	12.9	-2.6
2002-03	260079	21.9	311776	16.2	-51697	25.4	11.6	13.9	-2.3
2003-04	303915	16.9	367301	17.8	-63386	26.7	12.1	14.6	-2.5
2004-05	381785	25.6	533550	45.3	-151765	32.1	13.4	18.7	-5.3
2005-06	465748	34.4	695412	72.7	-229664	35.7	14.3	21.4	-7.1
2006-07	582871	43.2	862833	100.2	-279962	38.6	15.5	23.0	-7.5
2007-08**	667757	51.9	1036289	127.6	-368532	39.7	15.5	24.1	-8.6
2008-09*	798956	60.7	1341069	155.1	-542113	43.6	16.3	27.3	-11.0

Note: 1. ** indicates partially revised and * indicates provisional

2. # indicates manually computed figures.

3. (c.i.f) means including cost, insurance and freight charges.

4. (f.o.b) means free on board basis. i. e., excluding cost, insurance, freight charges.

Source: Handbook of Statistics on the Indian Economy 2008-09-Reserve Bank of India.

Table 2: Invisible Balance of India

Year	Invisible receipts (Rs. Cr)	Rate of change of invisible receipts #	Invisible payments (Rs. Cr)	Rate of change of invisible payments #	Net invisibles (Rs. Cr)	Gross invisible as % of GNP	Invisible receipts as % of GNP@ factor cost #	Invisible payments as % of GNP@ factor cost #	Net invisible as % of GNP@ factor cost #
1990-91	13396.0	7.3	13829.0	39.7	-433.0	5.4	2.6	2.7	-0.1
1991-92	23449.0	75.0	19190.0	38.8	4259.0	7.3	4.0	3.3	0.7
1992-93	27042.0	15.3	22567.0	17.6	4475.0	7.4	4.0	3.4	0.7
1993-94	35501.0	31.3	26412.0	17.0	9089.0	7.9	4.6	3.4	1.2
1994-95	48838.0	37.6	31003.0	17.4	17835.0	8.8	5.4	3.4	2.0
1995-96	59443.0	21.7	41028.0	32.3	18415.0	9.4	5.6	3.8	1.7
1996-97	76093.0	28.0	39814.0	-3.0	36279.0	9.3	6.1	3.2	2.9
1997-98	86245.0	13.3	49323.0	23.9	36922.0	9.8	6.2	3.6	2.7
1998-99	108459.0	25.8	69770.0	41.5	38689.0	11.1	6.8	4.4	2.4
1999-00	131449.0	21.2	74421.0	6.7	57028.0	11.6	7.4	4.2	3.2
2000-01	147778.0	12.4	102639.0	37.9	45139.0	13.2	7.8	5.4	2.4
2001-02	175108.0	18.5	103727.0	1.1	71381.0	13.4	8.4	5.0	3.4
2002-03	202757.0	15.8	120400.0	16.1	82357.0	14.4	9.0	5.4	3.7
2003-04	245413.0	21.0	118044.0	-2.0	127369.0	14.4	9.7	4.7	5.1
2004-05	311550.0	26.9	171959.0	45.7	139591.0	16.9	10.9	6.0	4.9
2005-06	397660.0	27.6	211733.0	23.1	185927.0	18.7	12.2	6.5	5.7
2006-07	517146.0	30.0	281567.0	33.0	235579.0	21.3	13.8	7.5	6.3
2007-08**	596954.0	15.4	297336.0	5.6	299618.0	20.8	13.9	6.9	7.0
2008-09*	746036.0	25.0	336194.0	13.1	409842.0	22.1	15.2	6.9	8.4

*Note: 1. ** indicates partially revised and * indicates provisional*

2. # indicates manually computed figures.

Source: Handbook of Statistics on the Indian Economy 2008-09-Reserve Bank of India.



Table 3: Current Account Balance of India


Year	Basic balance (Rs. Cr)	Basic balance as % of GNP@ factor cost #	Invisible balance (Rs. Cr)	Invisible balance as % of GNP@ factor cost #	Current account balance (Rs. Cr)	Current account balance as % of GNP@ factor cost #
1990-91	-16934	-3.3	-433.0	-0.1	-17367	-3.4
1991-92	-6494	-1.1	4259.0	0.7	-2235	-0.4
1992-93	-17239	-2.6	4475.0	0.7	-12764	-1.9
1993-94	-12723	-1.6	9089.0	1.2	-3634	-0.5
1994-95	-28420	-3.1	17835.0	2.0	-10585	-1.2
1995-96	-38061	-3.6	18415.0	1.7	-19646	-1.8
1996-97	-52561	-4.2	36279.0	2.9	-16283	-1.3
1997-98	-57805	-4.2	36922.0	2.7	-20883	-1.5
1998-99	-55478	-3.5	38689.0	2.4	-16789	-1.0
1999-2000	-77359	-4.4	57028.0	3.2	-20331	-1.1
2000-01	-56737	-3.0	45139.0	2.4	-11598	-0.6
2001-02	-54955	-2.6	71381.0	3.4	16426	0.8
2002-03	-51697	-2.3	82357.0	3.7	30660	1.4
2003-04	-63386	-2.5	127369.0	5.1	63983	2.5
2004-05	-151765	-5.3	139591.0	4.9	-12174	-0.4
2005-06	-229664	-7.1	185927.0	5.7	-43737	-1.3
2006-07	-279962	-7.5	235579.0	6.3	-44383	-1.2
2007-08**	-368532	-8.6	299618.0	7.0	-68914	-1.6
2008-09*	-542113	-11.0	409842.0	8.4	-132271	-2.7

*Note: 1. ** indicates partially revised and * indicates provisional*

2. # indicates manually computed figures.

Source: Handbook of Statistics on the Indian Economy 2008-09-Reserve Bank of India.

Graph-1: Trends in India's Merchandise Account**Graph-1 : Trends in India's Invisible Account**

Graph-3 : Trends in India's Current Account since Liberalization

Intellectual Property Right Issues in a Globalised World: A Study with Particular Reference to Traditional Knowledge

A M Ravindran

Abstract

Globalisation is increasingly dependent on economic growth based on intellectual property or original creations of human mind. Different forms of IP rights are expected to promote innovation and investment. Many experts fear that the technological supremacy of developed countries coupled with the present IPR regime may adversely affect developing countries in properly exploiting benefits from various IPR instruments. Awareness about IPRs and safe guards must be imparted to different stakeholders like researchers, scientists, traditional knowledge holders and practitioners through the existing institutions. Devising adequate protection and appropriate models for benefit sharing arrangements among different stake holders continue to be a difficult task in making I P protection more inclusive. Emerging RTAs can also be effectively utilised to protect the specific interest of developing countries by collective effort in IPR negotiations under the WTO frame work. India needs to play a more strategic pro active role with other developing countries in multilateral negotiations to make IPR inclusive and development friendly.

Key Words: Intellectual Property, Traditional Knowledge, Bio-diversity Innovation, Globalisation, Inclusive Development.

Introduction

Multilateral agreement on Trade Related Intellectual Property Rights (TRIPS) have been creating far reaching impact on the utilization of traditional knowledge genetic resources and bio diversity of developing countries including India. This paper attempts to examine major opportunities and threats encountered by developing countries in general and India in particular in maximizing development benefits from the new global IPR regime.

Intellectual property refers to the creations of human mind like paintings, artistic works, books, inventions, designs, trade mark etc. Intellectual Property Rights (IPR) are the legal rights governing the use of such creations IPR can be classified into two categories (A) Rights that cover

industrial property such as patents, industrial designs and trade marks (B) Copy right laws that cover literary, artistic and dramatic works relating to performing artists, the production and rights of broadcasters in their radio and TV programmes.

The new agreement on TRIPS is being administered and monitored by the World Trade Organisation (WTO). TRIPS inherited most (but not all) the provisions of the Paris, Berne and Rome conventions and the Washington treaty. World Intellectual Property Organisation (W I P O) continues to exist as a separate UN agency independent of the WTO. On 1 January 1996, an agreement between WIPO and WTO came into force. It provides for co operation concerning the implementation of TRIPS, particularly in

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relation to intergovernmental organizations operating under the Paris, Berne and Rome conventions and the notification of laws and regulations. The WTO and WIPO also agreed to cooperate in providing Technical assistance to developing countries to facilitate the implementation of TRIPS (WIPO 1997).

WIPO continues to administer the Paris, Berne and Rome conventions and other international IPR agreements. Signatories to WIPO treaties include Russia and China, who were not members in the WTO. There are a number of WIPO treaties that are not covered by TRIPS, such as the Patent Cooperation Treaty, the Madrid agreement on the international registration of trademarks, and the Hague agreement on the international registration of industrial designs. Each of the WIPO agreements is administered by an assembly of member states and a secretariat, representing in effect a separate intergovernmental organization. While TRIPS is based largely on previous WIPO agreements, it also contains some significant additions, such as the universal extension of patent terms to at least 20 years, something that was adopted before only in the European Union (Maskus 1993). TRIPS set minimum standards for IPR protection. Member countries are free to implement stricter standards if they wish to do so. As many developing countries did not join major WIPO conventions and as TRIPS covers all WTO members, TRIPS has greater coverage than the WIPO conventions (Revesz 1999).

The basic characteristics of TRIPS can be summarised as follows:

- National treatment of IPRs of member countries
- Both process and product patents(Art. 27)
- Patents without discrimination as to the place of invention, the field of technology whether the products are imported or locally produced
- Life of patents-20 years

- Burden of proof on the accused
- Patent for living organisms

In the light of multilateral agreement on IPR major legislations, undertaken in India include the following.

- Patent Act 1970 as amended in 1999, 2002 and 2005
- The Trademark Act 1959 as amended in 1979
- The Copyright Act 1957 as amended in 1999
- The Designs Act 2000
- The Geographical Indications of Goods (Registration and Protection) Act 1999
- The Protection of Plant Varieties and Farmers' Rights Act 2001
- The Semi-Conductor Integrated Circuits Layout Act 2000
- The Biological Diversity Act 2002
- The Seeds Bill 2004 (M Mohandass 2007)

It is to be noted that IPR have emerged as a major tool of technological development and investment. The availability of sound legal framework for protecting the IPR related to Patents, trade marks, industrial designs and copy rights was a special feature of our country. At the global level India is recognised both as an International Searching Authority (ISA) and International Preliminary Examination Authority (IPEA) like the other 6 world centers namely Australia, Austria, USA, European Union, China and Sweden. (The Hindu 21-2-09).

This paper based on secondary data collected from various sources is divided into 4 sections focusing on (I) Richness of developing countries in terms of traditional knowledge and bio-diversity (ii) Opportunities for utilisation of IPR instruments (iii) Issues involved in maximizing developmental benefits from IPR (iv) Strategies to be evolved in tackling the issues.

I

Bio-diversity

Bio-diversity in the broad sense refers to diversity of life on earth comprising of all life forms and the eco systems in the globe. Apart from providing the basis form, environmental health bio diversity has been the vital source of economic and ecological security both for present and future generations developed and developing countries. In developing countries it provides food, fuel, fodder fiber and materials for shelter manufacturing medicines etc. It has been estimated that rural poor depend upon biological resources for 90 per cent of their needs. On the contrary, developed countries depend on access to diverse biological resources to meet their insatiable demand for diverse industrial products. Biological diversity is made up of all species of plants and animals, their genetic material and the eco system of their part. Genetic diversity refers to the variations of genes genotypes information contained in the genes of individual plants, animals and micro organisms that inhabit the earth. Diversity within a species gives the ability to adapt to change whether in environment, climate and agricultural methods or the presence of new pests and diseases. Eco system consists of interdependent communities of species and their physical environment. The extent of an eco system or habitat can vary from few hectares to thousands of hectares. Eco systems include major natural systems such as grass lands, mangroves, coral reefs wet lands tropical forests and agricultural eco systems. (FAO 1993)

Distribution of Bio-diversity

Genetic species and eco system diversities are unevenly distributed across the globe. Countries lying in the tropical region account for 60 – 70 per cent of the world's bio – diversity. As shown in table 1 except Australia all the Mega diverse nations like Brazil, Colombia, Ecuador, Peru, Mexico, Madagascar, China, India, Indonesia and Malaysia are developing countries. The Amazon forests alone maintain more species

than any other eco system in the planet. Within India, regions rich in bio diversity are Andaman and Nicobar and Lakshadweep islands, Himalayas, Western and Eastern Ghats (FAO 1993).

Traditional Knowledge

Traditional local knowledge very often cannot be defined according to the rules of universal theories because local knowledge sprouts from regional specificities. Inhabitants of each locality achieved knowledge through observation and experiments after seeing, hearing and doing things themselves over a long period of time. For many countries, bio-diversity coupled with traditional knowledge have been providing the main source of livelihood to people. Farmers have selected varieties of crops and livestock breeds to meet environmental conditions and diverse nutritional and social needs. The immense genetic diversity of traditional farming systems is the product of historic and ongoing human innovation and experimentation. For a large number of developing countries self reliance in food production depends on improvements in the biological resources sustained in forest, range lands fields and farms. In many parts of the world, wild species and natural habitats continue to support household food security. For instance while in Nepal 135 tree species are used as fodder, in Ghana three fourths of the population depend on wild life for their annual protein. It has been estimated that at least 100 crores of people still use traditional food plants to satisfy their food needs. Traditional expertise can be effectively exploited to conserve and utilize fish genetic resources not only for domestic consumption but also for exports (FAO 1993).

In the light of the growing importance attached to traditional knowledge (TK) and related concerns about preserving cultural and biological diversity, protection of TK has assumed enormous significance in the recent past. , Being a multidisciplinary and complex area, there is no universally

accepted definition of TK. Even the World Intellectual Property Organisation (WIPO) uses the term TK in two senses. (1) In its narrow sense, TK refers to the content or substance of knowledge that is the result of intellectual activity and insight in a traditional context, and includes the know-how, skills, innovations, practices and learning that form part of TK systems, or is contained in codified knowledge systems passed from one generation to another. It is not limited to any specific technical field, and may include agricultural, environmental, medicinal knowledge, and knowledge associated with genetic resource. (2) Traditional knowledge' refer[s] to tradition-based literary, artistic or scientific works; performances; inventions; scientific discoveries; designs; marks, names and symbols; undisclosed information; and all other tradition-based innovations and creations resulting from intellectual activity in the industrial, scientific, literary or artistic fields. "Tradition based" refers to knowledge systems, creations, innovations and cultural expressions which have generally been transmitted from generation to generation; are generally regarded as pertaining to a particular people or its territory; and, are constantly evolving in response to a changing environment. Categories of traditional knowledge could include: agricultural knowledge; scientific knowledge; technical knowledge; ecological knowledge; medicinal knowledge, including related medicines and remedies; biodiversity-related knowledge; "traditional cultural expressions" ("expressions of folklore") in the form of music, dance, song, handicrafts, designs, stories and artwork; elements of languages, such as names, geographical indications and symbols; and, movable cultural properties. Excluded from this description of traditional knowledge would be items not resulting from intellectual activity in the industrial, scientific, literary or artistic fields, such as human remains, languages in general, and other similar elements of "heritage" in the broad sense I Certain intellectual property (IP)

mechanisms are considered to be more suitable for the protection of TK than others. Geographical Indications (GI) seems to be one of those mechanisms because GI as an instrument of IP protection has peculiar features, which in contrast to other IPRs, are considered to be relatively more amenable to the customary practices of indigenous communities. Knowledge remains in the public domain: No institution (firm or individual) exercises exclusive monopoly control over the knowledge/ information embedded in the protected indication (or the good), which remains in the public domain. Rights are (potentially) held in perpetuity: Generally, a GI is protected as long as the distinctive good-place link is maintained and the indication is not rendered generic. Certain systems of GI protection, however, require registration and its subsequent renewal. The scope of protection is relatively circumscribed: The scope of protection does not include the 'right to assign' an indication – a right that exists for trade marks (Article 20) and patents (Article 28.2) within the TRIPS Agreement. All enterprises fulfilling the conditions specified in a GI have the 'right to use' the indication (WIPO 2002b).

It has been estimated that nearly 75 per cent of prescription drugs derived from plants were discovered because of their prior use in indigenous medicine. Forest dwelling indigenous people employ at least 1300 plant species for medicines and related purposes. In the Amazon region alone over 60 species of plants are used to treat skin infection. In many parts of Africa, berries are traditionally used as soap and shampoo. Research studies revealed that sun dried and crush ended berries are lethal to all major species of snails but do not harm animals or people and further they are completely bio degradable. In African health care and development this was a major break through because Schistosomiasis one of the most serious diseases which was transmitted by fresh water snails could be checked by the low cost biodegradable lumicide (Groombridge 1992).

II

Opportunities for Utilisation of Intellectual Property Rights and Instruments

Developing countries have the potential to become world leaders since the lions' share of the global bio diversity is located in the tropical region which happens to be developing countries. Biological resource and traditional knowledge are economically as vital today as energy and India has the potential to dominate the world economy in the next few decades. With the emergence of new technologies the possibilities for utilization of genetic resources and associated traditional knowledge are increasing in different industrial sectors like botanical medicines, pharmaceuticals, seeds horticulture, cosmetics health care and agriculture. Since we are rich in bio – resources in order to maximize development benefits we have to further strengthen our technological and industrial capability. If we do not capitalize on our technological and industrial strengths to tap our rich bio diversity it will largely flow to developed countries resulting in only marginal benefits to us. The benefit of scientific and technological break through should reach all segments of our society. On the other hand explosive growth of technologies and resultant environmental and associated problems made many thinkers, scientists and technologists to revisit our ancient knowledge base such as tribal societies and other traditional knowledge sources. Accordingly large amounts of data on traditional systems of medicine, the use of herbs have been gathered. Making use of these data for further research and development led to applications of modern scientific and technological methods resulting in value addition and commercial production of traditional knowledge and experience based products. This in turn led to IPR protection claims against spate of inventions around Neem, tamarind, turmeric and basmati rice. Like the Indian traditional knowledge, other developing countries rich and diverse knowledge base were

increasingly exploited and threatened by similar actions by technologically rich advanced countries. In medieval India, the trade in medicinal plants made possible the beginning of a larger enquiry into the possibilities of herbal medicinal market. The arrival of Vasco Da Gama on the Malabar Coast in 1498 accelerated the exchange of biological information and biological material particularly among Asia, Europe and the Caribbean (Grove 1998). Even at that time, the expeditions conducted were mainly considered as a part of plans for later exploitation. In the medical field, there is evidence, which indicates that TIM did influence western medicine before the latter could make any impact on the indigenous system, and it is quite evident during the Portuguese period (Harilal 2008).

Genetic Resources and Value Addition

In India apart from huge number of medicinal plants available across the country we also have many folk medicines and practices. In India, the history of medicinal plants can be traced back to the Vedic period (4500–1500 BC). While the Rig Veda contains only minor references to the medicinal plants, the Atharva Veda contains more detailed information describing about 2000 species and their uses. After the Vedic era, Charaka Samhita and Susnita Samhita dealt with about 700 drugs of daily and specific uses. It has been estimated that out of about 2000 drugs that have been used extensively in India only 200 each are of animal and mineral origin whereas the rest are of plant origin. Since time immemorial, the Himalayan flora has been a major source of medicinal plants. Like wise there is every possibility of rural areas of the country rich in terms of good source of diversified medicinal plants and herbs (Kalam & Rajan 1998).

Both plant and animal genetic resources are available for use by present and future generations. In order to sustain genetic diversity two basic approaches to conservation is practiced (1) in situ method – maintaining plants and animals in their

original habitats in facilities such as gene banks, cell cultures botanical gardens or zoological parks. Different conservation systems can complement each other and ensure against the short comings of any one method. Gene bank provide most important means of storing plant genetic maternal. Ex situ conservation of animal genetic resources include cryogenic preservation techniques – comprising of the collection and freezing in liquid nitrogen of semen or embryos or the preservation of DNA segments in frozen blood or other tissues. It also includes captive breeding of wild or domesticated species in zoos or other locations away from their natural environment.

Utilization of genetic resources is closely concerned with the acquisition analysis and processing of genome information contained in them. It has been undertaken by the disciplines of genomics and bio informatics. Genomics has been defined as “a scientific discipline that encompasses all aspects of genome information acquisition processing storage distribution analysis and interpretations. This activity combines the tools and techniques of mathematics, computer science and biology to produce a variety molecular maps of genomes which includes DNA and protein sequences with the aim of understanding the biological importance of such data. OECD report of the working group on biological informatics or bio informatics has defined it as the inter disciplinary scientific area that brings the advantage of computational science, networking capabilities and information science and technology to bear on biological data and has been characterized as an enabling discipline for all modern biology”. In the field of genomics and bio informatics, the most relevant Intellectual Property Rights are copyrights, sui generis protection of non original data bases, patents, trade secrets and to some extent trade marks. Data processed by genomics and bio informatics generally form inputs to bio technological research and development. Biotechnology refers to any technological application that uses biological systems, living organism or derivatives thereof to

make or modify products or processes for specific uses (WIPO 2002).

Pharmacogenomics provides wealth of information pertaining to defective or missing genes which call for differentiated medicine. India can be positioned as the hub for differentiated medicines due to the affordable development bases for personalized medicines and for, generating new pharmaco genomic data and generating high value medical wisdom (Shaw 2006).

III

IPR Related Issues

The above discussion raises several challenges in managing IPR issues related to the use of traditional knowledge and genetic resources for value addition and product manufacturing. Table 2 shows utilization genetic resources and traditional knowledge in the value chain of value added products and how different types of intellectual property rights are involved in it. In the field of genomics and bio informatics the most relevant intellectual property rights often discussed are copy right, Sui generis protection of known original data bases patents, trade secrets and to some extent trade marks. In the case of bio technology the most relevant ex-situ intellectual property rights are patents, plant breeder's right and trade secret: In practice there are multiple interfaces with trade secrets; patents plant variety protection trade marks, copy rights and related rights.

TRIPS agreement which came into effect on January 1, 1995 intends to promote effective and adequate protection of intellectual property rights by (1) setting minimum Standards of protection (2) Procedures and remedies for enforcement of IPR and (3) Mechanism for settlement of disputes between WTO members in respect of TRIPS obligation. According to Article 7 of the TRIPS agreement the basic objective is the promotion of technological innovation and to transfer and dissemination of technology to the mutual advantage of producers and users of technological knowledge and in a manner conducive to

social and economic welfare and to balance rights and obligations (K.R. Gupta 2000). TRIPS agreement provided 3 dead lines for developing countries like India to comply with the multilateral patent regime. (1) In 1995 to introduce mail box protection and exclusive marketing rights (EMR) (2) In 2000 to comply with TRIPS Provisions on the duration of patent protection. (3) In 2005 to introduce Product patent protections for Pharmaceuticals and agro chemicals. To meet the deadlines the Indian government introduced an ordinance in December, 26, 2004 and carried out a further amendment to the Indian Patent Act 1970 (Gopakumar & Amin 2005). A Patent gives the inventor the right for a specified period of time to prevent others from making, selling, offering for sale or importing of his inventions without his authorization. Invention in all branches of technology whether products or processes shall be patentable if they meet the three tests of being new, involving inventive step and being capable of industrial application. The amendment to the Indian Patent Act was brought against the backdrop of intense debate on the need to establish a balance between the rights of Patent holders and the interest of the public at large, like access to medicines at affordable prices.

It is to be noted here that India has witnessed the development of a strong pharmaceutical industry one which has been able to deliver generic medicines at prices that were lower than those available in most countries. Not only has the Indian pharmaceutical industry provided cheap medicines in India, but it was also able to supply its products to several developed and developing countries. Therefore adequate safeguards are inevitable in the TRIPS consistent Patent law to ensure that (1) the country does not witness the specter of high price medicines caused by “ever greening” of Pharmaceutical Patents by incremental modification of existing drugs. (2) there is a need to establish an effective compulsory licensing system which would allow the generic producers to provide relatively cheap medicines as they have done in the past (Dhar & Rao 2005). The key amendments in

the patent bill 2005 which could have lasting effects on the accessibility to medicine in India and other developing countries which import cheap drugs from India, pertains to scope of patentability, immunity to generic manufacturers, pre-grant opposition, compulsory license provisions and compulsory licenses for exports (Gopakumar & Amin 2005).

In order to optimise benefits from herbal technological development and prevent bio piracy safeguards provided under TRIPS the agreements and measures advocated under convention of Bio-diversity (CBD) should be effectively utilised. Article 27.3 of TRIPS agreement incorporates specific obligation as the issue of patenting life forms to the extent that it obliges members to provide product patents for micro organism and for non biological and micro biological processes. Article 27.3 (b) stipulates that all members shall provide for the protection of plant varieties either by patents or by an effective sui generis system or by a combination of both. CBD categorically reaffirms that nation states have sovereign rights over their own biological resources. It was instrumental to incorporate the principle of ethics and equity in both access to genetic wealth and sharing benefits. The convention mandates countries to respect preserve and maintain knowledge, innovations and practices of indigenous and local communities and encourage the equitable sharing of benefits arising from the utilisation of such knowledge innovations and practices. Tremendous growth of research in bio technology drastically changed the perception of biological resources and has attributed much commercial value and property right to every component of bio diversity

Impact on Traditional Knowledge

“Jeevani” drug was developed by scientists at the Tropical Botanical Research institute (TBGRI) based on tribal medical knowledge of Kani tribe in Kerala. Within the Kani tribe, the customary rights to transfer and practice certain traditional medicinal knowledge are held by ‘Plantis’ or

tribal healers. The knowledge was divulged by three Kani tribal members to 3 Indian scientists who isolated 12 active compounds from “Arogya Pacha” plant developed the drug jeevani and held two patent applications on the drug. The technology was then licensed to Arya Vaidya Pharmacy Ltd. Coimbatore for commercial production. A trust fund was established to share the benefits arising from the commercialization of the TK based drug jeevani (WIPO 2002).

Further the Kerala Forest Dept. and TBGRI jointly prepared patent applications for another three herbal products based on the traditional knowledge of the Kani tribals in the Western Ghats. The drugs included (1). herbal tea which can cure Osteoporosis. (2) a cough syrup with flat with anti oxident properties and (3) a herbal pain balm. These products would be patented as nutraceuticals or food items which also acted as medicines. All the three products had undergone pharmacological studies to establish their therapeutic properties. In fact, patents would help to stake a claim of traditional knowledge of tribals. Under the World Bank aided project, a Bio Diversity register and indigenous knowledge system were established. TBGRI has listed 150 plant species which were used by the community (Nandakumar 2004).

At the national level, initiatives to prevent bio-piracy and protect traditional knowledge and bio-diversity include (1) creation of traditional knowledge digital library. About 36000 medical formulations contained in traditional Ayurvedic manuscript and similar projects for other Indian systems of medicines like Siddha have been recorded in 20 foreign languages using traditional knowledge resource classification (TKRC) recognized through international patent classification (IPC) system and World intellectual property organization (WIPO). TKDL can be used by patent offices of world wide for the pre-grant scrutiny and cancellation of frivolous IPRS (Utkarsh 2002; The Hindu Oct.26, 2003) (2) National Innovation Foundation (NIF) established in 2000 provide a National

Register of innovations and unique traditional knowledge (NRIUTK) digital data base for NIF. NIF apart from taking up value addition and marketing support it fills patent applications also. (3) Community or Peoples Biodiversity Register (C/PBR) is another decentralized initiative pioneered by Indian Institute of Sciences being nurtured by several Non Governmental organizations like MSSRF Gene Campaign, Deccan Development Society Green foundation etc. Infact, such data bases can be used for sharing resultant commercial benefits from IPR equitably with concerned states, village councils and communities or individuals therein based as registration of traditional knowledge practices and its sustainable use and conservation (Utkarsh 2002) .

Trends in the Use of IPR Instruments in India

Analysis of comparative trends in industrial property IPRs (Patents, Trade Marks and Designs) granted in India during the period 1991-92 to 2006-07, showed that-the number of patents granted increased from 1719 in 1991-92 to 7539 in 2006-07 (439 Percent). The share of patents in total IPRs ranged between 2.24 Percent in 2005-06 to 23.51 percent in 1997-98. Trade Mark granted witnessed dramatic increase from 6767 in 1991-92 to 184325 in 2005-06. The share of Trademarks in IPRs granted were maximum in India ranging between 52.53% in 1997-98 to 95.59 percent of total IPRs in 2005-06. The comparative trend in Design granted showed increase from 921 in 1991-92 to 4431 in 2006-07 (481% increase). The percentage share of designs granted to total IPRs ranged between 2.17 percent in 2005-06 to about 24 percent in three years from 1996 – 97 to 1998-99 (Table 3).

The country's technological advancement can also be evaluated in terms of the pattern and distribution of patents under various fields of invention. As per the recent Annual Report (2006-07) of the Controller General of Patents. Designs, Trade Mark, Geographical Indications in India, the total number of applications filed in 2006-07 was 28940 compared to 24505 in

2005-06 representing an increase of 19% in the filing; 7 applications were filed as patent of addition. The number of patent applications originated in India were 5314 contributing approximately 18 % of the total number of applications filed during the year. The share of applications filed state wise showed that Maharashtra had maximum (1607) followed by Delhi (1310), Karnataka (596), Andhra Pradesh (385), Gujarat (337), West Bengal (244), Uttar Pradesh (205), Jharkand (131) and Kerala (128). Majority of the foreign applications were filed through the PCT National phase route. The number of PCT applications filed during 2006-07 was 19768 which is about 28% higher compared to total of 15467 in the previous year. Analysis of patents granted under various fields of invention during the study period 1996-97 to 2006-07 showed that out of total 26964 patents granted in India share of chemicals were maximum of 27.65 percent followed by mechanical (26.98 percent) general (15.19) drugs (13.33) Electrical (10.36) and food (4.07) (see Table4). Classifications of computer electronics and biotechnology were made only from the year 2004-05 onwards. In 2004-05, 71 patents were granted for both Biotechnology and computer electronics; in 2006-07 patents granted to computer/electronics increased to 444 and biotechnology to 89. The total number of Bio technology patents registered was 211 accounting for only 0.78 percent during the study period.

Global Scenario

As per the data shown in WIPO World Patent Report 2008 in 2006, approximately 727,000 patents were granted across the world. Applicants from Japan, the USA, the Republic of Korea and Germany received 73% of total patent grants worldwide. Between 2000 and 2006, the number of patents granted to applicants from China and the Republic of Korea grew by 26.5% and 23.2% a year, respectively (average annual growth rate).

There has been a significant increase in the level of internationalization of patent

activity as reflected by non-resident patent filings and international filings through the PCT System. The non-resident filings share of total patent filings increased from 35.7% in 1995 to 43.6% in 2006.

- Non-resident patent filings mainly originated from United States of America (21.9% of non-resident filings worldwide), Japan (21.7%) and Germany (10.8%). Applicants from emerging economies, including China, file relatively few patent applications outside their home countries.
- Many inventions result in filings in multiple offices. Approximately 24% of all patent families are filed in 2 or more offices. 10% of patent families are filed in 4 or more offices.
- The number of international patent filings filed through the PCT in 2007 is estimated to be 158,400, representing a 5.9% increase from the previous year. Emerging countries such as India, Brazil and Turkey are increasingly using the PCT System to file international applications.

IV

Strategy

The above analysis broadly indicate that since ancient period India has been taking steps to protect its bio-diversity. Apart from worshipping trees and plants, people gave much importance to nature. The explosive growth of technologies had attributed commercial value and property rights to every component of bio-diversity. Threats to patent our biological resources and traditional knowledge by technologically rich developed countries and transnational corporations must be addressed by adopting a multipronged strategy. Communities in bio-rich countries should lead the compilation, operation and control of databases and registries of TK and associated biological/genetic resources. National and local actors should facilitate this, keeping in mind IP considerations as well as other benefits of documentation, such as

conservation of TK and associated biological/genetic resources. Agencies like WTO, WIPO and even emerging RTAs should facilitate capacity building and networking of actors and processes for protection of IP relating to these databases. The custodians of TK and associated biological/genetic resources should retain full control of the use of the documentation data of those resources and knowledge once they are compiled in databases and registries; initiatives like maintenance of Traditional Knowledge Digital Library (TKDL) and Peoples Bio-Diversity register should be effectively used for R & D within the country. Patent culture should be encouraged so as to promote more inventions and innovations among real stake holders within the country. As in the case of the 'Arogyapacha' plant the disclosure of traditional knowledge must be encouraged and effective benefit sharing agreement should be devised. Safe guards like measures to protect biological diversity and protection of geographical indications must be effectively utilized. In fact traditional/or quality products with strong cultural links provide producers of value added products with a strong cultural link to a particular geographical origin, with an opportunity to move away from commodity markets to a more lucrative niche markets through differentiation. Immediate action is required not only in the creation of IPR assets from our traditional knowledge, genetic resources and emerging frontiers of knowledge but also inculcating IP culture and innovative spirit among researchers with adequate funding and healthy regulation and monitoring by competent public authority. Emerging Regional Trade agreements like SAPTA can be made more effective in strengthening our bargaining for protection of bio diversity and traditional knowledge. In short, developing countries, particularly India should be more vigilant to further strengthen their individual and collective efforts while negotiating and reviewing TRIPS agreement for the protection of bio diversity and maximising benefits from their own intellectual capital.

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Table - 1: Mega Diverse Nations of the World

Countries	No. of mammals	No. of birds	No. of Reptiles	No. of Amphibians	No. of angiosperms
Australia	255 (6.23)	-	686 (13.86)	197 (6.02)	23,000 (8.21)
Brazil	428 (10.46)	622 (4.80)	467 (9.41)	516 (15.76)	55,000 (19.64)
China	394 (9.63)	1195(9.23)	270 (5.44)	265 (8.09)	27,000 (9.64)
Columbia	359 (8.77)	1721 (13.29)	383 (7.72)	407 (12.43)	45,000 (16.07)
Ecuador	280 (6.84)	1447 (11.17)	345 (6.95)	358 (10.93)	15,000 (5.36)
India	350 (8.55)	1200 (9.26)	353 (7.12)	197 (6.02)	15,000 (5.36)
Indonesia	515 (12.58)	1519 (11.73)	600 (12.09)	270 (8.25)	20,000 (7.14)
Madagascar	-	250 (1.93)	269 (5.42)	144 (4.40)	10,000 (3.57)
Malaysia	293 (7.16)	1200 (9.26)	294 (5.93)	171 (5.22)	15,000 (5.36)
Mexico	449 (10.97)	1010 (7.78)	717 (14.45)	282 (8.61)	25,000 (8.93)
Peru	361 (8.82)	1703 (13.15)	297 (5.99)	251 (7.67)	20,000 (7.14)
Zaire	409 (9.99)	1086 (8.38)	280 (5.64)	216 (6.60)	10,000 (3.57)
Total	4093 (100)	12953 (100)	4691 (100)	3274 (100)	2,80,000 (100)

Figures in brackets denote percentages

Source: Bio-diversity CPR Environmental Education Center Chennai, p.11

Table 2 : Utilization of Genetic Resources and Traditional Knowledge
Value Chain: value – added downstream

	Genetic Resources and associated traditional knowledge	Genomic and Bioinformatics	Biotechnological Research and Development	Commercial Products & Service
Subject Matter	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> Genetic resources Organisms or parts thereof Any biotic component of ecosystem Traditional Knowledge related to the biological 	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> Genome information Protection data Compilation of biological data 	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> Biotechnological inventions: processes, products, uses New plant Varieties and animal breeds 	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> Biological Products and Services New Plant varieties and animal breeds
Intellectual Property Rights	<p>Traditional Knowledge:</p> <ul style="list-style-type: none"> Trade secrets Trademarks & other distinctive signs Copyright in record TK and database thereof Sui generis system for traditional knowledge Plant variety protection 	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> Sui generis protection of non – original databases, Copyright Patents Trade secrets Trademarks 	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> Patents Trade secrets Plant variety protection 	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> Patents Plant variety protection Trade secrets Trade Marks and other distinctive signs
Other relevant Legal Instruments	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> National and regional access legislation Multilateral systems for facilitated access* Contractual agreements Customary laws 	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> Privacy Human rights Codes of ethics 	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> Biosafety Protocols Codes of Conduct* 	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> Biosafety Protocols Food Security

* Legal instruments under consideration

Source: WIPO Asia – Pacific Seminar on Intellectual Property and Genetic Resources Traditional Knowledge and Folklore, Nov 13, 2002

Table 3: Industrial property IP rights Granted in India

Year	Patents	Trade Mark	Designs	Total
1991-92	1719 (18.27)	6767 (71.94)	921 (9.79)	9407 (100)
1992-93	1676 (21.52)	5364 (68.88)	747 (9.59)	7787 (100)
1993-94	1746 (21.19)	5290 (64.21)	1203 (14.60)	8239 (100)
1994-95	1759 (18.72)	6209 (66.07)	1430 (15.22)	9398 (100)
1995-96	1533 (17.63)	5310 (61.08)	1851 (21.29)	8694 (100)
1996-97	907 (12.33)	4686 (63.69)	1765 (23.99)	7358 (100)
1997-98	1844 (23.51)	4120 (52.53)	1879 (23.96)	7843 (100)
1998-99	1800 (19.32)	5300 (56.87)	2219 (23.81)	9319 (100)
1999-2000	1881 (16.69)	8010 (71.05)	1382 (12.26)	11273 (100)
2000-01	1318 (7.42)	14020 (78.91)	2430 (13.68)	17768 (100)
2001-02	1591 (15.57)	6204 (60.70)	2426 (23.74)	10221 (100)
2002-03	1379 (9.23)	11190 (74.93)	2364 (15.83)	14933 (100)
2003-04	2469 (5.51)	39762 (88.80)	2547 (5.69)	44778 (100)
2004-05	1911 (3.77)	45015 (88.87)	3728 (7.36)	50654 (100)
2005-06	4320 (2.24)	184325 (95.59)	4175 (2.17)	192820 (100)
2006-07	7539 (6.21)	109361 (90.13)	4431 (3.65)	121331 (100)
Total	35392 (6.65)	460933 (86.67)	35498 (6.67)	531823 (100)

Note. Figures within brackets denote percentages.

Source ; Controller General of Patents, Designs, Trademarks,
Annual Reports-Various issues, Mumbai.

Table 4: Classification of Patents Granted Under Various Fields of Invention

Year	Chemical	Drug	Food	Electrical	Mechanical	Computer Electronics	Bio-Tech	General	Total
1996-97	282 (31.09)	71 (7.82)	18 (1.98)	54 (5.95)	142 (15.65)	-	-	340 (37.48)	907 (100)
1997-98	503 (27.27)	291 (15.78)	58 (3.14)	177 (9.59)	381 (20.66)	-	-	434 (32.53)	1844 (100)
1998-99	609 (33.83)	150 (8.33)	35 (1.94)	138 (7.66)	462 (25.66)	-	-	406 (22.55)	1800 (100)
1999-00	516 (27.43)	307 (16.32)	250 (13.29)	147 (7.81)	569 (30.24)	-	-	92 (4.89)	1881 (100)
2000-01	353 (26.78)	276 (20.94)	72 (5.46)	142 (10.77)	254 (19.27)	-	-	221 (16.86)	1318 (100)
2001-02	483 (30.35)	320 (20.11)	36 (2.26)	139 (8.73)	311 (19.54)	-	-	302 (18.98)	1591 (100)
2002-03	399 (28.93)	312 (22.62)	67 (4.85)	118 (8.55)	228 (16.53)	-	-	255 (18.49)	1379 (100)
2003-04	609 (24.66)	419 (16.97)	110 (4.45)	396 (16.03)	539 (21.83)	-	-	401 (16.24)	2474 (100)
2004-05	573 (29.98)	192 (10.04)	67 (3.50)	245 (12.82)	414 (21.66)	71 (3.71)	71 (3.71)	278 (14.54)	1911 (100)
2005-06	1140 (26.38)	457 (10.57)	140 (3.24)	451 (10.43)	1448 (33.51)	136 (3.14)	51 (1.18)	497 (11.50)	4320 (100)
2006-07	1989 (26.38)	798 (10.58)	244 (3.24)	787 (10.44)	2526 (33.51)	237 (3.14)	89 (1.18)	869	7539 (100)
TOTAL	7456 (27.65)	3593 (13.33)	1097 (4.07)	2794 (10.36)	7274 (26.98)	444 (1.65)	211 (0.78)	4095 (15.19)	26964 (100)

Note. Figures within brackets denote percentages.

Source: Annual Report of Office of the Controller General of Patents, Designs, Trade Marks and Register of Geographical Indication Head Office: Mumbai various Issues

Colonizing Greens: Political Economy of Deforestation in Colonial South India 1800-1900

V M Ravi Kumar

Abstract

Environmental history played an important role by documenting the ecological implications of British colonial rule in South Asia. As India and other South Asian countries are moving toward evolving an eco-friendly development paradigm, environmental history needs to play an important role by bringing out more critical accounts of the state of the environment in the past. This article concentrates on two things by way of making historiographical intervention: firstly it proposes that the quantum of deforestation is more intense than the existing scholarship estimates and secondly deforestation and evolution of institutionalized forest management had explicit linkages in colonial South India. Thus, the history of colonial forest policies in South India reminds us of the painful history of forest destruction during the British colonial rule.

Key Words: Environmental History, Colonial Forestry, South India, Deforestation

Introduction

In the discourse on environment, the phenomenon of deforestation is perceived as a potential threat for well-being of the ecosystem which regulates the biotic world. Series of interventionist measures for management of forests in colonial and post-colonial South Asia are justified with the discourse of averting deforestation (Shah 1943, Agwral and Narain 1982 and 1985). As South Asian countries are moving towards more eco-friendly policies, history facilitates this process by reminding us about the painful history of destruction of forests which took place during the British colonial rule. The process of deforestation on a large scale was initiated by the British colonial rule by the way of connecting forest resources to the global capitalist economy. This process had set in motion an

unprecedented depletion of forests in the Indian subcontinent. This paper analyses the process of deforestation in South India. By doing so, it explores the linkages between the exploitation of forests by the colonial state, and evolution of institutionalized governance for management of forests during the period from 1800 to 1900.

With regard to the analysis of deforestation in colonial South India, this article has been broadly organized into three sections. The first section conceptualizes deforestation from a historical perspective and illustrates a brief description of historical debates on deforestation in Indian history. Second section documents the quantum of deforestation in South India. And final section narrates the linkages between deforestation and evolution of forest policy initiatives.

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Deforestation - The Process

Historical documentation of deforestation in South Asia has been initiated by environmental history writings. It is argued that a substantial portion of Indian subcontinent in the early colonial period was occupied by healthy forest cover (Gadgil 1985; Gadgil and Guha 1992). Observations made by some of the colonial bureaucrats in South India attests that there existed a healthy forest cover in the pre-colonial period (Stuart 1882). By the end of the colonial rule, the extent of forest cover in India declined to 22% and according to the latest estimates; forests in India occupy 19% of the total land. Besides this, dense forests in India was estimated to be 36.7 million hectares which constitute only 11.2% of total forest cover (Segi 1994; and Ravindranath *et al* 2000). This extensive damage of forest cover brought about environmental problems such as decrease in volume in river water, siltation of water sources, degradation of top soil, and increase in frequency of flood. Thus, deforestation inflicts dangerous consequences upon both environmental and human costs.

The attitude of perceiving forests as commercial resources is a colonial legacy in India. The process of extensive exploitation of forests was set in motion in the early colonial period and accelerated further with the expansion of the colonial rule. The extensive removal of forests for the requirements of colonial economy¹ unleashed the process of unprecedented deforestation in India.

Historical Debates on Deforestation

Environmental history in South Asia mainly concentrated on documentation of colonial forest policies. Relationship between deforestation and the colonial rule was systematically conceptualized by some studies (Richards and Tucker 1988). It is

argued that deforestation is a worldwide phenomenon in the context of the march of human civilization toward Eurocentric development trajectory (Wooster 1977). It is further argued that the colonial rule in South Asia which safeguarded the capitalist of interests British indiscriminately exploited forests (Tucker 1988).

The impact of British rule on forests of India has been a contested historiographical issue. The green nationalist approach argues that the capitalistic exploitation of nature initiated by the colonial state was mainly responsible for deforestation in India (Gadgil 1989 & 1992; Guha 1995, 1989, & 1992; and Shiva 1988 & 1989). This approach is critiqued by green imperialism approach which argues that the deforestation in India is a product of the resource use systems that prevailed in the pre-colonial period. It is being further argued that colonial forest policies were devised to arrest deforestation to save the fragile ecosystems (Grove 1995 & 1998). The third approach on historical dimension of deforestation is a critical discourse approach² proposed by several studies in different regions of India (Rangarajan 1998; Sivaramakrishnan 1997 & 1999 and Sabarwal 1999). These studies argue that it is the exercise of power to secure resource requirements by the colonial state at one level and elite sections of Indian society who collaborated with the colonial rule at another level was responsible for deforestation. Two issues are not being adequately addressed in the existing studies on colonial forest policies: firstly, quantification of deforestation with certain degree of accuracy and secondly, the linkages between deforestation and evolution of institutionalized attempts for management of forests in India. This paper attempts to focus on these issues.

Beginning of Deforestation

Colonial discourse on forest policy attributes the reason for deforestation to peasants for expansion of agriculture and tribal communities for shifting cultivation on the hills (Balfore 1878, and Davis 1934). Indeed reclamation of forests for expansion of agriculture was a frequent phenomenon in ancient and medieval south Indian Inscriptions (Nandi 2000; Kumari 1994 and Babu 2005). However, there was a qualitative and quantitative break in terms of exploitation of forests that was set in motion after the advent of European trading companies in the Indian subcontinent. It was the entry of European countries which connected the valuable timber such as teak, red sander and sandal wood to the global market. This timber trade enhanced the commercial value and marketability of Indian forests.

Deforestation in East Coast

The entry of European countries for commerce in South India created heavy demand for timber. Thriving timber trade in the early 17th century was carried by the Portuguese, the Dutch, and England with the help of local merchants known as the Chitts (Subrahmanyam 2004). It is difficult to quantify the volume of timber trade in the early colonial India, but we do have some fragmentary evidence which shows the nature of timber trade in the East Coast of South India. The working plans prepared by forest department of the Madras Presidency recorded the nature of timber trade with particular reference to red sanders. It is estimated that in 1681, 300 tones of red wood was exported from the Madras port to European countries. In 1753 two ships sailed for France with the load of 3000 candies of red wood. G.S. Gamble in the Manuel of Indian timber record that between the years

1877-1883, 12,872 tons red sanders was exported to Britain, 1,116 tons to France, and 1,687 tons to the other Indian and Ceylon ports (Krishnaswamy 1937).

Teak wood was recognized as highly durable for shipbuilding. During the middle of 18th century, Coringa, a port town in the Cormandal Coast of Andhra region was popularly known as an emporium of timber trade. It is recorded that 2000-3000 timber logs were always kept for sale. Hamilton, a timber merchant who travelled extensively in the East Coast estimated that the Godavary region was capable of supplying 2000-3000 timber longs for export (Rao 1956: 35). Apart from valuable timber, inferior timber was also exported to European countries. The Manual of Nellore district mentioned that about 79000 logs were exported from the district to the Madras port (Government of Andhra Pradesh 1994). From 1786 onwards systematic exploitation of teak was initiated. Most of the teak was transported to the Bombay market from where it was sent to European countries (Crowell 1937 and Hemingway 1907). But due to problems encountered in transport of timber from this region to Bombay, teak timber trade was shifted to the West Coast (Government of Andhra Pradesh 1961).

Deforestation in the West Coast

Consolidation of political control of the East India Company over Indian territories resulted in integration of forests with the world capitalist economy. It was done in the context of the resource hungry economy of the British driven by industrial revolution. By 1780s most of the timber forests in England were exhausted by an unprecedented expansion of ship building industry. It was this shortage of timber that forced the British to look for an alternative source of durable timber (Ranajan 1996). The West Coast was identified as an ideal place for timber trade. The first organized

attempt in 1796 for exploitation of teak timber in the West Coast was made by a timber syndicate established by Machonochine in Malabar district. He supplied 7000 candies of teak wood annually to the Bombay market. This supply continued for ten years and did not continue further due to losses had incurred in the trade (Mann 2001). Though this timber trade survived for a short time, it inspired the subsequent attempts for exploitation of teak timber (Stibbing 1922 and Buchy 1996).

Most of the teak timber collected from the West Coast was sent to the Bombay market to be used in shipbuilding and to some extent exported to European countries. The collector of Malabar district reported to the Board or Revenue that 33,000 teak logs were exported from Malabar district in 1838. Thus, deforestation process was unleashed by the strategic requirements of the British in which native merchants actively collaborated. The following table shows the quantum of teak timber exploitation.

Table 1: Teak Wood Exports from India in Tons

Year	1840	1841	1842	1843	1844	1845	1846	1847	1848
Quantity	4,952	6,399	11,487	10,528	14,245	13,360	16,798	11,250	18,000

Source: Report of the 21st Proceedings of the British Association for the Advancement of Science, 1951, p.88.

An unprecedented exploitation of teak forests in Malabar Coast led to scarcity of timber required for the Bombay dockyard. In response to this situation, the government of Madras instructed Admiral Malcolm and Captain Harris to prepare a report on the condition of the Malabar teak forests in 1838. Their report mentioned the indiscriminate destruction of most of the accessible forests in the West Coast. They also recommended that the government should appoint an officer in Malabar district to regulate the teak timber trade and illegal teak cuttings (Stibbing 1922: 87). This timber scarcity led to two measures adopted by the Madras Government: firstly, timber conservation measures in the form of teak plantations were initiated and secondly the search for alternative sources of teak timber was pushed further.

Early conservation measures in the Malabar Coast were introduced after the 1840s. These measures were initiated in the form of the teak plantations in some of the districts of the West Coast. Mr. Conolly, the Collector of Malabar, had taken personal

interest in planting teak trees and prohibited the felling of pre-mature teak trees. His interests resulted in the foundation of the Nilambur teak plantations. More than a million teak plants were planted in 1200 acres. (Brown 1929: 59-60 and Innes 1909: 9). At the same time, to meet the timber demands of the Bombay dockyard, the Government of Madras initiated teak exploitation activities in the Annamali forests of Coimbatore district. The timber procured in 1850 was 1394 planks and of 34000 cubic feet, and in 1851, it was 1506, of 25,600 cubic feet (Government of Madras 1857: 12 and Lovirie 1919).

Besides the massive consumption of teak wood by ship building activity in the Bombay dockyard, timber was also consumed by other departments which are part of the colonial state apparatus. The Neilgherry Barracks and the Madras Gum Carriage Manufactory had consumed 17,378 cubic feet of wood from Annamali forests during the period of 1847-1851 (Lovirie 1919). It is estimated that after 1860, the public works department in the Madras

Presidency consumed about 600 tones of wood annually.³ And it was estimated by Dr. Cleghorn in 1852 that the Military department in the Madras Presidency had consumed 98,652 ½ tons of fire-wood annually (Cleghorn 1861: 152). The Military Works Department at Willington consumed 118,750 cubic feet of Mudimali teak wood in 1860. It is estimated that the total quantum of wood consumed by different military factories from 1857-1863 touched 500,000 cubic feet (Hicks 1928: 18).

Having destroyed most of the forest to satisfy a resource hungry economy guided by the Industrial Revolution, Great Britain heavily deepened upon Indian forests. In an estimation made by Reutzschn in 1862 reveals that Britain was that country which had least parentage of forest cover (5%) in Europe (Stuart 1882: 56). Consequently Britain was forced to depend upon wood supplies from colonies. It is estimated that in 1850, Britain had imported ten million cubic feet durable wood from India (Cleghorn 1861: 231).

Apart from this, expansion of coffee plantations in the East and West Coast districts of the Madras Presidency had led to massive clearance of forests which were located in ecologically sensitive areas. The following table shows the nature of expansion of plantation in different districts of the Madras Presidency.

Thus, by the 1880s, a substantial portion of the mountain slopes were either granted by the government or purchased mainly by European planters for cultivation of coffee and tea plantations (Cederlof 2005 and Sarvana 2004). The diversion of forests on mountain slopes for plantation became a threat to the drainage system of rivers. Alxender Gibson, an official of the Bombay Medical Department; who later became the conservator of forests in the Bombay

Presidency commented upon the state of deforestation in South India as follows 'Since the south-India had been to a great extent denude of forest, all the inhabitants asserting that the springs had left the uplands and the climate had become drier, the seasons became more uncertain and lands became less fertile'.⁴

Table 2: Coffee cultivation in different districts by 1877-78

Districts	Total Number of Plantations	Total Area in Acre
Vizagapatam	9	6. ½
Madura	1,691	3,510
Tinnevelly	42	2,616
Coimbatore	18	2,222
Salem	312	10,037
Neilgherry	213	28,559
Malabar	15,495	68,991 ½
Cochin	10	2,323
Travancore	93	36,530
Grand Total	17,883	1,54,795

Source: Board of Revenue Proceedings 13th February, 1879, B. No. 393, p. 892.

Between the years 1800-1860 most of the accessible forests in general and teak forests in particular were removed to meet the wood requirements of various government departments. Thus, the expansion of colonial apparatus had consumed massive quantum of forests thereby resulting in unprecedented deforestation in South India. At the same time, the colonial state initiated half hearted measures for control of deforestation.

After the 1850s, the process of deforestation was further accelerated due to aggressive expansion of cultivation due to promotion of commercial agriculture by the

British.⁵ With regard to the expansion of agriculture and reclamation of land, it is estimated by Dr. Lyons a member of the Select Committee on Forestry that the extent of cultivation in Bombay in 1850 was about 12,000,000 and by 1884 it increased to 22,000,000 acres; he further commented that a similar expansion took place in the Madras Presidency.⁶

Railways and Forests

The deforestation inflicted upon by railways in India has been documented by environmental historians of South Asia (Guha 1990). Some of the provincial level studies are as follows: in Central Provinces (Rangarajan 1996), in South India (Sarvanan 1998) and in Maharashtra (Ambra 2008). They project general trend of deforestation after the introduction of railways. But the quantum of forest exploitation is more intense than they estimated. Expansion of the railway network in various regions of Indian subcontinent after 1854 resulted in two simultaneous processes: firstly conversion of forests as resources used in the construction of railways and secondly institutionalization of forest management for sustained supply of timber.

Introduction of railways, deforestation and institutionalization of forest conservation in the form of establishment of forest departments had explicit linkages in British India. Regarding the impact of railways on forests of India, Colonial Pearson narrated that 'As soon as mutiny was suppressed, the railways were taken in hand and the timber merchants and sleeper contractors raided the forests for timber felling trees wherever they liked. It was only necessary for contractors, whether European or Indian, to obtain *Parwana* orders from authorities to cut timber for him to set work, in that context formation of the

Forest department was happened' (Pearson 1903: 312). The history of forest policy in the Madras Presidency shows the process of deforestation induced by railways at provincial level. After 1860s district collectors regularly reported upon the indiscriminate destruction of trees for construction of railway track in the Madras Presidency.⁷

The magnitude of deforestation induced by railway construction in India can be estimated at three levels i.e., all India level, provincial level and district level. For this the estimates made by Dr. H. Cleghorn, first conservator of forests in Madras Presidency, and E.P. Stebbing, forest historian of British India are used. The magnitude of deforestation expressed by Dr. Cleghorn, in 1859 is as follows: 'There were many causes at work which are gradually thinning the racks of our indigenous forests of the Madras Presidency, the first and by far the most formidable of these being railway requirements. It is scarcely credible that many thousands of large forest trees have been felled in the neighborhood of the various line of railway within the past few years' (Balfore 1878: 9). He estimated that each mile of the railway track constructions requires 1760 sleepers, measuring three cubic feet of wood, which would last effectively for 8 years. In addition to this, the maintenance of railway track as pre his estimation required at least 220 sleepers for each mile or 22,000 sleepers for every hundred miles annually (Cleghorn 1861: 31). Stebbing estimated that the construction of railway tracks requires 20,000 tons of durable wood for every fifty miles (Stabbings 1922: 314). If we apply these estimates with the expanding railway track at an all India level and provincial level we can tentatively quantify the magnitude of deforestation.

It is estimated that in 1854 the total length of railways was 20 miles and by 1900 the total length of railway tract increased to 24860 miles (Guha 1995: 1883). If the estimates of Cleghorn is to be believed, by 1900 railways consumed 4,37,53,600 sleepers. Besides this, the annual maintenance of railway tracks consumed about 52, 80000 sleepers. If the estimates of E.P. Stibbing are to be believed, by 1900 the railways consumed 10000000 sleepers. These estimates suggest that a massive quantum of Indian woods were exploited for the sake of British capital interests. This estimation does not include the clearance of forests for the construction of railway tracks.

Table 3: Railway Track Expansion in Madras Presidency by 1879

Madras Railways	
Route Name	Distance in Miles
South-West line	409
Bangalore railway line	85
Nilgiri Branch	26
North-west railway line	308
Bellary Branch	32
Total running miles	857
South India Railway	644
Total number of miles	1521

Source: Board of Revenue Proceedings, 8th April 1879, No. 919, p.3172.

Deforestation in Madras Presidency

The provincial governments were forced to respond to the demands created by railway companies for sleepers. The process of deforestation in the Madras Presidency shows the nature of exploitation of forests done by the British 'wood hungry' railways.

By 1879 the total length of railway track in the Madras Presidency was 1521

(table 2). If the statistics pertaining to the sleeper's utilization pattern mentioned by Cleghorn, are to be believed, by 1879, railways network consumed 26,00000 sleepers and annual maintenance of the railway track consumed about 330000 sleepers. If the estimates by E.P Stebbing are to be believed that by 1879, the railway companies consumed about 6000000 tons of wood for the railway track construction alone.

Besides the use of timber for construction of railway track, large quantity of inferior wood was consumed as fuel for railway engine. The quantity of wood used in railways given by E.P. Stibbing is as follows:

From inception to 1880s the railways in India have mainly depended upon wood as a main source of fuel (Table 4). At one level railways consumed durable wood for sleepers and at another level inferior wood was used as fuel. It is this pattern of wood consumption that had devastated forest landscape in India after the introduction of railways which was mainly an enterprise of British capitalists for maximization of profits. Railway companies preferred wood to coal. It is because according to Campbell Walker, the deputy conservator of forests that while each tone of wood fuel costs Rs. 5 per ton and the price of coal was Rs. 20 with a co-efficient of 3.25. And an Engineer of the Madras railways estimated that by using wood fuel, railway companies can save Rs. 1,00,000 per annum. This is the reason why railway companies mostly used wood as fuel for profit maximization.

In fact the requirement of the railway was one of the imperatives upon which the colonial policy discourse legitimized the institutionalization of forest conservation in south India. The following table (table-4) shows the source of fuel wood supply from different sources.

Table 4: Fuel Wood Consumption Pattern by the Railway Companies in Madras Presidency in tons

Items	Madras Railways		Great Southern of India Railway		Conjeveram Railways		Total	
	1867	1868	1867	1868	1867	1868	1867	1868
Coke	1,488	1,909	23	32	---	---	1,511	1,941
Coal	5,191	3,584	3,513	2,791	167	43	8,871	6,418
Patent	364	3,259	---	462	---	1	364	3,722
Fuel - wood	49,235	48,068	1,923	5,923	14	367	51,172	54,358

Source: E.P. Stebbing, The Forests of India, Vol. II. p.103.

Table 5: Fuel wood Supply from Different Sources (In tons) by 1880

Dominions	Government	Private	Total
1. Nizam	...	2,500	2,500
2. Bellary	...	1,120	1,120
3. Cuddapah	8860	1,800	10,660
4. North Arcot	2,750	23,410	26,190
5. Mysore	...	850	850
6. Salem	650	10,750	11,400
7. Coimbatore	400	15,250	15,650
Total	12,660	55,760	68,420

Source: D. Brandies, Suggestions Regarding the Forest Administration in Madras Presidency, 1883, Madras, p. 40.

Out of the total supply of fuel wood to railways the government supply constitutes only 22.60. Hence little below 80% of the total supply comes from private supply. There was a systematic attempt made by forest offices to increase the share of government in fuel wood supply. In fact forest department as a professional department of colonial bureaucracy, sought its legitimacy in supply of cheap wood to various government departments. Campbell Walker estimated in 1883 that railway companies may require 90,000 tons annually. Dr. Brandis who was the main architect of the Madras forest act of 1882 proposed that the railways may require 81,000 tons annually. And both argued that the forest

department needs to be strengthened to the supply the wood for railways.⁸ As Dr. Brandis inherited the German tradition of forest management, wherein forests were strictly managed by state control, he advocated government take over of forests, for systematic management for achieving sustainable supply of forest resources (Raja 2008).

The massive requirements of railway companies initiated the process of appropriation of forests at the district level. The quantity of the fire-wood supplied to the railways from the forests in Cuddapa district shows the quantum of deforestation inflicted by railway companies (Table 3).

Table 6: Fuel Wood Supply - Cuddapah District Forests to Railway Companies

Year	Quantity in Tons	Value in Rs
1870-71	7,816	17,509
1871-72	10,214	22,881
1872-73	16,491	36,940
1873-74	17,430	3,943
1874-75	12,838	28,758
1875-76	12,683	28,441
1876-77	16,000	33,330
1877-78	22,000	50,117
1878-79	12,000	27,906
1879-80	5,000	12,000
1880-81	7,000	16,000
1881-82	11,000	26,000

Source: V.S. Krishnaswamy, Working Plan for the Cuddapah South Forest Division, Government Press, Madras, 1937, p.28.

The wood supply to railway companies was mainly provided by private agencies in Cuddapah district. These agencies indiscriminately destroyed forests for quick profits. No mechanism was placed to regulate their fallings. Contractors were given a free hand to exploit forests to meet the demand of railway companies (Satyanarayan 2001). Due to the greed for quick profits timber contractors resorted to destructive methods of exploiting forests. The North Arcot District Collector reported that most of the valuable trees were indiscriminately cut down by the railway fuel contractors and all the forests near the railway lines were destroyed.⁹ While narrating the impact of railways for the destruction of forests in India, Dr. Lyons, a member of the Select Committee on Forestry appointed by the House of Commons narrated that 'When the railways were first

made, there was an immense demand for sleepers and contractors were given a go, without any proper control into the Government forests and cut timber. The contractor went in and cut everything straight down leaving nothing by which the forests could reproduce itself ... they destroyed a great deal more than they wanted as they did in America'.¹⁰

Evolution of forest policies in South India

The history of forest policy in South India is rooted in the imperative of resource requirements of the colonial economy. The linkages between evolution of forest policies and introduction of railways show the way in which forests were connected to the process of capitalistic exploitation. In 1849, the Government of India had entered a memorandum of understanding with some companies in England for construction of railways in India. Soon after this, a survey of land and mapping of resources required for railway was carefully done. In this context, forest conservation as a policy aspect of the state took shape during the time of Governor General Dalhousie. He declared a systematic policy for management of forests in 1855 (Ribbentrop 1986). This was followed by establishments of forest departments in various provinces as follows: Punjab in 1855; North West provinces in 1860; Central Provinces in 1861; Oudh in 1861; Coorg in 1864; Bengal in 1864 and Berar in 1865 (Brandies 1875).

In the Madras Presidency, the forest department was established in 1856 with Dr. H. Clehorn as the conservator of forests. The necessity of systematic forest conservatory measures were felt in the context of timber shortage encountered by railway companies. In 1860, a dispatch was sent by the Secretary of State for India to the Government of India. This dispatch insisted upon the need for

ensuring sustained supply of wood for railways.¹¹ This stimulated the policy measures for management of forests in India.

After 1860, forest conservation establishments were instituted in various districts of the Madras Presidency. In Salem district, a small establishment was created in 1860 to monitor the supply of wood for railways. It was reported in 1860 that the number of sleepers supplied from this district was 2, 45743 (Richards 1918: 248). In the South Arcot district, a forest establishment was established in 1861-62, with the main object of providing continuous supply of fuel wood for the railways. Five blocks in the Gingee hills and the slopes of the Kalarayans were selected and strict regulations were placed on peoples' access to forests (Francis 1906: 147). In Tinnevely district, the forests were brought under the conservancy rules. A small forest establishment was started and kept under the charge of a *Duftdar* and two peons. In 1860, the District Collector, Mr. Puckle advised that the only remedy for the destruction of forests was to place them under the charge of a special administrative establishment.¹²

After 1870, the colonial state took a serious note on the need for conservation of forests as supply of wood for railways became difficult. It is in this context that the officials of the forest department advocated the conservation gospel as a remedy for shortage of wood. R.H. Beddome, the Conservator of Forests commented upon the impact of railways and need for conservation that 'Railroads are utterly altering the features of the country and privileges hitherto in existence must disappear before them. The demand for timber and fuel in all districts transversed by the railways was already so far beyond that what can be looked upon as the permanent supply become an imperative duty on the part of

government to clearly define all rights and introduce strict conservancy for the future prosperity of the country's demand'.¹³ It is in this context that the concept of state centric conservation gained prominence.

In order to ensure continuous supply of wood for the railways, the Madras Government initiated the policy of reservation of forests suitable for timber growth. These are referred to as fuel reserves and declared as government property in which the access to the people was strictly prohibited. The reservation of forests for wood requirements of railways was initiated after 1865. In 1869-70, 41,479 acres or 64.8 square miles were declared as reserved forests and these areas increased by 1877-78 to 127,059 acres or 196 square miles.¹⁴ The forest area brought under reserved forest category steadily increased subsequently.

Foundation of Scientific Forestry

Table 7: Conservation of Natural Forests in 1876

Sl. No	Activity	Amount in RS
1	Protection from fire	1988
2	Fencing and enclosing	8020
3	Improvement and conservation	13546
Total		23554.00

Source: Annual administrative report of forest department 1876.

Application of scientific forestry principles for enhancement of productivity was successfully tested in Germany and France in 18th and 19th centuries. The colonies of the British Empire were expected to undergo a similar process. In South India, application of scientific forestry to enhance the productivity of forests was initiated after 1860 as the railways created a heavy demand

for wood. This was done by adopting certain techniques for forest conservation. After reserving forests as state property, forests were broadly divided into natural and artificial forests. Table 7 shows the money spent on conservation activities in 1876.

Table 8: Conservation of Artificial Forests in 1876

Sl. No	Activity	Amount in RS
1	Formation	14,155
2	Protection form fire	375
3	Improvement and conservation	35863
4.	Fencing and enclosing	993
Total		51386.00

Source: Annual administrative report of forest department 1876.

While the conservation of natural forests took less money for conservation, artificial forests required more money (Table 7 and 8). Besides that, experiments were conducted on yield of timber. In Arcot it is estimated that while the yield of unprotected forests was half tone per acre and protected forests yield is one tone per acre. In South Arcot the yield of artificially protected forests was estimated to be twelve tones per acre.¹⁵ These results stimulated the government policy of reservation of more forest for enhancement of productivity. Table 9 shows expansion of forests brought under the control of forest department in South India.

Brandies deputed to prepare forest act for the Madras Presidency justified the imposition of strict forest conservation to evolve a mechanism for sustainable supply of forest products. In fact the history of the forest policy in the Madras Presidency

represents the broad trends in the policy paradigm in the colonial governance. While the majority officials of the revenue department wanted to leave the supply of wood to railways by private agencies or communities and forest officials opted for strict conservation of forests by the state.

Table 9: Status of Forest Reserves prior to the Passing Madras Forest Act of 1882

Reservation of forests before passing the forests act. Districts (South Circle)	Area under reservation by 31 st March 1883, in Square Miles.
Chinglepat	84
North Arcot	271
South Arcot	399
Salem	44
Trichinopoly	6
Coimbatore } North	25
} South	163
Madura	306
Tinnevelly	315
Malabar	352
South Canara	1
Districts (North circle)	
Godavary	68
Kistna	156
Nellore	218
Cuddapah	301
Bellary	14
Anantapur	51.5
Neilgheries	59
Total	2782

Source: C.D.McLean, Manual of Administration of the Madras Presidency, Vol. II, Reprint edition, Asian Educational Service, New Delhi, 1985, pp. 320-324.

While the discourse of revenue department represents the Lezafer notion of the British bureaucracy, forest conservation represents the German tradition of forest conservation under the supervision of the state. Ultimately German policy paradigm prevailed as the colonial state was convinced of the fact that increase in productivity of forests is possible with the application of scientific forestry. In 1883 the Madras Government promulgated the Madras Forest Act of 1882. And within five years of passing this act, about 20000 square miles of forests in the Madras Presidency were declared as state property and customary access of peasants and tribes was declared illegal.

Conclusion

The history of colonial forest policies during the period 1800-1900 in South India shows the exploitative character of the colonial economy and destruction of the forest eco-system. Forests were treated as resources to be tapped at will without considering their environmentally sensitive role. Indiscriminate deforestation was inflicted by the colonial state in India. At the same time, this destruction in a way led to the evolution of forest conservation measures. But these measures were initiated with a view to enhance the productivity of forests for securing sustained supply of forest products. Thus, the colonial notion of conservation is not protection, rather it is a scheme of systematic exploitation of forests at the costs of wildlife, environment and livelihoods of forest dependent communities. The ecological crime in the form of deforestation inflicted by the British remains a stupendous task difficult to be reversed even in post colonial India.

The Author is thankful to Prof. A. Muraly, Department of History University of Hyderabad for his valuable insights.

End Notes

1. Colonial industrialization concept referred to the process of industrialization evolved during the British period. Studies on economic history of India argues that the form of industrialization encouraged by the British aimed at making India a colony for supply of raw material. See, Bipan Chandra, *Essays on Colonialism*, Orient Longman, New Delhi, 1999. This book consists of articles on the nature of transformation brought about the colonial rule in India; Irfan Habib, *Essays in Indian History: Towards a Marxist Prescriptive*, Tulika, New Delhi, 1995.
2. The term critical discourse approach coined by Washbrook (1999:597), to refer to the process of shift in method of writing history within the framework of post structuralism. He proposes that this approach analysis the historical process by using the method of discourse analysis in order to document the operational process of colonial policy systems.
3. Letter from the Deputy Conservator of Forests, Annamallai Range, to Conservator of Forests, 25th jan, 1876, No. 289, in Board of Revenue Proceedings, (BRP) Madras. 21st March, 1876, Board Number (BN) No. 797, Forest Number (FN), 1934, 28.p. 2902. Tamil Nadu State Archives (TNSA)
4. Gibson's ideas on the relation between the forests and climate were mentioned in a correspondence published in *The Indian Forester*, June, 1886, Vol. 6, p. 251.
5. *The Land Revenue Policy of the Indian Government*, Sai Satya Publications, (Reprint Edition) Delhi, Second Edition, 1986, first published in 1902, Government Press, Calcutta, p. 208. This book shows how due to the commercialization of agriculture and improved irrigation facilities massive agrarian expansion had taken place in the Madras Presidency. For instance, in 1851 the area under cultivation was 1,24,00,000 acres, which by 1891 had increased to 2,09,00,000 acres. Dharma Kumar estimated that between the period 1856 and 72, the cultivated land under the ryotwari system had increased 50 % faster than population growth. Dharma Kumar (Ed), *The Cambridge Economic History of India, 1757-2003*, Vol. II, Orient Longman, Expanded Version, New Delhi, 2003, p. 231. These works demonstrate the pressure on land for agriculture expansion in the Madras Presidency.

6. The Report from the Select Committee on Forestry, ordered by the House of Commons, Henery Hansard and Son, London , p.5.
 7. Letter from the Collector of Salem District to the Secretary to the Board of Revenue (hereafter BOR), in BRP, 14th August 1866, No. 5667, pp. 5215-47; Letter from the Collector of Coimbatore District to the Secretary to BOR, in BRP, 15th August 1866, No. 5709, pp. 5245-47; Letter from the Collector of Bellary District to the Secretary to BOR, in BRP, 21st August 1866, No. 5949, pp. 5245-47; Letter from the Collector of Trichinopoly to the Secretary to BOR, in BRP, 20th August 1866, No. 5895, pp. 5369-70. TNSA.
 8. Correspondence by Campbell Walker to the collector of North Arcot District, in BRP, dated. 12th November 1883, No. 3411. TNSA.
 9. Letter from Collector of North Arcot district to the Secretary to BOR in BRP, 13th July 1871, No. 2912. TNSA.
 10. Report from the Select Committee on Forestry, p.5.
 11. Dispatch from the Secretary of State for India, 9th May 1860, No 15, in BRP, 11th March 1861, No. 1491. TNSA.
 12. *Madras District Gazetteers: Tinnevely District*, Part-II, pp. 196-97.
 13. Letter from Conservator of forests to the Secretary to BOR in BRP, 4th June 1870, No. 3805, p. 4566. TNSA
 14. Letter from the Conservator of Forests to the Secretary to BOR, in BRP, 8th April 1879, No. 919, p. 3171. TNSA
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Ethnography of Sericulture: An Anthropological Study from South India

Eswarappa Kasi

Abstract

The practice of sericulture played an important role in the development of villages. Sericulture here I mean 'raising of silk worms' 'Development' can be seen in terms of availability of assets and accessibility of services to all the people in the village. These assets and services can be looked in the form of development in the village. The present paper is an outcome of the study conducted in the Village 'Kotha Indlu', of Kuppam Mandal in Chittoor District of Andhra Pradesh, India. The present paper is part of my M. Phil work which is submitted to the Department of Anthropology, University of Hyderabad in December, 2000. Kotha Indlu village is mixture of all the communities and has 50 households in the village. The paper tries to delineate the practice of sericulture and by this how a village has achieved growth and development. It also tries to explain how all the people of the village turned to sericulture activity. Practice of sericulture involves women's active role significantly and how the women responded to the sericulture activity in the village. To conclude 'Development' of sericulture is explained by using 'holistic approach' in the study village.

Key Words: Ethnography, Sericulture, Social Anthropology, Village and South India

Sericulture as a Development Strategy

The development experience in, Indian in particular and the other South Asian countries in general, reflects the extent to which economic growth per se does not lead to improvement in the socio-economic conditions of the people. Processes which speak of improved utilization of resources and growth patterns which gives a boost to the economy have often led to increased marginalization of people, especially children and women, in the long run. A critical area of concern in this regard should be to draw our attention to the thrust of development policies and agendas, which tries to address the issues and concerns of the marginalized to a large extent. This should largely reflect people's attitudes and responses to both an immediate and long-term macro-economic perspective and the social implication of these policies on their lives. Progress, if viewed from an economic and development pathway appropriate to the

conditions existing in a given socio-cultural milieu, will ensure a balance between economic development and the quality of life of people. The political priorities which maintain the social and economic order and the development agenda have ignored and pushed the poor, and more so their children, to the edge of life.

In this regard, the development of sericulture industry in India is a case in point. Sericulture is said to provide an excellent opportunity for socio-economic progress in the context of a developing country like India, due to various reasons. First and foremost, sericulture is a highly labour-intensive industry. Excluding moriculture (mulberry cultivation) which is a cottage industry, silkworm rearing itself generates 1.5-4.5 person-years of employment per year per hectare of mulberry garden, under rain-fed and irrigated conditions respectively (CSB 1992). Sericulture and related activities operate on a

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relatively low amount of fixed capital making it easily affordable even for economically weaker persons to invest. It was evident in our study that people belonging to lower sections, particularly Scheduled Castes, farmers also involved in the practice of sericulture and improved their standard of living to a maximum extent (Eswarappa 2000 & 2009). At the lower end, a fixed capital of less than Rs. 2000 on equipment can enable even a landless poor family to take up silkworm rearing by leasing in a plot of mulberry garden and using the premises of the dwelling place itself. Similarly, a poor household needs to invest about Rs. 2500 on a charaka to take up silk reeling.

Several development agencies, both public and private, have added to the Government's promotion of sericulture, seeing it as a viable regional development scheme and as one in which the poor can be drawn into the development circle. Sericulture practice at our study area/village is a perfect example to show cases this point (*ibid*).

Sericulture in India

Though India is the second largest silk producer in the World after China, it accounts for just 5% of the global silk market, since the bulk of Indian silk thread and silk cloth are consumed domestically. Germany is the largest consumer of Indian silk. The sericulture industry is land-based as silk worm rearing involves over 700,000 farm families and is concentrated in the three Southern states of Karnataka, Tamilnadu and Andhra Pradesh. (The states of Assam and West Bengal are also involved in the industry to a certain extent).

The present market context for silk in India is one of vigorously growing internal demand for silk fabrics, with growth rates of above 10% per year. It is mostly for traditional (sari type) design and does not impose sophisticated quality requirements upon the industry. This situation is likely to continue, unless Indian sericulture is able to

provide sufficient quantities of raw silk at affordable prices. The present trends represent a limitation to price increases for silk produced in India by import from other silk producing countries like China, Brazil, Korea etc., as well as by substitution with other fibres including by artificial silk. It also appears unlikely that the present demands can be met merely by expanding mulberry area in order to increase cocoon and raw silk production. Future additional output in raw silk will therefore mostly have to come from substantial productivity increases, mainly area and labour productivity.

Concurrently there is a growing demand for silk fabric among the growing Indian middle class and young urban consumers. These modern silk fabrics typically are produced by the expanding power loom weaving industry. The quality requirements imposed by this trend can only be met by bivoltine raw silk, although it is possible to produce high quality multi-bivoltine silk for conventional powerlooms. The bulk of today's world export demand is almost exclusively based on high graded quality bivoltine raw silk. If Indian sericulture is unable to generate a substantial production of bivoltine raw silk, these important market segments will continue to be lost to outside competitors. Hence, three main market segments offer great opportunity to India's silk industry:

- the broadening domestic traditional demand multi bivoltine based,
- the domestic demand for non-traditional silk fabrics, based at least partly on non- graded bivoltine raw silk,
- the vast and expanding international market for raw silk, silk fabrics and ready-mades, based on graded bivoltine silk, an export potential as yet relatively little exploited by India.

In one of the efforts of the Indian Government to promote the sericulture industry, the National Sericulture Project (NSP) was initiated as a national project

operational in 17 States in India. The project funded by the Central and State Governments together with an input of foreign funds, has a credit portion from the World Bank and a grant contribution from Swiss Development Corporation. The project was started in 1989 for a period of six years with the objectives oriented toward increased production, improved productivity, quality and equity. One of the critical elements taken into consideration by the project was the dominant involvement of the Central and State Government organisations in the promotion of sericulture.

Karnataka has been the leading producer of mulberry silk accounting for more than 50 percent of its production in the country. This State is now regarded as the "Silk Bowl of India". There are various studies (Hanumappa 1986 & 1993; Krishna Swamy 1986; Majid 1978; Muneer Pasha 1988; Narsaiah 1992; Narsaiah and Jayaraju 1999; Ramana 1987; Periaswamy 1977; Sandhya Rani 1988; Sinha 1986; Vijayalakshmi 1991; Inbanathan and Vijayalakshmi 1997; Ganga & Chetty 1991; Charsley 1982; CSB 1991; Aziz & Hanumappa 1985; Venkataranga & Siddaramaiah 1989; and Benchamin & Jolly 1987) which highlights the spread and volume of significance of sericulture practice in Karnataka. Andhra Pradesh comes next to Karnataka in producing mulberry raw silk. In Andhra Pradesh, sericulture has proved to be a money-spinner for many middle class families. Except for Hyderabad district (indicated in the Table 1), almost all the districts in the State have taken to sericulture activity. In 1956, mulberry cultivation in the State was only in 1212 hectares and it went up to 90,800 hectares by the end of 1993-94 (Department of Sericulture, Government of Andhra Pradesh, 1993-94).

Once confined to a few pockets in Anantapur and Chittoor districts bordering Karnataka, sericulture has caught up in such a big way that in just 10 years time the State of Andhra Pradesh has come to rank next only to Karnataka, the premier State of silk.

Though, almost all districts in the State have taken up sericulture, the main concentration of mulberry silk production is in the four Rayalaseema districts, namely Anantapur, Chittoor, Cuddapah and Kurnool, of which Anantapur, followed by Chittoor, stand first and second in the entire State in producing mulberry raw silk. We have numerable number of studies (Eswarappa 2000, 2005 & 2009; Reddy 1987; Eswarappa & Siva Prasad 2007; GoAP 1987 & 1985; Majid 1978; Narayana 1979; Sandhya Rani 1992; Santha 1986; and Vijayalakshmi et al 1991) which explained development and growth of sericulture practice in Rayalaseema region of Andhra Pradesh. At present Anantapur and Chittoor show enormous growth rates in sericulture development in Andhra Pradesh. Chittoor has been ambitious of achieving first rank in the production of mulberry raw silk in Andhra Pradesh. If the present tempo of growth were maintained, it would not be a surprise if it achieves its desired aim before long. Given these developments, it is worthwhile to study the changes that have taken place due to sericulture among the farmers, especially among the poor, in Chittoor district.

Sericulture in Chittoor District

In Andhra Pradesh, mulberry cultivation and cocoon production are mainly concentrated in Chittoor district, which account for nearly 23 percent of the area under mulberry cultivation. The mulberry plant, being hardy plant adjusts well to low rainfall and drought conditions and responds well to irrigation. The district appears to be gradually finding mulberry cultivation to be a profitable proposition. Prior to the inception of Drought Prone Area Programme (DPAP) in the district, mulberry cultivation as well as cocoon rearing activities was found to be concentrated in the areas adjoining to Karnataka State. The cocoons used to be sold in Bangalore. However, after the inception of DPAP in this district, mulberry cultivation as well as cocoon rearing slowly turned out to be major activity, especially in Palamaner, Madanapalle, and Thamballapalle and

Kuppam blocks. In course of time it spread to the adjoining localities of these blocks. Now, at present, there are around six to seven blocks where the rearing activity has become prominent. Overall, cropping pattern in the district has been found to be undergoing a change since the last decade. However, earlier not a single crop, except groundnut, was cultivated consistently for a

reasonable period by the farmers of the district. This may be due to the uncertainty involved in the cultivation of such crops. However, what is interesting to find is that silk rearing activity has not only expanded and covered almost two fourths of the district but also it appears to have been stabilising in this region (Eswarappa 2000, 2005, 2009 & 2009d).

Table 1: District wise particulars of sericulture in Andhra Pradesh (1993-94)

Sl. No	District	Area under Mulberry Cultivation	Cocoon production (In Lakh Kgs.)
01	Anantapur	33,190	114.69
02	Chittoor	18,108	80.79
03	Cuddapah	6,983	9.65
04	Kurnool	7,163	10.06
04	Prakasam	2,986	3.54
06	Nellore	1,158	3.32
07	Guntur	1,263	1.03
08	Krishna	1,646	3.55
09	East Godavari	1,433	4.19
10	West Godavari	1,476	3.21
11	Visakhapatnam	1,200	0.35
12	Vizianagaram	1,163	0.30
13	Srikakulam	0,773	0.69
14	Mahboobnagar	1,284	0.61
15	Hyderabad	---	---
16	Nalgonda	1,150	3.83
17	Karimnagar	2,152	0.40
18	Nizambad	0,513	0.37
19	Adilabad	0,794	0.84
20	Warangal	2,050	1.68
21	Khammam	1,780	0.25
22	Medak	1,682	2.43
23	Ranga Reddy	0,897	0.19
Total		90,774	245.110

Source: Directorate of Sericulture, Hyderabad.

As observed earlier, sericulture activity is highly concentrated in the four Rayalaseema districts, i.e., Anantapur, Chittoor, Cuddapah and Kurnool. Among them Anantapur ranks first with 33,190

hectares (36 % of the total area), followed by Chittoor with 18,108 hectares (24% of the total area). Kurnool and Cuddapah occupy the next places in ranking. The Rayalaseema region recorded good progress than other

regions in sericulture activity. This is due to the favourable climatic conditions in this region and also of the rising interest of farmers in this very lucrative activity.

India is been classified as Arid, Semi-arid and Humid zones according to the land or soil type. South India comes under the semi-arid zone. It comprises of dry and wet sub-zones. The soil in these parts varies from place to place. In parts of Andhra Pradesh, Karnataka and Tamilnadu it is gravely red and in some parts of Andhra Pradesh, such as Medak, it could be a mixture of various types of soils (Aurora:1991: 109-11). Like wise the soil types and rainfall in the area is also important while considering the practice of sericulture. Thus an attempt has been made here to explain the ecological/ environmental conditions in the area.

Methodology

The paper is based on a field work conducted during 1999-2000 as part of my M.Phil research work in the village *Kotha Indlu*. The village is selected based on a pilot study conducted in the area and after having discussions with the sericulture officials and visiting six villages in the Mandals of Santhipuram and Kuppam. Kuppam has the highest ratio of sericulture farmers and particularly in the village *Kotha Indlu* where majority of the farmers are practicing sericulture as their prime source of livelihood. Anthropological tools and techniques were adopted for the data collection. They are key informant interviews, observation, case study method and group discussions with the sericulture farmers and women's groups associated with sericulture practice in the village.

Sericulture Profile in *Kotha Indlu*

Kotha Indlu is a village in Kuppam mandal of Chittoor district and was previously known as Tabbagunta", prior to Independence. The name "*Kotha Indlu*" has a historical background as narrated by one key-informant. Earlier, most of the farmers in the village were practicing sugarcane cultivation in the village. Once, after

crushing the residues were left for drying in the fields. This was done in the nearby houses and majority of the houses are made up of thatched houses where they used forest grass (*bodha*) as the roofed material to cover their houses. Accidentally, fire broke-out and the whole village got burnt. The government built new houses with tiles after this incident. From then on, this village came to be known as "*Kotha Indlu*" (new houses).

This village is situated at a seven-kilometre distance on east to Kuppam, the mandal headquarters, and 32 kilometres away from the Dravidian University. The area of the village is 881 hectares (Census of India:1991) bounded by agricultural fields on the East, West, South and north and hill slopes on the Northeast. The Irrigation canal is located to the south of the village, behind the temple, which was constructed in the name of Timmaraya Swamy. There are two main roads leading into the village, which are connected by small by-lanes. On the way to Z.P. School one comes across two temples, the Timmaraya Swamy (Lord Srinivasa) and Gangamma (Goddess Bhavani) temples. *Anjaneya Swamy* (Lord Hanuman) temple is located in the middle of the village. They believe that *Anjaneya Swamy* would protect them from all the evils and hence he is located in the middle of their village.

The village is situated between Kuppam to Adavibudugur road, which links Kuppam to the Dharmapuri district of Tamil Nadu. The village leaders played a significant role during the Indian national movement and other social movements. This village produced a few political leaders and the villagers are proud of having the chief minister of the State from the Kuppam Assembly constituency. The village continues to play a significant role in deciding the fortunes of the regional political leaders / parties.

The climate

The climate of the district is dry and healthy. The upland mandals consists of 31 mandals in Madanapalle revenue division

and these are comparatively cooler than the eastern mandals, except in Chittoor revenue division where the climate is moderate. The district has the benefit of receiving rainfall during both the southwest and northeast monsoon periods and the normal rainfall received during these periods is 380.4 mms and 410.5 mms, respectively. Since the climate is cooler and healthy, Sericulturists prefer mulberry cultivation and silkworm rearing. The rainfall received from the southwest monsoons is more copious compared to north-east monsoon in the western mandals and in the central part of the district, whereas the rainfall received from north-east monsoons is comparatively copious in the eastern mandals of the district (Census of India 1991).

Flora and Fauna

The climate, topography and geology have played an important role in preserving the flora of the district. The district has hills and plateaus and the elevation ranges up to 1,318 meters. The floristic composition in the forests vary from dry mixed deciduous to thorny scrub with occasional patches of dry and evergreen growth. The forest of this region can be broadly classified into the following three principal types: 1) Dry tropical south Indian mixed deciduous forests, 2) Southern catch thorn forest groups, and 3) Tropical dry evergreen forests. Mesospheric type of flora like *syzygium cumini* (Neredu), *pongamia ghaira* (kanuga) and large trees of *Terminalia*

arjuna (Erramaddi and Tellamaddi) are found.

In the forest of this district at present wild animals like tiger and panther are present in small numbers. Sloth bear (*Melursus-ursinus*) is found still in good numbers in all the reserves of the district. Wild dog, wild pig, porcupine, Jungle cat, Jackal, fox, wolf, etc., are the other carnivores present in the district. The commonly found herbivores present in the district are sambar, black buck, chital, wild sheep, mouse deer, hare, rabbit, etc. A number of species among birds exist in this district.

However, since the study village is situated away from the forest area, most of these flora and fauna are not found in the village. The most commonly found floras are tamarind, ficus, custard apple, pongamia, eucalyptus, etc. The village fauna include cows, rabbits, cats, dogs, etc.

Occupation

As in the case of education, caste also has a bearing on the occupational patterns of people in *Kotha Indlu*. It is clear from the patterns of occupation observed that majority of Baliya (51.42%) are sericulturists, agriculturists or horticulturists, while the SCs (63.63) are predominantly agricultural labour. Similarly, most of the Baliya are in service and in business as compared to the others. Interestingly, there are more dependents among the Baliya than the others (Table: 1).

Table 2: Distribution of occupation by caste

Occupation	Caste				Total
	Baliya	Vanniar	Chakali	S.Cs	
Sericulture, Agriculture and Horticulture	75(51.42)	21(15)	12(8.57)	35(25)	140(51.1)
Agricultural Labour	06(27.27)	--	02(9.09)	14(63.63)	22(8.03)
Business	17(100)	--	--	--	17 (6.21)
Service	08(61.53)	01(33.33)	01(33.33)	03(23.07)	13(4.74)
Dependants	52(63.41)	06(7.32)	07(8.53)	17(20.73)	82(29.93)
Total	155(56.57)	28(10.22)	22(8.03)	69(25.18)	274 (100)

Note: Parentheses indicate percentages.

Table 3: Distribution of occupation by sex

Occupation	Sex		Total
	Male	Female	
Sericulture, Agriculture and Horticulture	66(47.14)	74(52.86)	140(51.1)
Agricultural Labour	14(63.64)	08(36.4)	22(8.03)
Business	07(41.2)	10(58.82)	17(6.20)
Service	10(76.92)	03(23.1)	13(4.74)
Dependants	44(53.66)	38(46.34)	82(29.93)
Total	141(51.46)	133(48.54)	274

Note: Parentheses indicate percentages.

It is interesting to note that there is a clear-cut gender divide in the occupational patterns observed in the study village. Women (52.86%) are more involved in sericulture, agriculture and horticulture than men (47.14%). We have to find here that women's participation in the sericulture activity is more because of their sensitive attitudes towards sericulture worms. It is also noticed in the study area that women treat silk works as their babies. Another reason is this activity is more reliable for women. Women headed households and widows, are easily managing this activity without the much help and cooperation of their men folk. This is also true in case of those who are involved in business, which mostly is petty trade, running a tea stall, etc. Men are involved more in agricultural labour and service than women do. The proportion of dependents is more among men than among women (Table:2).

Social organization

Baliya are the dominant caste in the village, followed by Vanni Kula Kshatriyas (Vanniar), Chakali and Scheduled Castes (Malas). The principal religion in the village is Hindu. There are a few households of Christians among the SCs. Along with other general festivals like Dushera, Ugadi, Diwali, Vinayak Chaviti, Ram Navami, Gouri Nomulu, etc., Amma Jatara (Ganga Jatara) festival is an important festival for the villagers.

All the villagers speak Telugu language. Since the village is located on the borders of Karnataka and Tamil Nadu States, many people speak Kannada as well as Tamil also. Malas speak Tamil fluently because they have most of their relatives in Dharmapuri district of Tamil Nadu.

Monogamy is the general pattern among all the communities of the village. Marriages are usually arranged by the elders of the community in the respective castes in the village. There are two inter-caste marriages in the village, where in one case a Vanniar man married a Baliya woman; in the other a SC man married a Vanniar woman. Nuclear family is the most prevalent form of family found among all the castes. It is interesting to note that they are significantly more between Chakali and the SCs (Table 3).

Table 4: Types of family

Caste	Nuclear	Joint	Total
Baliya	27	3	30
Vanniar	5	1	6
Chakali	1	2	3
Scheduled Caste	7	4	11
Total	40	10	50

Settlement Pattern

There is a clear-cut spatial distribution of castes in *Kotha Indlu*. The settlement pattern indicates the social and economic ranking and status. The Baliya, Vanniar and the SCs are located in separate streets, while the houses of Chakali are

located in between Baliya and Vanniar localities. The SCs' houses are located away from all the other castes houses.

Description of dwelling

All the families in the village have their own houses and the houses are used for dwelling and rearing purposes. The structure of a dwelling house differs from caste to caste and is related to their economic and occupational background. Most of the houses are stone roofed and brick walled. Thatched houses are seen among the SCs only. The houses of the sericulturists are not different from the others in the village.

Economic organization

While agriculture is the main occupation of the people in the village under study, sericulture is the major source of income. The crops cultivated are Paddy and Ragi, which are the staple crops and they constitute the staple diet of all communities. Commercial crops like flowers and groundnuts are also grown in the village. Floriculture is specially found among the Baliya farmers, while all the castes raise groundnut crop in their lands. Though sericulture occupies the second position after agriculture, it is the major source of income for the farmers in the village.

Most of the sericulturists have their own land and small farmers own most of it. Among the others, marginal farmers own more land than the large farmers. It is important to note that the land under mulberry cultivation among different categories of farmers is between half an acre to one and half acres. Majority of the farmers own about half an acre of mulberry garden (Table: 4).

Table 5: Land under Sericulture (in acres)

Type of Land holder	Own	Leased in	Total HHs
<i>Landless</i>		0.75	1
Marginal farmers	1.25		2
Small Farmers	23.50	--	27
Medium farmers	11.00	--	7
Large farmers	04.00	--	2
Total	39.75	0.75	39

Sericulture activity in the village

Kotha Indlu village is located in Chittoor district, about 15 kms from Kuppam, the mandal headquarters. There were 50 households in the entire village. Majority of them belonged to marginal, small and medium land owning categories. For 39 households the main economic activity is sericulture along with agriculture or horticulture, while 10 households practise only agriculture and horticulture. In *Kotha Indlu* the houses are scattered with the dwellings situated within agricultural fields. *Kotha Indlu* is predominantly agricultural with a majority of men and women being engaged in farming (which includes mulberry cultivation).

All the sericulture farmers have irrigation facilities for their mulberry gardens. Sericulturists have about 83 percent of their cultivated land, other than mulberry, under irrigation. Even among the sericulturists, the sericulturists from a few SC families have only conventional open wells, which usually go dry during summer. Non-sericulturists, on the other hand, have only about 24 percent of their land under irrigation. Availability of irrigation evidently is a contributing factor in opting for mulberry cultivation and silkworm rearing. A point to be noted here is that the quantity of water available for cultivation is crucial for the farmer to decide whether to take up sericulture (mulberry cultivation and rearing) or other agricultural activities. Thus if well water is available the farmer would take up sericulture, but if canal irrigation is at hand, he may prefer cultivation of paddy or sugarcane.

Kotha Indlu consists of Baliya (Naidus), Vanniar, Chakali (washer man) and Scheduled Castes (Malas). Traditional occupation of Chakali caste was washing clothes, and now after adoption of sericulture they have stopped indulging in their traditional calling. Baliya is traditionally an agricultural caste, while the SCs were agricultural labourers. Baliya, Vanniar, Chakali and the Scheduled Castes have predominantly taken up sericulture

(Eswarappa 2000 & 2009). A Balija woman, who is from a landless family and whose husband goes for agricultural labour, has taken 0.75 acres of irrigated land on lease from a relative and has taken up sericulture. It is more economically viable to carry out silkworm rearing if land is also available for mulberry cultivation. Buying mulberry leaves makes the rearing process costly and much less profitable (as well as relatively uncertain in terms of finding right type of leaves at the right time) for which reason the number of people buying mulberry leaves for rearing silkworms is extremely small. There is one or two who buy leaf during times of shortage, especially during summer when their wells go dry, from the neighbouring village sericulturists. In *Kotha Indlu* most of the rearers also own land, even if it is just about half an acre or even less, which is usually sufficient to manage a moderately profitable silkworm rearing activity.

It is interesting to know that a woman from Balija caste brought sericulture to *Kotha Indlu*. In 1977 Konda Chellamma got married to Ramakrishna, her mother's brother's son, who was a teacher in *Kotha Indlu*. Her parents were practising sericulture in Srinivasapuram, which is near Kolar in Karnataka. Through her parents she learnt all the methods, practices and techniques of sericulture. After she moved to her conjugal home she started practising sericulture (Sandhya Rani:2006; Eswarappa 2000 & 2007b). In that way sericulture enterprise has taken its birth in *Kotha Indlu*.

In the beginning the villagers and her relatives in *Kotha Indlu* ridiculed her. Their reluctance to adopt sericulture in the beginning was due to their apprehension about the success of the crop with which they have no familiarity. Further, the cropping pattern was tuned mainly to grow use value goods like paddy, ragulu, groundnut etc. Besides, they were reluctant to accept this crop as a woman introduced it, which was not known to them. However, Chellamma was not deterred by others opinion as she received complete backing from her husband. As a daughter of sericulture

household, she felt very happy that she could perform all the tasks by herself. She started growing mulberry garden and raising silkworms. After witnessing her success in sericulture and seeing the profitability, other people in the village also started adopting sericulture.

Adinarayanappa, who is Chellamma's father's brother's son and who migrated to *Kotha Indlu*, his mother's natal village, after his marriage, is the second man in the village who adopted this crop. This he did after he closely followed the Sericultural activities of Chellamma, who encouraged and assisted him in switching over to sericulture. Here, we can see how kinship has influenced the people to grow mulberry and practise sericulture. After Adinarayanappa, people in the village realised that this crop yields good economic returns and could change their life style. Later, others also started growing mulberry in *Kotha Indlu*. Now, nearly all the villagers are practising sericulture.

After noticing the rising income levels of the new sericulturists, others started raising mulberry in their irrigated lands. In the beginning they adopted M-5, S-5 and S-1 varieties of mulberry and now they have adopted the improved varieties of mulberry like S-13, S-36 and V-1, locally called resham kaddi (sericulture sticks). They believe that good variety mulberry will yield quality leaves, which, in turn, will lead to good sericulture harvest as well as good income. However, most of the SC farmers and the marginal farmers from the Balija and Vanniar castes still have traditional M-5 mulberry gardens, as they could not afford to switch over to improved varieties as it involves costs. Thus, the motivating factors that turned the farmers to take up sericulture in *Kotha Indlu* are good returns and favourable conditions.

Mulberry Cultivation

Usually, sericulture farmers in *Kotha Indlu* are following row system, i.e., 2' X 2', which is popularly called as "Kolar system" for planting the resham kaddi (mulberry stick

or plant). Rainy season is the preferable time for planting mulberry. People in the village were used to local variety of mulberry earlier and have now switched over to improved varieties, because they believe that new varieties give better yield. The sericulture farmers came to know about the new varieties of mulberry through the Department of Sericulture (Eswarappa:2000 & 2009).

Following the advise of the progressive farmers, who also happened to be the village elders, and also witnessing their progress, the sericulturists started adopting new innovations in sericulture. Agricultural Extension Officers from the Department of Agriculture do visit *Kotha Indlu* and advise the farmers on the crops that they are raising, other than sericulture, and the necessary precautions that they need to take to protect the crops from diseases, etc.

In *Kotha Indlu* sericulturists follow vegetative method of plantation in planting healthy mulberry cuttings obtained from different sources. The land is tilled about 4 times and fertilizers and irrigation are given to the plantations. Farmers of the village generally apply CN or 17:17:17 and, sometimes, small doses of urea, depending upon the requirements. Usually, plantation takes place before the onset of monsoon. But some farmers say that it depends on the availability of water facility. The spacing between plants varies from farmer to farmer depending on the availability of water. Generally gardens are better maintained. In *Kotha Indlu* gardens are of mixed variety. Farmers in *Kotha Indlu* usually apply farmyard manure either annually or for every three months, depending on its availability. Chemical fertilizers are also applied for every crop in the village. Use of FYM varies from 10-15 bullock carts or one tractor per acre annually. Besides FYM green manure/castor cakes are also applied in *Kotha Indlu* to get better leaf harvest.

Women in *Kotha Indlu* involve in leaf harvesting and pruning. Usually, harvesting and pruning is done early in the

morning and in the late evenings. They take a lot of care to perform this activity. Sericulturists in *Kotha Indlu* mostly transport leaves manually. They cover mulberry leaves with a wet cloth to prevent them from drying.

Sericulturists in *Kotha Indlu* do weeding for every crop regularly. Usually, women from sericulture households in the village perform this activity. Women are preferred because of their skill and their sensitivity to mulberry leaves. Non-sericulturists in the village cultivate potato, paddy, Ragulu, Jowar and horticulture crops. Some are into business like milk production, rice mill, general stores, tea and tiffin stall, etc. Non-sericulturists feel that they do not have enough land and resources to practise sericulture. For instance, Sridevi, who runs a tea stall, tiffin center and also a pan shop, stated that her father died at a very early age and her grandparents brought her up. They did not acquire any land and as a result they are not well off. Most of the farmers, especially sericulturists, have inherited lands from their elders.

Silk Worm Rearing

Silkworm rearing is an “art”, as said by one key-informant. It is really true in the sense that it needs skilled personnel. This activity needs people who have knowledge about their surroundings. People in *Kotha Indlu* have learnt techniques and have mastered silkworm rearing through observation, participation and also through their elders. Now department of sericulture in Kuppam has arranged training programme in Mysore for the local farmers. Three people from *Kotha Indlu* have availed this training.

Seeda Bhagyamma aged 43, stays along with her husband, Ramachandrappa, in a pucca house in *Kotha Indlu*. She has two sons and both of them are going to school studying 9th class and 6th class. Bhagyamma studied up to 5th class and she looks after both her household work as well as sericulture work. She is a very active and hard working person, according to the

convenor of the “farmers club” in *Kotha Indlu*. But she does not have a separate rearing house and is rearing silkworms in the dwelling house only.

It was quite interesting to hear about the selection of Bhagyamma for the training. She said, once she accidentally went to the cocoon market in Kuppam with her husband to know about cocoon market. During the auction of cocoons, officials of the department of sericulture announced that they wanted to take women from sericulture households for training in Mysore under women’s training programme. Ramachandrappa gave his wife’s name from *Kotha Indlu* village. There are about 20 women from Kuppam region who went with officials of the department of sericulture to Mysore.

Training was given for a period of three days. In the beginning, Bhagyamma was a bit afraid because this was her first experience to go out with out her husband. Her colleagues however, enabled her to get maximum knowledge in the art of sericulture. In those three days, they were taught about mulberry cultivation, silkworm rearing (pulgulu penchadam or mepadam), disinfecting of sheds and application of fertilisers, besides precautions on health. She also came to know about the techniques / methods like maintainance of garden, use of nets, upkeep of rearing house and plantation methods.

Bhagyamma after the training now feels that she could alone do any kind of sericultural activities by herself. Earlier she used to help her husband. Sometimes, now, she also goes to the market. She said that ever since the training programme, she periodically receives “*Annadatha*”, a monthly Telugu magazine that updates her knowledge about sericulture (Eswarappa 2007b).

Infrastructure and Equipment

In *Kotha Indlu*, there are 36 households who are practising sericulture. Out of them, 23 households have separate

rearing house and remaining sericulturists are practising sericulture in their dwelling house. Some of these rearing sheds are constructed under a governmental programme, viz., Indo-Swiss scheme, where as the others are constructed by themselves. Most of the sericulture farmers have their own trays (thattalu) and stands in the village. In case of shortage, they would procure them from their neighbours and relatives in the village. A few sericulturists in the village have chandrikas (mountages). Others go for hiring chandrikas from DWCRE groups in the village. As one key-informant stated that whenever they felt shortage of chandrikas they would go to nearby villages and borrow them from relatives and friends.

It is observed that in the village the trays and chandrikas are crowded. This again differs from farmer to farmer depending on the availability of sufficient space, adequate number of trays, chandrikas and manpower. Usually, sericulturists in *Kotha Indlu* spread 100 DFLs in 45-55 trays after 3rd moult. Srinivas Raidu says thin spacing requires more trays, chandrikas and labour, which implied more expenditure. It is observed that sericulturists who having inadequate chandrikas get large proportion of dubian cocoons.

Most of the sericulturists have trays. These trays are round in shape and are portable, and are easily manageable by any single person. These trays are being used since the last 10-15 years. They handle these trays carefully because their elders passed them on to them. Farmers from the Vanniar and Scheduled Castes were properly using these equipments. Scheduled caste sericulturists do not possess chandrikas and they hire them from other caste people in the village.

In *Kotha Indlu* women perform disinfection of sheds / rearing places. Formalin and bleaching powder are applied to disinfect the rearing shed. Sericulturists in *Kotha Indlu* disinfect the rearing place for every crop. Some of the sericulturists in *Kotha Indlu* use sprayers for disinfecting

rearing place and all of them white wash rearing place regularly. Almost all sericulturists disinfect rearing equipment (trays) regularly with cow-dung, bleaching / Formalin and sometimes mixture of both. In *Kotha Indlu* sericulture farmers use foam pads / paraffin papers or mosquito nets to control the Uzi fly.

The sericulturists follow indigenous methods in maintaining temperature and humidity in the rearing place. During summer, sericulturists spread sand on the floor and sprinkle water. To facilitate cool air to come into the rearing place sericulturists of *Kotha Indlu* also follow hanging wet clothes to windows and doors. Some of them also put coconut leaves on the roof of rearing place, while some others, especially SCs, put pandal in front of rearing shed during summer. During winter and rainy seasons, they use 100 volts bulbs.

In *Kotha Indlu*, women mostly do leaf harvesting. Many sericulturists do leaf harvesting twice in a day. Majority of the sericulturists transport leaves manually by themselves. During rainy season, they use fans to dry rainwater on the leaves. Most of the sericulturists in *Kotha Indlu*, give 4-5 feeds in a day. This is not the same for all moults. They believe that as the silkworm grows it requires more feed as is also the case with the human beings. For first moult, they feed only thrice in a day, where as for the fourth moult they feed 4-5 times. There is no difference in feeding from farmer to farmer. In cases of shortage they borrow / purchase leaves from their relatives and from neighbouring villagers.

Majority of the sericulturists in *Kotha Indlu* procure cross breed Disease Free layings (DFLs) from government grainage centres. They know about the races of cross breed that they are rearing. Some sericulturists in *Kotha Indlu* prefer bivoltine seed instead of cross breed multivoltine DFLs and they get it from government grainages. The prices are different for cross breed and bivoltine seed. For 100 cross breed DFLs the amount is Rs.150/-, where as

in case of bivoltine it is Rs.225/- for 100 layings. Half of the sericulturists are not happy with the Department of Sericulture grainage at Kuppam. Some sericulturists prefer private grainages like Purnima grainage in Krishnagiri (Tamil Nadu) and Gopikrishna grainage in Bangalore. During summer season, there is usually a shortage of DFLs. At that time, they mostly go to private grainages. Most of the sericulturists in the village prepare their own chawki and some sericulturists prefer or depend on chawki rearing centres (CRCs). Workers of the Department of Sericulture visit the village and provide guidance in chawki rearing. Before doing chawki, majority of sericulturists apply kumkum (Vermillion) to the trays and offer puja to their household deity with coconuts and agarbattis (incense).

Women in majority of the sericulture households mostly do bed cleaning (Sandhta Rani 2006 & 1998). Men in the village argue that bed cleaning is part and parcel of women's routine activity. Sericulturists compared worms with children. So, they regard bed cleaning and litter cleaning are women's activities. In some sericulture households' men do the bed cleaning. All sericulturists do bed cleaning once in a day in *Kotha Indlu*. There is no variation during different moulting stages in the village.

Sericulturists in *Kotha Indlu* reported Muscardine and Uzi fly as common diseases during rainy / winter seasons, where as in summer season it is Grasserie and Flacherie. They use nets round the rearing house to prevent or control the diseases and minimise the losses. Some sericulturists say that they destroy the whole crop / lot if the diseases breakout. The common reasons for diseases according to the farmers are not taking proper care by the sericulturists as well as extension staff.

During silkworm rearing, sericulturists take various measures to safeguard the crop or at least to minimize the losses due to the disease(s). In *Kotha Indlu*, if the disease breakout, sericulturists destroy the whole lot and they bring new layings.

This they do it because they can save at least the mulberry leaves. A few of the experienced sericulturists identify the diseases and sometimes get their worms tested and seek the assistance of sericulture extension officials.

Cropping Pattern

Tube wells and dug wells are the major sources of irrigation. The command area under tube wells is greater than the area under dug wells. The cropping pattern reveals that, besides mulberry, groundnut, Ragulu and paddy dominate the other crops in the village.

Sericulturists in *Kotha Indlu* give priority to mulberry over paddy, groundnut and Ragulu. Among the non-sericulturists, priority is given to groundnut, Ragulu and potato. Some progressive farmers practice both mulberry on one side and paddy and potato on the other. It is evident that because of the higher returns that mulberry promises the concentration is more on sericulture.

According to one key informant, sericulture farmers in *Kotha Indlu* get better income in sericulture because of high yields when compared to the other agricultural activities like groundnuts, paddy, Ragulu etc. One interesting feature in the village is that most of the sericulturists apply samrani and agarbattis (incense sticks) in rearing house, believing that it makes worms to eat more

leaves and thereby grow in size and give good yield. In this village sericulturists are raising 5-6 crops in a year. Per crop they get around Rs.9, 900 for one acre of mulberry garden. The following case illustrates the comparative picture of crop yield in *Kotha Indlu*.

Konda Adinarayanappa, aged 52, has a wife and two children, a son and a daughter. Son has studied up to 10th class and daughter is in the 5th class. Adinarayanappa studied up to 5th class. He had his education in Srinivasapuram. He looks after both sericulture as well as agriculture and manages other activities in the village as an ex-president of the Panchayat.

Adinarayanappa stated that sericulture yields in the village were responsible for encouraging the farmers to grow more silk worms. He has 5 acres of wetland and 4 acres of dry land and has been practising agriculture from the beginning. He used to produce paddy, Ragulu and groundnut earlier and now mulberry. In sericulture, he gets Rs.9, 900/- per crop and he uses 200 DFLs per crop. Quantity of cocoons he gets is 90 Kgs per crop. Average price per kg of cocoons is Rs.110. (110 X 90= 9,900). Following table shows the comparative yields of different crops in the village.

Table 6: Comparative returns from different crops

Sl. No.	Details of crop	No. of crops in a year	Annual income per acre (in Rs.)	Expenditure (in Rs.)	Net income per acre (in Rs.)
01.	Groundnut	One to two	7,500	5,243	2,257
02.	Ragulu	Two to three	12,000	3,600	8,400
03.	Paddy	Two to three	20,500	6,075	14,175
04.	Mulberry	Five to six	49,500	21,500	26,000

From above table we can see that the returns from sericulture are comparatively very much higher than the other crops. There are variations in the number of crops raised and it differs from village to village. Also, it depends on the available facilities like irrigation, and other factors. Timely application of fertilizer, water and planting

high yielding resham kaddi are the important factors to get good crops. In terms of yield and income, there are differences between old and new sericulturists. Old sericulturists mostly practice cross breed and old technology where as the new sericulturists has access to new technology and practice bivoltine.

Sericulture farmers in *Kotha Indlu* do not have adequate marketing facilities. Most of the sericulturists have complained about the market organized at Kuppam by Department of Sericulture and is the only available market for them. The prices in local market are comparatively lower than the private markets in Karnataka (Kolar) and Tamil Nadu (Krishnagiri). Sericulturists in *Kotha Indlu* usually prefer to go to private markets outside Andhra Pradesh. Even though the Department of Sericulture has started cocoon market in Kuppam, sericulturists are not happy with the prices they offer as well as the treatment by the officials of the department.

Significance of sericulture as a development strategy

In spite of limitations, it can be said that Indian agriculture is on threshold of entering into a stage of development characterised by a shift from static technology to a modern technology, in which capital requirement and purchased inputs occupy large share (Hanumappa:1986). Much of the success of the new programmes will depend upon the ability of the workers to act as growth promoters. So all the new technologies should be built on the ability of the farmers to understand and adopt the new agricultural activities, which will ensure higher income and employment to the rural population.

In this context, sericulture with its vast potential for employment generation in rural areas plays a vital role in alleviating rural poverty and unemployment. To argue further, sericulture has a major share in the reduction of poverty and provides minimum basic needs to the people. In all stages of sericulture practice, there is requirement of labour force which automatically provides minimum employment opportunities to the needy and poor. It is one of the crop enterprises that are labour intensive and is a most appropriate household activity. It provides gainful employment not only at the stage of the production of mulberry leaves but also at the stage of rearing of silk worms using the output of the former as an input of

the latter. Sericulture has been playing a very important role in transforming the tradition bound agriculture into a modernised agriculture by intensive use of land and capital. Sericulture, in which the same farm households integrate production of mulberry at the cultivation level with the rearing of silk worms, provides scope for augmenting employment opportunities and also increasing the income levels of farm households (Sandhya Rani:1998).

Green revolution technologies, based on the cultivation of hybrid seeds, chemical fertilizers and pesticides, have made strident progress in the semi-arid niches where stored water could be tapped to produce rice, wheat, sugarcane and sericulture (Aurora:1991: 115). In this regard, the development of sericulture industry in India is a case in point.

Now, in India sericulture has become the most promising rural activity due to certain reasons like minimum gestation period, less investment, maximum employment potential and quick turnover for the investment. Sericulture generates direct and indirect employment in various ways. Firstly, mulberry cultivation creates employment on farm, and, secondly, cocoon production, which uses mulberry leaves as an input, creates large-scale employment for the family labour of the mulberry growers. There are, instances of non-mulberry growers taking up cocoon production alone as a full-time occupation. They buy leaves from mulberry growers and use them as raw material for cocoon production. Further, the reeling activity is also mainly undertaken in rural areas or semi-urban areas and the employment generated there would help to reduce the rural unemployment in a significant way.

Therefore, in order to make "Leaf to Cloth" programme successful in the area what appears to be important at the moment is for the government to take steps in relation to improving the managerial capacity of the cocoon rearers through better extension mechanism and motivate people, irrespective

of caste, to take up silk reeling as well as weaving in the process of development of sericulture in the study areas.

It is rightly observed by Inbanathan and Vijayalakshmi that, "Economic development has been one of the main objectives of many governments of countries around the world. And, improving the socio-economic condition of women has also been an important aim in their development programs. In this context, and in India, sericulture has been found to be very helpful in meeting the development objectives of the Government. This is because it is labour intensive, and provides employment and income to many people, both in rural and urban areas. As such, it is of particular significance in anti-poverty programs. Sericulture is not one occupation but includes several activities, from planting and growing mulberry plants, rearing of silkworms to reeling of silk yarn from cocoons. In much of these activities, the labour contribution of women is significant" (1997: 37-8).

With regards to women's participation and involvement, it is very essential to look at the below case study. The first person who brought sericulture to the study area is a woman, as already mentioned in the paper, who introduced it in the year 1977. She had faced lot of resistance in making sericulture rooted in Kotha Indlu. This village also stands as an example of better participation of women in economic development along with men. Women not only do family labour but also contribute for increase in production levels. Women are enterprising in the village; for instance, they run tiffin stalls and rice milling independently. They have also organized themselves for economic benefits as the case in DWCRA. In *Kotha Indlu*, DWCRA group plays an important role in assisting sericulture farmers. In this village there are about 9 DWCRA groups, which are participating in the development of sericulture. DWCRA groups made people more coherent towards their work and further helped them to cultivate sericulture. The

following case study explains the usefulness of the DWCRA group in relation to sericulture development in the village.

Case Study

Krishnaveni, aged 28 belong to Scheduled Caste, lives with her husband, mother-in-law and three children. She studied up to 10th class in *Kotha Indlu*. She got married to her father's sister's son, Subramaniam, who studied up to Intermediate and was working as a Vidya Volunteer in Chandam Village, near *Kotha Indlu*. Krishnaveni has been practicing sericulture since seven years. She is the leader of DWCRA group by name Bharatha Matha. It was started in the year 1998. They meet once in a month and each one of them pays Rs 30/- or more. After the meeting, one person would go to bank and deposit the money.

Krishnaveni says that sometimes they go to private grainages like Purnima grainage in Krishnagiri and Gopikrishna grainage in Bangalore. But they also go to the Government grainage in Kuppam. She feels that because of sericulture women got economic freedom and could spend money to meet their needs. Women in *Kotha Indlu* also felt that because of sericulture and DWCRA groups their social status has improved. Women participate in the Programmes like Janmabhoomi, Shramadanam, etc., as members of particular DWCRA group. In the 11th Janmabhoomi programme, they constructed a school building in the village with the amount collected from each DWCRA group.

Another interesting and welcome contribution of the sericulturists of the village is that they have contributed 50% of the money to the new school building. There is only primary school in the village till 1996. Due to sericulturists' contribution and their enthusiasm, government sanctioned the remaining part of the money and constructed a new school building and the primary school has been upgraded to high school. Sericulturists feel that now there is no need to go to the mandal headquarters for high

school education. Sericulturists are proudly informed that the then Chief Minister has attended for the inauguration ceremony of the high school in the village in the year 1997.

Sericulture as an economic and social activity has brought a major change in *Kotha Indlu* life. They have given up looking at silkworm as worms and started looking them as babies and a lucky crop. People who are in sericulture get more benefits in terms of economic and social status. Agriculture and miscellaneous activities do not even match anywhere to sericulture. Dairy farming also complements sericulture activity. The leaves are not wasted and the hybrid cows (Jersey) are made to browse the mulberry leaves that are left behind by silkworms. This is something akin to mixed cropping in agriculture. In short, sericulture as a whole, by its very nature of activity, creates large-scale employment and income generation opportunities in the rural and semi-urban areas accelerating the economic growth of these areas.

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Development of a Comprehensive Environmental Vulnerability Index for Evaluation of the Status of Eco Development Committees in the Sunderbans, India

Debajit Datta

Abstract

Tropical coasts and mangrove wetlands like the Sunderbans of India and Bangladesh are among the most environmentally vulnerable zones worldwide due to their land-sea interface locations. An assessment of the level of environmental vulnerability of the Eco Development Committees, which are, in turn, the mainstay of community forest management in the Sunderbans, had been performed to identify the causes and impacts of environmental disturbances and hazards on this fragile ecosystem by applying participatory approaches. A Comprehensive Environmental Vulnerability Index and associated framework of indicators and sub-indicators had been constructed through analytic hierarchy process in such a way that these can become useful in field level monitoring and vulnerability evaluation. Several development strategies have been forwarded with the aim of sustainable management of the Sunderbans mangroves and community resource pools.

1. Introduction

Mangroves are among the most productive ecosystems on earth and occupy intertidal zones in the tropical and subtropical coastlines depending primarily on local temperature condition (ITTO, 2002). In recent years, mangroves are declining at an alarming rate globally. According to a FAO (2005) estimate, a sharp decline in the worldwide mangrove coastlines from 198000 km in 1980 to 146530 km in 2000 had been observed. Although India possesses 7% of the world's mangroves, most of these forests have been threatened or degraded largely due to intense anthropogenic interventions (Das *et al.*, 1997). World's largest contiguous mangrove forest, i.e. The Sunderbans, is not an exception in this regard (Gopal and Chauhan 2006). Giri *et al.* (2007) used multi-temporal satellite data from 1970s to 2000s and reported huge amount of turnovers within the different land use types of the

Sunderbans. Although areal extent of the mangroves has not been changed significantly in these years, i.e. only 1.2% of the original forest area, internal vegetation structure has been highly altered, specifically from dense and true mangrove stands to open and degraded mangrove areas. The magnitude of change is on the higher side in the buffer and transition zones of the forests, where forest dynamics are frequently disturbed by the local village communities due to their unsustainable livelihood practices (Gayen, 1995). Consequently, these areas have been greatly affected by quasi-natural hazards like cyclones, floods, sea surges, riverbank erosions and biodiversity losses from time immemorial (Bhattacharya, 1998). The concept of vulnerability has been used in this regard to assess the impact of these hazards on the local communities on one hand and to determine their fragility in case of survival on the other. As found by

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O'Keefe *et al.* (1976), Hewitt (1983) and several others, environmental vulnerability often has a socio-economic dimension and it is one of the prime determinants of the level of responses and recovery potential of the local communities against probable geo-environmental hazards. Hence, emphasis has been given in this paper to the evaluation of withstanding potential of the communities living in the Sunderbans in the form of a Comprehensive Environmental Vulnerability Index (CEVI) by applying the analytic hierarchy process (AHP) in a site-specific approach as smaller geographical units are often conceived as the most suitable areas for real-time ecosystem management and protection (Ippolito *et al.*, 2009).

2. Methods

The methods applied in this study include assessment of the major characteristics of study area, construction of the framework of Environmental Vulnerability Indicators (EVIs) and finally testing of the framework on the local communities of the Sunderbans to assess their levels of vulnerability.

2.1. Delineation of study area

The mangrove forest of the Sunderbans is world's largest halophytic formation and extends through India to Bangladesh. The Indian part of Sunderbans has an areal coverage of 9630 sq. km and lies between 21°32'N to 22°40'N and 88°03'E to 89°E (Figure 1). The whole Sunderbans was declared as a 'World Heritage Site' by IUCN in 1987 and 'Biosphere Reserve' by UNESCO in 1989 (Chaudhuri and Choudhuri, 1994). The area consists of 106 deltaic islands of which 54 islands covering an area of 5330 sq. km have human habitation (WBFD, 2007). The entire region is characterized by a dense network of innumerable rivers, rivulets and creeks. The climatic pattern is of tropical wet type characterized by an average annual temperature of 25°C, average precipitation of 190 cm with a pronounced monsoonal outburst. The soil types range from clay to sand and sandy loam with presence of both

non-saline and saline alkali varieties. Soil profiles exhibit a gradual change in salinity from inner to outer estuaries and east to west (Bandopadhyay, 1998).

Depending on the higher habitat heterogeneity in this vast mangrove landscape, abundant biodiversity is found in all the micro-environments which cumulatively comprise 87 plant species of which 37 are true mangroves, 127 species of euryhaline fishes, 1287 species of animals including 186 bird species and innumerable micro-organisms. Among floral species, notable are *Heritiera fomes*, *Nypa fruticans*, *Avicennia* varieties, *Phoenix paludosa*, *Excoecaria agallocha*, *Bruguiera gymnorrhiza*, *Ceriops decandra* and *Sonneretia apetala* (Siddiqi, 1997).

Due to intense human interventions and natural calamities, the Sunderbans has been increasingly threatened in the last 150 years and consequently losing significant amount of biodiversity, e.g. species like Javan rhinoceros have become extinct and several others like the Royal Bengal Tiger and Gangetic Dolphin are highly endangered. Changes in upstream river regimes have almost stopped the supply of freshwater in many tidal mudflats and thus making soils more saline and drastically reducing the number of several native floral species like *Heritiera fomes*. Increased rate of siltation in riverbeds has also enhanced the probabilities of floods and bank erosions. Most importantly, changes in global climatic pattern and consequent rise of sea levels possess a direct threat to the existence of this fragile ecosystem by accentuating the frequency and magnitude of several natural calamities. Moreover, the acute dearth of food in the mangroves and alterations in the intra-mangrove structure are often making the animals to trespass the forest-fringe villages and hence increasing the number of man-animal conflicts (Sanyal, 1987).

Among the numerous natural calamities which affected the Sunderbans in the last two centuries, the severe cyclonic storm named *Aila* of 25th May, 2009 was the most recent and perhaps the most destructive

one. After originating in the Bay of Bengal, it moved along the path of south-west monsoon and gathered huge amount of latent heat and water vapour. Finally it struck the southern coast of West Bengal near the Sagar Island with an average speed of 110 km / hour and moved inland causing havoc in terms of flooding, landslide, bank erosion, tree uprooting and destruction of human property and lives. In the Indian Sunderbans alone, altogether 2.5 million people were directly affected and 100 casualties were reported. Approximately 400 km long river embankments had been damaged and 5.1 million people had to be rehabilitated (Chattopadhyay, 2009).

In view of the immense destruction caused by the *Aila*, the CEVI scores were calculated twice to analyze its impact on the scores and thus making a comparison of the pre and post-*Aila* status of environmental vulnerability through the present study. The 14 Eco Development Committees (EDCs) present in this region with respect to sustainable mangrove management and creation of local resource pools had been chosen deliberately for this study so as to assess their vulnerability status towards probable geo-environmental hazards.

2.2. Development of appropriate vulnerability indicators

The framework of vulnerability indicators was constructed carefully keeping in mind the specific issues of vulnerability faced by the local inhabitants as a part of coastal mangrove ecosystem. The major factors of vulnerability assessment were shortlisted from the broad themes of biodiversity, pollution, resource depletion, poverty and status of livelihood practices (O'Brien *et al.*, 2004; UNEP, 2004). The analytical framework chosen for the construction of CEVI from the individual environmental vulnerability sub-indicators were largely developed after Kang *et al.* (2002) and Vatalis and Kaliampakos (2006). The whole procedure of construction of CEVI consists of two parts, i.e. selection of

proper environmental sub-indicators and calculation of the related EVI scores first and then assignment of weights to each EVI and finally calculation of CEVI by merging these EVI scores.

Initially, a survey of local public opinions through participatory rural appraisals (PRAs) was carried out in the EDC villages to enumerate the major environmental problems and to classify them according to their immediate vulnerability status. After identification of individual environmental problems as indicators, relative environmental impact coefficients (ICs) were assigned to those according to their relative contribution to the associated major vulnerability indicator (EVI). The relative ICs under each EVI were assigned in such a way that their cumulative impact equals to unity.

The data for each sub-indicator was gathered by interviewing the EDC members and local resource persons using structured questionnaires. Each sub-indicator comprises of one question with four possible options of answer, i.e. A, B, C, and D (Chattopadhyay and Datta, 2010). The respondents should choose only one option for each sub-indicator. The options had been designed in such a way that the options 'A', 'B', 'C', and 'D' indicate 'low', 'moderate', 'high', and 'very high', respectively. The options were, therefore, given weights in terms of 1, 2, 3, and 4, respectively meaning higher score was related to higher level of vulnerability.

As each sub-indicator has its own scale of measurement and can be represented in different units or values, a normalization procedure for each EVI is essentially required. Hence, the score of every sub-indicator in a certain year was divided by the score of that sub-indicator in a reference year. The relative ICs were also replaced by the weighted values derived from their corresponding sub-indicator scores. This normalization procedure can be represented as below:

$$EVI_{ic} = \left(\frac{S_{i1c}}{S_{i1b}} \times W_{Si1} \right) + \left(\frac{S_{i2c}}{S_{i2b}} \times W_{Si2} \right) + \dots + \left(\frac{S_{inc}}{S_{inb}} \times W_{Sin} \right)$$

$$\text{or, } EVI_{ic} = \sum_{j=1}^n \left(\frac{S_{ijc}}{S_{ijb}} \times W_{Sij} \right) \quad (1)$$

and,

$$W_{Sij} = \frac{S_{ijc} \cdot IC_{ij}}{\sum_j S_{ijc} \cdot IC_{ij}} \quad (2)$$

Where,

EVI_{ic} = Score of i^{th} major EVI in the current year

S_{ijc} = Score of j^{th} sub-indicator under i^{th} major EVI in the current year

S_{ijb} = Score of j^{th} sub-indicator under i^{th} major EVI in the base year

IC_{ij} = Relative environmental impact coefficient of j^{th} sub-indicator under i^{th} major EVI

W_{Sij} = Weighted value of IC_{ij}

$i, j = 1, 2, \dots, n$

While aggregating the normalized EVIs to calculate the CEVI, the weighted-sum method was used. The weight of every major EVI was obtained through the application of AHP (Golden *et al.*, 1989). In this process, local resource persons from academic and research institutions, public agencies and NGOs had been surveyed to assign the weights of EVIs by judging the threat quotient of specific vulnerability indicators. The respondents evaluated all the vulnerability indicators separately in terms of relative degree of threat level by using pair-

wise comparisons (Mendoza and Prabhu, 2000). A five hierarchy scale had been used in this study that runs from one (equal threat) to five (five times more threat).

The scores of all pair-wise comparisons were arranged in a square matrix first and then the weight of every EVI was calculated by dividing the arithmetic mean score of pair-wise analysis for each row by the sum of scores of pair-wise analysis for the corresponding column (Kang *et al.*, 2002). The mathematical procedure is as follows:

$$WI_1 = \left[\left(\frac{S_{11}}{\sum S_{1m}} \right) + \left(\frac{S_{12}}{\sum S_{2m}} \right) + \dots + \left(\frac{S_{1m}}{\sum S_{mm}} \right) \right] / m$$

$$WI_2 = \left[\left(\frac{S_{21}}{\sum S_{1m}} \right) + \left(\frac{S_{22}}{\sum S_{2m}} \right) + \dots + \left(\frac{S_{2m}}{\sum S_{mm}} \right) \right] / m$$

$$\vdots$$

$$WI_m = \left[\left(\frac{S_{m1}}{\sum S_{1m}} \right) + \left(\frac{S_{m2}}{\sum S_{2m}} \right) + \dots + \left(\frac{S_{mm}}{\sum S_{mm}} \right) \right] / m$$

$$\text{Hence, } WI_i = \frac{\sum_{j=1}^m \left(\frac{S_{ij}}{\sum_{j=1}^m S_{ij}} \right)}{m} \quad (3)$$

Where,

S_{ij} = Score of i^{th} row and j^{th} column of the square matrix of pair-wise comparisons

WI_i = Weight of i^{th} major EVI

m = Number of major EVIs ($m > 1$)

The comprehensive environmental vulnerability index (CEVI) for a particular EDC in the current year is then determined by the following procedure:

$$CEVI_{pc} = (EVI_{1c} \times WI_1) + (EVI_{2c} \times WI_2) + \dots + (EVI_{mc} \times WI_m)$$

$$\text{or, } CEVI_{pc} = \sum_{i=1}^m (EVI_{ic} \times WI_i) \quad (4)$$

Where,

$CEVI_{pc}$ = Score of CEVI of p^{th} EDC in the current year

$p = 1, 2, \dots, n$

The EDCs were then classified in four groups of different vulnerability status based on the mean (μ) and standard deviation (σ) values of the CEVI scores for any single year, i.e. highly vulnerable [$> (\mu + \sigma)$], moderately vulnerable [μ to $(\mu + \sigma)$], less vulnerable [$(\mu - \sigma)$ to μ] and not vulnerable [$< (\mu - \sigma)$].

2.3. Consistency analysis of the responses

Under the AHP, analysis of the consistency status of the responses collected by the study of pair-wise comparisons was also conducted. For this purpose, a consistency ratio (CR) had been used which can be expressed as:

$$CR = CI / RI \quad (5)$$

Where,

CI = Consistency index

RI = Random consistency index

Here, CI was calculated from the following formula:

$$CI = (\lambda_{\max} - m) / (m - 1) \quad (6)$$

Where,

λ_{\max} = Principal eigen value of the square matrix derived from pair-wise comparisons

On the other hand, RI is dependent on the size of square matrix and its values were computed after Saaty and Kearn (1985). The average random consistency index values of different sample sizes are shown in table 1. The results of AHP can be taken as consistent if the value of CR is less than 10%, which means the response level is almost randomized.

3. Results

The present study was conducted between April, 2006 and November, 2009. The scores of CEVI for the 14 EDCs were calculated for 2008 and 2009 taking 2006 as the base or reference year. Here, 2008 and 2009 scores represent the pre and post-*Aila* situations respectively.

3.1. Constructed framework of vulnerability indicators

A framework of 7 major EVIs and associated 34 sub-indicators was constructed based on the opinions gathered from PRAs in the EDCs (Table 2). The experience and wisdom of the local key informants were given supreme importance in selecting these indicators. Moreover, opinions and suggestions of environmental experts and officials of West Bengal Forest Department were also taken into consideration while grouping these sub-indicators. The major EVIs relevant for the Sunderbans were found to be the depletion status of mangroves, loss of biodiversity, changes in livelihood activities, loss of village property, other local environmental problems, changes in land use patterns, and unsustainable tourism practices respectively. The EVI_1 related with the depletion status of mangroves had highest number (6) of sub-indicators while EVI_4 and EVI_7 had the lowest numbers (4). All the sub-indicators had been assigned relative ICs according to their impact potential under the respective EVIs.

3.2. Assigned weights through pair-wise comparisons

A survey of 55 mangrove environment experts was conducted for the pair-wise comparisons of all the 7 EVIs

under a five hierarchy scale. The experts belonged to different occupational groups, e.g. ecologists, professional foresters, government officials, researchers, land use planners, geographers and environmental journalists. From the mean values (S_{ij}) of their comparisons, a matrix of relative degree of seriousness for all pairs of EVIs had been constructed (Table 3). It was found from this analysis that the depletion status of mangroves (EVI_1) emerged as the indicator group with highest vulnerability potential which was 1.52 times greater than the second highest vulnerability index, i.e. changes in livelihood activities (EVI_3). These two EVIs were followed by EVI_2 , EVI_5 , EVI_4 , EVI_6 , and EVI_7 respectively. Interestingly, EVI_1 was found to be 4.3 times greater than the indicator with least vulnerability potential, i.e. EVI_7 . From these comparison scores, weights (WI_i) for all the EVIs were calculated with the help of equation (3). From the assigned weights, it became clear that experts considered meso-scale regional problems as of highest vulnerability status than those of local or global issues.

In addition, using the computed λ_{\max} (7.068) for the square matrix ($m = 7$) of pair-wise comparisons, the value of CR was calculated as 0.009 which was less than 10%. Therefore, the results of this analysis can be taken as consistent and reliable.

3.3. Vulnerability status of EDCs in 2008 and 2009

Vulnerability status of every EDC was assessed through the developed framework of indicators for 2006 first and then for 2008 and 2009. All the scores of indicators were normalized according to the scores of 2006. The CEVI scores of 2008 showed that while Bally and Satyanarayanpur were of highest vulnerability status, EDCs like Dulki, Sonagaon and Pakhiralaya had performed better to obtain least vulnerability scores (Table 4). Very high scores were obtained for EVI_2 (2.47), EVI_4 (2.12) in Bally EDC and for EVI_7 (2.04) in Mathurakhand EDC. High rate of deforestation, riverbank erosion and lesser rate of sustainable eco-tourism

practices probably led to the higher vulnerability scores in these EDCs. A notable deviation from the overall better status of performance of Pakhiralaya EDC was observed for EVI₇ with a surprisingly higher vulnerability score (1.31).

In 2009, the whole notion of vulnerability was drastically transformed due to utter destructions caused by the cyclone *Aila*. The assessment of the status of vulnerability, when conducted in the months of August-September, 2009 in the aftermath of *Aila*, revealed an altogether different scenario of devastation by the fury of nature. Although, the EDC villages of Dulki, Sonagaon, Dayapur and Pakhiralaya still obtained the better scores than the other EDCs, the overall vulnerability status for all the EDCs increased in manifold terms (Table 5). Lahiripur-Chargheri, Lahiripur-Santigachi, Bidhan Colony-Luxbagan and Bally were the most severely affected areas as highest number of casualties, destruction of riverside mangrove stands, death of domestic animals and loss of properties had been reported here. The cases of salt accumulation on the top soil of agricultural lands were greater in Enpur-Rajatjubilee, Amlamethi and Bijohnagar because most of the earthen embankments in these EDCs had been breached by saline flood water during the cyclone. Higher death rate of *Heritiera fomes* species (local name: Sundari) by means of 'top-dying' due to increased soil salinity levels had been reported from almost all the EDCs. Remarkably, rate of change in land use patterns were found to be becoming lesser in 2009 in some EDCs in comparison with that of 2006 and 2008 which indicated enhancing status of environmental awareness among the local people as well as better performance of legislative and administrative bodies like the Department of Forests.

3.4. Classification of EDCs by CEVI scores

All the EDCs were classified based on the CEVI scores of 2008 and 2009 into four groups (Table 6). In 2008, 2 EDCs (Satyanarayanpur and Bally) had obtained the status of highest vulnerability followed

by 1 moderately vulnerable (Jemspur) and 11 less vulnerable EDCs. There was no EDC in the not vulnerable group in terms of its performance. However, in 2009, while Jemspur and Bally were classified as highly vulnerable, 3 EDCs (Satyanarayanpur, Bidhan Colony-Luxbagan and Mathurakhand) obtained the status of moderate vulnerability. 7 EDCs still remained as less vulnerable because most of these EDCs did not show any significant change in their performances. Remarkably, Dulki and Dayapur were classified as not vulnerable. It was probably due to the fact that large scale creation of mangrove plantations along the river banks were conducted by the local communities in these EDCs which acted as barriers against the devastating *Aila* and the villages were, in turn, less affected and thus the vulnerability scores did not increase much. An analysis of the percentage change of CEVI scores from 2008 to 2009 was also performed to detect the temporal changes in the status of vulnerability of all the EDCs (Figure 2). Sonagaon, Jemspur and Pakhiralaya showed highest changes in their status of vulnerability with respect to the average change scores (49.88%). On the contrary, Bally and Satyanarayanpur exhibited less changes in their CEVI scores as these EDCs remained highly vulnerable throughout the study period. Rest of the EDCs showed more or less average changes in their CEVI scores.

4. Discussion

India is one of the highest vulnerable countries with respect to the climate change induced by the rise of sea levels, and the Sunderbans is going to be one of the most susceptible regions to its severest impacts (Ghosh, 2009). As observed from the present study, other micro and meso-scale environmental problems are also present in this region and aggravating the overall vulnerability status. Notably, the higher rate of depletion of mangrove covers from these riverine islands was inferred to be one of the prime determinants of vulnerability enhancement. Therefore, sustainable management of the remaining mangroves of

the Sunderbans is the immediate task and it cannot be achieved without properly addressing the socio-economic needs of the local communities living in these vulnerable areas. Hence, based on the analysis of vulnerability status of the EDCs, the following recommendations can be forwarded to increase the withstanding potential of these fragile habitats against environmental hazards:

- i. Healthy mangrove plantation with a width of at least 100 m should be raised along the riverbanks of all the islands followed by earthen embankments of 5-10 m.
- ii. Enhancement of utilization potential of the mangrove based non-timber forest products (NTFPs) with proper value addition and marketing strategies should be materialized in all the forest fringe villages.
- iii. Continuous awareness generation programme for local communities in favour of grass-root level conservation, initiatives and alteration of the exploitative attitude towards mangrove resources should be done on an immediate basis.
- iv. Initiation of eco-tourism activities should be encouraged in the EDC villages with proper infrastructural facilities.
- v. A comprehensive disaster management authority should be created for the entire Sunderbans as a nodal agency which will synchronize and implement the suggestions and directives forwarded by various government departments dealing with agriculture, forestry, fishery, meteorology, environment and social welfare as well as citizen groups, NGOs and local SHGs (Self Help Groups).

5. Conclusion

The present study recommends the necessity of adopting an interdisciplinary approach towards the sustainable management of the physical and human environment of the Sunderbans. Although it is obvious that complete protection and

immunity from environmental calamities is not possible in these vulnerable areas, significant minimization of the risk quotient can definitely be achieved if proper methods are adopted. In the coming days, planning, design, operation and maintenance of this fragile ecosystem will be a challenge not only for the state or national government but also to all the stakeholders comprising local grass-root people because the effectiveness of holistic development programmes are often directly linked to the reduction of environmental vulnerability in every spatio-temporal scale. Moreover, the applicability of the present framework of vulnerability indicators in assessing the condition of local communities indicates that this framework can become useful in field conditions for ordinary government personnel and concerned research persons engaged in disaster management and eventually accentuate the development of a roadmap of sustainable management of the Sunderbans.

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Table 1: Random consistency index (RI) of $m \times m$ matrix

m	1	2	3	4	5	6	7	8	9	10
RI	0	0	0.58	0.9	1.12	1.24	1.32	1.41	1.45	1.49

Source: Saaty and Kearn (1985)

Table 2: Developed framework of environmental vulnerability indicators

EVI_i	Sub-indicator (S_{ij})	Relative environmental impact coefficient (IC_{ij})
Depletion status of mangroves	S ₁₁ : Impact of cyclone / storm	0.20
	S ₁₂ : Impact of flood / sea surge	0.10
	S ₁₃ : Impact of 'top-dying'	0.25
	S ₁₄ : Impact of land reclamation	0.15
	S ₁₅ : Impact of logging / fuel-wood collection	0.15
	S ₁₆ : Impact of land submergence / water level rise	0.15
Loss of biodiversity	S ₂₁ : Death of wildlife	0.30
	S ₂₂ : Problems of salinization	0.15
	S ₂₃ : Problems of poaching	0.20
	S ₂₄ : Problems of prawn seed and crab collection	0.20
	S ₂₅ : Problems of illegal NTFPs collection	0.15
Changes in livelihood activities	S ₃₁ : Reduction in the amount of fish collection	0.30
	S ₃₂ : Reduction in the amount of prawn seed and crab collection	0.20
	S ₃₃ : Reduction in the amount of NTFPs collection	0.15
	S ₃₄ : Reduction in the amount of agricultural production	0.25
	S ₃₅ : Reduction in the amount of tourist inflow	0.10
Loss of village property	S ₄₁ : Impact of cyclone / storm	0.25
	S ₄₂ : Impact of flood / sea surge	0.35
	S ₄₃ : Impact of riverbank erosion	0.25
	S ₄₄ : Damage to river embankments	0.15
Other local environmental problems	S ₅₁ : Salt accumulation on the top soil of agricultural fields	0.25
	S ₅₂ : Rate of siltation in the inland rivers and canals	0.05
	S ₅₃ : Impact of groundwater pollution	0.15
	S ₅₄ : Rate of flood inundation / land degradation	0.25
	S ₅₅ : Deterioration in the quality of drinking water	0.30
Changes in land use patterns	S ₆₁ : Rate of change from mangrove to shrimp pond	0.20
	S ₆₂ : Rate of change from mangrove to agricultural land	0.30
	S ₆₃ : Rate of change from mangrove to other land uses	0.20
	S ₆₄ : Rate of change from agricultural land to shrimp pond	0.20
	S ₆₅ : Rate of change from agricultural land to waste land	0.10
Unsustainable tourism practices	S ₇₁ : Deterioration in the status of eco-tourism practices	0.15
	S ₇₂ : Cases of water pollution by tourist vessels / oil spills	0.25
	S ₇₃ : Cases of forest trespassing	0.25
	S ₇₄ : Cases of conflicts between villagers and tourists	0.35

Table 3: Matrix of pair-wise comparisons of EVIs and corresponding weights

EVI_i	Mangrove depletion	Loss of biodiversity	Changes in livelihood activities	Loss of village property	Other local environmental problems	Changes in land use patterns	Unsustainable tourism practices	Weight (W_i)
Mangrove depletion	1.000	2.060	1.520	2.830	2.470	3.640	4.300	0.280
Loss of biodiversity	0.485	1.000	0.806	1.940	1.380	2.900	3.550	0.170
Changes in livelihood activities	0.658	1.240	1.000	2.280	2.030	3.200	4.100	0.211
Loss of village property	0.353	0.515	0.439	1.000	0.870	1.690	2.470	0.102
Other local environmental problems	0.405	0.725	0.493	1.150	1.000	2.160	3.060	0.123
Changes in land use patterns	0.275	0.345	0.313	0.592	0.463	1.000	1.980	0.068
Unsustainable tourism practices	0.233	0.282	0.244	0.405	0.327	0.505	1.000	0.046
Sum	3.409	6.167	4.814	10.197	8.539	15.095	20.460	-
$\lambda_{\max} = 7.068$			CI = 0.011			CR = 0.009		

Table 4: CEVI scores of the EDCs in 2008


Name of the EDC	EVI score							CEVI score
	EVI ₁	EVI ₂	EVI ₃	EVI ₄	EVI ₅	EVI ₆	EVI ₇	
Amlamethi	0.96	0.82	1.29	0.85	1.00	1.06	0.94	1.004
Mathurakhand	1.03	0.91	1.17	1.01	1.10	1.04	2.04	1.096
Dulki	0.93	0.96	1.00	0.88	1.05	1.00	1.00	0.966
Sonagaon	0.89	0.83	0.85	0.93	0.87	0.92	0.75	0.867
Dayapur	1.11	1.00	1.00	1.00	1.00	0.91	0.80	1.016
Lahiripur-Chargheri	0.93	1.16	1.18	0.82	1.12	0.94	1.00	1.038
Lahiripur-Santigachhi	1.24	0.88	1.00	0.96	0.94	0.81	1.00	1.020
Enpur-Rajatjubilee	1.07	1.00	1.00	0.93	1.20	0.84	0.79	1.017
Bijohnagar	1.04	0.96	1.22	1.09	1.29	0.86	1.21	1.095
Bidhan Colony-Luxbagan	1.08	1.10	1.15	0.96	0.99	0.82	0.88	1.047
Satyanarayanpur	1.46	1.79	1.42	1.18	1.36	1.28	1.00	1.435
Pakhiralaya	0.89	0.90	1.00	1.00	1.00	0.92	1.31	0.961
Bally	1.92	2.47	1.61	2.12	1.46	1.47	1.93	1.883
Jemspur	1.01	1.00	1.28	1.31	1.00	1.51	1.00	1.128

Table 5: CEVI scores of the EDCs in 2009

Name of the EDC	EVI score							CEVI score
	EVI ₁	EVI ₂	EVI ₃	EVI ₄	EVI ₅	EVI ₆	EVI ₇	
Amlamethi	1.05	1.14	2.34	1.55	2.40	1.52	1.23	1.596
Mathurakhand	1.50	1.41	2.40	1.52	2.14	0.93	1.80	1.728
Dulki	1.38	1.20	1.54	1.30	1.96	1.09	1.26	1.421
Sonagaon	1.20	1.90	1.83	1.47	1.47	1.36	0.75	1.503
Dayapur	1.42	1.32	1.72	1.40	1.38	0.92	0.94	1.405
Lahiripur-Chargheri	1.45	1.35	1.81	1.60	1.71	1.49	1.41	1.559
Lahiripur-Santigachhi	1.99	1.18	1.55	1.38	1.85	1.50	1.41	1.618
Enpur-Rajatjubilee	1.49	1.07	1.69	1.38	2.57	1.54	1.17	1.570
Bijohnagar	1.27	1.18	2.17	1.83	2.35	1.04	1.41	1.626
Bidhan Colony-Luxbagan	1.30	1.47	2.50	1.56	1.38	1.56	1.58	1.650
Satyanarayanpur	1.60	1.91	2.12	1.83	1.78	1.33	1.00	1.763
Pakhiralaya	1.53	1.41	1.72	1.40	1.74	1.36	1.11	1.531
Bally	2.01	2.86	1.77	1.94	1.56	0.96	1.71	1.958
Jemspur	1.50	1.58	2.42	2.55	2.15	1.42	1.57	1.892

Table 6: Classification of EDCs based on CEVI scores

Vulnerability Status	EDCs' assessment status	
	2008	2009
Highly vulnerable	Satyanarayanpur, Bally	Bally, Jemspur
Moderately vulnerable	Jemspur	Satyanarayanpur, Bidhan Colony-Luxbagan, Mathurakhanda
Less vulnerable	Amlamethi, Mathurakhanda, Dulki, Sonagaon, Dayapur, Lahiripur-Chargheri, Lahiripur-Santigachhi, Enpur-Rajatjubilee, Bijohnagar, Bidhan Colony-Luxbagan, Pakhiralaya	Amlamethi, Sonagaon, Lahiripur-Chargheri, Lahiripur-Santigachhi, Enpur-Rajatjubilee, Bijohnagar, Pakhiralaya
Not vulnerable	-----	Dulki, Dayapur

**Figure 1: Location map of the study area**




Figure 2: Percentage changes of CEVI scores of the EDCs from 2008 to 2009

The Myth of the Shrinking State

Nayar, Baldev Raj (2009): *The Myth of the Shrinking State: Globalization and the State in India*, Oxford University Press, New Delhi, pp.286.

Contrary to the popular notion that the State in India is receding from the commanding heights that it occupied for a longer period of time, the book, titled '*The Myth of the Shrinking State :Globalization and the State in India*', written by Baldev Nayar argues that the nature of the State remains same, especially in absolute terms. The study embedded in the book picks up arguments and contests them with that of scholars of different persuasions ranging from liberalism to Marxism, who predicted the shrinking of state during the period of economic reforms. The book, a well-researched one which spans eight chapters begins with a discussion on the globalisation thesis on state and proceeds into debates on state intervention and its consequences, and thereafter deals with economic reforms and its macro level consequences. In the process, the study analyses the welfare and economic role of the State with the support of a rich mine of quantitative data, which in turn helps the author to reflect on various aspects such as fundamental continuity of the role of the state, especially pertaining to regulation, control, welfare functions and the nature of the State in the present setting of a growing economy in India.

Economic Reforms and Growth in India: The Continuation of the State

At a broader level, Baldev has put forward the argument that though the role of private sector has increased in the era of economic liberalization in India, the role of state has also increased in absolute terms. It is to be noted that by the end of the financial year 2007-08, India had become a trillion dollar economy, while its per capita income rose to \$ 1000. If the country can sustain the present growth rate, it is likely to transit, before too long, from the status of a low income to that of a lower middle-income

country (p.59). The author has identified certain areas of state intervention and compared the expenditure incurred by the state in the period of economic liberalization and the period proceeding to that. In all the areas which have been taken up for analysis, it has been found that state expenditure has gone up. This trend is contrary to the apprehensions raised by scholars in the early 1990s that State's role would shrink in the era of globalisation as state would find it difficult to generate necessary revenue for expending in social sector. The author holds the view that the sustained and accelerated economic growth coupled with tax reforms has equipped state with sufficient economic resources to intervene in the social sector.

Elaborating further on the State's economic and welfare roles, Nayar puts forth the argument that in the realm of four important quantitative indicators of state intervention - state's share in GDP, the state's role in taxation, the real worth of state expenditure and subsidies - it is clearly seen that there has been no decline in the economic and welfare roles of the state.¹ Even with regard to public investment, where there has been select decline - but only relative to the private sector and not substantially – the states' role has continued to expand in absolute terms at constant prices (p.105).

Similarly, the author views the increasing regulatory reforms, initiated by the central and state governments as yet another instance of Indian state redefining its role in the changing political and economic settings, without diluting its power attributes. Nayar argues that regulatory institutions cannot be equated with erosions of the state, they are merely indicative of a rearrangement within the state. Nor do they constitute any shrinking of the state; rather, they represent

the expansion of the state (p.151). He provides ample examples where in the government departments continue to dominate private players in the market by highlighting the dominance of the Department of Telecom (DoT) over Telecom Regulatory Authority of India (TRAI), the independent regulator of telecom sector in the country.

Similarly, on the question of public ownership, regulation and controls, Nayar argues that economic liberalization gave way for a significant change to 'the command and control system', which is manifested in the substantial removal of controls by way of licensing in industry. In his opinion, such changes have rejuvenated private sector and the consequent acceleration of economic growth (p.171). He further argues that the rejuvenation of private sector forced competition on public sector, which was forced to emulate the models of private sector, especially through the introduction of modern and innovative management techniques. The whole processes brought in greater revenues and profits for the efficiency of the state-owned enterprises; it even turned earlier loss-making Public Sector Enterprises (PSEs) into profit-making ones (p.172). In addition, he points out that the extra revenue led the Government of India to invest it in innovative social programmes such as National Rural Employment Guarantee Act (NREGA), the Jawaharlal Nehru National Urban Renewal Mission (JNNURM) and so on.

Apart from this, the author emphasises that growth acceleration, which is the single most important consequence of economic liberalization, has gone hand-in-hand with the rise in the share of savings and investment in GDP. While in its early phase, the growth was consumption-driven, in more recent years it has been investment driven. Economic liberalization thus generated a virtuous economic cycle. India's growth acceleration led by a reinvigorated private sector, during the period after liberalization, transformed both the way in which the world viewed India and also the way India viewed

itself. Interestingly, international organisations such as Organisation for Economic Co-operation and Development (OECD) changed India's status from a member of under-developed world to that of an emerging market.

In brief, Baldev Raj argues that, there has been some reconfiguring of the state through a shift from controls to regulation to cope with the greater economic complexity and with the increased competition in the economy in the areas that were monopolized by the public sector. However state still remains the dominant economic actor. In way, the welfare and other interventionist role for the social development continue to be delivered by the state, irrespective of the large scale entry of private sector. Such a trend can easily be deciphered from the increasing expenditure of state in health, education² and so on.

At the same time, the book argues that in spite of huge economic growth, the state in India is lagging behind in certain areas. For instance, internal security remains a concern and progress in the development of education and health has left a lot to be desired. The deterioration of state leadership is another area Nayar emphasised as arena which show disturbing trends. He cites innumerable reports and evidences to drive home his point of view along with testimonies from practising policy makers from the country.

An assessment

Though the book provides us with a macro-level picture of economic growth and the continuing role of state in the present setting, there are certain issues which need to be highlighted. First, the large scale inequality generated out of economic growth among various classes, regions and so on, has made intervention of state problematic. Similarly, exclusiveness associated with economic reforms, especially its tilt towards service sector and high-knowledge industry has made masses perceive the state differently. It is to be noted

that there has been an explicit neglect on the part of state towards agriculture and informal sectors of the economy, whose share is more than Ninety percent in the total work force. Such neglect has led to popular perception that public policies are predominantly elitist oriented and state is an apparatus in the hands of the rich. Such a perception of the people resulted in the defeat of the NDA government in 2004 in the general election, though the macro-economic indicators were at an all time high. Having stated a few exceptions to the major arguments outlined in the book, one can confidently say that the book has forcefully and convincingly argued the existence of a strong continuation of state with all its fundamental nature in India in the era of economic reforms characterised by the ongoing processes of globalisation. This academic volume is indeed a valuable contribution to the study of globalisation, political theory and political economy.

End Notes

1. In the years 2000-01 and 2005-06, the state's role in Gross Capital Formation (GCF) as a proportion of GDP remained the same – that is 6.9 per cent (p.73). Likewise, Tax-GDP ratio has increased from 10.12 per cent in 1990-01 to 11.4 per cent in 2006-07(p.76). On similar lines, the absolute value of total expenditure at constant prices shows a rising trend, increasing almost fourfold from Rs. 830.53 billion in 1978-09 to Rs. 3158.56 billion in 2003-04(p.84)
2. States' welfare intervention by way of its social sector expenditure has gone up in the period of economic reforms characterized by globalization. For instance, during the period of 2000-01, the share of education expenditure of GDP touched 4.27 per cent, an all time high. Similarly, expenditure on health rose to 0.91 per cent of GDP, a relatively high mark, as per Indian standards.

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Towards Security Convergence

Devare, Sudhir (2009): *India and Southeast Asia: Towards Security Convergence*, Institute of Southeast Asian Studies, Singapore, Capital Publishing Company, New Delhi. pp.xiv+252.

Stepping out of the cubism that appears to have engulfed recent thought and literature emanating out of intellectual circles on security and strategic thought, Sudhir Devare's 'India and Southeast Asia' emerges as a breath of fresh air. The present work surfaces as the avant garde, authoritatively muscling away dark clouds of homogeneity and gloomy monotones that mar the arena of strategic thinking in the sense of attempting to rise above and traverse beyond the barb wired realm of strategic studies that lies smothered in the labyrinth of geopolitics. Shrouded, more often than not, under the pall of Great Power play, the dominion of international politics and especially that of strategic studies views other overtures as mere appendages-corollaries to the inevitable logic of the actions undertaken by those very Great Powers. But Devare's work stands out as against this ennui when speaking vociferously of two ideas that primarily permeate his work. One being the concept of 'Goeconomics' occupying centre stage in contemporary strategic thinking and policy formulation and the other being the significance that he renders to one of the key partnerships in Asia- that of India and Southeast Asia. Vouching for this no-prosaic-partnership and its centrality and vitality in determining the contours that may shape Asia in the coming century, he showcases deep faith in its transnational visage and views it as the harbinger of progress which is in turn, quintessentially unique in its trajectory.

He platters his thoughts through seven exhaustive but nonetheless luminous chapters. Raising the historical scepter he brings it down on the cultural and trade links that existed between the geographical entities-India and the Southeast Asian countries since time immemorial. Resuscitating the link, it is seen in a continuum-a continuum in time, a continuum in space. The transformation from the ochre to azure and further is seamless. The umbilical cord that binds Southeast Asia to India, the author feels, is the distinctive 'South Asianness' that should be revoked in the new age. Giving an account of the new-fangled developments on the political as well as the economic fronts in the Southeast Asian countries and India in the post Cold War era, the author builds on the thought of how these advances pave the way for greater cooperation between India and Southeast Asia and further create avenues for exploration.

Cementing together the nascent thoughts aforementioned, the author moves on to etch and chart out concretely the areas of convergence of Southeast Asia and India on concerns over security. These range over a broad spectrum and infill the crevices of the non-traditional concerns along with those of the traditional ones. Any tome on security issues would be rendered incomplete if the bugle is not blown on these non-traditional facets of security and the author with much rigor sheds light on them both. An expose that so brilliantly and subtly blends them

both and harbors them under the same roof and with equal ingenuity conveys them through the dialogue of the book remains as yet unseen.

Dwelling to some extent on traditional security concerns of both entities-India as well as Southeast Asia, which include the Balance of Power in the Indian Ocean Rim and the power games of regional and extra-regional powers and Super powers, the book probes much deeper into the playfield of the non-traditional which extends to include energy security, human rights, food security, environmental security and so forth. Identifying these areas of convergences as avenues of future cooperation, Devare goes on to elaborate the multilateralism that marks the policies of the Southeast Asian nations and India in dealing with these issues.

The alacrity and fluidity that multilateralism entails is well showcased in the defense cooperation and security initiatives of these nations as arising within the ambit of bilateral relations or regional forums such as the ASEAN Regional Forum (ARF); wherein despite having thwarted sanguine aspirations and expectations of the Southeast Asian nations, India had the space to explicate its stand which led to the forum coming heavily upon the attitude of the P5. The canvas is replete with similar examples. Despite the chagrin that China and some Southeast Asian nations find themselves in vis-à-vis the islands in the South China Sea, the caveat was overridden and a successful Manila Declaration of 1992 saw the light of the day. One may also mention the thriving accommodation of existing divergences of opinion amongst India, China and the Southeast Asian countries regarding U.S. engagement, environment, increasing Chinese clout and so on.

After coining convergences, the author does not propel any further but spreads wings horizontally and proffers an account of the marauding maritime issues of the Indian Ocean, stretching from the Southeast Asian nations to East African ones. Commonplace issues of maritime terrorism, piracy, drug, arms and human trafficking figure in every report but commendable on the part of this work is that it compels attention to newfound and hence pressing concerns of environmental safety, disaster management, fisheries and so on. The prognosis for the former is well available, however, the latter concerns are yet, to a great extent untouched. Having singled out the disease, the author prescribes sanguine positive and normative remedial initiatives. Critically analyzing systems and logistics already in place such as the IMO, the SOLAS and the CSI, he calls for the extension of national hands in support of initiatives such as the 'Distance Support' and the reinvigoration of the IOR-ARC.

This is followed by an elucidation of recent economic upsurges and downturns in Southeast Asia as well as in India and China and Devare makes a strong case in support of the possibilities of cooperation between the nations of this region, including the fields of flexible financial and monetary regimes. This is much in opposition to recent literature that plays off the inroads that China and India together can make into progress. Devare, quite audaciously by realistic terms of international politics, holds that the key to a peaceful, prosperous and progressive Southeast Asia lies in constructive engagement and cooperation amongst the two major powers India and China; a bundle of advantages would be concomitant to this relationship.

Having said this, Devare moves forward, on an apparently predestined path

of cooperative security and democratization. Thus, in chapter five, he not only roils up the age old debate of democratization and economic globalization, he dishes it out with an appetizer of cooperative security. He maintains that the pre requisite to cooperation in defense and security arrangements as well as economic communication is freedom from fear and apprehension and this is at best achieved with democratization. This occurs higher up in the agenda given the tremendous socio-economic upheaval and tumult being witnessed by sanguine nations of the Indian Ocean Rim. Threats from terrorism, separatism, ethnic violence have all raised their ugly heads in nations such as Thailand and Myanmar. Democratization under these circumstances assumes further significance as it helps reiterate the distinctly Southeast Asian 'Bhinneka Tunggal Eka' (*Unity in Diversity*) identity in the face of growing radicalization of Islam in primarily tolerant Southeast Asian Muslim nations and the massive impoverishment of ethnic minorities. Quoting the Indian Diaspora he urges them to assist their convergence with the culture of their homelands and contribute productively in terms of both-ethics and economics and render possible the fusion that he envisages of Southeast Asia and India.

Lastly, he mentions another avenue of cooperation that calls for immediate and adequate attention. Citing the Myanmar case, he chalks out a positive interventionist role to be played by India and Southeast Asia so as to allow normalcy to dawn. Though despite strong western sanctions, ASEAN

countries, India and China (most consistently), are engaging with Myanmar, Devare belabors the idea of how this engagement may be molded towards the better-that is towards democratization. The Southeast Asian nations and India have adopted a wait and watch policy towards the initiatives towards democratization, which the author thinks should be furthered fruitfully.

As a chronological summation to it all, Devare maintains that this convergence of Southeast Asia and India has come a full circle, starting right from Bandung. This cooperation is a lived reality of what was once a reverie. In underscoring the convergences, unearthing the divergences with a ripe passion for converting them into areas of cooperation between the two entities and uncovering the nuances, the work has left no stone unturned whilst striving towards the goal of forging a mature and enduring relationship. Through the consultation and consensus approach India and Southeast Asia envisage tackling an entire gamut of issues. The work ushers the reader into understanding vividly the success of the same and foresees a similarly bright future, thus rendering the dream of the 'Asian Century' so amplified, lived and real that any negation or denial of it seems impossible.

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Stateless in South Asia

Singh, Deepak K (2010): *Stateless in South Asia: The Chakmas between Bangladesh and India*, Sage Publication, India, pp.289.

The *Stateless in South Asia* by Deepak K. Singh comprising nine chapters is the only book from India I could say that deals with stateless refugees as a central theme. It is forwarded by Ramchandra Guha, and suggests that, most of the people who are writing on the issue related to northeast are mainly outsider and never born in the particular states. Indian scholars have tended to work on their linguistic or geographical regions. This book focuses on the Myron Weiner, thesis on how Chakmas become a rejected people in the Chittagong Hill Tract (Bangladesh) and unwanted in Arunachal Pradesh (India).¹ The study mainly examines the interactions between the displaced Chakmas and the tribes of Arunachal Pradesh. The book historically explored the human predicament of one of the earliest episode of mass displacement in the history of modern South Asia which made a very holistic study of what turned out to be one of the most intractable refugee issues.

India has been the home to a large number and different types of refugees throughout the past.² India has dealt with the issues of refugees on a bilateral basis. India's refugee regime generally confirms to the international instruments on the subject without, however, giving a formal shape to all practices adopted in a form of separate statute. The current position in India is that they are dealt with under the existing Indian laws, both general as well as special, which is applicable to all the foreigners who came to India over a period of time. This is only because there is no separate law and policies to deal with refugees. India does not have on

its statute book a specific and separate law to govern refugees.

The Chakma influx into India can be traced to the partition of the sub-continent. From the beginning, inconsistency and political expediency governed India's CHT policy. Until the 1970's, its policy vis-à-vis Chakmas was lackadaisical and short-sighted. The first influx of the refugees took place shortly after partition when 40,000 Chakma families fled to India. Having housed and absorbed a large number of non-Muslims Chakmas from East-Pakistan, India rehabilitated them first in North Indian states and latter to the North Eastern states of India. The manageable number of the Chakmas, their widespread dispersal in the sparsely populated Northeast and their ethnic proximity largely mitigated any potential for opposition from the state government and civil society groups. Further more, absorption was feasible partly because ethnic consciousness in the Northeast was still in its infancy. In the region human rights violation is also in peak, and very common. For example Chakmas' children have no right to get admission in schools, they are not allowed to get government jobs, public distribution system is denied, trading license being cancelled, markets are not allowed to sell their goods, medical facilities are completely stopped, and electricity, drinking water roads etc are completely blocked.³ India's refugee regime is yet to evolve a transparent framework linking rights, laws and policies. It results in great prevarication between policies and practices. Treatment of refugees widely differs in India from state to

state and is subject to much pressure from civil society groups.

Though Singh by training is a political scientist he also draws innovatively upon the work of anthropologists, sociologist and historians. His first take is to show the case of Chakmas as the first victims of environmental/developmental displacements. He mainly focuses on the political and religious persecutions which affect the lives of displaced persons. This book shows how the issue of citizenship is being played in a democratic country like India. Book suggests very strongly the Chakmas of Arunachal Pradesh do not want to be the second class citizens like the Dalits, Adivasis and Muslims⁴. Equally important on the issue of hosting Arunachalees relating to their growing fears of cultural annihilation in the wake of Chakmas are politically glorified in the region. Chakmas are largely settled in the three districts of Arunachal Pradesh particularly, Changlang, Papumpare and Lohit sub-divisions. In 2004 some 1,497 Chakmas were included in the voter list during BJP regime but latter withdrawn by the Congress regime due to All Arunachal Pradesh Student Union (AAPSU's) protest.⁵ In 2002, the State Government of Arunachal Pradesh granted citizenship to the ninety Tibetan refugees' families of Shyo village living in Tawang district of Arunachal Pradesh bordering China who came very late then Chakmas. The State government cites the East Bengal Regulation Act of 1873 for forcible deportation of the Chakmas and Hajongs. The 1873 Act requires taking of prior permission before entering into Arunachal Pradesh. However, the Chakmas who fled from CHT did not go to Arunachal Pradesh on their own. They were taken to NEFA (present Arunachal Pradesh) by the Central Government with a view to permanently settle there.⁶

Most of the refugee studies rarely go beyond the concerns of the displaced people who are doubtless of genuine care and understanding. However, the fact is that it is rarely acknowledge and assume centre stage in all dialogue and negotiation with the states from where the refugees arrive. Some of the very key issue of the study shows that the stateless peoples and refugees in South Asia in general and Arunachal Pradesh in particular are solely responsible for the status of refugees in the region. Today modern nation-state in South Asia rarely gives any attention to solve the problem to restore peace in the region and allow both the groups to live with dignity. Singh provides in all his chapters the detail account of the conflicts between the Chakmas and the Arunachalees. The authenticity of the book is mainly lies with the methodology particularly the primary data's, personal interviews, reports published and court cases.

One can disassociate from the book by saying that, the data work is not done properly. It is lacking on the part of the issue related to citizenship and various citizenship amendments. It does not have any comparative study of other stateless refugees within India and Bangladesh. The author also did not touch upon the role of UNHRCR and NHRC on the issue related to the Chakmas and their rights in the region. Newcomers may get lost in the sophistication, subtleties and details of chapters that sometimes lose touch with Indian realities. But some times this type of study brings a very concrete and clear understanding about the excluded community in relation to the issue of citizenship.

This book will to help researchers of different streams and subjects to explore and know the areas which always isolated and unknown to other parts of the states of northeast India. The author wrote this book,

keeping in mind the need for useful resources for scholars and students of politics, international relations, sociology, anthropology, history, policy makers and lawyers to critically think about issues related to statelessness, citizenship, migration, displacement and so on. From an outsiders' point of view, Singh effectively accomplished the task of providing hopes to both the Chakmas and Arunachalees and opening a very strong debate by questioning why there is no solution even after 50 years of refugee hood. However, the book remains very rich which illuminates the real aspects of Indian society, past and present, particularly as far as Arunachal Pradesh is concerned.

References

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