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The Political Economy of 'shift' in India's Foreign Policy: A Brief Note

Mohanan B Pillai & P M Joshy

Abstract

The political economy aspect of NAM seems to be the less explored area of any study. Most often a discussion on NAM revolves around the theme "independent foreign policy of newly emerging nations." However, it should be noted that the foreign policy of a country shall not be independent, because it is the reflection of the both internal as well as the external pressures. As far as India was concerned, the foreign policy during the Nehru era was so dominated by the question: how to sustain a full-fledged capitalist development legitimately under state tutelage, and how to posit India in the new web of nation-states as a nation with a difference? Ideologically, it enunciated counter hegemonic postures in foreign policy, but basically it was playing in the lap of the world capitalist system.

The present study is an attempt to elucidate the complex relations between the currents of the world capitalist system and India's foreign policy ever since India's independence. It is observed that the ruling class has been using foreign policy as a tool for 'silencing' people and implementing their economic agenda in society. Historically, social systems have been exclusionary, oppressive and exploitative. It has also been generating both hegemonic and counter hegemonic strategies. The ruling class is always inclined towards system maintenance. In this process they have been using different strategies to 'silence' those marginalized sections and ultimately legitimize themselves through so-called democratic strategies. The dominant sections are seeking legitimacy for governing the rest of the people through different discourses and the excluded are using counter hegemonic measures to make the system more 'inclusive.' However, an understanding of this process needs an analysis of how the capitalist system has been working and how national economies revolve around a centripetal power- the world capitalist system. This study will exemplify how the capitalist system in its welfare capitalist phase and the neoliberal global setting sustains its legitimacy and how the foreign policy of India is entwined with the movement of such systemic forces.

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Under the neoliberal global regime, there is a concerted effort to posit the economic over the political in all areas of statecraft and development thinking. The politics of development and its correlation with foreign policy is discarded from day-to-day discussions. This academic position is also a part of the prevailing global capitalist agenda. The end of the Cold War, specifically the demise of Soviet Communism has created an intellectual vacuum and uncertainty in society. This has been celebrated by the liberal intelligentsia as a victory of western liberal economy and polity. According to Fukuyama it is “the end of History,” the “end point of mankind’s ideological evolution” and western democracy is the “final form of human government” (see Fukuyama 1992). With the disintegration of Soviet Union, the United States asserted itself as the World Policeman. Under US imperialism the texture of international politics changed a lot. However, the end of the Cold War brought about a legitimacy crisis in American foreign policy. During the Cold War, US foreign policy was legitimized on the ground of its ideological war against Soviet communism. However, incidents that took place on the 11th of September moulded US foreign policy in quite a different manner. New connotations like “war on terrorism” got prominence with an intellectual support from Samuel P. Huntington’s celebrated book *The Clash of Civilizations*, which became the Magna Carta of an aggressive US foreign policy. US imperialism has been using its foreign policy as a tool for implementing its economic agenda across the Third world. In this scenario, the Third World states are forced more and more to adjust their economies and polities in accordance with the interests of a changing global capitalist system. Given this background, we are trying to take a bird’s eye view of India’s foreign relations from the past to the present.

In the aftermath of these developments, foreign policy elites and political parties of centrists and rightist ideologies perceive that a subordinate status under US hegemony is the only way to satisfy the developmental needs of India. There is another argument which brings about an alternative to the emerging critical scenario and that is, India should develop its soft power capabilities to the maximum and assert its distinct identity through the soft power option. However, it is doubtful whether enhancing of its soft power capabilities would ever help India engage in a positive manner without losing its autonomy and independence. It is ironic that India is still pursuing its ‘go out’ policy in the current scenario of a global economic melt-down. Because of the global economic debacle, the first world countries have adopted more protectionist policies. India’s “Look East” policy is the finest example of its immature assessment of the current developments in global affairs (see Harilal 2009). At the same attempts to integrate South Asia economically and politically have been in vain and have always been eroded by bilateral issues and the suspicious psyche of the neighboring countries regarding India’s possible hegemony.

II

There is an argument that the end of the ideological clash or the end of the super power rivalry gave sufficient space for the states of South Asia to formulate "independent" foreign policy. It should be noted that the foreign policy of a nation can never be independent. It is the reflection of the interest of the class alliance within the state and the demands or pressures from the world capitalist core. As far as South Asia is concerned bilateral issues dominate over all other aspects of state dealings. It is embedded with the question of 'nation building' and the 'regime legitimacy' of the ruling class. In this background the interests of the native bourgeoisie to economically integrate South Asian countries in order to cope with economic globalization, is being thwarted by historically hostile relations based on the plurality of the social system in the region. The ascendant 'neoliberal globalism' brings forth an 'apolitical' developmental pattern in which the modern states are transposed and informal networks in the name of "civil society" are accentuated. Through this structural change global capitalist forces have been trying to integrate every nook and corner of regional systems into the logic of market capitalism. The aim of the native bourgeoisie therefore is more collaboration with foreign capital along with a simultaneous search for a safe position within regional systems. However, foreign policy elites are less concerned with this type of systemic play. The politics of the present developmental patterns are brushed under the carpet and focus is retained only on a set of foreign policy discourses which bring forth superficial conclusions.

In fact, US imperialism is not only working through its economic policies and programs but also through its political/ideological/cultural underpinnings which are to be understood. An understanding of an economic system needs thinking on how the system has been sustaining itself legitimately in society. Both the political, cultural and ideological institutions play a vital role to make the system legitimate. The foreign policy of a country cannot be detached from the very nature of its economic system. The widely acclaimed position of the makers and the practitioners of foreign policy is that the external policy of a state is concomitant with its 'national interest.' In fact, in the modern post-Westphalian state system, the national interest is giving into the interest of the bourgeoisie or the dominant class alliance. This could only be understood by analyzing the historical evolution of the national bourgeoisie or the class configuration in the society and how the system is revolving around the capitalist system. National economies are in a way linked to the capitalist core. The developments in the core have repercussions on the national economies. So a policy shift has clear-cut economic backgrounds which are most often underestimated in the "formal" foreign policy circles.

III

The countries of Asia and Africa got independence in the aftermath of the Second World War. In the West, social transformation led to the moulding of a bourgeois state. Quite differently, the newly independent states of the east experienced a state-led “social transformation,” (Kaviraj 1997: 77) which was very dominant during the welfare capitalist phase. The elites of these countries spoke about “national interest” “national development” “national security” “independent foreign policy” in a two pronged language, that is, on the one hand it ensured the sustained growth of native capitalism under state patronage and on the other it succeeded in retaining regime legitimacy.

In India, the charismatic leadership of Jawaharlal Nehru, especially his consensual language had a somewhat ‘silencing effect’ on the Indian socio-political system. The Nehru government formally selected a ‘midway’ between the two models of development, capitalist and the socialist that prevailed in the post-war period. This midway position of Nehru and his justification for it can be depicted with a quotation from his speech: “We cannot have a welfare state in India with all the socialism or even communism in the world unless our national income goes up greatly. Socialism or communism might help you to divide our existing wealth, if you like, but in India, there is no existing wealth for you to divide, there is only poverty to divide. It is not a question of distributing the wealth of the few rich men here and there” (Nehru 2007:557). The basic assumption is that high level development of productive forces is an essential prerequisite for socialized distribution. Here Nehru equated wealth in terms of modern infrastructural facilities, high level capitalist production and a hike in the GDP growth. He had simplified the persisting social realities in India with an argument that heavy industrialisation would replace caste, religious identities with a class based identity. However, the principle of universal suffrage and equal voting rights were unable to create a cohesive electorate guided by rational self-interests and above the influence of its religious or caste based identities. In short the Indian state succeeded in preserving the pre-capitalist power centers and under state patronage the capitalist class ensured protectionist development.

In fact, Nehru’s foreign policy cannot be detached from his domestic policy. He adopted a ‘consensual pattern of capitalist development’ in the country and promulgated a foreign policy which was concomitant with the interests of the native bourgeoisie. The foreign policy is a tool for the national elites to sustain regime legitimacy. India emerged as a modern nation state within an ideologically divided world. The world was divided into two ideological blocs, the US led liberal capitalist bloc and the USSR led socialist bloc. There were movements

across the world for a socialist change. To some extent, the people of the newly emerged states of Asia and Africa were fascinated by socialist ideas and the prospects of a socialist change. The elites of the country envisaged a somewhat state-led socialist transformation. In the name of "national development," "national interest," "national security", the ruling class "silenced" the historically marginalized sections like the Dalits and Adivasis. However, in the process, social transformation and land reforms slowed down and the condition of deprived sections remained pathetic (Palshikar 2004). Viewed thus, Nehru's proclaimed Non-Aligned foreign policy was most probably aimed to accrue adequate infrastructural facilities from the world nations to accelerate native capitalist development. It is a fact that ethically Nehru was unable to contempt socialist values because it was deep rooted in the nationalist struggle. By adding socialist flavors to capitalist development, in the welfare capitalist phase, the Indian bourgeoisie sustained a legitimate capitalist development with state patronage.

The political economy aspect of NAM seems to be the less explored area of any study. Most often a discussion on NAM revolves around the theme "independent foreign policy of newly emerging nations." However, it should be noted that the foreign policy of a country shall not be independent, because it is the reflection of the both internal as well as the external pressures. As far as India was concerned, the foreign policy during the Nehru era was so dominated by the question: how to sustain a full-fledged capitalist development legitimately under state tutelage, and how to posit India in the new web of nation-states as a nation with a difference? Ideologically, it enunciated counter hegemonic postures in foreign policy, but basically it was playing in the lap of the world capitalist system.

IV

In the second half of the twentieth century, the world capitalist system has undergone a shift from welfare capitalism to the corporate techno-capitalist phase called neoliberalism. The crisis in the Fordist regime led to the post-Fordist restructuring of the world capitalist economy. Reaganomics in the US and the Thatcher regime in UK changed state-society relations and from there started the regime of neoliberalism (see Harvey 2005). Neoliberalism is not putting forward any methodological solutions to address crucial issues like widening economic and social disparities between the north and the south. The Neo-Marxist especially the Dependency school raises highly relevant questions and the liberal perspectives fail to address them. In fact, the disintegration of Soviet Union, the global technological changes etc., boosted up the process of economic globalisation. Coincidentally the Washington/post-Washington consensus dictated the Third World countries to structurally adjust their economy and polity in accordance

with the interests of world finance capital. Under the neoliberal global regime, the role of the state has changed into being a mere facilitator of global finance capital. It has grown out of age-old *laissez faire* economism of Adam Smith to “market fundamentalism” (Somers & Block 2005) under the neoliberal siege bringing forth the total alienation of the working class.

In the post cold war era US became the pinnacle of the world capitalist power structure. America has been sustaining its hegemony not only through its economic and military capabilities but also through ideas and ideologies. American imperialism has been exporting a particular version of democracy which has a clear-cut economic agenda. The capitalist system has been working so complexly and it has been generating many ‘tension absorbing systems’ to smoothen the path of finance capital. The prevalent politics is that the capitalist core under US leadership generates a “common sense,” that there is no alternative to liberal ideas and its institutions. This is the way it has been trying to sustain its hegemony in world affairs. In such a scenario, foreign policy experts in the Third World seem to be in a big dilemma and as a result, superficial conclusions are made. Those who are attempting to reinvent the “legacies” of NAM overlook the exact politics of such movements in the welfare capitalist phase. This perspective draws no attention towards understanding the nature of the emerging capitalist phase and the role of the state in the system. In the neoliberal period the native bourgeoisie is inclined towards more cooperation with foreign capital and it has been using the state machinery and setting such foreign policy so as to make more ventures with other states. In the pragmatic sense, some experts are blindly supporting economic and military cooperation with the US and more integration with the global capitalist economy. However, it should be noted that the tightening of integration with the ‘core’ only facilitates a subordinate status for the ‘periphery.’

Foreign policy is an arena from where common people are totally discarded. The overall discourses structured around the questions “national security” “national interest” are all the realms that the post-colonial elite utilized for legitimizing their rule by demarcating between ‘us’ and ‘them.’ During the welfare capitalist phase the overall political practices tended to ‘silence’ the working class and legitimately implement the capitalist agenda in society. In many ways, it suppressed the unrest among the working class. It is very important to understand how the capitalist system has been appropriating people’s unrest and ultimately silencing them. Globalization is accompanied by much structural violence and mobilization in civil society. Today, mobilizations in the civil society are labeled as the new-social movements, which are characterized by its ‘apolitical’ nature. These movements are basically non-violent and based on the strong assumption that ‘without capturing the state power the existing perverted world system can be changed.’ The post-colonial/postmodernist ideas are giving

epistemic support to such movements. Here, it is very important to understand the linkage between liberalism and postmodernism. Amin pointed out that: "The ideological discourse of postmodernism is sustained by.....recuperating every common prejudice produced by the disarray characteristic of moments such as ours, it methodologically lays out, without concern for overall coherence, one argument after another encouraging suspicion towards the concepts of progress and universalism. But far from deepening the serious critique of these expressions of enlightenment culture and bourgeois history, far from analyzing its contradictions, which are aggravated by the obsolescence of the system, this discourse is satisfied with substituting the impoverished propositions of liberal American ideology for a true critique: 'live with your time', 'adapt to it', "manage each day"- that is , abstain from reflecting on the nature of the system, and particularly from calling into question its choice of the moment "(Amin 2004:20).

The postmodern/neoliberal understanding is also an attempt to commodify the cultural capital of a society through civil societal activism. Though there are some resistant movements, mobilizations in the civil society are not going beyond a space. It has been scattering the working class and thwarting the process of coming up with a unified working class movement. At the same time, neoliberalism has been forwarding a neo-Tocquevillean notion of civil society being filled with donor aided NGO networks. The politics of NGO activism is concomitant with the agenda of the smooth implementation of neoliberal policies in the Third World. These networks have been employed as 'tension absorbing systems.' Without understanding these types of under flows many foreign policy experts strongly support the new version of "civil society" for strengthening and deepening democracy across national frontiers. The attempt to bypass the state with civil society institutions is also a world capitalist agenda. It is so evident in World Bank reports (see World Bank 1997:116).

V

In the above discussions it is very clear that the nature of the nation state and class configuration in the society and its relations with the world capitalist core are the major determinants of the foreign policy of a nation. In fact global imperialist hegemony is working through the entire gamut of liberal ideas and institutions like WTO, World Bank, IMF, various International Organizations, NGO networks, the cultural industry, funded academic activities etc. It is the time to challenge the established 'common sense' propagated by liberal ideology and its institutions, which are claiming that the only panacea to the ills of the society and ultimately global peace, is the liberal international world order. However, liberalism still does not forward an adequate package which has the capability to answer questions of widening

disparities in international development, specifically the widening gap between the haves and the have-nots both at the national and the international realm. The debates over rejuvenating the NAM as a counter hegemonic strategy for a new world order overlook the very politics of NAM during the welfare capitalist phase. The post-Cold War era can be imagined as an arena where like minded states come together as a counter hegemonic force, hesitating to subjugate their autonomy to American imperialist interests. However, the interests of the ruling classes are quite contrary to this proposition. The Indian bourgeoisie leans more towards global capitalism and at the same time it strives to integrate South Asia economically, in order to safeguard its interests in a globalised environment. But in South Asia, preoccupation with discussing bilateral issues and the constraints of nation-building distracts attention from this vital factor that shapes India's foreign policy.

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India and Pakistan: Chasing the Horizons of Discord and Concord

Nalini Kant Jha & Subhash Shukla

Abstract

The present paper attempts to answer these and related questions. The paper begins with a brief summing up of India-Pakistan discord since 1947 to 2008 and then makes an overview of the issues and factors that prevent concord between the two States. An attempt thereafter has been made to discuss alternative approaches to peace building with Pakistan. The paper ends with a sober note that until and unless the international community helps in real empowerment of the civilian Government in Pakistan, which is able to subordinate the Pakistani army, intelligence agencies and jihadist groups, peace and cooperation between New Delhi and Islamabad may continue to be a mirage.

After suspension of dialogue with Pakistan since the terrorist attack in Mumbai on November 26, 2008, India has resumed once again the talks with Islamabad. Foreign Secretaries of the two countries met in Islamabad during June 23-24, 2011. Whether this new beginning is going to be in any way different from previous attempts to mend fences with Pakistan? What are main stumbling blocks that prevent evolving of friendly or at least normal relations between these two South Asian neighbors? Why common bonds of geography, history, society, and above all, shared destiny are not able to bring them closer? What should be India's strategy to deal with this tough neighbour? The present paper attempts to answer these and related questions. The paper begins with a brief summing up of India-Pakistan discord since 1947 to 2008 and then makes an overview of the issues and factors that prevent concord between the two States. An attempt thereafter has been made to discuss alternative approaches to peace building with Pakistan. The paper ends with a sober note that until and unless the international community helps in real empowerment of the civilian Government in Pakistan, which is able to subordinate the Pakistani army, intelligence agencies and jihadist groups, peace and cooperation between New Delhi and Islamabad may continue to be a mirage.

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II

Despite India's attempt to develop cordial ties with its significant neighbour, Pakistan, peace has eluded Indo-Pak relations ever since partition of the sub-continent and their emergence as separate states in 1947. Probably, the conditions that led to partition and the way in which partition was brought about generated enough doubts and suspicions amongst the two countries, which have clouded their bilateral relations till now. The division of territories and the migration of people from one side to another, accompanied by communal violence, generated a trust deficit, which both the countries have not been able to bridge so far.

The discontent with the division of territories led to the invasion of Kashmir by the tribals with the help of the Pakistani army in 1947. Ever since then, Pakistan has not accepted the accession of the former Princely State of Jammu and Kashmir to India. This subsequently led to the war of 1965. The Tashkent Pact signed between the two countries with the mediation of the former USSR in January 1966 failed to establish peace between them. In 1971, another war took place between the two countries, which led to the creation of Bangladesh after a humiliating defeat of Pakistan (Jha 2002 a: Chapter-V).

The signing of the Shimla Agreement in 1972 thereafter and the subsequent release of 90,000 Prisoners of War by India, it was hoped, would settle the territorial dispute between the two countries. Mrs. Indira Gandhi, the then Indian Prime Minister, hoped that Pakistan would recognize the Line of Control (LoC) as an international border. This hope was based on her verbal understanding reached with the Pakistani leader, Zulfikar Ali Bhutto, who backed out as soon he stabilized his position in Pakistan (Dixit 1998:111-112).

With the coming to power of Gen. Zia-ul-Haq, the Pakistani ruling establishment tried to avenge the defeat of Bangladesh. This led them to initiate and support secessionist movements first in Punjab and Assam in 1980s and then in Jammu and Kashmir since 1989. At the same time, the Soviet intervention in Afghanistan in 1979 led to the renewed arms supplies to Pakistan by the United States of America, which led to an arms race in the Indian subcontinent. Thus from 1980 onwards, though there was no direct confrontation between the two countries till 1999, Islamabad launched a low intensity or a proxy war against India.

The conduct of nuclear tests by India in the summer of 1998 and the subsequent nuclear tests conducted by Pakistan on 28th May, 1998 raised fears of a nuclear holocaust in the South Asian region. Hence, the then Indian Prime Minister, Atal Behari Vajpayee, tried to lessen the tensions through his bus diplomacy and signing the Lahore Declaration on 21st February 1999. However, while this initiative was in progress, the Pakistani army was busy with making secret intrusions into the Indian Territory perhaps without prior information to the civilian Government in Pakistan. This led to the Kargil conflict in May-June 1999. Thanks to the bravery of the Indian army, neutrality of China and pressure of the Clinton administration,

Pakistan declared an end to hostilities in Kargil (Shukla 2007: 252; Jha 1999 a; 1999 b: 1-7; 2000 a: 36-43).

Undaunted by failure of his bus diplomacy and the Kargil perfidy by Rawalpindi (military headquarters of Pakistan), Prime Minister A. B. Vajpayee invited Gen. Pervez Musharraf, who had come to power after toppling the civilian Government of Nawaj Sharif in October 1999, to Agra, the historical Indian town of Tajmahal, the symbol of love. Both the leaders met there in August 2001. However, the Agra Summit also ended in a fiasco due to the insistence of both sides on what should be the priority for their talks. While the Pakistani side insisted on the Kashmir dispute, the Indian side insisted on the checking of the cross border terrorism for any forward movement of peace talks between the two sides. The divergence of opinion of both sides on these two issues led to the failure of the Agra summit (Jha 2002 b: 49-68; Mohan 2003: 179).

Soon after, on 13th December, 2001, there was a terrorist attack on Indian Parliament which saw the relations between the two countries reaching to the nadir and subsequently leading to the largest troop deployment by India at its border with Pakistan. The two countries were again on the brink of another war in June 2002 because of terrorist attack at Kaluchak in India. As the US was worried about the possibility of nuclear exchange between the two countries, Washington exerted pressure on both of them to maintain peace (Jha 2003 a: 97-112; 2003 b: 56-73).

The terrorist attack on the US symbols of sovereignty in New York on September 9, 2001 and surfacing of evidence of the Pakistani connections with the Al-Qaeda extremists, who carried out the attack, convinced Washington about the dangers of terrorism to the world and the US. Hence, the Bush administration put more pressure on Islamabad / Rawalpindi for dismantling the infra structure of terrorism radiating from Pakistani soil. This led to President Musharraf's statement in January 2002 (Shukla 2007: 283) wherein he condemned terrorism or violence of any sort for any cause anywhere in the world, including Jammu and Kashmir. On the sidelines of the SAARC summit in Islamabad in January 2004, both sides decided to move forward the peace process and resume the composite dialogue. Pakistan agreed to create a violence free atmosphere, India promised to negotiate on the Kashmir question, and together the two sides would take steps to normalize the bilateral relationship (Jha 2002 b: 49-68; Mohan 2009). This led to the resumption of contacts between both sides of Kashmir.

The 26/11 terrorist attacks in Mumbai in 2008, however, severely damaged the peace process. The Indian side again accused the Pakistani Government of not taking enough action against those either indulging in terrorist violence in India or those who were supporting it. It expressed its disappointment and displeasure over the Pakistani Government's unwillingness to restrain the agencies and groups indulging in terrorist operations in India. Though they decided to resume the ministerial and foreign secretary level dialogue, the peace process got once again

stalled upon the two issues of stoppage of cross border terrorism and the resolution of the Kashmir dispute.

III

If we review relations between India and Pakistan over the last six decades we can identify five major issues, which have created hurdles in bringing peace between these two countries. Firstly, the issue of the accession of Jammu and Kashmir to India has been the core dispute between the two countries so far. Pakistan has failed to swallow the bitter truth that under the Indian Independence Act of 1947 the accession of Jammu and Kashmir to India was legal, complete and final (Appadorai and Rajan 1985: 80-81). To recall the episode briefly, the Indian Independence Act, 1947 released the Princely States from the paramountcy of the Crown and, in law, made them independent. While, the advice of the last British Governor General, Lord Mountbatten, to rulers of these States, statesmanship of Sardar Patel, and pressures of circumstances led all Indian States, except three (Junagarh, Hyderabad and Jammu and Kashmir) to accede to one of the two Dominions, India and Pakistan. The ruler of Jammu and Kashmir avoided taking a decision. When, however, around five thousand tribes of North West Frontier Province of Pakistan attacked that State and captured several towns, the Maharaja of the State, Hari Singh, signed Instrument of Accession with India to seek military help from New Delhi and drive out the invaders. The accession which took place on October 26, 1947 was thus both legal and valid (Campbell, 1985: Chapter XIV).

Then, how does the question of the unlawful accession or occupation of Jammu and Kashmir by India arise? It arises because of the fact that upon the advice of Lord Mountbatten and in the hope that due to support of Kashmir's largest political party led by Sheikh Abdullah, the Kashmir people will support the accession in any plebiscite, the Indian Prime Minister, Jawaharlal Nehru, agreed to determine the wishes of the people of Jammu and Kashmir as regards the accession of Jammu and Kashmir to India. This provision was included in the Appendix of the Instrument of Accession of Jammu and Kashmir to India. This provision however contained a condition that plebiscite will be conducted after vacating of the occupied territory by Pakistani invaders. Since Pakistan never vacated the portion of Kashmir occupied by it, India did not conduct plebiscite; but Islamabad continues to demand plebiscite ignoring the condition about vacating of Pak-occupied Kashmir.

Subsequently, during the Cold War, Pakistan became a part of SEATO and CENTO, the military alliances of the Western powers, including the United States of America and Britain, which thereafter espoused the cause of Pakistan in the case of Jammu and Kashmir. Consequently, India received support from the USSR on the issue of Jammu and Kashmir because of the non-aligned status of India during the Cold War (Jha 2009b; 14-25). China also used this issue to mount pressure on India by indirectly supporting the case of Pakistan in the issue of Jammu and Kashmir. However, the end of the Cold War and the subsequent

disintegration of the USSR led to a considerable change in the attitude of the western powers, particularly the US and Britain. The subsequent convergence of interests between India and the western powers and the 9/11 terrorist attack on the US made Washington and London to understand India's position on Jammu and Kashmir. But for their vested interests in Afghanistan, Central Asia and West Asia, they require Pakistan to sub serve their national interests; hence they have not exercised the amount of pressure on Pakistan, which they could have otherwise done. They have tried to use their mediatory efforts not to allow these two nuclear powers to go to a war over this issue, but their efforts have not been enough to nudge Pakistan towards a peaceful resolution of the Kashmir problem.

Secondly, though Pakistan had been trying to engineer disaffection in Jammu and Kashmir ever since its accession to India, it started indulging in the promotion of violent terrorist activities in various parts of India after the creation of Bangladesh in 1971. Gen. Zia ul Haq adopted this strategy of promoting and supporting secessionism in various parts of India when he overthrew Zulfikar Ali Bhutto from power through a military coup in 1977.

This policy was adopted by the Pakistani army, under the leadership of General Zia ul Haq not only to avenge the dismemberment of East Pakistan and the creation of Bangladesh, but also to destabilize India, which had established a decisive edge over Pakistan in military and strategic terms after the creation of Bangladesh (Dixit 1998: 148-149; Jha 2002a: 20-38). Accordingly, Pakistan started supporting and sponsoring extremist and secessionist elements both in Punjab and Assam in the early 1980's. The supporters of Khalistan were given not only logistical support but were also trained by the Pakistani army and its intelligence wing, the ISI, to indulge in militant and terrorist activities in Punjab. Then, the separatist movement in Assam was also supported by Pakistan's ISI. After the attempting to engineer subversion and secession in Punjab and Assam, Pakistan used the discontent of the people of Jammu and Kashmir due to the poor governance of the state Government and the rigged elections in 1987 to sponsor militancy and terrorism in Jammu and Kashmir since 1988.

Since then, it has not only supported militancy and terrorism in Jammu and Kashmir by offering material and logistical support to terrorist groups, but has also provided shelter and training to them on its own soil. It has organized terrorist training camps on its own soil or in Pak Occupied Kashmir and has trained them in militant and terrorist operations with the help of its army and the ISI. Furthermore, it has also encouraged fundamentalist groups like Laskar-e-Taibiyaba (LeT) and Jaish-e-Mohammed (JeM), etc., to carry on terrorist activities in Jammu and Kashmir. Prior to January 2004, it never acknowledged its role in militant and terrorist activities in Jammu and Kashmir; it said it only offered moral support to the militants who, according to Islamabad, were *fidayeens* or freedom fighters waging a freedom struggle there. However, after the attack on Indian Parliament, which almost snowballed into another war between the two countries, it had to come out openly in January 2004 condemning of any type of terrorism anywhere in the world, including Jammu and Kashmir, under pressure from the

Western countries, particularly from the United States of America and Britain (Jha 2003c: 261-279).

While there was a gradual decline in cross border infiltration of terrorists and terrorist activities in Jammu and Kashmir, the fundamentalist Jihadi groups like LeT and JeM, etc., did not stop their anti India activities. They launched a brutal terrorist attack in Mumbai on 26th November 2008. Ever since then, India has been constantly complaining of Pakistani Government not doing enough to check cross border terrorism.

Thirdly, Unlike India, which has enjoyed a democratic form of Government since independence, Pakistan witnessed a military coup in 1958. Ever since then, the Pakistani army has directly or indirectly called the shots in its ruling establishment. The Pakistani army thrives upon tensions between the two neighbours. It can be said that the army is today a state within a state in Pakistan and a degree of hostility towards India remains a strong *raison d'être* for the army's role in Pakistan (Jha 2009 a; Parthasarthy 2007: 635).

As explained earlier, during the Cold War years the coming to power of the Pakistani army served the interests of the western powers led by the United States of America. Pakistan entered into a military alliance with them through SEATO and CENTO. Ever since then, the Pakistan army has raised the bogey of an Indian threat for garnering financial and military aid from the West. This enabled it to indulge in the 1965 war with India. However, neither the Western powers nor China came out in open support of Pakistan during that war. Even in 1971, the Sino-US-Pak axis was not of much avail. However, after the creation of Bangladesh in 1971, the Pakistan army tried its level best to avenge the humiliation through supporting insurgencies in various parts of India.

Whenever a democratic Government in Pakistan has embarked on the path of peace with India, the Pakistani army has either tried to subvert it through subversion of the regime itself through a military coup, or through indulging in a proxy war against India by actively abetting terrorists or indulging in a Kargil type misadventure.

Fourthly, as already indicated earlier, India's pursuit of an independent foreign policy since the independence invited American wrath, for, the US, being a global power did not like emergence of an independent centre of power that could circumscribe American global influence. It was at this juncture that Pakistan was searching a 'plus factor' to seek parity with India. This led to a convergence of interests between the US and Pakistan against India (Nayar 1976; Jha 1992: 79-94; 2009b: 14-25). While Pakistan's main objective of joining the US camp was to counter balance India, the US needed Pakistan also to serve its interests in West Asia and Central Asia as well. Not surprisingly, Washington always propped up a puppet regime in Pakistan, even if it required supporting or establishing a military dictatorship.

The American support to the Pakistani stand on the issue of Jammu and Kashmir was the natural outcome of the above-mentioned US policy towards Pakistan and India. Instead of ensuring a withdrawal of the Pakistani occupation of the part of Jammu and Kashmir, known as Pak Occupied Kashmir (PoK), they exploited the Indian appeal to the United Nations for the pacific settlement of the dispute of 1947 between India and Pakistan to their advantage and made the legal accession of the State of Jammu and Kashmir to India a disputed accession. Rather it would be befitting to say that the Kashmir crisis is a creation of the Western powers, particularly the United States of America and Britain. They deliberately supported Pakistani's stand on Jammu and Kashmir in the United Nations or even tried to establish an independent Kashmir by supporting and provoking Sheikh Abdullah.

The Soviet intervention in Afghanistan in 1979 again boosted Pakistan's strategic significance for the US, as they needed Pakistan even more to contain the growing influence of the USSR in Central and the South Asian region. The United States not only went for supply of modern arms to the Pakistani defence forces, but also turned a blind eye towards the Pakistani involvement in abetting, supporting and even initiating secessionist and extremist movements in various parts of India. Surprising though it may appear, the gradual process of improvement in US-India ties began at the this very juncture due to several reasons (Jha 1994a: 89-107 ; 1994b: 3035-46), which got a fresh momentum after a few months of India's nuclear tests in 1998 (Jha 2000b: 12-21). This finally culminated in US-India strategic partnership and the signing of civil nuclear agreement in 2008. These developments withstanding Washington's reliance on Islamabad for containing terrorism in Afghanistan has prevented it to from tightening the screws over the Pakistani Government as well as the Pakistani army as much as they would have done otherwise. Even after the killing of the Al-Qaeda leader Osama Laden at Abbottabad, near Islamabad that generated genuine concern in the US about Pakistani army and intelligence wing's support to Al-Qaida terrorists, the Obama administration is not willing to stop economic assistance to Pakistan. Taking advantage of this, Pakistani army, in particular, along with their intelligence wing, ISI, is continuing to sponsor terrorist attacks in India and militancy in Jammu and Kashmir.

On the other hand, China has throughout used Pakistan as a proxy against India. It has not only supported it on the issue of Jammu and Kashmir but also provided arms to the Pakistani army and helped it in the development of its nuclear weapons and missiles targeting India. It also constructed a road link connecting the Chinese province of Xin Kiang through the PoK. Recently, there were reports of the build up of the Chinese troops in PoK as well their engagement in a host of construction activities there. Therefore, it would be appropriate to say that the role of major powers, like the US and China, inevitably affect developments in India and Pakistan.

Fifthly, unlike India, where successive Governments have respected and honoured the various agreements signed with Pakistan, whether it was the Tashkent agreement, Shimla

Agreement or the Lahore Declaration, in Pakistan the situation has been diametrically opposite. In Pakistan, there has been no such national consensus, subsequent Governments in Pakistan have not shown the due respect or failed to honour the bilateral agreements entered into or made by their previous Governments with India. As stated earlier even when ink of the Lahore Declaration sinned by Atal Behari Vajpayee and Nawaz Shariff had not dried, Gen. Pervez Musharraf carried out the Kargil misadventure. Afterwards, when Gen. Pervez Musharraf came for talks at Agra with Prime Minister Vajpayee, he started to insist on a new Agreement or Declaration instead of the Shimla Agreement or the Lahore Declaration. This was one of the reasons for the failure of the talks at Agra. Similarly, Z.A. Bhutto entered into the Shimla Agreement with Mrs. Indira Gandhi, when, however Zia-ul Haq replaced Mr. Z.A. Bhutto, he waged a proxy war against India by supporting secessionist movements in various parts of India in clear contravention of the spirit of the Shimla Agreement which sought to resolve all outstanding disputes between the two countries peacefully and bilaterally (Mohan 2003: 184). On the other hand, successive Indian governments have not tried to disregard or dishonour the agreements entered upon by previous governments with Pakistan.

IV

After considering the impediments to peace it would be appropriate to discuss what could be the path or road map to peace in the prevailing circumstances. Broadly, three strategies have been adopted to ensure peace between these two countries.

Firstly, it is argued that there remains a huge trust deficit between the two countries; therefore in order to develop peaceful and cordial relations between the two countries it is essential to create an atmosphere of bilateral confidence between the two nations by bridging this trust deficit. But as discussed already, previous attempts at Shimla (1972), Lahore (1999), and Agra (2001) failed due to Pakistani's perfidy. Due to international pressures General Musharraf assured India to dismantle the infrastructure of terrorism in Pakistan. This assurance was reiterated by the civilian Government, after the exit of Gen. Musharraf. But hopes generated by these assurances were dashed ground when with the help of the ISI; the terrorists attacked Mumbai on November 25, 2008. Thereafter, the peace process and the composite dialogue got derailed once again. Though they have been resumed again in February 2011, it remains to be seen whether they are able to produce some concrete results or just remain a cosmetic exercise.

Secondly, one of the view points in international history is that it is only when two hostile countries develop an economic stake in each other than peace becomes an imperative and war a non-option. The recent examples that are cited are those of United States of America and China as well as United States of America and Japan. It is said that business and economics forced these former enemies to change their posture towards each other. It paved the way for more people to people interaction and a progressive amicable relationship.

In the case of India-Pakistan relations, however, the Pakistani army has prevented growing of economic ties with India to sustain hostility with this country and thereby perpetrate its dominance in Pakistan. Despite having so much in common, like sharing a 2000 km. land-border, common tastes born of centuries of a shared heritage, and ready demand for each others' products, India's trade with Pakistan is at a paltry 2 billion dollars, much lower than that with smaller neighbours such as Bangladesh and Sri Lanka (Kansal 2010).

Thirdly, another viewpoint is that given the nature of contemporary South Asian politics, reconciliation need not be state driven any more. Civil Societies in India and Pakistan are robust enough to set this process in motion. The theory behind this viewpoint is that increased interaction at the level of the common peoples of the two countries would bridge the trust deficit that has plagued their bilateral relations (Mattoo 2010). It has been argued that the media can create an enabling environment where new ideas can germinate and bold initiatives can sprout. The media can begin the conversation where a plurality of views and opinions are not drowned out by shrill voices. It can cleanse polluted mindsets and revive the generosity of spirits, which is a distinctive trait of the subcontinent (Statement 2010).

Incorporating the three strategies mentioned above, the road map to peace should involve: addressing the core issue of Jammu and Kashmir; cessation of cross border terrorism has to be stopped, which includes the dismantling of terrorist camps; and increased bilateral economic and socio-cultural cooperation between the two countries.

However, as pointed out earlier, the trust deficit between the two countries cannot be wiped out unless the anti India stance of the Pakistan Army is neutralized. All the talk of increased economic and socio-cultural cooperation between the two countries as well as increased people to people contacts sounds unrealistic because of the anti India attitude of the Pakistani army, which wields the ultimate power. It has to be noted that the Pakistani army is the de facto sovereign institution and it thrives upon its anti-India stance as well as the threat from India in the Pakistani polity. Above all this, it enjoys the patronage of the world's two strongest military and economic powers, the United States of America and China. Hence, it would be impractical and unrealistic to expect durable peace between these two neighbours until there is a change in the attitude and role of the Pakistani army towards India.

Needless to add, the Indian ruling establishment on its own cannot accomplish this task. For this to happen, India needs the support of the US and, if possible, but which remains unlikely, that of China as well. The United States of America's defence establishment, the Pentagon, has a strong relationship with the Pakistani army for the last sixty years. New Delhi is, therefore, trying to use its strategic partnership with the US to neutralize the stand of the Pakistani army towards India. But the question that haunts the Indian policy makers is that whether the Washington would go so far as to exert pressure on the Pakistani army to end its anti India tirade. This is because of the fact that the US needs the Pakistan army in its counter-

terrorist operations in Afghanistan to neutralize the fundamentalist forces led by Taliban, ironically a creation of the U.S. itself during the Cold War. Then, the establishment of the defacto ruling authority of the army in Pakistan has been an act of the US itself because the puppet military dictatorial regime helped to serve the U.S. interests during the Cold War.

Furthermore, is the Indo-U.S. strategic relationship so deep and strong or is there such a convergence of interests between the two that would force the U.S. authorities to reconsider their support for the military establishment? The answer is in the negative. Moreover, the Chinese are unlikely to restrain the Pakistani army from its anti-India tirade, as they have been consistently used Pakistan as a proxy against India. Their attitude in this regard has not been positive in recent years, with the increased activity of the Chinese army in PoK and the issuing of stapled visas for Kashmiri residents of India. Nor would the U.S.A. would go to the extent of asking the Chinese authorities to restrain themselves from supporting the anti-India tirade given their own increasing economic dependence on the Chinese. Thus, in the given circumstances, it is highly unlikely that there would be a change in the attitude of the Pakistani army.

Coming to the issue of Jammu and Kashmir, it has to be said that there does not seem to be a solution to this issue, which would be acceptable to both sides. One may argue that accepting the Line of Control as an international border would be an ideal solution. However, if this solution had been acceptable to Pakistan, then this issue would have been resolved after the signing of the Shimla Agreement. That has not been the case. Pakistan wants to have the Kashmir Valley or it would like to first see an independent Kashmir, which ultimately decides to merge with Pakistan and if not, then it remain under the hold of Pakistan.

India on the other hand would never accept this situation wherein it has to lose Kashmir. India would like to retain Kashmir at any cost and would go to any extent to retain the Kashmiri territory. As regards determining of the wishes of the people of Jammu and Kashmir is concerned, India offered to conduct plebiscite in Jammu and Kashmir in 1948, immediately after its accession to India in October 1947. However, it was Pakistan who refused to accept this offer at that time. Thereafter, various elections to the Jammu and Kashmir State Assembly have been held. Just by inciting a certain sections of the people of Jammu and Kashmir with the help of fundamentalist militant organizations, Pakistan cannot dispute the accession of Jammu and Kashmir to India. In fact, it is guilty of illegally occupying the part of Jammu and Kashmir, which is called the Pak Occupied Kashmir.

VI

The forgoing discussion leads to an inescapable conclusion that a durable peace between India and Pakistan would continue to elude us until and unless dominance of the Pakistan army in that country is replaced by supremacy of civilian Government, which understands that interest of Pakistani people lays in peace and harmony with India that

Pakistan's fast economic development. Obama administration could have used the Abbottabad incident, which revealed the support extended to Al-Qaeda terrorist by the Pakistani army and ISI. But it has not done so for protecting its perceived strategic interests in Afghanistan and Central Asia. Under the circumstances, India has to rely on its own strength to counter Pakistan sponsored terrorism, improving ties with all major powers and development of people-to-people contact with Pakistan, which in the long run can pave the way for amity between the two neighbours.

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Imperatives of Nuclear Non-Proliferation in South Asia: A case of India and Pakistan

Dilip Mohite

Abstract

This paper analyses the behaviour of the two nuclear capable states in South Asia, but the major focus is on Pakistan as it has shown certain indications of 'anarchy' with no central or one authority to control the situation, this making the issue of non-proliferation difficult and dangerous. Contrary to this, India has earned a reputation being a responsible nuclear power state which is evident from the fact that the only super power, USA along with the Nuclear Supply Group (NSG) has acknowledged India's responsible nuclear status. Hence, this paper views the issue of nuclear proliferation from two different angles. First, it uses the conceptual framework of the concept and dilemma of the modern state. The second framework is that of 'Abolitionists,' the 'Targeteers,' the 'Deterers' and the 'Arms Controllers.

This paper deals with micro-level analysis of the issue of nuclear disarmament and non-proliferation with specific focus on South Asia. This is the region where two nuclear armed states, India and Pakistan, escaped all norms imposed by the international community and more so by the privileged 'Five' who for certain obvious reasons did not want nuclear weapon states to grow. This move was interpreted from more than one angle, but mainly from the humanitarian angle, and also to maintain monopoly in the field. A slight miscalculation on the part of nuclear power states could lead to human catastrophe. The basic argument of the N5 was that the new nuclear powers (in context of India-Pakistan) lacked mature diplomacy to avoid nuclear war. Besides this, they also argued that both India and Pakistan did not have strong economic base to sustain the high expenditure involved in developing nuclear weapons as well as the delivery systems. However, despite economic sanctions and political pressure, both India and Pakistan went ahead with their respective nuclear weapon capability with a view to deter each other. It is to be noted that Pakistan's nuclear program was directed against India while India's was against China. In the same vein, China's explosion in 1964 was deterrence against the United States of America. Dunn and Overholt have advocated the theory of 'Proliferation Chain. Their contention is that some triggering events such as radical change in the security environment, weaponization by an adversary state – lead to further weaponization by the affected state.

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In case of Asia, China acquired nuclear capability in 1964; its implication on India's security dilemma following 1962 Indo-China war began to shape India's nuclear policy. The defeat and secession of Pakistan in 1971, forced Pakistan to develop nuclear weapons to overcome India's conventional superiority. Once proliferation occurs in one state, a chain reaction is set in motion as security dilemmas bring latent insecurities in neighbouring countries to the forefront (Dunn and Overholt 1976: 505-16). Commenting on the Indian explosion, which called Indian Chain by Dunn and Overholt, predicted that it would emerge and would eventually include Pakistan, Iran, Iraq, Libya, Syria, Egypt, Saudi Arabia and Israel (Herz 1950).

It is to be noted that most of the above countries (except Israel) are Islamic and the Pakistan Bomb was largely identified as 'Islamic Bomb' against the Christian and Hindu Bomb (Powell and McGirk 2005: 22-23). Pakistan's nuclear weapon programme was covertly financed by the oil rich Gulf countries while technical assistance was provided by China. The Pakistan-China bonhomie began soon after the 1962 India-China war. The chief protagonist of nuclear proliferation, USA, connived at Pakistan's bomb making during and post 1979 Russian invasion of Afghanistan, and later 'Fight against Terror' after 9/11 incident. The mujaheedins with adopted name as Taliban who were initially created to fight Russians, had now been turned into a staunch enemy of USA and its allies. In this context, the role of Pakistan through ISI and Armed Forces with blessings from the Pakistan government is well known and well documented. The New York Times reported a truce between Taliban and Pakistan government, accepting its sway over SWAT, North and South Waziristan (Paulez 2009). This shows Pakistan-Taliban linkage which exists till this day. It is this rapport which made General Kayani work out a truce with the Taliban which would enable graceful withdrawal of American troops from Afghanistan and enable Pakistan's entry into Afghanistan for possible strategic depth against India. This elaborate background was necessary to provide the base for impending danger involved in Pakistan's nuclear capability through Taliban-Pakistan linkage, which poses potential danger to nuclear proliferation.

Nuclearization of South Asia

India and Pakistan becoming nuclear weapon power states raised many eyebrows. Most experts believe that there is a real and pressing danger of a nuclear war between India and Pakistan. In fact, South Asia has been described as a "nuclear flash point" in the event of virtual defeat by one state or loss of vital interest (Sawhney 2002: 174-75). The impending nuclear war was predicted over the traditional issue of territory (Kashmir) or secession or strategic issues.

Apart from these factors, issues like civilizational factors such as ethno-religious conflict or religious fundamentalism such as 'Islam versus the rest' was not in the reckoning till the menace of terrorism with different facets became the instrument of state action. Moreover, the angle of the non-state actors such as terrorists acquiring portable nuclear weapons has not been fully explored. With the advent of nano technology, these possibilities assume considerable importance from the perspective of security and grassroots proliferation of nuclear weapons and its misuse without holding the state responsible. There are sizable numbers of states in the Third World, and also in South Asia, where pundits are debating the issue of Failed State, Weak State and Rogue State syndrome. With this kind of scenario, the issue of nuclear weapons falling in the hands of non-state actors cannot be ruled out. Moreover, military personnel having a sway over the state and its control also pose serious challenge to the issue of nuclear proliferation and its use as desperate means to achieve strategic and political objectives.

Under the circumstances, this paper analyses the behaviour of the two nuclear capable states in South Asia, but the major focus is on Pakistan as it has shown certain indications of 'anarchy' with no central or one authority to control the situation, this making the issue of non-proliferation difficult and dangerous. Contrary to this, India has earned a reputation being a responsible nuclear power state which is evident from the fact that the only super power, USA along with the Nuclear Supply Group (NSG) has acknowledged India's responsible nuclear status. Hence, this paper views the issue of nuclear proliferation from two different angles. First, it uses the conceptual framework of the concept and dilemma of the modern state. The second framework is that of 'Abolitionists,' the 'Targeteers,' the 'Deterers' and the 'Arms Controllers.' Hence, the first part of the paper deals with the state of Pakistan with occasional reference to the state of India, while the second part deals with non-state actors, their behaviour and goal to achieve an objective through terrorist act. The entire issue of nuclear non-proliferation in South Asia is viewed from the second framework of "Abolitionists," the "Deterers," the "Arms Controllers" and the "Targeteers."

Abolitionists

Abolitionists are those who believe that the arms race itself is a potential cause of war. The crucial thing, therefore, is to eliminate the capacity for conducting hostilities. In this view, nuclear weapons, as the most sophisticated and most destructive form of armaments yet invented, are the single most important target for elimination. The implication is that getting rid of the weapons will be possible to reform international politics and move away from the situation described by Hobbes as a state of potential war. In line with the 'Abolitionists,'

political and non-political actors who have consistently shown disregard for human security and mobility can also be eliminated to ensure the enforcement of human security and ethical standards set by international order.

The Deterriers

The Deterriers and Arms Controllers have a paradoxical approach to nuclear weapons. They feel that they have positive effects on reducing the possibility of war (Kenneth Waltz and K. Subrahmaniam in India) but at the same time they can be dangerous if prudent management is lacking. Unlike the superpowers during the cold war who were heavily armed but locked in a series of highly dangerous security dilemmas the two nuclear power states in South Asia are in a transitory stage of their application and utility of nuclear weapons. However, the comparison between the two (India and Pakistan) adversaries is far from reality. India was completely guided by the deterrence value of nuclear weapons while Pakistan while initially justified its need for the deterrence to address its security concern but it ended up with much dangerous overtones of 'first strike' and marketing its know how to other countries with religious and ethnic understandings. Such an approach defies the basic assumption of 'deterriers and Arms Controllers to have a respect for international norms and successful management of international system in the nuclear age.

The Targeteers

The Targeteers believe that the nuclear weapons have not made any revolutionary change in the basic strategy of war. War remains a continuation of politics by other means and the best way to prevent a nuclear war is to be prepared to fight and win it. Weapons may be more destructive than in the past, but the basic logic of warfare remains the same. The targeteers who subscribe to this position generally believe that nuclear weapons have military utility. The target would be to neutralize adversary's military capabilities. To achieve this objective, deterrence can be best achieved through an evident capacity for nuclear war fighting. From this perspective, the nuclear weapons are different from earlier weapons in degree but not in kind. In order to have maximum peacetime impact, it is necessary to have rational policy planning for wartime use. The South Asia reflects 'strategic fundamentalist' model, which poses challenge to handle anarchic international order. The model also applies succinctly to South Asia as it represents inherently aggressive adversaries. The situation in South Asia also resembles what Henry Kissinger described as an 'inherent bad faith model.' Which one of the

two South Asian states fits into this category and what remedy is available to avoid human catastrophe? (Williams 1992: 205-16)

From Peaceful Nuclear Explosion to Nuclear Weapon Capability

India was always committed to peaceful use of atomic energy from the day one. From Nehru to Rajiv Gandhi, Indian efforts have been made in this direction. The exception was Indira Gandhi, who was compelled by circumstances like the Chinese explosion of 1974, the U.S. Nuclear Fleet during 1971 Bangladesh war, and subsequent hostility from Pakistan – China strategic axis against India. It is therefore a proven fact that the international environment and the nature of relations between states lead politicians to determine the course of action on a particular issue. The South Asian environment was vitiated by an over ambitious, and an insecure Pakistan, and the ever hungry for territory, and politically ambitious China. Under the circumstances, India's emphasis on 'atom for peace' which is also embedded in its culture, and maintainer of status quo was forced to revise its historically pronounced stand on war, arms race, disarmament and views on nuclear power for military use (Pathak 1996). Right from Haripura Congress in 1938, India's emphasis was on disarmament in general and nuclear arms in particular ever since nuclear weapon was introduced as part of state capability in 1945 by USA. Since then India's frantic efforts for nuclear disarmament is well known. This goal could be achieved by peaceful cooperative relations amongst nation and which was repeatedly stated at national, regional and international forums. Despite the 1962 India-China hostilities and the Chinese nuclear explosion in 1964, India still refrained from becoming a nuclear power, despite a strong plea from 'hawks.'

During early 1970s, India was left with no alternatives but to initiate the 1971 Bangladesh war. During the war, the two nuclear powers, USA and China were sympathetic to Pakistan. India was left with no choice but sign a 'Treaty of Friendship and Cooperation' with the (former) Soviet Union, making major compromise with its 'nonaligned' policy, while China openly threatened to intervene in the war, and the U.S. dispatched 7th Fleet to coerce India. At this critical juncture, Henry Kissinger cautioned India about Chinese intervention and that India should not expect any help from USA. This resulted into two major outcomes. First, India had to deviate from its nonaligned foreign policy, and second it had to acquire nuclear deterrence to meet security concerns created by the USA, China- Pakistan axis. The 1974 nuclear explosion by India is largely attributed to the above situation which directly affected its security and status in South Asia. In brief, India was forced to react to what one may call a 'nuclear blackmail' by USA and China.

Following the 1974 Peaceful Nuclear Explosion (PNE), India did not go for nuclear weapon programme till 1998. Due to domestic constraints, immense US pressure and economic sanctions. However, India's adherence to nuclear disarmament remained an important factor. From Morarji Desai to Indira Gandhi's second term (early 1980s) to Rajiv Gandhi, India continued to plea for nuclear disarmament. Rajiv Gandhi made frantic appeal for nuclear weapon free World at the UNO in late 1980s. All these years, India loosely fell in the 'Abolitionists' category but the security environment in South Asia was heading towards inevitable nuclearization.

Chain of Deterrence

The Chain Theory, as described earlier is apt to describe the security dilemma of India against China and Pakistan. After the emergence of Bangladesh, Z.A. Bhutto realized the futility of artificial comparison of military strength between Pakistan and India. India's superior conventional strength frustrated Pakistan's efforts to achieve its objectives in 1948, 1965, and 1971. Bhutto realized that Pakistan and China axis, based on Kautilya's premises that 'my friend's enemy is my enemy' had caught momentum. The 1980s also came as a boon to Pakistan's nuclear ambition. In 1979, Soviet Union invaded Afghanistan. Pakistan agreed to act as a frontline state to arm and train Afghan mujahedins on Pakistani soil by the Americans. China provided the 'blueprint' for the bomb as well as missile technology while USA connived at it despite sufficient proof available to them. This was a major setback to non-proliferation of nuclear weapons by one of the main protagonists, the USA.

By now, Pakistan's dream of becoming a leader of the Islamic World was dampened by its fragility of the state. The civil or democratically elected government could not control the stormy currents of fragmentation within the Pakistani society. Half of its history is that of military rule which is marked by conflict with India in 1965 (Ayub Khan), 1971 (Yahya Khan) and Musharaff (Kargil 1998). Bhutto and subsequent rulers in Pakistan saw the 'bomb' as the reviving and reinstating Pakistan's position as an important member amongst the group of Islamic countries. To attract and impress the Islamic countries, Bhutto introduced the notion of 'Islamic Bomb' against Christian and a Hindu Bomb and also shared nuclear technology with other Muslim countries. Saudi Arabia is believed to have provided generous financial support that helped Pakistan to sustain sanctions from the western countries (Khan and Lovey 2009: 224). Pakistan not only once aspired for South Asian hegemony, but also aspired for leadership in the Islamic World, not realizing its own inherent weaknesses in the society and state. The weakness in the state of Pakistan on account of disharmony between the Pakistani society and

the state need a theoretical interpretation so as to enable us to adjudge the state of Pakistan's ability to handle the delicate matter of command and control of nuclear device.

Utility State

The excessive dependence of the state of Pakistan on external powers (USA, China and some Islamic countries) shows its internal weakness. As such, Pakistan is a plural society with its population sharply divided on religio-ethnic factors. From the perspective of state, having internal 'anarchy' due to 'polymorphous' character, has minimal agential power to intervene in the society. Michael Mann says, "as compared to traditional states which have (despotic) strong power, it could reach into the society to achieve its goal and to realize its policies" (Mann 1993). What is now known as the 'domestic agential power of the state connotes the ability of the state to make domestic (or foreign policy) as well as shape the domestic realm, free of domestic social structural requirements or interests of non-state actors (Hobson 2000: 5). The state of Pakistan has failed to extend its influence and governance in Baluchistan, Pashtun area and what is known as SWAT regions. According to Kenneth Waltz's thesis of 'power capability' where he refers to the strong and weak states, strong states or great powers are in effect 'power makers' whereas weak states are 'power takers,' having no choice but to follow great powers (Waltz). Pakistan from the day of its existence suffered from security as well as insecurity dilemma. Its inability to deal with its ambition of equating with India and also unable to resolve Kashmir dispute in its favour resulted into dependence on USA for its security and subsequently on China. The net outcome was nuclear capability from China to balance out India's superior conventional strength and also deterrence against India. The State of Pakistan is unable to sustain its own domestic divergent forces, which resulted into overplaying the India card.

Also it is assumed that after the crushing defeat in the 1971 Bangladesh war, Pakistan frantically tried to enhance its state power by going nuclear, flow of arms from both USA (after 1979 Afghan invasion by the Soviet Union) and China. Apparently, it appeared that the state power of Pakistan strengthened the state but Michael Barnett observes that 'increased security pressures lead to decline of state power (Barnett 1992: 102). In nutshell, the study draws attention to constraints which such states suffer from domestic and international systems. Domestically, Pakistani society largely under traditional values refused to adhere to the policies of the modern nation state of Pakistan, while internationally Pakistan came under tremendous pressure on account of nuclear policies and subsequently nurturing terrorism on its soil. It's Army, ISI, and Fundamentalists have often disregarded the will of the state. Benazir Bhutto

showed ignorance of nuclear weapon programme while Nawaz Sharif was not aware of Kargil (1998) planned by General Mushraff. Despite several proofs submitted on 26/11 Mumbai attack by India and approved by international community (especially USA), Pakistan remains mute at the cost of becoming a laughing stock in the eyes of World public opinion. The discord between the State of Pakistan, which once cherished the ambition of adopting Turkish model of modern Islamic state, found itself at cross-roads when the traditional (Islamic) society of Pakistan refused to accept state intervention for mobility and progress. Robert Mann's non-reductionist theory of state power refers to the lack of domestic power of the state over society, resulting into zero sum contests between the state and society (Mann1993). Right from the day of its creation, Pakistan suffered from a security paradox. On one hand it assumed its superiority against Hindu India, cherished a dream of South Asian hegemony while it feared the dominance of vastly superior India in terms of size, population, resources and an edge in science and technology. In sheer desperation, it tried to propose Islamic unity, and paradoxically to its culture joined western defense alliance. Both religion (Islam) and military alliances and dependence considerably increased its security dilemma. Despite its own doing, India remained the central focus in Pakistan's overplayed fear from India. This resulted Pakistan depending heavily on external powers. In order to ensure overall support, it even sold the idea of Islamic Bomb to some countries like Saudi Arabia, Iran, Iraq, Syria, Libya etc (Lovey 2009). In brief there are several factors such as phenomenal rise in Madrassa education as against universities and schools that detach the modern state from society, which ought to be the source of strength to the state. In the absence of all vital factors, the state of Pakistan finds it difficult to govern and have its sway over society. Adding to this, the hyped up insecurity from within and India, creates a vacuum, which facilitates external forces to fully exploit the situation (Bhaumik 2010) converting it into a 'utility state' rather than becoming an important and a responsible member of the international community. In nutshell, it has created a 'failed state' syndrome for itself.

Related to nuclear non-proliferation, the issue is whether a failed state can be trusted with the safety of nuclear weapons, especially when military generals have been ruling that state, and also controlling the nuclear installations. Military generals have been eyeing power in Pakistan, and according to Mushraff's statement in the interview with 'Times' news channel(October9, 2010), confessed that he had no control over ISI training and supporting Talibans with terrorist strikes on India .In a government, when there is no central authority to control its actions, it is a sure sign of 'failed state.' Even the civilian government has failed to control non-state actors from acting independently. Can such a state be trusted with nuclear weapons?

Rogue State Syndrome

The concept of 'Rogue State' is an American invention. After making and using nuclear bomb on Nagasaki and Hiroshima, they wanted to maintain 'nuclear monopoly' to emerge and remain number one power in the world. Their cherished goal however was not fulfilled when the Soviet Union acquired nuclear weapon capability in 1950 followed by UK and France. Numerically the western block possessed more such weapons, yet Soviet Union was successful in creating a deterrence which incidentally created loose balance of power. It did prevent major war between the two super powers but gave rise to two doctrines which became dominant issue in the field of international relations. The first issue was that of nuclear disarmament, arms control, nuclear free world based on realization of the fact of 'Mutual Assured Destruction' (MAD). This resulted in a series of efforts like SALT I, II and III. The second issue which is critical is the 'Low Intensity Conflict' backed by nuclear weapon state. This was observed in the Vietnam War where the Soviet Union backed Ho Chi Minh against Americans and later Americans backed Afghan Majaheedeens against the Soviet in Afghanistan. These lessons were later learnt by Pakistan. Saira Khan highlights the international perception that Pakistan as a dangerous and irresponsible nuclear weapon state also showed political liability of using weapons in revisionist role. She also pointed out that the possession of nuclear capability also gave rise to low intensity conflict through terrorist activities (Khan 2009).

According to some experts, the concept of 'Rogue State' is largely viewed from the prism of American perception and interest. The concept is applied to those states which have acquired nuclear weapon capability or trying to achieve it. The countries listed are: India, Pakistan, North Korea, Iran, Iraq, Syria, etc. Out of these, the rising military powers in the third world countries, some of them may pose challenge to the US hegemony. The US feared that horizontal proliferation would risk not only its own security but also global security as a whole. They viewed the issue of nuclear proliferation from the prism of self-interest and global security. Ideally, this was a humane step but not free from self contradictions which had strategic overtones. Just one example would suffice to show double standard of USA in regard to nuclear non-proliferation. It connived at Pakistan's nuclear weapon program right from early 1980s till 1998 when Pakistan exploded its nuclear device. This was done under Pakistan's strategic support against Soviet Union in Afghanistan and later in its war on terror. Contrary to this, the US pressure on India was such that after the 1974 explosion, it (India) could not go ahead with further development despite precarious security environment caused by China-Pakistan military axis.

Essentially, the concept of 'Rogue State' was tailor made by American invention to serve its strategic goals which were cleverly mixed with global interest. Its application is flexible to suit basically America's larger interest. From this perspective, the Indian interpretation of 'Rogue State' has to be different which can serve its security as well as global security interest. The Indian interpretation hence should revolve around five points. Besides, efforts will be made to show comparative behaviour of the states of India and Pakistan from the perspective of 'state as rationale actor model,' especially from the prism of nuclear proliferation.

The Indian concept of 'Rogue State' ought to have five basic parameters which are applicable specifically to Pakistan. First, Pakistan developed its nuclear bomb keeping focus on India. This was done to neutralize the conventional advantage that India had vis a vis Pakistan. Further, it had a religious bias. It was designated as 'Islamic Bomb.' As stated earlier, Pakistani bomb was financed by quite a few Islamic countries (Kand and Lovey). This made Pakistan obligatory to pass on nuclear technology to other countries like Iran, Iraq, Syria, Saudi Arabia and North Korea and may be few other Islamic states. It was US pressure that leads Pakistan to exercise restraint and put Dr. A.Q.Khan under dramatic house arrest. The US role here is quite dubious. On one hand, USA connived at Pakistan's bomb while at the same time it cautioned Pakistan from leaking nuclear technology to other states which were adversaries of USA.

A.Q.Khan's Walmart

In return, USA right from the Regan days overlooked Pakistan's nuclear programme. It continued to pump arms and money to Pakistan with the aim of using Pakistan as a 'frontline state.' China too stepped in with nuclear and missile technology to balance out India. China did this to contain India, and also extend its territorial linkage with central Asia which is full of natural resources.

The following part of this paper deals with Dr. A.Q. Khan's nuclear Walmart and its possible implications on horizontal proliferation. As stated earlier, both USA and China used Pakistan's strategic location to serve their larger foreign policy goals in return for help in developing their nuclear device as well as different ranges of missiles. There are two serious interconnected issues which pose obstacle and threat to nuclear proliferation. The first issue is that of A.Q.Khan who was detected selling of nuclear technology to some Islamic countries in return for financial benefit. This enabled Pakistan to sustain economic sanctions from USA. Khan was also involved in acquiring nuclear technology through clandestine means from some

European countries which is proved and is a well known fact. It is also true that while A.Q.Khan was involved in these activities, one finds it difficult to believe that the state of Pakistan was unaware of his activities. Further, making a bomb requires a huge amount of money which Pakistan would not be able to afford. Earlier, in 1960s, when the proposal was made to develop a nuclear bomb, the then President Ayub Khan had to turn down the proposal as his Finance Ministry objected to (such) huge spending (Sinha and Subrahmaniam 1980: 34-35). Since Pakistan's financial position continued to be critical it could not have gone ahead without covert assistance from some rich Islamic countries. It is also necessary to recall that Zulfikar Ali Bhutto had christened this plan as 'Islamic Bomb' which explains the interest that was generated and gave the bomb a religious colour. The world history has noted innumerable ethno-religious conflicts which are unabated till today. Fanatism in Pakistan is on increase. Its Madrasses numbering few hundreds are turning out jihadis with deep fanaticism against non-Islamists. Such forces get further impetus when the Pakistani army indulges in anti-India stance in their training at operational level. Its intelligence wing ISI has been training terrorists and indulging in sabotage activity in India. Its culmination was 26/11 Mumbai attack. The state of Pakistan is in a denial mood and has yet to accept the role of ISI or non-state actors despite its mentor's (USA) pressure.

In this respect, a caution was raised by an independent panel which stated "the greatest risk to US," (India can be added here) is that WMD will find their way into the hands of jihadists (Defence review congress 2010). The non-state actors have grown beyond one's expectation, yet Kenneth Waltz's believes that that the central role of states will be needed only if non-state actors develop to the point of rivaling or surpassing the great powers, not just few of the minor ones. They show no sign of doing that. Philip Cerny disagrees with Kenneth Waltz. He states, "Non-state actors and structural categories may not be replacing the states, but they are co-existing with it, rivaling it and cutting across it" (Verny 1993: 45). It is a well known fact that non-state actors in Pakistan are not only co-existing but influencing major decisions of the state.

The Pakistan Army and ISI have acted independently on more than one occasion in either having promoted and sponsored terrorist attack on India, and also supporting insurgency in Kashmir and other parts of India. The Army which has ruled Pakistan almost half of the time in the history of Pakistan saw three wars with India under military rulers (Ayukhan 1965; Yahyakhan 1971; Musharaff 1999). The Targeteers believe that the nuclear weapons have not changed the strategy. War remains a continuation of politics. It is generally believed that nuclear weapons have military utility and these weapons are different in degree but not in kind.

The strategy is to use nuclear weapons to win the war and achieve the objective by hiding behind nuclear weapons (Baylis and Rengser 1999:207). During the Kargil War, Nawaz Sharif was unaware of the Kargil operation. It is believed that the Army may have informed him but full discussion never took place. Civilian government was marginalized by the Army and ISI (Hegerty). In brief, one can summarise that military junta in Pakistan has upper hand irrespective of the fact whether army or civil government is in power.

The second point where India can consider Pakistan as Rogue State is viewed from a normative angle. The state has originated with the values like welfare, highest good, to allocate moral values, maintain law and order in the society. According to Hobson, state's domestic agential power connotes "the ability of the state to make domestic or foreign policy as well as shape the domestic realm free of domestic social structural requirements or the interests of non state actors (Hobson). The state of Pakistan has completely failed to intervene in domestic and foreign policy matters. According to Pervaiz Mushraff, the people expect the Army to intervene when the civil government fails to deliver what is expected of it. The breakdown of law and order and failure to control dissident groups has a profound effect on its foreign policy.

Each dissident group in Pakistan has different agenda. The fundamentalists, who resist the inroads of western and also other cultures into their own, organize themselves to preserve it and come in direct confrontation with the state which has originated through the western concept of "nation-state." Within the state of Pakistan, there is a conflict between the state and a section (fundamentalists) of Pakistani society. These groups follow their own agenda of crusade against non-Islamist states and societies. Such ideas are vehemently injected in young minds through scores of Madrassas. Training by The Army initiates the indoctrination of its young officers keeping India as a target. How does one explain this phenomenon? State connivance and indirectly supporting such dangerous doctrine is not only detrimental to its own existence but also to countries like India and USA. India has faced several terrorist attacks which include '26/11 in Mumbai.' Pakistan's covert support and blatant denials despite the whole world knowing its involvement defies all moral and ethical bases of the state and undoubtedly international norms by which the world community is bonded together by international law. The state of Pakistan has violated all norms and continues to support such destructive forces and ideas simply because it also serves its foreign policy goals of containing India from developing into an influential state in world politics. Though immense pressure is exercised by the USA to improve its relations with India, Pakistan has refrained from direct or indirect involvement to normalize the relations. Hence, it encourages terrorist organization to

operate against India, exploit sentiments of Muslim minority and in brief bleed India economically and socially by fragmenting its secular democratic structure.

Despite several attempts, the Pakistani tactics have not succeeded against superior Indian security forces which have foiled Pakistan's game plan. How does one interpret the behaviour of the state of Pakistan? There are three explanations one can think of. First, though remote possibility, but out of sheer frustration and helplessness, the Pakistani nuclear device may fall in the hands of terrorist elements. If so, they would not hesitate to use it. Graham Allison has already expressed fear and such possibility after several attempts to steal nuclear weapons or weapon usable material especially in Russia and former Soviet Republics. He says, "Acquiring some 40 pounds of highly enriched uranium, or less than half that weight in plutonium with material otherwise available off the shelf can produce a nuclear device in less than one year." The terrorists would not find it difficult to sneak such a nuclear device into the United States. The nuclear material required is actually smaller than a football. Even a fully assembled device, such as a 'suitcase nuclear weapon' could be shipped in a container, in the hull of a ship or in a trunk carried by an aircraft or a ship (Allison cited, Sardesai and Thoman 2006: 52). A Pakistani group that may have sought to develop such nuclear bombs for Al-Qaeda operatives worldwide (India would be a prime target after USA). These organizations are 'Ummah Tammeer-e-Nall' (UTN) which is funded by nuclear scientists (Burns 2001).

Kashmir's terrorist groups with the help of ISI and some sections of Pakistan Army may have already prepared such a 'blue print.' Having attacked the Indian Parliament and other 'civilian targets,' such exercise like 26/11 Mumbai attack may have been a testing ground as it revealed security lacunae on the Indian sea and land borders. According to Ashley Tellis, western countries are deeply concerned about the prospect of Pakistan losing control over its nuclear capabilities; especially the prospect that weapons or fissile material could fall into the hands of terrorists or Islamic groups. Further Adam Lowther warns that "among existing nuclear powers, Pakistan presents the greatest nuclear proliferation risk" (Lowther 2009: 8-21). In another fact finding revelation, the US President Obama warned that there was a real danger that terrorists might get and use a nuclear bomb calling that possibility "the most immediate and extreme threat to global security." He called for international effort to secure all vulnerable nuclear material around the world within four years. Bunn further quoting Kofi Annan in 2005, says that if the terrorists succeed in laying their hands on nuclear and chemical weapons, it would change America and the world. The Al Qaeda terrorist network has been seeking nuclear weapons for years. Osama Bin Laden has said that he feels a 'religious duty' to acquire nuclear and chemical weapons and Al Qaeda operatives have made repeated efforts to buy stolen

nuclear material to make the nuclear bomb. They have also tried to recruit nuclear weapon scientists to help them including the two extremist Pakistani scientists who met Bin Laden and Ayman-al-Jawahari shortly before the 9/11 attack to discuss nuclear weapons (Bunn 2009). There is also a China dimension to this where China is wooing Jihadis and encouraging Pakistan to expand its nuclear facility. The China-Pak axis is creating a serious threat not only to India's security but is also posing danger to USA's troops in Afghanistan, besides frustrating the nuclear proliferation agenda.

From this angle, worldwide consensus and efforts have to be made towards Pakistan's approach to nuclear proliferation. India is therefore confronted with unique multifarious threat to its security from the State of Pakistan which has sheltered and promoted several terrorist acts known to the entire world yet blatantly denying its role. Such an irresponsible state having no respect for international values and commitments cannot be trusted and that leads India to have its own interpretation of a 'rogue state.'

The third factor which should be considered is the frequent rule by military and its control over Pakistan's politics and decision making process, especially in view of the 1965 war under General Ayub Khan and General Yahya Khan's their (1969) refusal to accept the democratic verdict of the voters when Sheikh Mujibur Rehman's party won the majority. Instead of respecting, democratic norms, he chose to inflict tirade against men and women of East Pakistan (now Bangladesh). The result was that thousands of women were raped and men killed, forcing ten million to take shelter in India (Wolpert 1982). Keeping and prioritizing strategic interest, the USA connived at the human massacre in East Pakistan. The Kargil war in 1999 initiated by General Mushraff was not known to Nawaz Shariff, the then Prime Minister of Pakistan. In recent statement, he has denied having known about Mushraff's plan in Kargil (Kargil Review Committee Report 2000)

Such is the body politics in Pakistan that the left hand does not know what the right hand is doing and the political leaders, titular or democratically elected have no say in the decision making process. At least theoretically, a true democratic state provides and substantiates 'rationale actor model' but history is full of examples where military rulers have initiated wars for personal gains or to achieve personal ambitions. To interpret this view from, the targeteer's angle, where most military personnel or rulers subscribe to winning war. They consider that nuclear weapons have military utility, and nuclear weapons are different in degree but not in kind (Baylis and Reneger). The strategy is to use nuclear weapons and win the war or achieve the objective by hiding behind nuclear weapons. The Inter State Intelligence (ISI)

which is Pakistan's state sponsored organization is deeply involved in terrorist acts in India. It blatantly uses military officers to bleed India. One has to note that most ISI officials are current or ex-military personnel (Martin 2010: 189-90). The Pakistani Army and Madrassas have one single agenda and that is to destroy India and this appears more feasible when military is having the last word in Pakistani politics. In recent times, a top US expert on South Asia has said, "The General (Ashfaq Parvez Kayani) along with ISI's Ahmed Shuja Pasha is the one who calls shots in that country while President Zardari is absolutely despised and loathed." Further he says, "The Congressional delegation that goes to Pakistan, do not meet their counterparts in the National Assembly. They all want to meet General Kayani and General Pasha (Fair 2010). Contrary to this, when General MacArthur wanted to use nuclear weapons in the Korean War he sought permission from the US government but the US Congress turned down his request. Hence, these are the two models of the state, one which does not fall within the purview of rationale actor model while the other (the US) reflects the rational model syndrome at least in the use of nuclear weapons. Pakistan's nuclear doctrine initially approves 'first use' and other postures have prevented India from taking punitive measures despite state sponsored terrorism in India where sizable number of innocent civilians are killed. It is not only the fear of nuclear war but India's civil government is committed to development rather than getting provoked by such irresponsible acts of Pakistan. India's posture is that of a responsible and peaceful use of nuclear power as opposed to Pakistan's irresponsible behaviour and using 'nuclear shield' to unleash terrorism. From this angle, India is a victim of rogue behaviour and its interpretation of a rogue state has to be different than the one the Americans have devised. The indirect use of nuclear weapons also betrays the norms of security and therefore an international opinion has to be mobilized against nuclear proliferation by states like Pakistan, especially when some fundamentalist Islamic countries, along with terrorist outfits are trying to placate Pakistan to give them nuclear technology. Hence, the issue of nuclear proliferation has to be viewed from a different angle of non-state actors and other aggressive states which are trying to acquire nuclear technology. This phenomenon has to be judged from the prism where the state of Pakistan and its successive regimes have blackmailed USA, and extracted huge sums of money in the name of fighting terrorists (Mehta 2008: 212). However, reality is that the arms and dollars are largely directed against India and also by subverting issues of non-proliferation and terrorism. Pakistan's crisis is of its own making. Its fiscal situation is deteriorating. Its identity crisis is still not resolved. And elements of the infamous government agency known as Inter Services Intelligence (ISI) may yet endeavour to scuttle any progress the country makes domestically or the hard won improvements it has achieved in relations with India (Mehta: 212). Besides ISI, the mullas have been constantly spewing venom and calling for Islamic Jihad against India. These elements are ignoring the fact that India is a secular

democracy, its plurality and democratic values are time tested over the last 65 years. All minorities enjoy equal rights irrespective of caste, colour, creed or religion. They have held highest positions in the government, and some have freely pursued their career as doctors, scientists, lawyers, and in sports or say practically in all walks of life. Yet, Pakistan has followed one policy and that is of religious and ethnic provocations to disturb the stability and progress. This kind of irresponsible behaviour is on account of its vulnerability as it is caught between the domestic interest and external pressures leading to loss of identity. A nuclear weapon equipped state with such characteristic poses serious threat to India, including nuclear attack by both, the state as well as uncontrolled non-state (terrorist) actors. Under the circumstances, nuclear roll back or international control of its nuclear capability would be a step worth considering. The UN Security Council Resolution 1540 which was adopted in 2004 on the initiative of Bush Administration has universalized undertakings that either were constrained in the international treaty regimes governing the realms of nuclear, chemical and biological weapons, proliferation or emerged from voluntary agreements of countries that were willing to strengthen the norms in these treaties. These measures aim to establish strict state control over materials, equipments and technologies that is in wrong hands which could help terrorist make these particularly deadly weapons (Muller 2008: 71). This amply shows the concern and fear of the global community of nuclear weapons sneaking into the hands of terrorists. Today, Pakistan's record and vulnerability demands strong steps from the United Nations as well as from the international community. Its mentor USA should stop looking the other way when such serious developments are taking place in Pakistan. Contrary to this, India's record as nuclear weapon state is responsible and rational.

India as a Nuclear Power

Fourthly in contrast to Pakistan's nuclear programme, India's approach can be described as 'reluctant nuclear power.' India has been an advocate of nuclear disarmament, right from Nehru to Rajiv Gandhi, and has vehemently appealed for nuclear non-proliferation except in 1974 (Pokhran I) when India was circumspect by joint US-Pakistan-China military axis during the 1971 Bangladesh War. Since then, India restrained itself till the China-Pakistan axis began to threaten India's security. Moreover, Pakistan had progressed considerably in the 'bomb making' with the help provided by China. Two important points need mention here. First, as known to everyone, USA and China took full advantage of Pakistan's utility as strategic state. For USA, Pakistan was not only a 'frontline state' against Soviets in Afghanistan but strategically an important foothold to monitor the Middle East and Gulf. In recent past of China, an access to Middle East and Central Asia was part of future strategic

planning but more than that it would station itself right next to its regional adversary India. The security scenario for India and South Asia became extremely precarious. Under the circumstances, India was forced to declare its nuclear capability overtly in 1998 and this was followed by Pakistan few weeks later (Bidwai and Vanaik 1999: 50-61). The security scenario for India and South Asia became extremely precarious with three nuclear weapon states with deep conflictual relationship in proximity with each other. The hostility level is so high that both India and Pakistan are sitting on a 'Nuclear Short Fuse' (*Ibid*: 227-30). India, contrary to Pakistan, has stable democratically elected government. Its nuclear arsenal is safe and under civilian control. It has proved to the world that it could be as rational and as mature as any western (nuclear) power state. It would be therefore worthwhile to briefly assess India's nuclear status as well as image in the international community.

The fifth point where India could designate Pakistan as a 'rogue state' is its double standard in dealing with USA. The US is also responsible for boosting and nurturing Pakistan's aggressive posture against India. Daryl Kimball of Arms Control Association comments on US military sales to Pakistan. He says, "The latest geo-strategic rationale for many US sales on 'terror,' F-16 and other military equipments under Barack Obama will help Pakistan in its fight against India and also quite a few South Asian states. Similar views are expressed by David Kilkullen" (Kulkullen). In another revealing observation Rediff News states, "Distrust of India is one thing that fuels Pakistani nationalism" (Redeff News 2010). Liberation of Jammu and Kashmir and balancing Pakistan remains a fundamental strategic doctrine. Long back, the creator of Pakistan Jinnah voiced his concern, "A weak Pakistan and a strong Hindustan will be a temptation for the strong Hindustan to dictate. I have always said Pakistan must be viable state and sufficiently strong as a balance vis-à-vis Hindustan" (Noorani 1976: 1500-54). Such feelings from this projected sense of insecurity, Lt. Gen. Khalid Ahmed Kidwai in his interview to Egyptian Daily Al-Ahram said that Pakistan's nuclear arsenal is aimed chiefly at India, especially he claimed that Pakistan has no other enemies (Kidwai 2010). Looking at Pakistan's 'unfinished agenda' the nuclear arsenal is directed against India and if the direct action does not solve the issue between India and Pakistan, a frustrated group in charge of nuclear weapons is capable of illegal proliferation to other countries. He further states, "Pakistan is entitled to share its knowledge and experience in the nuclear field with other countries such as Egypt and UAE (*Ibid*). This candid view is also substantiated by prominent US experts who strongly feel that terrorist organizations like Al-Qaeda are trying to get hold of nuclear weapons. In finality, according to Bruce Reidel, a former CIA official, "Just before murder in December 2007 former Pakistani Prime Minister Benazir Bhutto said, "I now think Al-Qaeda can be marching to Islamabad in two to four years (Reidel 2009). Under such circumstances one can imagine

what would happen to nuclear weapons of Pakistan. Moreover, according to Rolf Mount-Larssen, “Pakistan’s nuclear weapons fall under the control of the military but authorities in every country possessing nuclear weapons worry about the possibility of insiders who are willing to assist terrorists steal a weapon or gain access to facilities containing nuclear weapons and materials” (Ibid).

Two points emerge from this discussion. First, that the terrorist organizations are eager to obtain nuclear weapons in one form or the other, and second, that the military has a different outlook to war or conflict. Theoretically, its (military) aim is to win war as they fall under the category of targeteers and also their soft corner for terrorist outfits which is their own creation. The second point is that of involvement of state agency ISI in promoting and protecting terrorist organizations, helplessness and connivance of the state in such matters invites nomenclature as a ‘rogue-state’ where India is a major target and victim of Pakistan’s nuclear weapons.

India as Nuclear Weapon State

As stated, Arundhati Ghosh described India as a ‘reluctant nuclear power.’ The Indian security dilemma arose first from nuclear armed China with whom India had serious territorial, ideological and strategic problems. Soon after the 1962 war, China acquired the nuclear capability in 1964, forcing India to reconsider its commitment to the issue of nuclear proliferation. After 1962 Indo-China war and the war with Pakistan in 1965, the military axis between Pakistan and China began to take shape. It culminated into two nuclear powers, China and USA coming together with Pakistan and causing serious concern to India’s security in 1971 (USS Enterprise). The 1965 war with Pakistan, China began to cultivate Pakistan as bulwark against India. The strategic relationship culminated into USA joining the two while India was engaged in a war of attrition over the Bangladesh issue. The Indian security concerns resulted in making major compromise with its nonaligned foreign policy. India signed a “Treaty of Friendship and Cooperation” with Soviet Union. Once, the Bangladesh War was over, Pakistan began its nuclear weapon programme with Bhutto’s well known pronouncement that “we will eat grass but make the nuclear bomb.” The Indian explosion was vehemently opposed by USA and several western powers that included Japan. Economic sanctions and several other measures were taken to punish India but India had no choice but to adhere to unavoidable and pragmatic choice to overcome its security dilemma. It had done something which was against its own choice of ‘nuclear free world,’ nuclear disarmament and above all ‘Nuclear Weapons Free Zone’ for South Asia (Ohajunawa 1995).

Theoretically, there are trends in international politics which compel a nation to device its policy. During the bipolar world, there was an intense conflict between the American and Soviet blocks. On more than one occasion, both came close to confrontation which would have been a use of nuclear weapons. But both judiciously avoided nuclear confrontation which was attributed to more than one factor. Matured diplomacy, realization of 'Mutual Assured Destruction' (MAD) as both had witnessed harrowed experience of loss of life and property during the two great wars could be the important factors. The fact was theorized by scholars like Moregenthau (Balance of Power), Waltz (deterrence), moral aspect, survival etc. led to standoff between the two hostile rivals. The restraint was further operationalized through 'Confidence Building Measures' (CBMs), Arms Control, Disarmament, NPT, CTBT, NNPT etc. which was a result of behaviour which was framed under 'rationale actor model' and states exercising moral responsibility towards humanity. The question that arises in case of Pakistan and to an extent China would be governed by the same norms and realize the futility of nuclear weapons beyond deterrence value. But in several pronouncements, the terrorist organizations have vowed to destroy USA and India by acquiring nuclear weapons, and it becomes more dangerous when the state of Pakistan has no effective and meaningful control over these organizations, the Army and the ISI. When such paradigm exists, it becomes extremely difficult to ensure non-misuse of nuclear weapons. What is the way out of this critical situation? A nuclear rollback, dismantling nuclear installation or international supervision?

India as a nuclear weapon power state definitely cannot be put in the same category. It has adequately proved itself as a responsible state guided by the principle of 'state as rationale actor model,' exercising restraint on more than one occasion when its Parliament was attacked by a Pakistani sponsored terrorist, the infamous 26/11 attack in Mumbai, besides several attacks on Indian cities killing innocent civilians. Despite such thoughtless ventures by Pakistan, India has not talked of using nuclear weapons or taken conventional military action against Pakistan. Such mature and responsible behaviour has resulted into the US changing its foreign policy stance towards India. The civil nuclear deal – agreement 123 and subsequent acceptance by Nuclear Supply Group (NSG) are the proof and certification to India as a responsible nuclear state guided by moral considerations. Stephen Cohen endorses "India as global actor, a moral force at international level (Tellis 2009). In fact, India's stand on NPT, CTBT, FMCT etc. was juxtaposed with its moral and cultural approach to the issue of proliferation of nuclear weapons. Refusing to sign NPT, CTBT, FMCT was justified on 'discriminatory ground.' Still, ever since India became an overt nuclear weapon state, its responsible behaviour has been acknowledged by the most leading nuclear power states. It, therefore, undoubtedly falls under 'rational actor model' and state exercising moral responsibility towards humanity.

Ever since India entered the select group of nuclear power states, its record has been that of restraint and responsibility. It took India ten long years to explode its nuclear device in 1974 after its adversary did it in 1964 soon after the 1962 Indo-China war, where India suffered worst military humiliation. Again after 1974, India waited for twenty four years (1998) to demonstrate its nuclear weapon capability. The question arises as to why India waited for such a long time? There are few possible explanations. First, its own position on nuclear weapons was clearly defined. It wanted nuclear energy for economic development and not for human catastrophe. Its stand on nuclear disarmament was clear. Right upto the end of 1980s India kept striving for nuclear disarmament. It changed its stance only after its appeals failed to convince establish nuclear powers as well as aspirants who were not willing to cooperate. Moreover, nuclear weapon states like China and USA were disregarding India's security concerns vis-à-vis Pakistan -China axis. By end of 1990, India was left with no alternative but come out with explosion in 1998. Pakistan followed within three weeks. The direct consequences of South Asian nuclearization was the emergence of two contradictory models. India as a nuclear weapon state attempted to be in the league of responsible and moral category, with minimum deterrence doctrine. Its emphasis to use nuclear energy for rapid economic development remained unchanged. The rational approach to nuclear issue by India resulted into USA changing its earlier attitude towards India. The net result was Agreement 123, with USA recognizing India as a de facto and responsible nuclear weapon state. This was followed by Nuclear Supply Group (NSG) to enter into agreement with India.

The other model was provided by Pakistan and China. China provided blue print for Pakistan's nuclear programme, defying international norms and commitments. Pakistan, instead of using nuclear power as 'minimum deterrence' and confining to its own security dilemma began to oblige other states with technical knowhow. This has posed a serious challenge to the cause of nuclear non-proliferation. The second issue is for equally dangerous. It encouraged militants and terrorists who were let loose on India, knowing fully well that India would not retaliate militarily on account of nuclear interlocking. Since then, India has become the victim increased insurgency and terrorist attacks, causing tremendous damage to life and property. Ashley Tellis opines "India has become a sponge absolving most of the blows from terror campaign of LET, JEM etc (Cohen 1991: 13). It is true that Pakistan has taken full advantage of nuclearization by hiding behind nuclear capability. It continues to nurture for conflict, knowing fully well that India would not retaliate. India is dealing with this menace with maximum caution and diplomatic maturity. One wrong step would invite unimaginable human catastrophe. Earlier, USA connived at Pakistan's nuclear programme but it is on its radar for its immoral and irresponsible approach to nuclear capability. Contrary to this, India, as described

by Stephen Cohen is a responsible nuclear state guided by moral considerations in the interest of humanity (Perchowich 1999:9).

Pakistan's approach is India or region specific from the day it came into existence. It suffered from insecurity dilemma vis-à-vis India. Broadly speaking, Pakistan's logic is the same as India's vis-à-vis China. But there is a qualitative difference between the two paradigms. India, unlike Pakistan and despite hostilities with China never suffered from 'existential threat,' India's nuclear programme is oriented from the notion of 'minimum deterrence.' Having achieved this objective, it waited for 24 years for its next explosion in May 1998. This was also done under compulsive situation of 'nuclear weapon nexus' between hostile Pakistan and China. India's vigorous efforts for complete nuclear disarmament were demonstrated in Rajiv Gandhi's efforts at the United Nation in the second half of 1980s. It was only when the response from other powers was discouraging that India accelerated its nuclear weapon programme. This marked the beginning of termination of India's moralistic approach to nuclearization and disarmament. It was also a sort of ultimatum to the world of India's resolve to acquire nuclear weapons in the wake of delicate security scenario which emerged on account of speedy and covert nuclearization by Pakistan with Chinese blessings. Pakistan's belligerent attitude was narrated by Seymour Hersh in the article 'Nuclear Edge,' where he claims Pakistan loading nuclear weapons on F-16 aircraft with a view to launch surprise attack on India. The author claims, the situation was averted after the dispatch of US diplomat who was flown to Islamabad and Delhi. Though substantive evidence is not available on this issue, but if true, Pakistan government can be checked but what if in future terrorists attempt this kind of attack with a suitcase bomb?

As opposed to that Indian nuclear weapon programme and its control is in safe hands, away from McCarthyian approach. George Perchowich writes, "Indian nuclear policy making has been highly personalized and concentrated in a handful of political leaders and scientists. Most speeches and view points of main actors in nuclear decision making were culturally opposed to its use, except for economic development of the nation. Even the issue of Indian security was embedded in a 'nuclear free world.' Further, he writes, "India's approach to nuclear weapons has been fraught with great tension between competing values and interests (Perchowich 2002). For almost three decades, unlike western powers, India saw "nuclear weapons more as political-psychological symbols than a military weapon (Ibid). Right from Nehru days, India has been ambivalent and swung between 'atom for peace' and 'atom for war.' Despite 1964 Chinese test, and having suffered a serious political and military setback,

India expressed moral and existential doubts about possessing nuclear weapons even as the capability to do so was in hand.

The Indian ambivalence towards covert weaponization, and at the same time advocating nuclear free South Asia was viewed skeptically by the world community. Some critics called it a 'smoke screen.' Defending and justifying India's nuclear programme, Shyam Saran, India's Former Foreign Secretary, argues, 'right from 1967 till India acquired overt nuclear status, there has been consistency and continuity in India's approach. It was in reality embedded in its cultural philosophy. The apt example can be found in ancient epic of Mahabharata when Pandavas were forced to acquire sophisticated weapons. The concept of universal brotherhood is highlighted when Arjun, was hesitant to use the weapons. It is here where Lord Krishna justifies it for the protection of 'dharma' (righteousness) against evil forces (Chimnayanand 1999: 36).

The 1990 was deemed as the 'End of History' by Francis Fukoyama. The ideological conflict, as well as nuclear arms race was put to rest, atleast between the two super powers of the cold war era. The world also heaved a sigh of relief that the cold war did not transform into the hot war. The world saw the emergence of unipolar world in the hope that the world would also see the end of arms race as well as nuclear proliferation. But contrary to this, India and Pakistan emerged as the de-facto nuclear weapon states in South Asia, while Israel, South Africa and North Korea exhibited nuclear weapon capability. The other states like Saudi Arabia, Israel, Iran, Syria, Libya etc., began covert efforts to acquire nuclear weapon capability. Europe which was loaded with nuclear weapons had averted nuclear holocaust but in 1990s, a new chapter began in nuclear proliferation with some serious characteristics. An intense geo-political, geo-economic and a conflict based on ethno-religious factors began to threaten the world from a new dimension of Huntington's 'clash of civilization.' The conflict level on above ground deepened to the extent that most affected states sought the possession of nuclear weapons. There was yet another aspect and that is the non-state actors trying to acquire suitcase type nuclear bomb. Under the circumstances, USA's efforts to enforce NPT, CTBT, FMCT, MTCR etc. appeared to be more of an illusion rather than reality. The nuclear arms race between the two super powers collapsed which resulted into the emergence of unipolar world. The US forcefully canvassed for NPT, CTBT and FMCT etc., especially amongst those powers which were on the threshold of acquiring nuclear weapon capability. India refused to sign on the ground that it was discriminatory. Instead, India pleaded for 'binding convention' on the non-use of nuclear weapons which found general acceptance only on moral grounds. India still persisted for a commitment by the nuclear weapon powers to a time bound programme for

(nuclear) disarmament though the issue was intrinsically linked to India's security needs (Ghosh 1998: 16). India indirectly hinted that it cannot accept any constraints on its capability if other countries remain unwilling to accept the obligation to eliminate their nuclear weapons. The world order structure was hierarchical with monopoly and stockpile of nuclear weapons. India was single handedly facing threat to its security from two nuclear armed rivals and more importantly by non-state actors which were patronized by its rivals.

Still, India's behaviour as a responsible nuclear power after the 1999 explosion received a place of respect and prominence. It has exercised sufficient caution where its larger emphasis is on 'atom for peace and development.' In fact, India's nuclear weapon capability also plays an increasingly significant and unusual role in its growing global profile. India's handling – its capability has become means of demonstrating its international good citizenship – its ability to be a responsible global player (Rajgopalan :193) and more so after Pakistan's A.Q. Khan's episode. India's credential as rationale actor was successfully demonstrated during India-USA dialogue, which culminated into a historic US-India Civil Nuclear Deal popularly known as Agreement 123, and access to Nuclear Supply Group (NSG).

Conclusions

The theoretical frameworks of Abolitionists, the Deterers-Arms Controllers and Targeteers have been used in order to provide theoretical base into the arguments (Williams: 207). There are sizable numbers of scholars, politicians, diplomats and philosophers who have advocated the abolition of arms in general and nuclear arms in particular. But this seems to be a farfetched dream. All those who possess nuclear weapons would be unwilling to roll back. Under the circumstances, three models are available which can be tried. First, that all those who possess nuclear weapons, at least some of them like Britain and Russia now do not face any threat from each other. An initiative to sign a treaty of 'no use of nuclear weapons' could lead the way for reducing the threat from nuclear holocaust. The second model refers to history where USA and former Soviet Union (now Russia) could take collective initiative to gradually reduce their nuclear arsenal and make joint and vigorous efforts to the cause of non proliferation. China and India could be co-opted in this effort. The above countries are mature and assumed to be serious in nuclear non-proliferation. Roger Cohen writing about 'Global Zero bandwagon,' refers to Barack Obama's optimism (Prague Speech 2009) to seek the peace and security of the world without nuclear weapons. This vision fluctuates between optimism and pessimism, idealism and realism when he says, 'perhaps (he will) not see the end of nukes in his lifetime.' This pessimism is seen in the light of Britain's Prime Minister justifying

nuclear deterrence and France's 'force de frappe' and Chinese continuing expansion and refinement of nuclear arsenal, and perhaps helping directly-indirectly states like Pakistan and North Korea to go nuclear (Cohen 2010). Under the circumstances the vision of 'abolitionist' can never materialize. The third model which has emerged is far more dangerous. Perhaps Kenneth Waltz's theory of nuclear balance and minimum deterrence gives the hope of interlocking and avoidance of major conflict (Waltz 1999). But such observations are derived after futility of the arguments by the 'abolitionists' for total nuclear disarmament.

However, the third model which is recent, and demands serious attention is a compelling factor of "think the unthinkable – about the nuclear weapons roles, strategies, and implications outside the interstate system (Muthiah: 20). It is this fact that is highlighted in exercising caution. The focus on terrorist organizations in Pakistan with deadly combination of weak and a failed state syndrome has made Pakistan a haven for terrorist outfits to operate from the Pakistani soil. It is that fact where the state is helplessly succumbing to extremist elements and a military-ISI nexus. Allowing these elements to control the 'will' of the state has resulted into loosing 'agential powers' in domestic as well as foreign policy sphere. Putting it differently, it has lost its legitimacy from the internal point of view, which reveals its failure to maintain 'order' in the society, by order. Having the location with tremendous geo-strategic significance, it has been exploited by the powerful forces like USA and China. One has to admit that in a globalized world, no state enjoys absolute sovereignty, and it is no more sacrosanct but there is a limit to which it loses its sovereign right to govern. Pakistan's misplaced goals of equating with India in terms of power, has ruined its economic and political credibility in the world affairs. Acquisition of nuclear capability has produced three devastating results. First, it has come under tremendous pressure from its own long standing ally USA for its safety. Second, it was politically and economically circumspect to sell nuclear technology to some Islamic and non-Islamic countries which earned the state of Pakistan a reputation of being the 'wallmart' of nuclear technology. The third factor is extremely delicate and serious which refers to its nuclear technology arsenal falling in the hands of terrorist. The concern is sufficiently expressed by Graham Allison (2006), Thomas Schelling, Galluri (2006) and several analysts who are convinced that organizations like Al Qaeda, Lashkar-e-Toiba are desperately trying to lay hands on nuclear weapons (Muthiah). The finger is pointed to Pakistan's nuclear arsenal where the concern is that while certain non-state actors may acquire nuclear weapons; they also exert a deep influence on national and international security threat perceptions, security policies and strategies, including the prosecution of the global war on terrorism (Ibid). In view of failed state, weak state and if one would like to accept the nomenclature (as defined in this article) of rogue state for Pakistan, the concern that is expressed is that of "regime

collapse.” Under these circumstances, as stated by Henry Kissinger (in a modified form), Asian nuclear weapon states are not immune to the logic of nuclear weapons. In this respect, India has fully shown and proved its logic and reason by strictly adhering to reducing its nuclear weapons to minimum deterrence value which has found acceptance by major nuclear powers, which also consequently facilitated India’s access to NSG. One does not wish that Pakistan falls to regime collapse or state collapse. But it has been suffering from ‘cancer’ (Obama 2010) and Hillary Clinton also expressed similar view where the state sponsored terrorism against India and USA is a matter of great concern. It is from this perspective that rollback on Pakistan’s nuclear arsenal or strict international control over its installation has to be mooted for safe and secured world.

Finally, to quote Bruce Reidel, “Pakistan has become the most dangerous country in the world. Its weak civilian government may have good intentions but seems powerless to address country’s multiple crises (Reidel 2010). Further his latest book reveals shocking truth about how Pakistan Army has nurtured jihad for more than three decades. He warns ‘an extremely powerful jihadist Frankenstein is now roaming the world. The monster has powerful protectors in Pakistan, right up to the top...’ It threatens not just India or the United States. It threatens the entire planet (Reidel 2011). The time has come to think the unthinkable where jihadist take over of Pakistan becomes possible. And then what? Such a regime will take control of Pakistan’s nuclear arsenal and for all the talk of America having plans to secure those weapons, no outsider knows where most of them are located. The history of Pakistan has consistently proven record of being powerless against Army ISI and jihadi elements. Under the circumstances can a weak and powerless civilian government, an ambitious military junta, ISI and radical Islamist scientist be trusted with nuclear weapons? It is therefore necessary to add this dimension in the area of nuclear proliferation and the role of non-state actors. The onus is not only on USA or India but the entire world community has to worry about such situation.

Notes

1. Three Out of Four Wars were initiated by three Army Personnel, Ayubkhan, 1965; Yahyakhani, 1971; and Pervaiz Mushraff in 1999 against India.
2. The U.S. had dispatched nuclear equipped 7th Fleet (USS Enterprise) in the Indian Ocean with possible two objectives. First to prevent India from attacking West Pakistan and settling Kashmir dispute second to pacify enraged Pakistan, and impress China-US commitment to its allies.
3. By order I mean state’s ability and capability to create an environment in the society whereby citizens can pursue their goal freely and without fear.

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India's Trade Relations with Pakistan: The Effectiveness of SAFTA for Deeper Integration

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Abstract

The history of Indo Pakistan economic relations have perhaps been one of the most politicised, controversial, and sensitive issues that has conquered the realm of South Asian politics. This has also been a basis of significant concern in international fora. Trade cooperation between India and Pakistan was a direct product of the separation of Indian subcontinent on August 14, 1947. At that time, India and Pakistan were highly dependent on each other for trade. Thereafter, both resorted to purposeful measures to minimize their trade dependence on each other. As a result, both were strained to import many items from the world market at higher prices. The potential gain from mutual trade with each other range between Rs 15,000 and 20,000 crores during the last five decades. The boost up in trade requires political will with very little investment. During 1997-2004, Pakistan's actual imports from India were 4.8 per cent and India's actual imports from Pakistan were 6.4 per cent only of the respective potential imports, on an average per annum. The establishment of SAARC (South Asian Association for Regional Cooperation) in December 1985 has also played an important role in boosting the intra-trade ties between India and Pakistan. The agreement of South Asian Free Trade Agreement (SAFTA), effective from January 1, 2006 has also further improved trade between the two countries. SAFTA is a step forward in the right direction for fostering regional economic integration. But a major limitation of SAFTA is its narrow coverage. Different countries have kept a significant part of their imports out of the purview of the Tariff Liberalisation Programme (TLP) by putting them on the sensitive or negative list. Apparently 58.5 per cent of India's exports to SAARC countries are subject to sensitive list (Pakistan 34 per cent). Pakistan's imports from India are still governed by a positive list as Pakistan has not provided Most Favoured Nation (MFN) to India. Therefore, there is urgent need for extending the coverage of the Agreement to substantially all trade in the region, as per the WTO requirement. This paper looks deep into the problems and potentials of trade between India and Pakistan. The article analyses how SAFTA has in fact given a fillip to a better understanding between the two countries; how the latter has contributed to the furthering of the two countries' relations notwithstanding the fact that the bilateral disputes are out of the purview of the SAARC agenda. The article also focuses on how the inclusion of bilateral problems would derail the SAARC process.

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Introduction

Bilateral trade between India and Pakistan had steadily declined since the partition of 1947, as both countries sought to reduce their interdependence. Geographical proximity and economic complementarity are the natural compulsions which should bring India and Pakistan closer so far as commercial relations are concerned and put an end to the stiff and illogical barriers which have been artificially created between them. Both countries are facing the common scourge of grinding poverty, social divisions and religious extremism. Besides, the relentless pace of globalization and the dangers emanating from the rupture in the world order makes it imperative for India and Pakistan to move towards economic cooperation and seek political interaction (Inayat Kalim, year not mentioned).

Trade between India and Pakistan takes place in three forms. The direct formal trade that remained marginal for many years, which has now picked up in the last few years. The second arrangement is indirect trade through third countries which are mainly Dubai and Singapore. The third form is plain smuggling through the porous borders or through the misuse of personal baggage or through the misuse of personal baggage facilities by the travellers between the two countries (Sajjad Ashraf, 2009).

Indo-Pak trade suffered a marked drop in the early 1950s, and over the course of wars and military disputes, trade flows have decreased systematically. Both countries pursued policies of import substitution, which discouraged trade in general. Pakistan's trade with India as a share of its trade with the world fell to zero by the mid 1960s from 21 percent in 1950. Trade with India never exceeded 2 percent of Pakistan's total trade in the past two decades. Given its larger economy, India's trade with Pakistan has always represented a somewhat smaller share of its trade with the world, but has followed a similar pattern over the past five decades (Eugenia Baroncelli (2007), Zareena Fatima Naqui & Philip Schuler (eds.), p.61-62).

Trade only picked up in 1988-89 with the increase in the list of approved imports from India. The list was expanded to 249 items and then to 571 in 1986 which was further increased to 596. This list however, does not include items like automotive, consumer durables, heavy engineering goods, textile machinery, computer software and most of the drugs and pharmaceuticals. These products are being imported by Pakistan from other sources at higher costs. Opening up of trade in these areas with India would definitely be to Pakistan's advantage (Mukherjee, Shome 2001: 89) (See Table 1).

In 1983, an India-Pakistan Joint Commission was formed which formally ratified an agreement to foster greater bilateral cooperation in the economic, industrial and commercial fields. As a result, 40 items were allowed for import from India by the private sector, which were later increased to 584 items. The trends in trade from the above table show that India's exports to Pakistan have increased after 1990. But in the year 1998-99 there occurred a large

surge of imports from Pakistan to India. India's trade balance with Pakistan recorded a deficit till 1992-93 and turned surplus for the next five consecutive years, and again registered a deficit in 1998-99. In 2007-08 the total trade (exports plus imports) between India and Pakistan amounted to a little more than US\$ 2 billion, up from a paltry US\$500 million in 2000.

Table 1: Indo Pakistan Trade (Value in Rs Million)

Year	Exports to Pakistan	Imports from Pakistan	Balance of Trade	Total Trade
1990-91	736.0	844.9	-108.9	1580.9
1991-92	988.2	1412.8	-424.6	2400.1
1992-93	1470.8	3755.1	-2884.3	5225.9
1993-94	20009.6	1366.8	642.8	3376.4
1994-95	1797.0	1651.1	140.9	3453.1
1995-96	2561.9	1508.0	1061.1	4069.9
1996-97	5581.1	1283.5	4297.6	6864.6
1997-98	5320.1	1651.9	3668.2	6972.0
1998-99	4659.9	8918.5	-4258.6	13578.4
1999-2000	4027.7	2955.9	1071.8	6983.6
2000-01	8535.4	2925	5610.4	11460.4
2001-02	6867.9	3088.3	3779.6	9956.2
2002-03	9977.3	2170.5	7806.8	12147.8
2003-04	13185.2	2649	10536.2	15834.2
2004-05	23411.8	4267.4	19144.4	27679.2
2005-06	30514.7	7949.8	22564.9	38464.5
2006-07	61068.8	14627.3	46441.5	75696.1
2007-08	78273.7	11587.2	66686.5	89860.9
2008-09	65320.7	16683.9	48636.8	82004.6
2009-10	74610.3	13046.2	61564.1	87656.5
<i>Source: DGCI &S, Calcutta & I.N. Mukherjee, Parthasarathi Shome (ed.), (2001), p.89.</i>				

In 1983, an India-Pakistan Joint Commission was formed which formally ratified an agreement to foster greater bilateral cooperation in the economic, industrial and commercial fields. As a result, 40 items were allowed for import from India by the private sector, which were later increased to 584 items. The trends in trade from the above table show that India's exports of Pakistan have increased after 1990. But in the year 1998-99 there occurred a large surge of imports from Pakistan to India. India's trade balance with Pakistan recorded a deficit till 1992-93 and turned surplus for the next five consecutive years, and again registered a deficit in 1998-99. In 2007-08 the total trade (exports plus imports) between India and Pakistan amounted to a little more than US\$ 2 billion, up from a paltry US\$500 million in 2000.

Trade Relations of India and Pakistan

Trade policy of Pakistan with India is on the basis of the opportunities and threats which emerged due to trade liberalization between the two countries. In view of Pakistan's domestic industrial base, Pakistan has adopted open trade with India particularly in sectors in which it is not so competitive. When Pakistan allows all kinds of exports to India, India had maintained a positive list of 687 items in 2004-05, officially imported from India. In pursuance of SAPTA negotiations, the positive list of importable items was expanded by 81 items to a total of 768 items (these items correspond to around 1650 items at 8-digit level) and further to 773 items. Most of the new items included in the positive list are in the nature of raw materials and chemical items required by the local industry. Items not covered in the list are not permissible for import from India (Trade Integration Between Pakistan and India).

India is the largest country in the region and occupies 70 per cent of the landmass of the region. Its territorial and maritime boundary encompasses all the SAARC countries (see the table below). India is well endowed with natural resources and minerals and some of these (e.g. Uranium, iron ore, gold and silver etc) are exclusive to India only. In terms of population, India accounts for 90 per cent of the region's population. India's dominance is not restricted to size only-it accounts for nearly 73 per cent GDP and 64 per cent of the export trade of the regional bloc. In terms of manufacturing value added, India constitutes nearly 80 per cent of the region's manufacturing value added and also dominates the export and import volume of the region. Its exports to other SAARC countries have increased from 3.9 per cent in 1970 to 5.5 per cent in 1999 whereas import share declined from 1.4 per cent to 0.9 per cent over the same period (Chowdhury, 2005).

A study done by State Bank of Pakistan estimated bilateral trade volume crossing US\$ 5.2 billion with the liberalization of bilateral trade. 32 per cent of Pakistan's export products are bought by India from other countries and constitute one-third of India's total imports. The report notes that about 1,181 items worth \$3.9 billion, covering 45 per cent of the total items exported by Pakistan, were at par with India's imports during 2004. It indicates that about 70.3 per cent of the common items exported from Pakistan have unit values less than or equal to

Indian imports' unit values, and there is a large scope for the export of those items simply by producing the quality required by India. The study also finds that India earns \$ 15 billion in export revenue from 2,646 items being imported by Pakistan from other countries and notes that in 2004 the unit value of Indian exports for 48.7 per cent of these items. Forty five per cent of those common imports were not included in then Pakistan's positive list and hence their import from India was not allowed. Pakistan was losing \$ 400 million to \$ 900 million by importing those items from alternative sources (South Asia Development and Cooperation Report 2008:65-66).

Table 2: Economic Indicators of major SAARC Member Countries, 1998

Indicator	Bangladesh	India	Pakistan	Sri Lanka
Population (mil)	126.6	979.7	131.6	18.8
Area (sq km)	147570	3287253	796095	65610
Growth rate of GDP (% 1995-98)	4.6	4.3	2.5	5.9
GDP per Capita (US\$)	360	370	500	800
Agricultural Sector (% of GDP)	24.5	25.4	25.3	18.9
Manufacturing Sector	16.1	14.5	14.7	14.8
<i>Source: World Bank, world Tables 2002 & World Development Indicators, 1999. World Bank, 1997, South Asia's Integration into the World Economy & Mamta, Chowdhury (2005).</i>				

Imports from Pakistan are subject to both tariff as well as non tariff barriers. Products subject to customs tariff above 50 per cent include sugar, resins, mixed woven fabrics, asafoetida, poppy seeds, sultanias, pistachios, figs (dried) apricots (dried), liquorice roots, denim, cotton fabrics, ayurvedic and unani herbs, among others. In addition, a number of products are subject to non tariff measures. Products subject to import restrictions include other woven fabrics, poppy seeds, other ash and residue, denim, citrus fruits, ayurvedic and unani herbs, hazel nuts in shell, other semi precious stones, etc. There is an evident need to reduce duties and other import restrictions on these products which will not only enhance imports of these items from Pakistan, but simultaneously serve as a goodwill gesture towards SAARC (Mukherjee and Shome 2001: 92).

Bilateral trade between India and Pakistan reached US\$1.6 billion in 2006-07 from US\$835 million in 2004-05. For the first time, imports from India to Pakistan crossed the US\$1 billion mark and reached US\$1.25 billion. Pakistan's exports to India, on the other hand, grew slowly from US\$280 million in 2004-05 to only US\$370 million in 2006-07, despite the fact that India had granted MFN¹ status to Pakistan. Trade volume between the two countries (2007-08) stands at US\$2.12 billion, with the balance heavily tilted in favour of New Delhi. As neither country falls in the category of the top 10 partners for the other, trade between the two still remains negligible. Such trade has largely remained dependent upon the political climate prevailing in the region (Sajjad Ashraf, 2009).

Ershad Ali & Dayal K. Talukder (2009) in their study say that differences in welfare gains among members depend on the trade creation effects. Welfare gains arise from trade on imports from the rest of the World. Factors that influence trade creation are the elasticity of import demand, the pre-agreement level of protection and import from the rest of the world. Large countries like India and Pakistan have relatively high levels of trade with the rest of the world and their import demands are relatively elastic and, therefore, they gain more from trade creation than they lose.

Economic Integration under SAARC

The South Asian economies, propelled by the changing international environment, and the success stories of NAFTA and EU in the West, and ASEAN, closer home, realised albeit a little late, that meaningful economic cooperation may be the only option ahead to ensure a greater say in international outcomes as well as create conditions for overall growth. SAARC was formed as an answer to these developments in 1985. The process of trade liberalization under the SAARC framework has been rather slow as compared to the progress made at the bilateral and sub regional fronts. The trade cooperation under SAARC has been subjected to severe criticism as intra-SAARC trade as a proportion of SAARC's total trade has remained low at around 4 per cent. In order to realize the full potential of regional cooperation SAARC will need to move forward to avail of the vast opportunities of deeper regional integration which are beckoning the South Asian countries. The basic parameters and paradigms driving the integration of the South Asian countries with the outside world have changed beyond recognition in ways which have imposed asymmetric costs and benefits on the member states. The South Asian countries can cope with these changes more effectively if they can address some of these issues as a cohesive regional group rather than as individual towards regional integration and deepening regional cooperation (South Asia Development and Cooperation Report 2004, pp.47-48).

South Asian Preferential Trading Arrangement (SAPTA)

SAARC paved the way for SAPTA which became operational in 1995. The objective of the formalisation of SAPTA, has been to enhance economic cooperation among member states of SAARC through trade enhancement. This agreement is considered to be the major stepping stone towards higher level of intra-regional trade liberalisation and economic cooperation among the member countries. The final goal of this trading bloc is intended to reach towards the South Asian Free Trade Association (SAFTA) to form a free trade area in the South Asia with a favourable treatment towards the Least Developed Countries (LDCs) comprising Bangladesh, Maldives, Bhutan and Nepal. SAFTA will facilitate the free movement of goods and services across the member nations by dismantling tariff and non-tariff barriers to trade in the region (Mamta, Chowdhury 2005).

In the face of ensuing Indo-Pakistan tensions, economic cooperation may be somewhat difficult to achieve. The countries of the region could, however, explore every possibility of moving ahead through in the field of investment linkages. In view of the delays in negotiations regarding the reduction and elimination of tariff and non tariff barriers at the SAPTA rounds which has been a contentious issue, agreements on investments and joint ventures might be relatively easier to reach. This could serve as an effective confidence building measure Shome 2001: 18). India and Pakistan have successfully concluded bilateral negotiations on additional lists of products for preferential market access to each other under the fourth round negotiations of SAPTA at a meeting held at the SAARC Secretariat in Kathmandu on December 2, 2003. Both countries agreed on inclusion of additional 500 tariff concessions, which, though bilaterally negotiated, will also be available to all other member states. The depth of preferential tariff concessions extended by both sides ranges from 10 to 25 per cent (South Asia Development and Cooperation Report 2004: 57.). There is also immense scope for investment cooperation in terms of joint ventures (JVs) between India and Pakistan which is shown table 3.

In effect, the full potential of Indo-Pakistan trade is yet to be realised. Pakistan's imports from the world market of certain products are definitely more expensive than imports of those from India. This is particularly evident in the case of iron ore agglomerates, reactive dyes, and sewing machines. It would be far more cost effective for Pakistan to import these products in larger quantities from India. Pakistan could save considerable foreign exchange by reducing its dependence on imports of products like soyameal-which it imports from US under PL 480, and tea from the rest of the world, and importing the same from India, at comparatively lower costs. India too could increase its imports of those commodities from Pakistan that are cheaper to import from that country than the world markets. This would on the one hand intensify trade, and on the other, act as a confidence building exercise among the two countries (Mukherjee and Shome 2001: 97).

Table 3: Potential joint ventures between India and Pakistan

Industry Group	Project Focus
Information Technology (IT)	Software Exports Training Centre/Centre for Software Training & Management (CSTM) Software Development Centre (SDC). Pakistan has the potential to become an important software exporting and training centre. India can become a role model and both the countries should cooperate and collaborate to tap the large global market for software.
Fish Processing	Processed Frozen/Canned Fish products Future thrust should be on value added canned products exports to the developed countries.
Drugs & Pharmaceuticals (DAP)	Bulk drugs: expansion of formulation sector (tablets, capsules, ointment, injection, etc.) and expansion of health care products (IV fluids, disposable syringes, diagnostic kits etc.) Indian pharma industry can provide the necessary support and assistance to Pakistan for the expansion of its industry.
Agro-Chemicals	A pesticides manufacturing unit in Pakistan. With the expansion of agri business, demand for agro chemicals will grow in future. Indian major players can play an important role through transfer of technology.
Chemicals	Dyes and pigments manufacturing unit in Pakistan has a strong manufacturing base for textiles and leather. Indian players and multinationals can assist Pakistan in developing the sector.
Automobile Ancillary	Integrated auto component complex. Next to India, Pakistan is the only country in the SAARC Region to Manufacture & Assemble Passenger Cars: Pakistan may also consider assembly of HCV & LCV in collaboration with TELCO/Ashok Leyland from India.
<i>Source: FICCI, Status Paper India Pakistan Economic Relations, 2003. & Regional Economic Integration in South Asia: Lessons from Different Approaches, South Asia Development and Cooperation Report 2004, Research and Information System for the Non-Aligned and other Developing Countries (RIS), New Delhi, India.</i>	

The signing of SAFTA in January 2004 represents an important turning point in the relationship between Pakistan and India. The treaty came into force on January 1, 2006. It will be fully implemented by December 2015, when all countries will have reduced tariffs to 0-5 percent. SAFTA is expected to promote intra regional trade, and to further regional cooperation in investment and related economic matters, thus enabling South Asia to become a bigger

player in world trade (Eugenia Baroncelli 2007). However Upinder Sawhney (2010) argues that despite regular summits and meetings of SAARC nations, there is lack of cohesion and cordiality among most of the SAARC members. The region is afflicted with terrorism also. Most economies of SAARC have shown resilience in the face of recent global meltdown.

Concluding Remarks

The above discussion has shown how India and Pakistan failed to capture the extent of complementarities due to high incidence of informal trade, trade barriers, and lack of supply capabilities. Creation of jointly advantageous ventures will also promote and perk up bilateral ties. A free trade area implies dismantling customs barriers, which mean all SAARC members, will have to have the same view to a general import strategy, either formally or informally at some point of instance. But on the other hand it is increasingly apparent that unless countries of a region enjoy some degree of political harmony, they cannot agree to concessions like surrendering their sovereignty over their import policy. The available evidence also points to substantial potential of India and Pakistan economic integration, their need to expand the scope of SAFTA and expedite its implementation scheduled and move on to expand the coverage of integration to services, investment facilitation, and industrial cooperation, integration of capital markets and financial and banking cooperation. A strong-minded implementation of political will can develop cooperation. However, this as a matter has to be a joint political will, enjoying harmony in both India and Pakistan.

Note

1. MFN is one of the instruments in use by the WTO to make member countries' trade regimes competitive and non-discriminatory. India granted MFN status to Pakistan in 1996 but Pakistan has not yet reciprocated in the same manner. As a signatory to the WTO Agreement, Pakistan is bound to grant MFN status to all member countries including India without any discrimination. Instead of granting MFN status, Pakistan has gradually increased the number of items permissible for trade with India. Pakistani manufacturers feel that liberalizing trade between the two countries, after granting MFN status to India, will mostly benefit India given that it possesses a substantial industrial and engineering base. Moreover, dumping of cheap Indian products is also likely which will pose problems for the regulations in Pakistan. See also Implications of Liberalizing Trade and Investment with India, www.wds.worldbank.org, Accessed on 12th September 2010.

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Growing Trade Ties between India and China: Current Status and Prospects

Surinder Kumar Singla

Abstract

India and China are two rapidly emerging economies in world. Both the countries together are home to the world's largest pool of skilled human resources and there is a general consensus that these two countries will continue to be the engines of global economic growth in the 21st century. With their high growth rates and huge markets, these two Asian giants have attracted the attention of international business managers to take a fresh look at the rapidly emerging opportunities in the two countries. After the border war, the relations between these two countries remained depressed for a long time. However, since early nineties, both the countries started deepening their mutual economic relations. Today, India-China relations are conspicuous by the fast rise of trade, which has already crossed US \$ 42 billion in 2009-10. China has already become India's second largest trade partner after U.A.E. Further, India's share in Chinese global trade has also been increasing during the recent past. Hence, it is extremely a fascinating subject to examine their trade ties for the simple reason that both are close neighbours and enjoy unbounded cultural affinity. Any attempt for strengthening trade relations or economic ties between these two countries would, therefore, be most rewarding for their rapid development. The present paper throws much light on bilateral trade between these two neighbouring countries. It tries to find out the major problems of their merchandise trade and suggests some policy measures to improve their bilateral trade.

Key Words: India, China, Mutual Trade, WTO, Concentration Index.

All the factors of production are not adequately available in a country. Hence, for grafting their varied needs, countries engage in international trade. As Ohlin (1952) stated that international trade mitigates the disadvantages of disproportionate geographical distribution of productive resources. International trade decidedly increases the exchangeable value of possessions, means of enjoyment and wealth of the countries concerned. Thus, international trade plays an important role in economic development and growth of a country (Krueger 1980).

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The success story of high performing Asian economies has proved this quite efficiently. Over the past three decades, these economies have consistently outperformed other developing regions and have become the new growth pole of the world economy. This is the case with both India and China, which are emerging as economic powerhouses not only in Asia but also in the world. The importance of India and China in international business is becoming apparent with each passing day. So, it is extremely a fascinating subject to examine their trade ties for the simple reason that both are close neighbours and enjoy unbounded cultural affinity. Any attempt for strengthening trade relations or economic ties between these two countries would, therefore, be most rewarding for their rapid development.

Since 1962, India's trade ties with China were almost cut down for fourteen years. This attributed to the continuation of strain in their political relations and the restrictive trade practices followed by them towards each other. As a result of this syndrome, trade advantages emanating from geographical proximity and ethnic similarity have always remained elusive. However, the economic and diplomatic relations between India and China restarted in the late seventies. In 1984, both the countries offered Most Favoured Nations' (MFN) status to each other, which opened the boundaries of these two countries for their economic interactions. After that the high level officials' visits put a positive impact on their trade relations. However, their trade relations got a big momentum only since 1990, when India started its liberalization process. Further, the end of cold war and emergence of a vibrant Asian economy have altered the global balance of power during the nineties and China has emerged as one of the fastest growing economies in the world and become one of India's major trading partners (ITPO, 2003). Chinese accession to WTO, in 2001, further strengthened the trade ties between these two neighbours. However, their mutual trade could not be untouched from global economic slowdown and it declined considerably during the last few years. Hence, it is an interesting issue to analyse the various aspects of India's merchandise trade with China.

This paper has been divided into five sections. Section 1 deals with basic introduction and plan of the study. The growth of India's merchandise trade with China has been presented in section 2. Section 3 examines the composition of India's merchandise trade with China. Section 4 compares the diversification of Indian exports to China and Chinese exports to India. Section 5 examines the potential for intra-industry trade between India and China. Section 6 comprises the summary and conclusion. The present study is based on secondary data which have been collected mainly from Monthly Statistics for Foreign Trade of India; and Statistics of Foreign Trade of India by Countries, Directorate General for Commercial Intelligence and

Statistics (DGCI&S), Kolkata; and UN Commodity Trade Statistics, United Nations (UN). The analysis has been made for the period from 1990-91 to 2009-10.

Growth of India-China Merchandise Trade

India-China trade relations experienced various changes during the last twenty years. These changes have been analysed over the period from 1990-91 to 2009-10. Table 1 depicts the value of India's merchandise trade with China from 1990-91 to 2009-10. In 1990-91, India's exports to China were merely Rs.33 crore which increased to Rs. 54714 crore in 2009-10. Similarly, India's imports from China also rose quite tremendously from Rs. 64 crore in 1990-91 to Rs. 146049 crore in 2009-10. With the substantial growth of exports and imports, India's total trade with China also increased remarkably, from Rs. 96 crore in 1990-91 to Rs. 200763 crore in 2009-10. India's total trade with China decreased only once, by 5.74 per cent in 1998-99.

Table 1: Value of India-China Merchandise Trade (Crore Rs.)

Years	Exports	Imports	Balance of Trade	Total Trade	Annual Percentage Change
1990-91	33	64	-31 (0.29)	96	-
1995-96	1113	2716	-1603 (9.88)	3829	20.14
2000-01	3798	6863	-3065 (11.23)	10660	35.03
2001-02	4540	9712	-5172 (14.29)	14252	33.69
2002-03	9560	13512	-3952 (9.39)	23073	61.89
2003-04	13579	18625	-5046 (7.68)	32204	39.58
2004-05	25233	31892	-6659 (5.30)	57125	77.38
2005-06	29925	48117	-18192 (8.92)	78042	36.61
2006-07	37530	79009	-41479 (15.44)	116538	49.33
2007-08	43597	109116	-65519 (18.38)	152713	31.04
2008-09	42661	147606	-104944 (19.66)	190267	24.59
2009-10	54714	146049	-91335 (17.63)	200763	5.52

Note: Figures in parentheses show the percentage share in India's overall negative balance of trade.

Source: Calculated from Monthly Statistics of Foreign Trade of India, DGCI&S; Kolkata, (Various Issues)

This is due to the sharp decline in India's exports to China. During the year 1998-99, India's political relations with China became terse, which adversely affected their trade relations. After that the annual growth rate of total trade between the two Asian giants remained healthy up to 2006-07 but beyond that the financial crisis in the world economy showed its negative impact on the pace of their mutual trade. In fact, due to this crisis, India's exports to China declined in 2008-09 and similarly its imports from China also declined in 2009-10. As a result of this decline in exports and imports, the annual percentage change of total trade remained only 5.52 per cent in 2009-10.

Though, the values of India's exports to and imports from China remained quite phenomenal however one major problem from India's point of view was its rising trade deficit with China. By and large, the balance of trade remained in China's favour, except the years 1990-91 and 1992-93, when India enjoyed favourable balance of trade with China of Rs. 67 crore and Rs. 44 crore respectively. But, except these two years, India suffered unfavourable balance of trade with China. Further, the trade deficit with China accounted for only 0.29 per cent of India's overall trade deficit in 1990-91, which rose to its maximum i.e. 19.66 per cent during 2008-09, and then slightly reduced to 17.63 per cent during 2009-10.

Table 2: India's Percentage Share in China's Exports and Imports

Years	Exports	Imports	Total Trade
1991	0.20	0.19	0.20
1996	0.45	0.52	0.48
2001	0.71	0.70	0.71
2002	0.82	0.77	0.80
2003	0.76	1.03	0.89
2004	1.00	1.37	1.18
2005	1.17	1.48	1.32
2006	1.50	1.30	1.41
2007	1.97	1.53	1.78
2008	2.21	1.79	2.02
2009	2.47	1.36	1.97

Source: Calculated from UN Commodity Trade Statistics, United Nations.

The relative importance of India as China's trade partner and that of China as India's trade partner is depicted in Table 2 and Table 3 respectively. It is clear from the Table 2 that India was not a big partner of China during 1991-2003. During this period India's share in China's total trade though increased slowly but remained below one per cent. But in 2004, India gained one per cent share in China's global trade and this share increased rapidly to 2.02 per cent in 2008. However, in 2009, it again declined slightly to 1.97 per cent. The similarly trend was also seen in case exports and imports with one exception that the share of India in China's global exports increased even during the financial crisis and reached at its ever maximum point, i.e. 2.47 per cent in 2009.

Table 3 depicts China's position in India's overall trade. China's share in India's total trade increased from 0.13 per cent in 1990-91 to 9.15 per cent in 2007-08. However, then it dropped slightly to 9.09 per cent 2009-10.

Table 3: China's Percentage Share in India's Exports and Imports

Years	Exports	Imports	Total Trade
1990-91	0.10	0.15	0.13
1995-96	1.05	2.22	1.67
2000-01	1.87	2.97	2.45
2001-02	2.17	3.96	3.14
2002-03	3.75	4.55	4.18
2003-04	4.63	5.19	4.94
2004-05	6.72	6.36	6.52
2005-06	6.56	7.29	6.99
2006-07	6.56	9.40	8.25
2007-08	6.65	10.78	9.15
2008-09	5.07	10.74	8.59
2009-10	6.47	10.71	9.09

Source: Calculated from Monthly Statistics of Foreign Trade of India, DGCIS; Kolkata, (Various Issues)

China's share in India's exports and imports also increased from 0.10 per cent and 0.15 per cent in 1990-91 to 6.65 per cent and 10.78 per cent in 2007-08 respectively. But, during 2009-10, both the shares declined slightly to 6.47 per cent and 10.71 per cent respectively. Further, it may also be noted here that after the Chinese accession to WTO in 2001, China's share in India's exports and imports increased with a rapid pace, because China put its door wide open for the international markets. Like other countries, India also utilised this opportunity to deepen its economic ties with China, but the recent crisis has curtailed the pace of their merchandise trade.

During the study period, the values of India-China trade grew at a phenomenal rate which can also be shown in Table 4. During 1990-91 to 2009-10, the growth rates of India's exports to and imports from China (i.e. 40.31 per cent and 45.91 per cent respectively) remained well above than India's overall exports and imports (i.e. 17.83 per cent and 19.91 per cent respectively). Further, as in case of India's overall exports and imports, the growth rates of India's imports from China remained higher than that of India's exports to China (except sub-period 2000-01 to 2004-05).

Table 4: Growth Rate of India's Exports and Imports: China and Overall

Years	Overall		China	
	Exports	Imports	Exports	Imports
1990-91 to 1994-95	26.16	20.82	131.56	176.36
1995-96 to 1999-00	10.23	14.78	13.75	21.81
2000-01 to 2004-05	16.91	21.30	62.96	45.12
2005-06 to 2009-10	17.57	21.43	14.28	32.92
1990-91 to 2004-05	17.83	19.91	40.31	45.91
<i>Note: Figures represent the average annual trend growth rates.</i>				
<i>Source: Calculated from Monthly Statistics of Foreign Trade of India, DGCI&S, Kolkata, (Various Issues).</i>				

Moreover, during the first sub-period (from 1990-91 to 1994-95), Indian exports to and imports from China grew at a fabulous rate, i.e. 131.56 per cent and 176.36 per cent respectively. There are mainly two reasons behind this phenomenal growth rate. First, India initiated its liberalisation process during this phase. Secondly, the political relations between these two nations turned to be good one, which positively affected their trade relations.

However, during the second sub-period, i.e. from 1995-96 to 1999-00, their political relations again became gloomy, due to their nuclear considerations, which negatively affected the growth of their mutual trade. Thus, during this period, the growth rate of India's exports to and imports from China fell substantially, i.e. 13.75 per cent and 21.81 per cent respectively. In third sub-period, i.e. from 2000-01 to 2004-05, the trade relations between the two countries improved rapidly. However, one thing should be noted here that, in this sub-period, the growth rate of India's exports to China (i.e. 62.96 per cent) was much higher than that of imports from China (i.e. 45.12 per cent). The major reason behind this was that during this sub-period, China joined WTO and put its door wide open for the world market. India also utilised this opportunity. But, in the last sub-period, i.e. 2005-06 to 2009-10, the growth rates of exports and imports again went down sharply (i.e. 14.28 per cent and 32.92 per cent respectively) due to the financial crisis.

Composition of India-China Merchandise Trade

The usefulness of foreign trade depends upon the structure and pattern of trade which is determined by the nature of commodities exported and imported by a country (Singla and Brar, 2008). The share of selected fifteen commodities in India's total exports to China increased from 83.28 per cent in 1990-91 to 85.12 per cent in 2009-10. However, during the study period, it fluctuated sharply. In 1991-92, it reached to greater heights, i.e. 98.64 per cent, due to the sharp rise in the share of ores, slag & ash, which rose from 18.78 per cent in 1990-91 to 66.67 per cent in 1991-92. However, after that its share declined with lots of fluctuation and adjusted at 47.80 per cent in 2009-10. Thus, during the last few years, this commodity has emerged as dominating commodity in India's exports basket to China, constituting nearly half of the total exports. The share of cotton and organic chemicals improved sharply. The share of iron & steel; and plastic got stimulated during 2000-01 to 2002-03, but then they lost their relevance. While some other commodities, such as residues and waste from food industries; inorganic chemicals; pharmaceutical products; and copper also lost their relative relevance. The remaining commodities partially affect India's overall exports to China. They dominate, India's exports to China, one or the another year. Thus, this shows that the share of different commodities exported to China, was very unstable (Table 5).

Table 6 presents percentage share of China in India's global exports of selected commodities. China's demand for ores, slag & ash increased fabulously from 0.52 per cent in 1990-91 to 83.54 per cent in 2009-10. In case of some other commodities such as organic chemicals; salt, sulphur, earths & stone; animal or vegetable fats & oils etc.; inorganic

chemicals; plastic; inorganic chemicals; cotton; animal or vegetable fats & oils etc.; and prepared feathers & down, China's share improved with rapid pace. However, in case of some other commodities namely residues and waste from the food industries; iron & steel; and copper, China's share was very unstable. In few years their share went up to greater heights while in other years it went down to be negligible. One thing should be noteworthy here is that India's exports to China were mainly dominated by raw materials and semi-manufactured products. Though, India's overall exports of manufactured items have increased but not in the case of China. It is still exporting a great extent of raw material to China.

During the liberalisation era, Indian dependency on Chinese items increased rapidly. Due to the cheap prices of Chinese products, Indian imports from China increased at a tremendous pace. Table 7 shows the percentage share of selected commodities in India's total imports from China. The total share of selected commodities, in India's overall imports from China, increased from 77.91 per cent in 1990-91 to 82.13 per cent in 2009-10. During the whole study period, their share remained above 75 per cent, except the year 1994-95, when it went down to 59.42 per cent. The share of two commodities namely electrical machinery & equipment; and nuclear reactors, boilers, machinery & mechanical appliances in India's total imports from China improved quite surprisingly from 1.64 per cent and 2.16 per cent to 31.44 per cent and 20.66 per cent in 2009-10. Thus, these two commodities constitute more than half of India's total imports from China. This rise may be the result of increasing demand in Indian consumer market for cheap Chinese electrical equipments. However, some commodities, such as, mineral fuels & oils; silk; salt, sulphur, earths & stone; and edible vegetables, lost their relevance during the study period. Besides the above mentioned commodities, the share of all the other commodities remained very low.

Table 8 presents the percentage share of Chinese market in the selected Indian imports from the world. As is clear, Indian dependency on Chinese silk increased tremendously. China's share in India's total imports of silk was mere 11.01 per cent in 1990-91, which shot up to 96.14 per cent in 2009-10. China's share in Indian imports of some other commodities, i.e. organic chemicals; electrical machinery & equipments; nuclear reactors, boilers, machinery & mechanical appliances; inorganic chemicals; articles of iron & steel; projected goods; Optical, photographic cinematographic measuring etc.; man-made filaments; and impregnated, coated, covered or laminated textile fabrics, also increased sharply. While in other commodities China's share remained quite unstable and low.

Table 5: Percentage Share of Selected Commodities in India's Exports to China

S. No.	HS Codes	Commodities	1990-91	1995-96	2000-01	2001-02	2002-03	2003-04	2004-05	2005-06	2006-07	2007-08	2008-09	2009-10
1	23	Residues & waste from the food industries	1.47	8.61	0.99	0.44	0.19	0.59	0.65	2.14	0.83	0.86	1.70	0.88
2	26	Ores, slag & ash	18.78	33.78	18.68	27.62	25.02	29.34	52.13	51.26	45.89	56.88	51.35	47.80
3	03	Fish and crustaceans	0.00	4.13	13.93	8.90	5.88	2.57	1.79	2.05	1.03	1.23	0.90	1.84
4	72	Iron & steel	0.63	11.43	3.29	1.73	25.43	20.42	11.78	6.28	5.76	2.06	4.02	2.65
5	52	Cotton	0.67	6.65	8.47	7.24	3.22	3.64	1.56	7.62	9.04	9.98	4.07	10.76
6	29	Organic chemicals	0.76	7.43	13.00	11.86	7.87	7.50	6.45	6.81	6.25	5.78	4.27	4.40
7	25	Salt, sulphur, earths & stone	0.82	1.67	5.77	6.07	3.49	3.05	2.53	2.24	2.49	1.85	2.93	2.40
8	15	Animal or vegetable fats & oils etc.	0.00	5.96	1.67	0.75	0.08	0.48	0.85	0.48	0.68	0.64	1.08	1.51
9	28	Inorganic chemicals	28.92	2.94	0.46	1.95	4.31	3.42	4.02	4.86	4.24	1.45	2.22	0.95
10	30	Pharmaceutical products	1.22	1.83	2.17	2.27	1.80	0.67	0.49	0.31	0.33	0.22	0.26	0.21
11	39	Plastic	0.00	3.57	9.74	11.95	7.52	9.03	7.11	4.05	5.18	2.13	1.53	2.70
12	67	Prepared feathers & down	0.00	0.31	2.14	2.13	1.31	1.21	0.77	0.82	0.97	1.14	0.88	0.76
13	84	Nuclear reactors, boilers, machinery & mechanical appliances	0.15	0.78	2.11	0.91	1.60	2.31	1.88	1.88	1.88	2.16	2.52	2.67
14	90	Optical, photographic cinematographic measuring etc.	0.29	0.08	1.68	2.02	1.00	0.80	0.42	0.48	0.48	0.35	0.64	0.92
15	74	Copper	29.57	0.01	1.87	0.31	1.21	1.15	1.17	1.74	6.43	3.71	1.28	4.69
Total			83.28	89.19	85.97	86.15	89.94	86.19	93.60	93.04	91.49	90.42	79.66	85.12
<i>Source: Calculated from Monthly Statistics of Foreign Trade of India, DGCIS; Kolkata, (Various Issues)</i>														

Table 6: Percentage Share of Chinese Market in India's Global Export of Selected Commodities

S. No.	HS Codes	Commodities	1990-91	1995-96	2000-01	2001-02	2002-03	2003-04	2004-05	2005-06	2006-07	2007-08	2008-09	2009-10
1	23	Residues & waste from the food industries	0.08	4.04	1.79	0.84	1.18	2.34	5.05	12.89	5.53	4.51	6.86	5.86
2	26	Ores, slag & ash	0.52	18.66	33.74	48.30	47.14	66.34	78.31	77.82	78.07	88.28	88.27	83.54
3	03	Fish and crustaceans	0.00	1.37	8.41	6.96	8.31	6.15	7.67	9.75	5.46	8.94	6.41	11.72
4	72	Iron & steel	0.06	4.52	2.42	1.75	26.28	23.29	15.68	11.14	8.53	3.41	5.10	6.81
5	52	Cotton	0.01	1.11	2.92	3.46	2.89	4.37	3.86	17.25	19.12	21.00	12.22	27.23
6	29	Organic chemicals	0.05	2.97	6.25	7.02	7.39	7.85	10.01	9.48	9.04	8.72	5.35	6.82
7	25	Salt, sulphur, earths & stone	0.08	1.77	10.76	12.89	13.27	14.43	17.11	16.70	17.79	16.84	21.71	25.02
8	15	Animal or vegetable fats & oils etc.	0.00	7.37	5.97	4.10	1.07	6.58	13.89	11.56	17.39	13.72	17.61	31.20
9	28	Inorganic chemicals	3.07	4.73	1.62	7.02	21.17	23.83	35.35	42.41	43.88	19.06	18.37	11.41
10	30	Pharmaceutical products	0.05	1.00	1.91	2.05	2.54	1.21	1.33	0.86	0.87	0.56	0.48	0.47
11	39	Plastic	0.00	2.56	11.55	14.70	14.82	19.98	18.98	12.67	15.68	8.27	5.69	11.36
12	67	Prepared feathers & down	0.00	9.48	42.13	44.05	52.77	49.92	53.07	53.33	55.20	60.40	45.58	45.29
13	84	Nuclear reactors, boilers, machinery & mechanical appliances	0.00	0.30	1.23	0.55	1.84	2.72	3.20	3.04	3.06	3.44	2.94	4.28
14	90	Optical, photographic cinematographic measuring etc.	0.07	0.32	5.17	6.31	5.38	5.08	3.96	4.59	4.92	4.01	5.08	8.60
15	74	Copper	16.62	0.03	9.48	1.40	6.13	5.97	6.94	7.73	17.52	13.78	6.72	30.14

Source: Calculated from Monthly Statistics of Foreign Trade of India, DGCIS; Kolkata, (Various Issues)

Table 7: Percentage Share of Selected Commodities in India's Imports from China

S. No.	HS Codes	Commodities	1990-91	1995-96	2000-01	2001-02	2002-03	2003-04	2004-05	2005-06	2006-07	2007-08	2008-09	2009-10
1	29	Organic chemicals	7.07	23.48	16.59	16.85	16.78	15.89	11.59	12.06	9.79	8.79	8.63	9.76
2	27	Mineral fuels & oils	27.60	15.18	17.53	12.90	6.27	5.46	12.71	6.63	7.21	4.78	3.74	1.23
3	50	Silk	21.24	8.95	7.54	7.68	5.75	5.46	4.27	3.54	1.93	1.41	1.15	1.20
4	85	Electrical machinery & equipment	1.64	6.70	10.75	13.43	25.07	29.17	25.04	25.52	24.29	28.13	30.85	31.44
5	84	Nuclear reactors, boilers, machinery & mechanical appliances	2.16	5.88	12.56	11.42	10.19	12.20	14.81	19.90	18.61	17.79	17.03	20.06
6	28	Inorganic chemicals	2.25	3.61	3.37	3.05	2.65	2.74	2.10	1.87	1.65	1.47	1.71	1.47
7	73	Articles of iron or steel	0.06	0.78	0.46	0.72	0.58	1.08	1.35	1.79	5.76	4.25	3.19	2.78
8	98	Project goods	0.00	3.30	0.85	0.40	0.93	0.13	0.38	0.98	2.86	1.47	3.82	6.82
9	25	Salt; sulphur; earths & stone	8.85	2.68	5.49	2.98	1.32	1.05	0.86	0.45	0.27	0.29	0.42	0.26
10	72	Iron & steel	0.83	2.43	0.66	0.65	0.31	0.50	1.77	2.47	4.05	5.39	5.36	2.60
11	71	Natural or cultured pearls, precious or semiprecious stones	1.76	0.53	1.80	4.82	4.88	1.69	2.18	1.11	0.53	1.26	2.51	0.90
12	90	Optical, photographic cinematographic measuring etc.	0.10	0.94	1.35	2.63	1.99	1.58	1.32	1.26	1.16	1.21	1.79	1.44
13	07	Edible vegetables	4.33	1.08	0.21	1.47	1.60	0.61	0.25	0.21	0.24	0.08	0.12	0.42
14	54	Man-made filaments.	0.00	0.73	0.42	0.74	1.74	1.68	1.48	1.29	0.94	0.77	0.70	0.76
15	59	Impregnated, coated, covered or laminated textile fabrics	0.00	0.41	0.73	1.04	1.70	1.63	1.59	1.80	1.26	0.97	0.85	0.99
Total			77.91	76.68	80.32	80.77	81.76	80.89	81.72	80.89	80.55	78.08	81.87	82.13
<i>Source: Calculated from Monthly Statistics of Foreign Trade of India, DGCIS; Kolkata, (Various Issues)</i>														

Table 8: Percentage Share of Chinese Market in India's Global Imports of Selected Commodities

S. No.	HS Codes	Commodities	1990-91	1995-96	2000-01	2001-02	2002-03	2003-04	2004-05	2005-06	2006-07	2007-08	2008-09	2009-10
1	29	Organic chemicals	0.28	9.58	15.58	18.61	21.20	20.61	19.68	25.48	28.31	29.38	32.78	32.04
2	27	Mineral fuels & oils	0.15	1.42	1.50	1.67	0.89	0.97	2.59	1.43	2.03	1.50	1.18	0.40
3	50	Silk	11.01	65.76	91.17	92.46	81.76	86.67	94.00	96.76	96.17	97.22	98.05	96.14
4	85	Electrical machinery & equipment	0.06	2.60	6.03	8.59	13.82	18.01	19.87	23.31	29.11	37.99	39.57	43.82
5	84	Nuclear reactors, boilers, machinery & mechanical appliances	0.03	1.13	4.45	5.47	5.55	7.13	10.89	15.54	17.46	19.07	20.74	25.77
6	28	Inorganic chemicals	0.17	3.37	4.67	5.17	6.42	8.62	8.25	8.63	11.34	14.11	11.78	13.20
7	73	Articles of iron or steel	0.01	1.76	2.26	4.09	3.69	6.81	10.81	14.88	39.76	34.97	28.04	30.72
8	98	Project goods	0.00	1.12	1.68	1.42	4.79	1.34	4.43	11.76	27.62	30.57	38.12	44.25
9	25	Salt; sulphur; earths & stone	0.69	5.02	18.75	16.74	8.83	10.58	9.44	6.36	5.53	5.57	5.58	4.84
10	72	Iron & steel	0.02	1.21	1.04	1.19	0.77	1.15	3.75	4.93	11.54	16.06	16.86	9.10
11	71	Natural or cultured pearls, precious or semiprecious stones	0.03	0.14	0.28	1.05	1.30	0.48	0.75	0.58	0.41	1.29	1.88	0.60
12	90	Optical, photographic cinematographic measuring etc.	0.01	1.05	2.12	4.53	4.10	4.12	4.66	5.16	6.52	7.79	11.86	10.07
13	7	Edible vegetables	0.51	4.15	2.79	4.18	7.08	4.34	3.94	3.50	4.12	1.53	2.80	5.82
14	54	Man-made filaments.	0.00	4.84	3.33	5.90	14.57	20.19	26.49	30.78	36.86	42.65	43.60	42.08
15	59	Impregnated, coated, covered or laminated textile fabrics	0.00	4.21	8.90	14.71	30.58	37.12	43.01	54.06	56.36	56.36	55.65	57.96

Source: Calculated from Monthly Statistics of Foreign Trade of India, DGCIS; Kolkata, (Various Issues)

Table 9: Composition of Ores, Slag & Ash to China (Rs. Crore) (At 6-Digit HS Codes)

Commodities	1990-91	1995-96	2000-01	2001-02	2002-03	2003-04	2004-05	2005-06	2006-07	2007-08	2008-09	2009-10
1. Iron ores & concentrates (non-agglomerated)	2.10 (34.38)	138.30 (36.79)	500.66 (70.56)	850.78 (67.84)	1808.15 (75.60)	3310.70 (83.08)	10707.04 (81.39)	13201.14 (86.05)	14926.23 (86.67)	20468.96 (82.54)	18926.35 (86.40)	24134.23 (92.29)
2. Iron ores & concentrates (agglomerated)	0.00 (0.00)	94.04 (25.02)	93.01 (13.11)	135.78 (10.83)	167.93 (7.02)	473.67 (11.89)	1333.43 (10.14)	1288.83 (8.40)	157.17 (0.91)	1284.44 (5.18)	986.38 (4.50)	129.62 (0.50)
3. Mineral ores & concentrates	0.00 (0.00)	7.10 (1.89)	8.91 (1.26)	28.71 (2.29)	14.52 (0.61)	37.54 (0.94)	66.32 (0.50)	25.09 (0.16)	11.45 (0.07)	70.14 (0.28)	80.23 (0.37)	89.89 (0.34)
4. Aluminium ores & concentrates	0.00 (0.00)	0.00 (0.00)	0.00 (0.00)	0.05 (0.00)	42.73 (1.79)	31.48 (0.79)	5.71 (0.04)	17.62 (0.11)	188.45 (1.09)	585.04 (2.36)	100.13 (0.46)	10.43 (0.04)
5. Lead ores & concentrates	0.00 (0.00)	0.00 (0.00)	5.76 (0.81)	16.26 (1.30)	2.47 (0.10)	0.00 (0.00)	139.69 (1.06)	29.31 (0.19)	442.68 (2.57)	270.53 (1.09)	564.92 (2.58)	243.43 (0.93)
6. Zinc ores & concentrates	0.00 (0.00)	0.00 (0.00)	0.00 (0.00)	18.84 (1.50)	139.18 (5.82)	56.70 (1.42)	148.81 (1.13)	161.17 (1.05)	777.50 (4.51)	905.31 (3.65)	237.91 (1.09)	556.41 (2.13)
7. Chromium ores & concentrates	4.01 (65.62)	136.47 (36.30)	100.60 (14.18)	203.12 (16.20)	216.52 (9.05)	74.44 (1.87)	710.55 (5.40)	595.85 (3.88)	702.37 (4.08)	1076.28 (4.34)	836.81 (3.82)	718.90 (2.75)
8. Titanium ores & concentrates	0.00 (0.00)	0.00 (0.00)	0.41 (0.06)	0.29 (0.02)	0.29 (0.01)	0.14 (0.00)	8.45 (0.06)	13.95 (0.09)	8.76 (0.05)	32.76 (0.13)	12.96 (0.06)	94.05 (0.36)
9. Others	0.00 (0.00)	0.00 (0.00)	0.23 (0.03)	0.19 (0.02)	0.00 (0.00)	0.09 (0.00)	35.09 (0.27)	7.87 (0.05)	6.51 (0.04)	104.39 (0.42)	158.93 (0.73)	173.68 (0.66)
10. Total	6.11 (100.00)	375.90 (100.00)	709.57 (100.00)	1254.01 (100.00)	2391.79 (100.00)	3984.76 (100.00)	13155.09 (100.00)	15340.82 (100.00)	17221.12 (100.00)	24797.86 (100.00)	21904.63 (100.00)	26150.63 (100.00)

Note: Figures in parentheses show the percentage share.

Source: Calculated from Statistics of Foreign Trade of India by Countries, DGCI&S; Kolkata, (Various Issues)

Table 10: Unit Values Realised for Exports of Ores, Slag and Ash to China and to RoW (Rs. Lakh Per ton) (At 6-Digit HS Codes)

Commodities		1990-91	1995-96	2000-01	2001-02	2002-03	2003-04	2004-05	2005-06	2006-07	2007-08	2008-09	2009-10
1. Iron ores & concentrates (non-agglomerated)	China	0.003	0.005	0.009	0.009	0.008	0.010	0.019	0.020	0.020	0.035	0.031	0.028
	RoW	0.003	0.005	0.007	0.008	0.007	0.008	0.008	0.016	0.017	0.023	0.033	0.028
2. Iron ores & concentrates (agglomerated)	China	-	0.010	0.013	0.015	0.014	0.023	0.042	0.037	0.036	0.055	0.057	0.024
	RoW	0.005	0.009	0.009	0.016	0.015	0.016	0.027	0.059	0.040	0.042	0.015	0.022
3. Mineral ores & concentrates	China	-	0.021	0.048	0.033	0.022	0.024	0.022	0.017	0.033	0.044	0.051	0.036
	RoW	0.014	0.011	0.021	0.016	0.020	0.015	0.022	0.025	0.028	0.026	0.083	0.070
4. Aluminium ores & concentrates	China	-	-	-	0.189	0.007	0.076	0.045	0.016	0.015	0.016	0.019	0.009
	RoW	0.003	0.031	0.010	0.007	0.010	0.016	0.013	0.013	0.015	0.017	0.023	0.018
5. Lead ores & concentrates	China	-	-	0.043	0.109	0.617	-	0.199	0.298	0.587	0.025	0.697	0.668
	RoW	-	0.214	0.216	0.089	0.558	0.500	0.293	0.275	0.070	0.067	0.093	0.100
6. Zinc ores & concentrates	China	-	-	-	0.114	0.113	0.122	0.182	0.076	0.036	0.253	0.272	0.324
	RoW	-	0.070	0.116	0.115	0.034	0.117	0.127	0.336	0.096	0.256	0.113	0.300
7. Chromium ores & concentrates	China	0.032	0.046	0.031	0.023	0.022	0.316	0.074	0.090	0.066	0.138	0.057	0.116
	RoW	0.023	0.051	0.025	0.025	0.047	0.604	0.056	0.107	0.064	0.118	0.032	0.117
8. Titanium ores & concentrates	China	-	-	0.137	0.143	0.129	0.020	0.021	0.035	0.036	0.045	0.054	0.038
	RoW	0.017	0.040	0.068	0.143	0.071	0.057	0.039	0.047	0.058	0.074	0.086	0.073
9. Others	China	-	-	0.186	0.231	-	0.092	0.029	0.033	0.018	0.028	0.041	0.028
	RoW	-	-	0.186	0.454	-	0.004	0.008	0.023	0.012	0.016	0.005	0.028
10. Total	China	0.007	0.009	0.011	0.011	0.009	0.011	0.021	0.022	0.021	0.037	0.033	0.029
	RoW	0.003	0.006	0.008	0.009	0.008	0.010	0.011	0.021	0.020	0.025	0.018	0.029
<i>Note: RoW refers to Rest of the World (whole world minus China).</i>													
<i>Source: Calculated from Monthly Statistics of Foreign Trade of India and Statistics of Foreign Trade of India by Countries, DGCIS; Kolkata, (Various Issues)</i>													

As is clear from the above discussion that India's exports to China, during the study period, were mainly dominated by the single commodity group namely ores, slag & ash. The share of this commodity group in India's total exports to China increased dramatically from 18.78 per cent in 1990-91 to 47.80 per cent in 2009-10. In fact, during the last few years, this commodity group constituted more than a half of India's total exports to China. Further, in 2009-10, India is exporting 83.54 per cent of its global exports of ores, slag and ash to China alone. Hence, it would be motivating to see what are the interests of both the countries in trading such a huge amount of this commodity. It is done at the most disaggregate level (i.e. 6-digit HS classification).

Table 9 provides the composition of Indian exports of ores, slag & ash to China at 6-digit HS classification. It is clear that the sub-commodity group namely iron ores & concentrates (non-agglomerated) played a drastic role in the enhancement of India's overall exports of ores, slag & ash to China. In 1990-91, its value was mere Rs. 2.10 crore which rose quite superbly to Rs. 24134.23 crore in 2009-10. Consequently, its share increased from 34.38 per cent in 1990-91 to 92.29 per cent in 2009-10. During the study period, the share of two more commodities namely iron ores & concentrate (agglomerated); and chromium ores & concentrates also got stimulated but recently these commodities have lost their relevance. The remaining commodities played a very small or negligible role in India's total exports of ores, slag & ash to China.

Since Indian exports to China are found to be heavily dependent on ores, slag & ash, it is important to examine the unit values realised by India for this commodity. For this purpose, the unit values realised by India from both China and Rest of the World (RoW*) have been compared. Table 10 shows the unit values realised for exports of ores, slag & ash from China and RoW. Some trends are discernible in some cases. For instance, the unit values for exports of iron ores & concentrates (non-agglomerated) were higher in case of China during most of the years. In case of other commodities, the unit values showed mixed scenario. The noticeable point is that in this commodity group as a whole, the average unit values realised from China were higher than the rest of the markets (except the year 2009-10, where, the unit values realised from China as well as from RoW remained same i.e. Rs. 0.029 lakh per ton). In 2008-09, average unit value for ores, slag & ash from China (i.e. Rs. 0.018 lakh per ton) was nearly double than that of RoW (i.e. Rs. 0.033 lakh per ton). Moreover, during the study period, the unit values of this commodity for both China and RoW got stimulated. Perhaps, that was one of the major reasons for growing share of this commodity group in India's total exports to China.

How diversified is the India-China trade?

It is very important to know that how much India's trade with China is diversified. The extent of diversification of India's trade with China is examined via two different ways. First - with the help of number of commodities exported to and imported from China, and second - with the help of Hirschman's Concentration Index (HCI). Table 11 simply shows the number of commodities exported to and imported from China at different HS digit levels. The number of items, for both exports and imports and in different commodity groups, increased very rapidly during the study period. In 1990-91, India's exports from China at 2-digit level were 34; at 4-digit level were 62; at 6-digit level were 72; and at 8-digit level were 84, which rose to 98, 985, 2966 and 4859 respectively, in 2009-10. Similarly, India's imports from China, in 1990-91, at 2-digit level were 44; at 4-digit level were 154; at 6-digit level were 238; and at 8-digit level

Table 11: Total Number of Commodities Exported to and Imported from China at Different Digit Levels

Years	2-Digit Level		4-Digit Level		6-Digit Level		8-Digit Level	
	Exports	Imports	Exports	Imports	Exports	Imports	Exports	Imports
1990-91	34	44	62	154	72	238	84	270
1995-96	72	76	293	612	474	1505	647	2133
2000-01	92	95	629	962	1399	3064	2141	4886
2001-02	93	97	673	991	1543	3302	2369	5266
2002-03	93	97	751	1041	1782	3544	2828	5840
2003-04	94	95	844	1072	2245	3906	4718	9776
2004-05	96	95	860	1084	2337	3955	3923	7173
2005-06	95	96	907	1109	2464	4118	4101	7591
2006-07	97	96	931	1117	2587	4273	4243	7991
2007-08	96	96	964	1126	2745	4314	4424	8145
2008-09	97	97	989	1132	2982	4445	4810	8396
2009-10	98	97	985	1106	2966	4207	4859	7989

Source: Monthly Statistics of Foreign Trade of India, DGCIS; Kolkata, (Various Issues)

were 270, which increased to 97, 1106, 4207 and 7989 respectively, in 2009-10. The major change has been seen in the case of 8-digit level. The number of commodities at 8-digit level, for both exports and imports, increased at a rapid pace, except the year 2004-05 and 2009-10. The export commodities fell due to the decline in exports of organic chemicals; cotton; pharmaceutical products; electrical machinery & equipments; fish & crustaceans etc. On the other hand, import commodities fell due to the decline in imports of electrical machinery & equipments; nuclear reactors, boilers, machinery & mechanical appliances; inorganic chemicals; articles of iron or steel; organic chemicals, etc. It should be noted that at the broader commodity groups (i.e. 6-digit HS level and 8-digit HS level) and in each year, the number of India's imports from China was more than that of India's export to China. This clearly shows that India's exports to China are comparatively less diversified than Chinese exports to India.

The Export Concentration Index or Hirschman's Concentration Index (HCI) is being used to measure the commodity concentration in export-trade of a country (World Bank, 2008). The index is calculated by using the following formula:

$$HCI = \sqrt{\sum (X_i/X_t)^2}$$

Where X_i is country j 's exports of product i ; X_t is country j 's total exports; and $\sqrt{}$ stands for square root. Highest value for this index is unity that occurs when exports consist of only one good. The lower value of concentration index shows that the exports are more evenly distributed over the various possible categories. Table 12 presents the HCI of India's exports to China and that of China's exports to India. In 2008, the value of HCI of India's exports to China reached at its maximum point i.e. 0.61, which reflects that India's exports basket to China is concentrated around only few items (particularly around ores, slag & ash). Similarly, the value of HCI of China's exports to India have also shown a rising trend in the recent past and it reached its maximum point in 2009 i.e. 0.41. This suggested that like Indian exports basket to China, Chinese exports basket to India is also getting narrow one. However, it should be noted that the annual average value of HCI of India's exports to China (i.e. 0.44) remained well above than that of Chinese exports to India (i.e. 0.34). Thus, this shows that during the study period Chinese exports to India remained more diversified vis-à-vis Indian export to China.

Table 12: Hirschman's Concentration Index (HCI): India and China

Years	HCI of India's Exports to China	HCI of China's Exports to India
1996	0.38	0.35
2001	0.35	0.31
2002	0.38	0.33
2003	0.38	0.31
2004	0.55	0.33
2005	0.53	0.32
2006	0.49	0.35
2007	0.54	0.37
2008	0.61	0.37
2009	0.48	0.41
Annual Average (1996-2009)	0.44	0.34
<i>Source: Calculated from UN Commodity Trade Statistics, United Nations.</i>		

Potential for Intra-Industry Trade

Ricardian trade theory predicts that countries would trade on the basis of their comparative advantage in different products. Thus, trade would be inter-industry. However, much actual trade between countries consists of differentiated goods within the same industry. This pattern is consistent with new trade theory involving product differentiation (Cerra, et al., 2005). So, in this context, it becomes important to compute the Grubel-Lloyd Intra-Industry Trade index which measures the proportion of total trade comprised by intra-industry trade (World Bank 2008). The Index is measured as follows:

$$IIT_i = \frac{\sum_i (X_i + M_i) - \sum_i |X_i - M_i|}{\sum_i (X_i + M_i)} \times 100$$

Where X_i and M_i are the values of exports to China and Imports from China by India in product group i . For higher degree of intra-industry trade, the value of this index will be closer

to 100. With the help of data at 2-digit HS classification, the index has been computed for the period 1996-2009.

During 1996-2009 the value of Intra-Industry Trade (IIT) index varied between 17.18 and 28.63 per cent. Though, in the mid years of the study period, the value of this index increased up to some extent but after that it again started declining and reached to 17.80 per cent in 2009. The average value of intra-industry trade index between these two neighbouring countries remained 21.36 per cent which is quite low. Therefore, the index confirms that intra-industry trade plays a very little and declining role in India-China bilateral trade (Table 13).

Table 13: Intra-Industry Trade (IIT) Index between India and China

Years	Intra-Industry Trade Index (Per cent)
1996	17.18
2001	25.23
2002	24.14
2003	27.49
2004	22.44
2005	22.31
2006	22.37
2007	15.97
2008	13.69
2009	17.80
Annual Average (1996-2009)	21.36
<i>Source: Calculated from UN Commodity Trade Statistics, United Nations.</i>	

Summary and Conclusions

The trade and economic relations between India and China is developing its own momentum and dynamism. There is a strong political impetus on both sides to advance trade and economic ties further. Both the countries have decided to move faster on the track of economic relations. In 2008, the governments of two sides had revised the trade target to US \$

60 billion for 2010, rather than US \$ 40 billion i.e. fixed in November 2006. However, this target could not be achieved due to the global slowdown. But, both the countries are trying to get out of this crisis situation and finding out the ways to further extend their mutual trade. The institutional framework of bilateral cooperation, including the Joint Economic Group, Joint Working Group and other sector-specific mechanisms, is being strengthened and expanded to cover new areas. Business exchanges are intensifying and the flow of delegations between the two countries is consistently increasing. Both the countries are also making efforts to expand areas of economic linkages that could further boost and broaden bilateral trade ties.

However, one major problem, from the Indian perspective, is its rising trade deficit with China. Almost all the years, India experienced adverse balance of trade with China and the deficit of trade widened substantially due to the higher growth rate of imports from her. As per the latest figures issued by the Ministry of Commerce and Industry, Government of India, in year 2008-09, India's trade deficit with China was over US \$ 20 billion, which is likely to increase more in the coming years, if corrective steps are not taken (GOI, 2009).

China has already emerged as one of major trade partners of India. China's share in India's merchandise trade has increased rapidly since the mid nineties and that is why China has emerged second largest trade partner of India only after U.A.E. However, India's share in China's global trade though increasing yet it is very low. In fact, India is failed to grab a big share in Chinese market. Though India's exports to China rose rapidly during the recent few years, yet there exists a vast potential to enhance them further by improving their competitiveness. There is a need to control the unit values of major exports to China, so that India can get maximum market share in Chinese world imports. Further, by promoting the higher FDI inflows; reducing the intensive industrial reservation; and improving the quality of public infrastructure, India can reduce the cost and improve the quality of its exports. Then India would be in position to grasp the higher market share for a large range of commodities in Chinese economy as well as in the world economy.

The other major problem, with India-China trade, is the narrowness of trade basket. The Hirschman's Concentration Index (HCI) clearly reveals that China's exports to India are more diversified than that of India's exports to China. In fact, Indian exports are mainly dominated by exports of ores, slag & ash. Importantly, during the recent few years, this commodity constituted more than half of India's exports to China. Similarly, during 2009-10, out of India's global exports of ores, slag & ash, nearly 84 per cent was exported to China alone. Moreover, within this commodity group, the share of iron ores & concentrates (non-agglomerated) as commodity sub-group was as high as 92.29 per cent in 2009-10. Hence, this export item was the actual export driver for enhancement of India's export trade with China. In

fact, the rapid depletion of China's iron ore reserves, thereby, making its front-running steel industry dependent on imports from India to meet the growing demand for steel for its construction and defence industries. While, on the other side, Chinese exports to India are comparatively much diversified and balanced. Though, during the recent few years, the concentration index of Chinese exports to India showed some upward trend but still it is well below Indian exports to China. Furthermore, India's major exports to China belong to natural resource based and primary products while Chinese exports to India belong to manufacturing products. The intra-industry trade plays a minor role in India-China trade. In the interests of continuing high growth rates of trade, the two countries have to ensure the diversification of trade basket and to identify the potential areas of intra-industry trade.

Hence, India and China are only beginning to discover the full scope and opportunities for expanding trade and economic cooperation at the regional and international levels. If coordinated well, the combined market size of India and China can provide significant leverages to both countries in regional and global trade across a range of product categories. The complementarities inherent in the economies of the two countries could be harnessed to propel trade and economic cooperation between India and China to greater heights.

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Pakistan-Saudi Arabia Relations: Implications for India

Babjee Pothuraju

Abstract

Close geographical proximity, historic trade ties, religious affinity, complimentary nature of economic needs and convergence of views have created a strong bondage between Pakistan and Saudi Arabia. Both share multi-faceted relationship spanning political, economic and energy, defence, strategic and security, religious and cultural realms. Conversely, there is strong evidence that both are partners in global terrorism. The cooperation and bilateral engagements between these countries is galvanised due to the presence of external powers. This “unique relationship” has far-reaching implications for India's security; assiduous efforts have been made by Pakistan to radicalise Indian Muslims. Separately, India's economic ascent and growing pragmatism in international affairs created conducive atmosphere for regional cooperation. WikiLeaks' cables offer a timely reminder of the machinations of a key foreign player, Saudi Arabia, describing its increasingly strained ties with Pakistan. Understanding the Pakistani-Saudi relationship is important to understand the future of both countries, the nuclear balance in both regions, and the crisis in Pakistan today. There are difficult times ahead for Pakistan and Pakistan's misfortunes represent a giant Indian opportunity.

The Asian countries of Pakistan and Saudi Arabia showcase their respective existence, in terms of a state created on the basis of Islam and another state that caused the creation of Islam. Pakistan's ties with Saudi Arabia are, at one and the same time, the most obscure and likely the most important (Wriggins 1984:292). An overview of Pakistan's foreign policy shows that Pakistan's goals have remained more or less constant, although their scope was often redefined and new dimensions were added. The diplomatic and military strategies to pursue these goals also varied over time. Close geographical proximity, historic trade ties, religious affinity and the complimentary nature of economic needs have created a strong bondage of trust between these countries. In addition, there is a convergence of views and interests between them on most of the regional and international issues (Pakistan Consulate 2007:1).

Conversely, documents from WikiLeaks' vast trove of U.S. diplomatic cables offer a timely reminder of the machinations of a key and more influential foreign player, Saudi Arabia.

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Some of the WikiLeaks documents released in December 2010 describe increasingly strained ties between Pakistan and its long-standing Arab ally, with the Saudis particularly disgruntled by Pakistan's President, Asif Ali Zardari; other cables suggest the Saudis would prefer Pakistan to lose its weak civilian leadership in favour of strong military rule (*Time* 6 December 2010). In this background, it is pertinent to bring a holistic study of Pakistan-Saudi Arabia relations in broadest terms and its possible implications for India's regional security.

Influencing Factors

Conventional wisdom has it that three 'A's sum up Pakistan's policy matrix: Allah, Army and America, which is half truth. To complete the picture, one has to add a fourth A (Saudi Arabia) and a C (China) to the list. A host of factors influence the foreign policy choices of Pakistan which include the dynamics of regional and international situation, the availability of human and material resources and the disposition and priorities of the policy makers. Domestic politics and the military play a decisive role in the decision-making of Pakistan. Since Pakistan had come into existence in the name of Islam, promotion of cordial and close relationships with the Muslim states has formed the cardinal principle of its foreign policy, sometimes for political benefits. As with other countries, Pakistan's foreign policy with Saudi Arabia is determined by facts of history and geography and by special influences which were transitory in nature. Both have noted the friendship and mutual understanding rooted in the unity of Islamic faith which binds the government and people of the two countries, conferring upon these relations continuity, durability and impact on regional peace and stability which must not be underestimated. On the other hand, the region's immense energy resources and its global impact have made it essential for both the countries "to re-strategise their structure and roles" (Riedel 2008).

Though Pakistan share a unique relationship with Saudi Arabia, its relationship is not eternal and many politics involved in this bilateralism. Throughout the formative years, Pakistan's political, military and bureaucratic elite moved the nation in directions that were contrary to the fundamental Islamic ideology that was officially espoused by the State. Close relations with Islamic countries remained a desired but distant goal as Pakistan became an active member of the Central Treaty Organization (CENTO) and Southeast Asia Treaty Organization (SEATO), military pacts sponsored by the United States (US). Alongside, Pakistan also attempted to build an Islamic bloc as a bulwark against India (Cheema 1990: 67-83). However, the Muslim world, particularly the Arab, on the eve of the resurgence of Arab nationalism, was against Western imperialism. Hence, Pakistan was seen by Arab nationalists

in the opposite camp. Moreover, Pakistan did not join the Non-Aligned Movement (NAM) though most Muslim countries had adhered to it (Burke 1973:158-164).¹ This framework of foreign policy could be changed only during the tenure of Prime Minister Zulfikar Ali Bhutto, though the basic anti-India premise of the policy was kept intact.

Disillusioned with the role played by the US and China in the 1971 war, Pakistan, in its foreign policy formulation from 1972 emphasised on the country's links to the Islamic world. From 1972, there were a number of ways in which the formulation and execution of Pakistani foreign policy was touched by Islamic resurgence. Regular consultations, particularly with the conservative Arab regimes, became part of a new pattern of diplomacy. Pakistani diplomacy brought the earlier experience with Pakistan's "bilateral trilateralism", namely good relations bilaterally with each of the super powers, to bear on the cultivation of friendly ties with three important Muslim countries: Saudi Arabia, Iran and Libya. Henceforth, any attack on Pakistan became not simply a clash of rival states, but rather an attack threatening the destruction of the Islamic state, thus drawing in other Islamic powers. General Zia-ul-Haq's regime (1977-1988) had given the Islamic factor in Pakistan's foreign policy more importance than was given in any other regime since the inception of Pakistan. The 1979 Soviet invasion of Afghanistan has further brought Pakistan closer to the Organization of the Islamic Conference (OIC) and institutionalised General Zia-ul-Haq's role as spokesman for the group (Zakaria 1989: 138-141).² Increased Pakistani military cooperation with key Muslim countries like Saudi Arabia is a corollary of enhanced identification with the Islamic bloc.

Dimensions of Bilateral Relationship

As Pakistan sets out its foreign policy goals much beyond what its size, population, resources and other sources of power can warrant, it goes all out in search of a "plus factor", and tries to obtain assistance from whichever source possible (Chopra 1983: 37-38). Pakistan and Saudi Arabia share multi-faceted relationship spanning political, economic and energy, defence, strategic and security, religious and cultural realms.

I. Political:- In the political sphere, high-level visits from Pakistan and Saudi Arabia reflect the depth of bilateral relations. Presidents and Prime Ministers of Pakistan have visited Saudi Arabia on a number of occasions. Concurrently, successive Saudi leadership has visited Pakistan from time to time. For the greater part in the history of their bilateral relations, Pakistan and Saudi Arabia have stood by each other on most political issues. There have been only two brief periods of estrangement between them: In the mid-1950s, Pakistan's joining of

the Baghdad Pact which also included Iraq, with which the Saudis had an old dynastic rivalry, led to a period of strain between Pakistan and Saudi Arabia. The second time when Pak-Saudi relations came under a cloud was when Z.A.Bhutto and his party-men showed sympathy for the Palestinians and other Arab radicals who were strongly critical of the conservative Arab regimes like Saudi Arabia. Later, Pakistan's unflinching support for the Palestinian and Arab cause against Israel has won it the lasting appreciation of Saudi Arabia and other Arab countries. Nevertheless, it was the Saudi shift away from the Nasser-led nonaligned Arab group which once again brought the two countries together (Chopra 1983: 348-349).³

Saudi Arabia was a major backer of the military regime of General Zia ul-Haq, which seized power in 1977, embarked upon an Islamisation campaign throughout Pakistan and was also a key U.S. ally (*Dawn* 18 April 1978).⁴ Within two months of his takeover, Zia-ul-Haq made his first political pilgrimage to Saudi Arabia to assure the Saudis of his complete loyalty and to express his willingness to accept their commands and corrections (*Strategic Digest* 1977: 73-77).⁵ Again, Nawaz Sharif, after his ouster in a bloodless coup by General Pervez Musharraf in October 1999, went into exile in Saudi Arabia. When Saudi King Fahd died in August 2005, President Musharraf declared a state mourning and became the first non-Arab ruler of a Muslim country to announce that he would attend the last rites. On his first tour to Asia in 2006, King Abdullah included Pakistan as his final destination, a trip by any Saudi King in almost 30 years and held historic meetings with President Musharraf and Prime Minister Shaukat Aziz.

After declaring a state of emergency in November 2007, General Musharraf's first trip abroad was to Saudi Arabia to dissuade the Saudi government from allowing exiled Nawaz Sharif to return to Pakistan. However, Sharif was able to re-enter Pakistan on November 25, 2007 as part of a deal brokered between the Saudi government and Musharraf. Analysts opine that the unprecedented support to the Pakistan government by the Saudi leadership in Sharif's deportation has been a "major shock". But Riyadh defended its role saying it got involved because the Sharif issue was likely to threaten Pakistan's peace and unity (Janardhan 2007).⁶ However, the truth is that the Saudis do not want to see Pakistan descend into chaos, because this would further strengthen al Qaeda, which has its own sight on the kingdom's rulers, by gaining access to Pakistan's nuclear weapons, putting the entire region in danger. It also sees Sunni-dominated Pakistan as a potential counterweight to Shi'ite Iran. So it makes sense for Arabia to buy stability in Pakistan (MacDonald 2008).

At this juncture, WikiLeaks documents released in December 2010 describe increasingly strained ties between Pakistan and its long-standing Arab ally, with the Saudis

particularly disgruntled by Pakistan's President, Asif Ali Zardari. According to a January 2009 cable, Saudi King Abdullah described Zardari as "the 'rotten head' that was infecting the whole body"; other cables suggest the Saudis would prefer Pakistan to lose its weak civilian leadership in favour of strong military rule (*Time* 6 December 2010). The cables chronicle Saudi complaints over Zardari's alleged corruption and incompetence but also suggest a pronounced sectarian bias on the part of the Saudis, who perceive Zardari to be a Shi'ite and therefore friendly with Iran, Saudi Arabia's nemesis. According to a U.S. cable issued soon after Zardari's election in 2008, Pakistani diplomats complained to their American counterparts of "a sharp reduction in Saudi financial assistance". A February 2010 "scene setter" suggests Saudi nostalgia for the government of Pervez Musharraf. The almost royal treatment given by the Saudi government to Musharraf during his visit to Riyadh in September 2009 has thrown his opponents into total confusion (*Dawn* September 2, 2009).⁷ Riyadh may well have come to see its best hope in Pakistan as the current army chief, General Ashfaq Kayani. A May 2009 cable relates a discussion between Holbrooke and a Saudi minister who lauds Kayani as "a decent man" and describes the Pakistani army—which has ruled Pakistan for long stretches of its six-decade history—as Riyadh's "winning horse" in the country.

Despite tensions with Zardari's government, military and intelligence links between Riyadh and Islamabad have remained strong and close—so much so that the U.S., for all its presence in the region, still leans on Saudi Arabia for counsel and support. As Hassan Abbas, a professor of South Asian studies at Columbia's School of International and Public Affairs, notes, "Saudi Arabia is a monarchy and not interested in seeing many Muslim countries going down the road of democracy" (*Time* 6 December 2010). An April 2009 cable claims the Saudis are fearful of a "Shi'a triangle" of hostile Shi'a-led governments in Iraq, Iran and Pakistan, while others depict the Saudis as desperate to counteract the growing clout of Turkey, another rising Muslim democracy. The WikiLeaks cables reveal a belief in Washington that Pakistan's road to salvation still winds through Riyadh. Foreign ministry spokesman Abdul Basit, however, said the leaks would not significantly alter Pakistan's international relationships. Presidential spokesman Farhatullah Babar also dismissed the report (*BBC News*, 29 November 2010).

II. Economic and Energy:- Pakistan has been successful in developing the close political ties with the Kingdom of Saudi Arabia into a deeper economic relationship. The Kingdom is amongst the top twenty export destination of Pakistan. Saudi Arabia has been the main source of energy to Pakistan, which is another main reason for Islamabad to develop a "unique relationship" with Riyadh (Zingel 2005: 3-14).⁸ Saudi Arabia is Pakistan's largest oil supplier

and bilateral trade during 2004-05 amounted to \$ 2.83 billion, while the Saudi investments in Pakistan during this period stood at \$ 275 million. Saudi Arabia makes up 10.5 per cent of the total value of Pakistani imports, making it Pakistan's second largest import partner. Pakistan exports various items worth US\$ 500 million every year to Saudi Arabia (Pakistan Consulate 2007: 2-3).⁹ In 2003-04, the total volume of trade was US\$ 2127.225 million, which constituted US\$ 348.520 million exports from Pakistan and US\$ 1778.705 million imports into Pakistan, thus registering a trade deficit worth US\$ 1430.185 million for Pakistan which due to large-scale imports of petroleum products (*Paktribune*, May 9, 2006). In 2005, both agreed upon promoting collaboration in telecommunication and construction sectors expressing the sanguinity of doubling the existing trade volume in the coming two to three years (*Daily Times*, February 10, 2005). Saudi Arabia also provided assistance after the October 8, 2005 earthquake in Pakistan (*Daily Times*, April 17, 2006).¹⁰ During the state visit of King Abdullah in 2006, the two nations issued a joint communiqué renewing their commitment to bilateral cooperation in trade, investment, economy and education. They also signed several agreements, including a Memorandum of Understanding (MoU) on the avoidance of double taxation and the prevention of tax evasion, etc (Royal Embassy of Saudi Arabia 2006: 1).¹¹

In pursuance of the agreement on establishing the Joint Ministerial Commission between Pakistan and Saudi Arabia in 1974 for economic cooperation in different fields, the eighth session of the JMC was held in Riyadh from February 20 to 21, 2007. In the session, the Pakistani side requested the Saudi delegation for preferential treatment of Pakistani labour seeking employment in the Kingdom and grant pardon to all such Pakistani prisoners who are detained in Saudi Jails for minor crimes having the punishment of less than two years (*Daily Times*, February 23, 2007). A major chunk of both skilled and unskilled labourers are trained in the programmes organised by the Manpower Division since mid 1970s and nearly 1.1 million expatriate Pakistanis are living and working in Saudi Arabia, providing a major source of remittances.¹² Another training programme was organised by the Overseas Pakistani Foundation in the capacity of an autonomous organisation (Shah 1983: 415). There is exchange of academics also; both agreed for academic linkages between Quaid-e-Azam University and National Institute of Science & Technical Education with similar institutions of Saudi Arabia and exchange visits of academicians, scholars and teachers. Both sides also agreed to exchange tourism information/statistics, publications, publicity material, development and marketing plans for mutual benefit for further promotion of cooperation in the cultural and tourism spheres. The Pakistan side also sought Saudi investment in the tourism sector of Pakistan (*Daily Times*, February 23, 2007).

Saudi Arabia has recently become the 149th member of the World Trade Organization (WTO) on December 11, 2005 and Pakistan is one of those first three countries which have signed bilateral WTO accession agreement with the Kingdom.¹³ The economic relations between the two countries took a new shape, following the economic set-back experienced by Pakistan in the year 2008. The economic crisis and ongoing tension between the US and Pakistan resulted in making Saudi Arabia the second largest trading partner in Pakistan (followed by China). President Zardari left for Riyadh on November 4, 2008, to ask for Saudi support up to \$6 billion in deferred payments for petroleum imports. The deferred oil payments were supposed to free up capital that Pakistan could then use to pay its other international obligations (Martin and Krondstadt 2008: 3 and 6).

III. Religious:- Religion is considered to be the only binding force in the Muslim world, which “provides a natural platform for the cultivation and development of inter-state relations” (Pasha 2005: 3).¹⁴ In the past few years Islam has been used by Pakistan to promote its foreign policy objectives, which is both fascinating and frightening. As Pakistan is an ideological state, its “geo-strategic stature” has come to occupy a position of importance in the Muslim world’s strategic thinking. A Sunni majority state, Pakistan has sought to develop close bilateral ties with Saudi Arabia, home to two holiest cities of Islam, Mecca and Medina. There is a pervasive belief held more widely outside Pakistan than in the country itself that like Israel, Pakistan’s very origin was to fulfil a religious ideal, to create an Islamic state and Islamic society for Muslims of India. Within Pakistan itself this slogan was proclaimed most stridently by the Jamaat-e-Islami, a fundamentalist extreme right wing party. But real efforts in this direction were made by Z.A. Bhutto from 1972 and his successor Zia-ul-Haq also had a firm faith in the policy followed by his predecessors.

Saudi Arabia funds mosques, Sunni Muslim clerics and Islamic schools, giving the Kingdom influence over Pakistan’s Sunni Islamic movements. Most famous example of this relationship is the Faisal Mosque in Islamabad.¹⁵ Over 600,000 Pakistanis visit Saudi Arabia for the performance of the Hajj and Umrah every year, comprising one of the largest groups of Hajj pilgrims. Moreover, Saudi Arabia has poured money into religious schools- madrasas - spreading its puritanical Wahhabism throughout Pakistan (Zakaria 1989: 15-18).¹⁶ Lately, this relationship has assumed another dimension. The Islamic character of resistance in Afghanistan has been called *Jihad* in Pakistan, which attracted hundreds of militant youths to fight in the name of Islam (Weaver 2003: 5-12). Through its powerful intelligence service, Pakistan basically created the Taliban, and its agents cooperated with Al Qaeda. But Saudis are clearly the major funding source for Al Qaeda. In fact, the person who helped create Al Qaeda was

Prince Turki, who at the time was the head of Saudi intelligence. The United States has not opposed this move; conversely it was very supportive of all kinds of groups, irrespective of their ideology since the Afghan militants were fighting against the Soviet army during the cold war. However, after September 11, 2001, the monster of Islamic fundamentalism has been accepted as the major challenge of early twenty-first century, now in full play in and around Afghanistan and Pakistan, a vital and strategic centre of the Islamic world.

The September 11 attacks kindled criticisms of alleged Saudi involvement in terrorism or of Saudi laxity in acting against terrorist groups like the Lashkar-e-Toiba (*The Hindu Business Line* August 10, 2005).¹⁷ Critics of Saudi policies have also cited a multiplicity of reports that the Saudi government has permitted or encouraged fund raising in Saudi Arabia by charitable Islamic groups and foundations linked to Osama bin Laden's Al Qaeda.¹⁸ At the same time, Pakistan's Inter-Services Intelligence (ISI) continued to provide support to the Jihadi groups like the Lashkar-e-Toiba and the Jaish-e-Mohammed, whose cadres are being arrested worldwide for inciting and promoting terrorism. Of late, Osama bin Laden, the same child of the earlier Saudi-Pakistani joint project in Afghanistan, has declared war on both countries and has been responsible for dozens of terrorist attacks in both countries (*Daily Times* January 3, 2008).

On the other hand, there is strong evidence that Pakistan and Saudi Arabia are partners in global terrorism. A December 2009 secret cable signed by US Secretary of State Hillary Clinton called Saudi Arabia "a critical source of terrorist funding" (*BBC News* 5 December 2010). That had a direct bearing on Pakistan, since it alleged that much of the financial backing for jihadist organisations in Pakistan continued to originate in Saudi Arabia, despite Riyadh's efforts to cut down on private donations to Sunni militant groups abroad. Analysts have observed that conservative madrasas set up across the country with Saudi backing have helped spread a puritanical and intolerant brand of Sunni Islam that helps fuel the militancy that plagues Pakistan today. The leaked U.S. cables also allege that extremist groups operating on Pakistani soil, such as al-Qaeda, the Taliban and Lashkar-e-Taiba (LeT) "probably raise millions of dollars" each year in Saudi Arabia (ibid). An August 2009 cable points to a Saudi-based front company that LeT likely used to pool and move its money. Washington has urged the Saudi government to shut down its local sources of terrorist funding— and the leaked cables report positive steps in that direction— but Riyadh clearly lacks the means to totally turn off the tap.

IV. Strategic and Security Cooperation:- Security cooperation or peacetime military engagement is not a new concept, but one that has evolved significantly over the last decade (Dyekman 2007: 1). Common perceptions of threat have historically been instrumental in the formation of military alliances among nations. The national security weakness of one country is complemented by the strengths of the other. Specifically, Saudi Arabia with its gigantic economic power in the form of oil revenues is heavily deficient in trained military manpower and martial spirit necessary to protect itself from internal as well as external threats. The Pakistan armed forces--"the soldiers of Islam"--are first rate fighters, but are constrained by lack of modern and sophisticated weaponry, as well as a need for a reliable source of income with which to underwrite military modernisation (Staudenmaier and Kheli 1981: 1).

Pakistan's military has a history of performing security duties in the Saudi kingdom and training military personnel (Janardhan 2007). Both have been close strategic allies since early 1970s, when a Pakistani Air Force squadron was deployed to assist air defence operations in Saudi Arabia. In 1981, Saudi Arabia financed the \$800 million purchase of 40 F-16s to Pakistan from the United States; in return, Pakistan agreed to station troops and technicians in Saudi Arabia. Accordingly, Pakistan has been sending its armed personnel since December 14, 1982 and during the 1970s and 1980s, up to 15,000 Pakistani troops were stationed in the kingdom, some in a brigade combat force near the Israeli-Jordanian-Saudi border (Riedel 2008: 2). Both sides also agreed in 2003 to transfer war technology and hold joint military exercises between the armed forces. Subsequently, Pakistan has explored the possibility of joint ventures with Saudi Arabia in arms production including missiles and tanks. The new agreement covers areas related to cooperation in the field of training, deputation, transfer of technology, exchange of experience, purchase of weapon systems, equipment, spare parts and military medical services. Of late, the three-week-long joint naval exercise, code named "Naseem-e-Bahar", ended in Karachi in February 2008.

Coming to nuclear cooperation, the Arab defeat at the hands of Israel in 1973, in addition to the nuclear threat that preceded it, fueled Saudi support of an 'Islamic bomb.' The commencement of Pakistan's nuclear programme around the same time was seen by the Saudis as an opportunity to help build the 'Islamic bomb'. Beginning 1975, the Saudis transferred funds into Pakistani nuclear programme though such a course was directly contrary to the Kingdom's longstanding stated goal of making the entire Middle East a nuclear weapons free zone (SIPRI Report 2004). King Faisal provided money in return for a promise that Pakistan's nuclear programme would provide a security umbrella for the kingdom (Riedel 2008: 3).¹⁹ Nuclear ties between the two countries grew so close that Sultan Ibn Abdul-Aziz, the Saudi

Minister of Defense, was invited to tour the Pakistani uranium enrichment facility at Kahuta, the Khan Research Laboratories (SIPRI 2004).²⁰ Such episodes have aroused concerns about possible nuclear ambitions because there is certain plausibility to the idea that Saudi Arabia might aspire to have at least a small nuclear capacity as a deterrent to aggression (Lippman 2008). Concerns again intensified after the October 22-23, 2003 visit of Saudi Arabia's de facto ruler, Crown Prince Abdullah bin Abdulaziz to Pakistan during which a deal was supposedly brokered requiring Pakistan to provide nuclear technology in return for Saudi oil (Dvali 2004).

The Nuclear convergence between the two countries in respect of nuclear deal has numerous motives. In the Saudi case, there is evidently growing disengagement with Washington due to the "war on terrorism" and the war on Iraq. These events have created an atmosphere where Saudi elites evidently feel less inclined to rely on American protection in the face of regional threats, specifically the likelihood of an Iranian nuclear weapon. They also see no pressure from Washington being directed against Israel's nuclear arsenal, even though there is no sign or even consideration of an attack on Saudi Arabia. They also clearly resent the evidence of a Saudi connection to al-Qaeda and accusations against them of less than wholehearted cooperation with Washington and other Western capitals in efforts to break up al-Qaeda and its source of financing. On the other hand, Pakistan's fears of an Israeli-Indian alliance are well known and out in the open. As India is reported to have some 200-400 nuclear weapons, Pakistan is seeking equalizers to deter India, and weapons located outside India's targeting reach offer that possibility. At the same time, because its other oil sources are located in areas that might be unreliable, like the Gulf or Central Asia, a deal with Saudi Arabia eases fears of an energy boycott or blockade in time of crisis. Another consideration is that a possible Saudi nuclear deterrent might also check Iran, with whom Pakistan has issues, especially over Afghanistan (Blank 2003). To counter what Pakistani and Saudi leaders regard as multiple regional threats, the two countries have decided to move ahead with an exchange of free or cheap Saudi oil for Pakistani nuclear know-how.

According to an article in *The Guardian* in September 2003, Saudi Arabia undertook a strategy review of its options regarding national security and nuclear weapons in 2003. The review outlined three options available for Saudi Arabia -

- To acquire a nuclear deterrent;
- Enter into alliance with an existing nuclear power that would assure protection under nuclear umbrella; and

- Work for a nuclear-free Middle East.

Since Israel is unlikely to dispose its ‘basement’ nuclear arsenal and Iran appears close to developing the technical base that could support a nuclear weapon programme, the prospects for a nuclear-free zone in West Asia appear somewhat remote and seems out of the way. Also, given the Saudi’s growing hostilities toward the United States and the evident deterioration of U.S.-Saudi security ties, particularly after the September 11 terrorist attacks, it is likely that the Saudi government would consider alternative security arrangements, including a nuclear option. However, Saudi Arabia’s limited technical infrastructure is inadequate to support an indigenous weapon development programme. Because of its history of cooperation and exchange with foreign nuclear powers, in addition to the nation’s tremendous wealth, therefore, procurement from foreign sources is not unforeseeable. In this situation, Pakistan—the only Muslim country possessing nuclear weapons has become special and a great source of strength for Saudi Arabia.

Role of External Powers

I. US with Hovering Influence:- The cooperation and bilateral engagements between Saudi Arabia and Pakistan is galvanised due to the presence of the United States. The US has an everlasting influence over the politico-economic scenario of both the countries. Consequently, US interests in South Asia and Middle-East are jointly guarded by Pakistan and Saudi Arabia respectively. The US support to the monarchy of Saudi Arabia and the political heads of Pakistan is not guided by the concept of Democracy or Political Freedom. Strategically, in United States strategic planning, Pakistan and Saudi Arabia figure high in the security architecture for South West Asia. Ironically further, the United States reveled in the belief that Pakistan and Saudi Arabia were the new “twin-pillars” of US security architecture in the region (Kapila 2010). The common issues for US and Saudi interest include Pakistan and security cooperation along with Iraqi conflict, Iran’s nuclear technology development, Saudi political and economic reform efforts, oil policies and counter terrorism cooperation (Blanchard 2009: 12). On the Saudi side, King Abdullah believes the US is not always reliable, consistent, or willing to heed his advice on important issues such as Iraq. Saud Al-Faisal and others have openly been critical of US policies they describe as having shifted the regional balance of power in favour of arch-rival Iran.

II. Proximity of Iran to Pakistan:- The geographical and historical proximity of Pakistan and Iran act as a competing factor in the Pak-Saudi relations. In spite of being Islamic countries,

Pakistan, Saudi Arabia and Iran have diverse Islamic characters. The Shi'a and Sunni sectarian conflict has taken an international dimension with Saudi Arabia, especially the Wahhabi ideology dominant in the eastern province of the country, stigmatising Shi'ites as "polytheists" (RAND 2004: XVIII). The permeation of Shi'ite ideology of Islam into Pakistan has resulted in the intensification of (the counter force of) Wahhabism in the country with puritan Sunni perceptions. The role of Saudi Arabian money in fomenting sectarian hatred in Pakistan right from the 1980s has resulted in Iranian support to the radical Shi'a groups (Behuria 2004: 161). The unfolding of the Iranian revolution in 1978 drastically changed the security picture for both Pakistan and Saudi Arabia. The fall of the Shah destroyed the Iranian role as policeman of the Persian Gulf, and raised the spectre of the export of the Iranian style revolution to other monarchies in the area (especially Saudi Arabia) (Staudenmaier and Kheli 1981: 4).

On the other hand, the bilateral 'special relation' of Pakistan and Saudi Arabia did not deter Pakistan transfer nuclear technology and materials to Iran knowing fully that the country aspires to be a regional power and there is a clear Iran-Saudi rivalry in the region (Alam 2004: 542). The two Sunni states also share a concern about Shi'a Iran. Both seek to keep ties with Tehran as normal as possible but have a deep fear that Iran might encourage unrest among their Shi'a minorities (Murnock 2006: 45). Iran and India, located on either side of Pakistan, have also signed a strategic agreement whose aim is regarded with suspicion in Islamabad (Borchgrave 2003). Strategically speaking, a nuclear Pakistan cannot relate well to a nuclear Iran because of "the Arab factor", especially after the Saudis and other Arabs have started buying heavily into Pakistan's economy. Read together with the past Saudi largesse to Pakistan, it seems Saudis are seeking a new and enhanced relationship with "nuclear Pakistan" to create "equilibrium" (*Daily Times*, April 17, 2006). While the King's preference is to cooperate with the US, he has concluded that he needs to proceed with his own strategy to counter Iranian influence in the region.²¹

III. China as a Factor:- Beijing has been the main foreign supplier to Pakistan, and has a long record of supplying missiles to Saudi Arabia. China-Pakistan-Saudi Arabia strategic triangle commenced with the China-Pakistan strategic nexus in the 1960s and expanded to the China-Pakistan-Saudi Arabia strategic triangle by the 1980s. While in the case of Pakistan, the lure was a nuclear weapons arsenal with Chinese direct assistance, Saudi Arabia was lured by the supply of CSS-2 Intermediate Range Ballistic Missiles (IRBMs) with nuclear weapons capability (Kapila 2010). The strategic triangle may not have acquired the contours of a formal military alliance or a security grouping yet, but China's crafting of this strategic triangle and cementing it with China-supplied nuclear weapons and missiles makes it a potential threat to

many states and can trigger another international crisis in both the Middle East and South Asia (Blank 2003). The strategic locational advantage of the Gwadar port in Pakistan has been utilised and funded by both China and Saudi Arabia (Parthasarathy 2003). With the advancement of Gwadar port, Saudi Arabia, China and Pakistan are examining the feasibility of developing an "energy corridor", which includes the construction of a refinery in Gwadar and laying an oil pipeline from Gwadar to China's Xinjiang bordering Pakistan for transporting Saudi refined oil products to China via Pakistan (*Asian Economic News*, 2006). Saudi Arabia is trying to come to terms with the shift in global energy and trade ties towards Asia, which has political and economic consequences. China's motive would be to secure access to energy resources as an essential component of its economic and foreign policy, national security and military strategy (SIPRI 2004). In this regard, Saudi Arabia told the Chinese that it is willing to effectively trade a guaranteed oil supply in return for Chinese pressure on Iran not to develop nuclear weapons.

IV. The Presence of the OIC:- The Organisation of the Islamic Conference (OIC) came into existence in 1969 in Rabat to coordinate a boycott of Israel following an arson attack on the al-Aqsa mosque in Jerusalem (Masood 2006). Saudi Arabia and Pakistan are members of the OIC, with the pertinent aim of maintaining the interests of Muslim countries in the areas of economic, social, cultural and knowledge. As a founding member of the OIC, Pakistan has an abiding commitment to the purposes, principles and objectives of the Charter (Senate of Pakistan 2005: 9 and 15). Pakistan earned the esteem of the Islamic world for its consistent and effective advocacy of Muslim causes, specially at the United Nations and contributions to the budget of the OIC General Secretariat in pursuing its reform agenda. Similar support was extended in the OIC Ministerial and Summit meetings for advocating Pakistan's view of Kashmir issue (Pakistan Consulate 2007: 2). Regarding the issue of Kashmiri sentiment in Pakistan, Saudi Arabia has been a consistent supporter in the OIC of Pakistan's protégés in the Hurriyat Conference in Jammu and Kashmir (Parthasarathy 2005). At the same time, Riyadh agreed to support India's claim for observer status in the OIC. It has also been supportive of recent Indian moves to de-escalate tensions in Kashmir.

Implications for India

The "unique relationship" of Pakistan-Saudi Arabia has far-reaching implications for India's security. Following the terrorist strikes of 9/11, American scholar Richard Hass noted India could be proud that none of its Muslim citizens had responded to bin Laden's call for an international Jihad against "Jews and Crusaders". He asserted, Indian experience showed that

the successful functioning of a pluralistic democracy was the best antidote for terrorism in the name of Jihad (Parthasarathy 2007). However, terrorist attacks in Delhi, Ayodhya, Mumbai, Bangalore and Hyderabad revealed India's vulnerability for terrorist and extremist activities. At the same time, the involvement of Indian nationals in acts of terrorism and suicide bombing in London and Glasgow and the arrest of Indian nationals in the UK and Australia explains the level of Indian susceptibility. The origin of present-day terrorism lies in the Reagan Administration's decision in 1981 to treat the opposition to the Soviet occupation of Afghanistan as Jihad, ideologically motivated and funded by Saudi Arabia. The success of Pakistani military and intelligence establishments in fulfilling their objectives in Afghanistan encouraged them to divert Taliban cadres to make trouble in Kashmir. By 1993, Wahhabi-oriented groups were used by the ISI for its Jihad in Jammu and Kashmir. The Pakistani interest in undermining communal harmony in India came through starkly when a former Director General of the ISI asserted that though Indian Muslims strongly opposed Pakistan's Jihad in Kashmir, "We will soon make the Kashmir issue an issue of faith amongst Indian Muslims" (ibid).

There is strong evidence that assiduous efforts have been made by Pakistan to radicalise Indian Muslims in Saudi Arabia and the UAE by attempting to poison their minds about alleged injustices that Muslims faced from people practicing other faiths across the world. The Lashkar-e-Taiba, which has played a prominent role in this effort, openly proclaims that "Hindus, Jews and Christians are enemies of Islam" (ibid). It is well established that Wahhabi oriented groups now spreading their wings in India like the Students Islamic Movement of India (SIMI), the Jamat-e-Islami, the Tableeghi Jamat and the Jamat Ahle Hadise draw their inspiration from Wahhabi groups in Saudi Arabia. Hence, it is important for New Delhi to strengthen its intelligence surveillance in Gulf countries like Saudi Arabia and the UAE. Accordingly, India and Saudi Arabia signed a memorandum of understanding dealing with terrorism, transnational crime, and subversive operations during King Abdullah's visit in 2006 (Pant 2006).

Moreover, the deep-seated historic hostility between India and Pakistan has produced a peculiar geo-psychology among ruling elites to outmaneuver the other in order to contain each country's political, economic, and strategic influences in Greater Middle East (GME). But when it comes to regional politics, Muslim Pakistan was consistently favoured by the GME. Gulf States sympathised with Islamabad in wars with India and back Pakistan's claims in occupied Kashmir as Pakistan has supplied Gulf countries with soldiers, pilots and police (Jain 2007: 461-484). Gulf unease with India was compounded by New Delhi's policy of aligning

itself with the Soviet Union during the Cold War. Gulf relations with India hit a low point when the Babri Mosque in Ayodhya was demolished in 1992.

Separately, India's economic ascent and growing pragmatism in international affairs has created conducive atmosphere for regional cooperation. India and Pakistan are on divergent economic and political trajectories and the Gulf could be drawn towards India. There is evidence of trade between Arabia and the Indian subcontinent during the Indus valley civilisation 4,000 years ago (O'Sullivan 2007). British India for over a century from 1858 effectively governed Aden, Kuwait, Bahrain, Qatar and what is now the UAE and controlled treaty relations with the Sultanate of Oman. For a period, Indian rupee was the principal Gulf currency and much of Arabia and the entire Indian subcontinent was a single economy. The economic connection was so strong that India minted in 1959-66 the Gulf rupee for use in the region (ibid). But the most abiding bond is people. Before oil, the Gulf pearl trade was dominated by Indian merchants. Traditionally, the GCC regarded the Indian subcontinent as a source of low-cost labour. Now, more than three million Indians live in the GCC and represent the largest non-national share of the labour force. Two-way trade, estimated more than \$16,000 million in 2006, is forecast to double in less than a decade and there are plans for a GCC-India free trade agreement.

In a sign of changing times, the 2006 Republic Day celebrations featured an intriguing guest - King Abdullah bin Abdul Aziz of Saudi Arabia. This was the first visit of the monarch--also known as the 'Custodian of the Holy Places [of Islam]-- to India since 1955. It was a strategically significant trip and one that has important long-term implications. Some have labelled the Saudi king's visit "a strategic shift in the foreign policy of the country" and have argued that it "heralds a new era" (Pant 2006) Saudi Arabia is not just the country where Mecca and Medina are located, and hence exerts an emotional pull for Indian Muslims, but is also the largest exporter of oil to India as India emerged as Arabia's fourth-largest destination for oil exports, as well as host to millions of Indians, the largest expatriate population in the kingdom. The visit is as much a part of a larger realignment of India's foreign and security policy as that of Saudi Arabia.²² India's Reliance energy decided to invest in a refinery and petrochemicals project in Saudi Arabia. In addition, Oil and Natural Gas Corporation (ONGC), was planning to engage Saudi Arabia as its equity partner for a refinery project in Andhra Pradesh (ibid). The Saudi shift has been marked by its admission to the World Trade Organisation. As the world oil supplies dwindle, and India's dependence on oil import grows, the Saudi peninsula emerged as one of the most important regions for India's wellbeing and security.

For India, the issue of cultivating an Islamic state that can act as a counterweight to Pakistan in the Islamic world is very significant. Traditional Indian policy in the region concentrated on Iran and Iraq, never mind the era of Nasser, Tito and 'original' non-alignment. However, Iran's excessively ideological preoccupations and aggressive anti-Western attitudes are coming in the way of closer ties, and so New Delhi has sought to move beyond the Persian Gulf to the Saudi peninsula (*Hindustan Times* November 16, 2005).²³ Ties with Gulf countries like Oman have always been good, and in recent years the United Arab Emirates, too, has sought closer ties with New Delhi. Now better relations with Saudi Arabia will help India to work out an even balance in its relationships in West Asia as a whole.

As India aggregates economic power and develops its military capacities, the future will be shaped by economic interdependence and mutual interaction. Of all the regions, the Saudi peninsula and the Gulf littorals are vital for Indian economic growth not just as a source of energy, but as markets for Indian products and to provide jobs for Indian skills. But to reach that point India need to fight and win a battle of ideas with forces of Islamic radicalism in its neighbourhood and in this battle, Saudi Arabia occupies an important place.²⁴ For India, Saudi Arabia's decision to take on the Islamic radicals who foment terror is an important one (*ibid*).²⁵ Saudi Arabia is now trying to expiate its past by setting up an international anti-terrorism centre in Riyadh. In such a framework, India occupies a unique role. Its crucial dependence on oil makes not just relations with Saudi Arabia important, but for peace and stability across the West Asian region. This cannot be achieved by India alone, but in cooperation with like-minded countries. India's emerging military capabilities can contribute to the process, as indeed its growing diplomatic and economic clout.

Conclusion

Understanding the Pakistani-Saudi relationship is important to understand the future of both countries, the nuclear balance in both South Asia and the Near East, and the crisis in Pakistan today. The Saudi connection and support has its own implications for Pakistan. The Saudi grants, subsidies and assistance coming to Pakistan do not follow a regular pattern and are sporadic in nature (Wriggins 1984: 293). In Pakistan's recent domestic political turmoil and disputes for power, Saudi Arabia has played a behind-the-scenes role between competing factions (Katulis 2008). The dependence of Pakistan on Saudi support in the international arena has caused a challenge to the independent existence of Pakistan. The guidelines of Saudi Islam, oil and petro dollars have long dominated the religious, political and economic arena of Pakistan. For the kingdom, Pakistan will remain a unique partner. But the critics point out that

there is no such exaggerated excellence in these relationships. In simple words, birds of the same feather flock together. Both regimes have so much in common that they have no option but to be together (*Khaleej Times* September 19, 2007).

Notwithstanding the attempts by Saudi Arabia and India to upgrade their bilateral ties, various factors are bound to play a constraining role in the future. With the U.S. viewing China as the most likely potential threat to its global supremacy, while at the same time helping India to emerge as a global player, the pressure under which Saudi Arabia will have to operate will become stronger. At the same time, champions of Islamic co-operation argue Pakistan, which has been enjoying unprecedented growth, should be the top priority. But India's economic ascent and growing pragmatism in international affairs compares favourably with the fog of uncertainty that has descended over its historic rival. There are difficult times ahead for Pakistan and Pakistan's misfortunes represent a giant Indian opportunity.

Notes

1. It was only late in the 1970s that Pakistan decided to join the movement mainly because the US sponsored military alliances CENTO and SEATO had become defunct by that time.
2. However later, in his capacity as spokesman of the Islamic Conference, Zia also made several, generally unsuccessful, attempts at ending the Iran- Iraq war.
3. The civil war in Yemen was really a proxy-war between Egypt and Saudi Arabia and Saudi Arabia now felt a need to stake a leadership claim to a larger and as yet unrecognized group of Muslim countries as against Nasser's Arab group.
4. An explicit blessing to Zia's rule came from Crown Prince Fahd, who issued a statement, "we are sure that as long as General Zia-ul-Haq is handling the affairs of Pakistan with his capable and able colleagues, stability and order will rule in Pakistan".
5. Earlier, Bhutto had accepted Saudi mediation only in a crisis-situation. But now, Zia sought to make it a regular feature in Pakistani politics.
6. "This support has been extended not as a favour to another country, but as a fulfillment of responsibility towards a friend and a brother. Pakistan's unity, integrity and sovereignty are as important to Saudi Arabia as its own. We have always stood by the side of Pakistan whenever it has been threatened from outside. Pakistan's strength has been our strength and Pakistan's problems our problems," the Saudi ambassador to Pakistan said.
7. Reports that King Abdullah sent a special plane to bring the retired general from London to Riyadh have surprised a number of politicians many of whom had received Saudi favours and courtesy.
8. In May 1998, when Pakistan was deciding whether to respond to India's test of nuclear weapons, the Saudis promised 50,000 barrels per day of free oil to help the Pakistanis cope with the economic sanctions that might be triggered by a counter test. The Saudi oil commitment was a key to then Prime Minister Nawaz Sharif's decision to proceed with testing.

9. Major items of exports include cotton items, knitwear (hosiery), bed linen, towels, tents & canvas, art silk & synthetic textiles, readymade garments, leather etc. Pakistan imports major requirements of petroleum from Saudi Arabia; other items of import, though minor in volume, include petrochemicals, chemical products, plastic and plastic products, fertilizers, steel products, electrical equipment and materials, raw skins, tanned leather, boilers and heavy equipment, copper and copper products, aluminum and aluminum products, precious metals, steel castings, tractors and other floor coverings of man-made fibers etc
10. Saudi Arabia was the biggest donor to the relief fund. Saudi government provided SR. 500 million for rebuilding some basic structures in earthquake-affected areas. The aid collected through a massive telethon amounted to SR. 450 million while more than SR. 40 million of medical and relief goods were provided by Saudis. Among the countries that established "a bridge" to help the survivors of the earthquake Saudi Arabia was the first.
11. The signing of five bilateral agreements between the two countries included the MoU on Agreement on Avoidance of Double Taxation, along with other political, scientific and cultural aspects. Both sides underlined the importance of encouraging the private sector in their countries to explore the opportunities that each other's potentials provide for mutual benefits and interests (Press Release 2006).
12. Between July and August of 2007, Pakistani workers in Saudi Arabia sent home \$202.4 million out of the \$985.2 million of remittances transferred to Pakistan during that period. Details can be accessed at "Pakistan-Saudi Arabia Ties", *Middle East Progress*, 12/12/07, URL: <http://www.middleeastprogress.org/>
13. For more background and individual bilateral WTO accession agreements with the Kingdom, see American Association of Exporters and Importers, *Saudi Arabia's WTO Accession*, Vol. 105, No. 46, November 22, 2005.
14. Nevertheless, there is no unity amongst the Muslim states, although they have common basic values. North Yemen versus South Yemen, Morocco versus Algeria in the Western Sahara, Egypt versus Libya, Iran versus Iraq and Syria versus Iraq are some of the sore points threatening the solidarity of the *Ummah*. Other inter-Islamic disputes have featured Libya and Tunisia, Iraq and Kuwait etc.
15. Saudi Arabia has provided extensive religious and educational aid to Pakistan. Being a major contributor to the construction of mosques and madrassas (religious schools) across Pakistan, the Faisal Mosque in Islamabad, the capital of Pakistan was dedicated to King Faisal of Saudi Arabia.
16. This was because "When Pakistan was formed (after the 1947 partition from India) we were losing Palestine. So it seemed in public minds that the establishment of a Muslim state out of a colonial past was somehow a recompense for the losses of the Muslim world in Palestine".
17. This is evident from the phone calls made by Lashkar militants operating in India to contacts in Saudi Arabia.
18. The exiled bin Laden was formerly a Saudi national, but Saudi authorities revoked his citizenship in 1994. For more information on the question of Saudi fundraising, see CRS Report RL32499, *Saudi Arabia: Terrorist Financing Issues*, by Alfred B. Prados and Christopher M. Blanchard.
19. After Pakistan's 'success' in developing and testing its nuclear arsenal in 1998, Saudi aid continued even as other sources dried up.
20. It was believed to be the first time any outsider had been permitted to visit the Pakistani sites. Neither country has ever revealed full details of that visit, but Pakistan denied that it had anything to do with nuclear weapons.

21. This strategy includes rebuilding Riyadh-Cairo-Damascus coordination, supporting Palestinian reconciliation, and expanding relations with non-traditional partners such as Russia, China, and India to create diplomatic and economic pressure on Iran.
22. The manifestations of the Indian change have been visible through the year 2005 in breakthrough agreements with the US, Japan, China and the EU, as well as the emphasis being placed on economic diplomacy with the ASEAN and SAARC.
23. It is an antidote of sorts to the fire-eaters in Teheran who wanted to punish India for the vote in the IAEA by reneging on some of its oil supply commitments, as well as a means of spreading out India's risks in a vital but potentially unstable region by having a diversified set of suppliers.
24. Because Saudi Arabia is the place where the holiest shrines of Islam are located and whose control is the sworn aim of al-Qaeda and others. While the kind of radicalism that has torn countries like Afghanistan and Pakistan is not visible in India, recent incidents of terrorism, involving some Indian Muslims, are a disturbing sign that the missionary effort of groups like the Lashkar-e-Toiba may be working.
25. Groups like the Lashkar-e-Toiba derive their inspiration and monetary support from Saudi Arabia. The man who helped found the Lashkar is Sheikh Abdul Aziz, reportedly a resident of Saudi Arabia. Even now there are reports that money for a variety of terrorist activities in Pakistan, India and Bangladesh originates in that country, from rich but ignorant Sheikhs.

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General Zia's Despotic Rule and the Dilemma of Pakistani Society

Riaz Ahmed Shaikh

Abstract

After the partition of United India and the establishment of a separate state on the basis of religion, the demand for the enforcement of Islamic laws got stronger with time in Pakistan. This happened during General Zia's military regime (1977-88) and eventually the Islamization of Pakistani society changed the socio-political culture of the country. This paper traces how General Zia on one hand depoliticized Pakistani society and simultaneously promoted religious extremism in the country. While silencing genuine political forces, he encouraged religious fanatics and even after his death, this legacy was taken further by the Pakistani establishment.

Introduction

In the fourth decade of the last millennium when the movement for the liberation of India was at its peak, Muslims of United India demanded partition of the sub-continent and the creation of a separate state for themselves. It is interesting to note that most of the Muslim religious parties opposed the idea of Pakistan that was floated by the Muslim League. For them the demand for Pakistan was in contravention to the concept of *Umma* as the country was going to be a modern nationalist state due to the secular outlook of the leadership of the Muslim League (Ali 1933). From its inception, debate started about the future political system of the newly created country, especially the role of Islam in any proposed political structure (Waseem 1994). To brush aside any controversy about the pervasive role of religious clergy in the political decision making process of the country, founding father, Muhammad Ali Jinnah in his first address to the country's Constitutional Assembly on August 11, 1947 said in loud and clear terms:

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“You are free, free to go to your temples; you are free to go to your mosques or to any other place of worship in this state of Pakistan. You may belong to any religion or caste or creed that has nothing to do with the business of the state..... Now I think we should keep that in front of us as our ideal and you will find that in course of time Hindus would cease to be Hindus and Muslims would cease to be Muslims, not in the religious sense, because that is the personal faith of each individual, but in the political sense as citizens of the state” (Hasan 1986)

At another occasion, he had to say:

“The constitution of Pakistan has yet to be framed by the Pakistan Constitution Assembly. I do not know what the ultimate shape of this constitution is going to be, I am sure that it will be of a democratic type, embodying the essential principles of Islam....Islam and its idealism have taught us democracy In any case Pakistan is not going to be a theocratic state to be ruled by priests with a divine mission” (Shaikh 2009: 4-21).

But this debate continued, even after the demise of the founding father and eventually on March 7, 1949, just six months after his death in September, 1948, Liaquat Ali Khan moved the ‘Objectives Resolution’ (OR) articulating the main principles that the future constitution of the newly established country should embody. Jinnah’s conception of a modern national state became obsolete with the passing of the Objectives Resolution on March 12, 1949 (Iqbal 1986). In pursuance of the OR, a Basic Principles Committee was constituted with an objective to formulate the principles and to submit its recommendations to the Constitutional Assembly. The country acquired its first constitution on the 23rd of March, 1956, based on the principles adopted in the OR. According to this constitution, the nomenclature of Pakistan was the Islamic Republic of Pakistan. This constitution was abrogated just two and a half years later on the 7th of October, 1958, by General Ayub Khan with the imposition of a martial law for the first time in the country. The second constitution was announced on March 1, 1962. During the process of passing the Constitution Bill in the Pakistani Parliament which acted as the Constituent Assembly, the word ‘Islamic’ was deleted from the country’s official nomenclature of the ‘Islamic Republic of Pakistan’. However, it was soon restored under tremendous pressure from religious parties. As a result, the second constitution announced on March 1962, contained the word ‘Islamic’ along with the Republic of Pakistan (Gaborieu 2002). During the second martial law regime of General Yahya Khan (1969-71), another attempt was made to unite the different ethnic groups and nationalities under the umbrella of Islam and therefore, a new terminology – ‘Ideology of Pakistan’, was coined. Previously, the entire province of West Pakistan was merged into a single unit in 1955 to be called as “One Unit”, so as to match and bring parity

with East Pakistan (now Bangladesh). This idea was nothing but the revival of the obsolete term 'Two Nation Theory', used by the leadership of the Muslim League in United India prior to the partition so as to justify their demand for a separate state for the Muslims of the subcontinent. It is significant to note here that Jinnah through his speech on August 11, 1947, had declared to discontinue the legacy of the Two Nation Theory in Pakistan. However the third constitution adopted in 1973 was heavily loaded with Islamic provisions (Cohen 2005).

During Zulfikar Ali Bhutto's regime (1972-1977), Pakistan looked towards the Middle East. King Faisal's oil embargo after the Ramzan war (Arab-Israel of 1973), fascinated Bhutto and he saw a new hope of developing relations with the Petro-dollar-rich Arab nations. In 1974, a conference of all the Heads-of-States of Islamic countries was held in Lahore. Next year, on the demand of religious parties, the Pakistani parliament took a decision that laid the foundation for rising extremism in the country in the days to come. The move to declare the Muslims of the Ahmediya sect as non-Muslims, made the state of Pakistan unique vis-à-vis other Muslim countries in the world as none of them had as yet adopted such a stand. The success of this encouraged the clergy to make further demands and the government kept surrendering to the fanatics. The weekly holiday was now to be on Friday instead of on Sunday. The consumption of alcohol was banned. Gradually, night clubs also stopped functioning and for the first time, an exclusive ministry for religious affairs was established. These actions were undertaken so as to establish Pakistan as an 'Ideological State' instead of a modern Nation State (Iqbal 2003). But the worst was yet to come under the third martial law regime of the dictator, General Zia-ul-Haq.

General Zia's Islamization and birth of new Pakistan

Zulfikar Ali Bhutto announced the holding of general elections in the country in March, 1977, a year and a half prior to the completion of his government's prescribed tenure. Land slide victory of his Pakistan Peoples Party (PPP) was challenged by the opposing 'nine-party' Pakistan National Alliance (PNA) (Mazari 2006). The PNA was heavily dominated by religious parties including the Jamiat-i-Islami, the Jamiat-Ulema-Pakistan and the Jamiat-Ulema-Islam, besides other nationalist, regional and rightwing parties. As a result of four months of agitation, the Bhutto government was toppled in a military coup, led by General Zia-ul-Haq on July 5, 1977. General Zia after imposing a martial law, ruthlessly did away with his political opponents, especially the PPP and other liberals. On the other hand, he initiated a process of Islamization of the Pakistani society. In his first speech after the coup, he said:

“Pakistan, which was created in the name of Islam, will continue to survive only if it sticks to Islam. That is why I consider the introduction of [an] Islamic system as an essential pre-requisite for the country” (Talbot 1998)

Furthermore, rejecting the universally accepted concepts of adult franchise and democratic rights of common men, he said:

‘It is not in the *Quran* [Muslim Holy Book] nor has it been revealed to me that elections will be held on 18 Oct, [1977] and nothing will happen thereafter.....In my opinion the presidential system which is closer to Islam, is more suitable for Pakistan. I will put it up to the National Assembly on October 28 and leave the decision to the next government..... My government is an interim government.....This country can be kept together only by the armed forces and not by the politicians” (Shuja 2008)

These statements of General Zia were in fact reflections of his policy line and what he was going to adopt in future. Since April 1979, in accordance with his self-conceived Islamic ideology, he initiated the introduction of several Islamic laws (Baxter 1985). The invasion of Afghanistan by Soviet forces in December 1979 gave an opportunity for General Zia to involve Pakistan in the Afghan crisis against the Soviet Union. General Zia’s policy shift was going to affect the future of Pakistan in different ways (Grare 2003). Since the Soviet invasion of Afghanistan was considered as an attempt to occupy an Islamic state, the Afghan resistance movement was named as *Jihad* (crusade) against an atheistic and communist USSR. Afghan warriors and war lords were declared as *Mujahideens* (Islamic Volunteers) and their actions were named as *Jihad Fisabillillah* (sacrificial war for the blessing of God). For this purpose, not only were Afghans trained but also were other extremists and Jihadis from several other countries especially from the Middle East recruited for *Jihad*. Not only did the jihad destroy Afghan society and state but also destabilized Pakistan (Wilson 2007). The socio-political culture of Pakistan was ‘overhauled’ under state-control to cater to ‘new needs’ and ‘new policies’ designed under the ‘command’ of the military dictator General Zia. Not only did the Pakistani nation as a whole, not participate in the decision-making process, it was also denied of its legitimate right of expressing its voice on government policies through elections.

Birth of Extremist Islam in Pakistan

General Zia promoted and patronized a very extremist form of Islam-*Wahabism*. *Wahabism* was introduced by Muhammad Bin Wahab (1703-1792) in the Arabian Peninsula in the 18th century. Wahabi extremist Islam had no previous tradition in the Indian subcontinent

(Bas 2004). It never enjoyed popularity or mass acceptance amongst the Muslims of the subcontinent. Apart from the *jihad* in Afghanistan, through which it was attempted to enforce Wahabi Islam, historically, there has been just one identical attempt of enforcing Wahabi Islam in the same region. Syed Ahmed Shaheed (1786-1831) attempted it unsuccessfully against the Sikh regime in Punjab and Peshawar in 1831 (Allen 2006). For Syed Ahmed and his lieutenants (including Syed Abdul Aziz and Shah Abdul Haq, the sons of another Islamic reformist Shah Waliullah, who invited Afghan warrior Ahmed Shah Abdali in 1761 to defend the declining Mughal empire from the Marathas), the reason for the defeat of Muslims was due to their deviation from true Islam-*Salafi* Islam (Rizvi 1982:3). For them, Muslims had adopted several traditions-*Bidas*, which were totally in contravention to the true teachings of Prophet Muhammad. Hence, there was a need to revive Islam in its 'purest' form. This precedence was followed by General Zia and his associates in Pakistan during his decade long (1979-1988) military regime, until he died in a mysterious plane crash on August 17, 1988 (Jalal 2008).

Historically, Sufi and Mystic Islam have prevailed in the Indian Sub-Continent. From Northern India to the South, Sufi Islam- that was a product of the Bakhti Movement, was the most popular form of Islam. Post-partition, Pakistan inherited the same Sufi tradition (Ali 2010), and in the new country, *Durghas*, *Khankas* and shrines of the Sufis & Saints such as those of Data Ganj Baksh (Lahore), Madhu Lal Hussain (Lahore), Rehman Baba (Peshawar), Shah Raknuddin (Multan), Baba Farid Ghanj Shakar (Pakpattan), Odearo Lal Baba (odearo Lal), Bari Imam (Islamabad), Lal Shahbaz Qalandur (Sehwan), Sachal Surmast (Khairpur), Shah Abdul Latif Bhittai (Hyderabad) and so on, remained the most visited places. The tolerant face of Islam was more acceptable than any other extremist version. However, during General Zia's military regime, this came to be replaced by a more extremist ideology.

General Zia gradually started replacing all tolerant and humanist traditions of Islam. While doing this, he introduced several obsolete and rigid Islamic laws and regulations that promoted extremism, fundamentalism and discrimination in society (Ahmed 1998).

General Zia's Islamization and Pakistan's drift towards Islamic extremism

In the modern era, the best way to bring forth the aspirations of the citizens is to adopt collective political wisdom through the parliamentary system. However, in such societies and states where democratic processes and democratic forces are denied, extremists and non-democratic forces take over the state and its institutions eventually. And this is what happened in Pakistan during General Zia's military rule. In Zia's regime a vast and extensive network of

madrassas (Islamic seminaries) was established in the country. Till 1979 the total number of such *madrassas* were just 600, but in a decade this number exceeded 10000 and the figure reached 18000 in the year 2002. Although every sect established their own *madrassa*, almost 85-90 percent of the aforementioned number belonged to the Wahabi/Ultra Deobandi school of thought. The remaining 10-15 percent belonged to the Beralwis, the Ahl-Hadits and the Shias (Shaikh 2009). Since Wahabi Islam had no roots in the Indian subcontinent (including Pakistan), the Wahabi network was fully financed by several Middle Eastern monarchies, especially Saudi Arabia. On the one hand, Wahabi *madrassas* kept on producing *mujahideens* for the Afghan jihad; on the other hand, they ignited horrible sectarian clashes in the country. Due to the escalating influence of Deobandies, rival sects also explored and developed their national and international links and started getting financial support and external patronage to fulfill their motives. Soon, Pakistan became an additional front of the proxy war going on between different international and regional forces. Eventually these *madrassas* became the nurseries of extremism. Mosques and places of worship of the so-called rival sects were attacked. Innocent worshipers were killed and religious clerics were assassinated in targeted killings. Even foreign diplomats were not spared. Followers of specific sects dealt with their rivals diabolically. This generated hysteria in the country, impacts of which became clear very soon (ICG 2002).

Discrimination and denial of freedom to religious minorities

Pakistan was created so as to safeguard the rights of the Muslims of United India and the founding father had guaranteed equal rights for all religious minorities and promised that there would be no discrimination on the basis of religion or sect. Despite occasional demands by religious parties, religious minorities enjoyed a relatively better status until General Zia's military regime decided to make discriminate on the basis of religious beliefs. Ignoring internal and external pressures and protests, he introduced several biased and discriminatory laws in the country, which *de facto* relegated the religious minorities to the status of second class citizens in the country (Eqbal Ahmed, 1998). He replaced the general principle of joint electorate with the separate electoral system. As per this amendment, religious minorities were to cast their vote only in favour of the candidate of their own religion. This act was in fact a step towards the political alienation of the country's religious minority groups (Haqqani 2005).

General Zia's military regime made very crucial changes to the Blasphemy laws. Originally those laws were introduced by the British during colonial rule in India on the

pretext of maintaining religious harmony. But after the amendments introduced by General Zia, an element of bias and prejudice against religious minorities became obvious and its abuse became very frequent. Miscreants attacked and accused innocent people to secure personal gains and settled personal scores in several cases. Because of the attitude of religious fanatics, minorities faced hardships in carrying out even essential religious rituals. It were the people belonging to the Ahmedia sect who became the prime victims of these developments (Weiss 1987).

The Islamization process and gender bias:

In a country like Pakistan, where women consist half of the country's population, laws introduced in the name of Islamization, impacted their social status as well. Inbuilt legal prejudices were aimed at curtailing the freedom of expression of women and also at controlling their freedom of movement. For Islamists like General Zia, women belonged just to the private realm of the home. General Zia revived the centuries old *Hudood* laws that had been in vogue in tribal Arab societies at the time of the arrival of Islam (Alavi 1991). Such laws were not competitive and practical in this modern era of democracy. Another shameful act was the changes made to legal evidencing/witness-bearing. The criminal laws introduced by the British in 1860, did not discriminate on the basis of gender. Women and men enjoyed identical and equal status. However, General Zia, discriminating on the basis of gender, repealed those laws. As per the new amendments, if a woman bore witness to a case, the value of her words would be half of that of a man bearing witness to the case. That is to say that two women acting as a witness to a case would equal one man as a witness. Another change was made to the laws of rape. Accordingly, there was no difference between adultery and forcible rape. In case of rape, the already victimized woman was held responsible. In order to prove her innocence, she was supposed to produce four eye witnesses. If not, it was considered that the woman had willingly indulged in the act. Such inhuman laws encouraged men to further commit crimes against women. In one such case, a blind house maid, who was raped by her feudal employer, was awarded death penalty wherein she was to be stoned to death. Women's Associations and civil society organizations protested against such inhuman behavior in the name of religion. General Zia imposed several other discriminatory laws against women including the non-induction of women into foreign and police services. They were not recruited in the military except as medical corps. They were not allowed to undergo training for becoming pilots and so on. Such laws were created in the name of Islam so as to stratify the society on the basis of gender (Patel 1991).

Use of electronic / print media for promoting extremism

In modern terms, it is the state's responsibility to promote national integrity, liberalism and social harmony among different segments of the society so that all groups have equal opportunity to participate in the affairs of the state. But unfortunately, General Zia was not only a staunch supporter of religious extremism, but also used the media to promote his beliefs. In addition to religious seminaries, the state controlled Pakistan Television (PTV), the radio as well as newspapers became important sources of propagating extremism in society. All such programs promoting 'liberal values', were immediately replaced with programs promoting religious extremism. 'Hate literature' received patronage. The terminologies 'Pakistan's ideology' and 'Islamic Ideology' were promoted and newspapers propagating such ideology received the support of military regime and soon became widely circulated newspapers. Newspapers and periodicals like *Lashker*, *Jihad*, *Zulfiqar*, *Takbeer*, *Ummat*, *Jasarat*, *Islam* and *Al-Saif* became the tools for extremist propaganda in the country (Baxter 1985). Television channels were instructed not to show women without the veil. Newspapers and periodicals were instructed not to print photographs of woman. These developments not only discouraged the promotion of liberalism and tolerance in the society, but also encouraged extremism. These were actions undertaken by the state to deny citizens the right to access information (Pasha 1993).

General Zia's policies of promoting Jihad

In fact Soviet invasion of Afghanistan in December 1979, came as a blessing in disguise for General Zia's military regime. He successfully used this event to acquire legitimacy for his military regime as he was under extreme pressure from the West to restore democracy in the country. But due to the Afghan crisis the US took General Zia's military regime on board in order to raise the Afghan resistance movement against the Soviet Union. General Zia dreamed to use the Afghan war as a base to revive the old *Khilafat* system. With the withdrawal of the Soviet forces, General Zia and his coterie decided to expand the jihadi concept to the rest of the world. The Afghan resistance movement was now not restricted to Afghanistan but had spread to Central Asia, Middle East and to the East Asian states as well (Ahmed 2002). The insurgency in Kashmir starting from 1989 was also a product of the promotion of this Jihadi culture. Earlier on the struggle in Kashmir was for the political rights of the Kashmiris and by and large a peaceful agitation and protest with a nationalist outlook. However, with the induction of Jihadi elements in Kashmir, this peaceful struggle turned into a militant armed struggle bearing a religious color. The Pakistani religious political party-Jamat-

i-Islami (JI), which was an active collaborator of the Pakistani army against the Bengalis in the civil war of 1971 in East Pakistan (now Bangladesh), once again became the flag bearer of Jihad in Kashmir (Pirzada 1996:25). Different Jihadi groups very conveniently established their networks across the border. This jihadi culture has not only soured relations between the two neighboring countries but has also promoted misunderstanding and distrust. Both countries greatly increased their military expenditures, further promoting war hysteria in the region. Involvement of extremists and militant groups in the Kashmir conflict changed its nature wherein its basically political orientation was transformed into a military one. For the Pakistani establishment, the Kashmir conflict also became a Kashmiri *jihad* (Malik 2005).

General Zia's legacy of encouraging extremism was carried further by the Pakistani establishment, which found it appropriate to promote the jihadi culture so as to achieve its targets. This culture, nurtured during the Afghan crisis had now developed into a full-fledged organizational structure. The *Jihadi* network now spread to different corners of the world. After the dissolution of the USSR, the newly independent Central Asian States of Uzbekistan and Tajikistan emerged as new areas of Jihadi action, where jihadis could continue with their nefarious designs. Chechnya and Bosnia emerged as other points of conflicts for these jihadis. Use of Pakistani and Afghan soil for jihadi activities became a constant headache for the whole world (Kohlmann 2004).

Denial of Legitimate political rights in the name of religion

In his decade long rule (1977-88), General Zia exploited Islam for regime legitimacy. After capturing power in an illegal military coup, he tried all options to keep his illegitimate rule intact. Political activities of all kinds were banned in the country. Political workers, journalists, members of the civil society and professionals who protested against the environment of suffocation and political victimization were brutally suppressed. Pakistan's notorious jails including *Shahi Qila* Lahore, Attock jail and Mach Jail, which were used by the British to punish freedom fighters, again became centers for torturing political activists. General Zia revived the centuries old uncivilized tradition of lashing protestors, as a punishment for agitating to restore democracy and their right to expression. Ignoring the concept of human dignity and honor, such punishments were awarded in open places including sports complexes. These sports complexes which ought to be symbols of the process of creating a healthy and sound society became the stage on which opponents of General Zia's military regime were taught a lesson (Lallemant 1985).

General Zia while banning political parties especially targeted those which promoted liberalism and genuinely represented the people. Political parties are the wheels of a democratic political system and these itself were declared anti-state and non-patriotic. They were not permitted to operate amongst the masses. Zia justified these actions in the name of religion. According to General Zia there was no room for the working of political parties in an Islamic state like Pakistan. This view of his was duly endorsed by the clergy. Political parties, according to him, were responsible for the division of the *umma* (Muslim nation). In pursuance of this ideology he decided to hold general elections in the country in 1985 on a non-party basis. Due to the absence of political parties, there emerged ample space for extremists and fundamentalists to play a political role as well. The military regime played a pivotal role in strengthening the influence of religious fanatics at the cost of genuine political parties. Discouraging people's genuine will and supporting religious groups to spread extremism in the country ultimately promoted a situation wherein rational thinking and logical conclusions took a backseat (Lawrence 1984).

ISI's involvement in the politics of Pakistan

Involvement of the army and especially the ISI, which had already become an important element in Pakistan's politics, became further deep rooted during General Zia's regime. As a result of the Afghan war, the ISI became a major player in Pakistan's politics. The ISI became an important policy maker in the defense sector and the foreign affairs of the country benefiting from the generous financial assistance of the West, especially the US and their favorable patronage. General Zia ran the state with the advice and assistance of his rejuvenated Muslim generals. But even after his mysterious death, the ISI decided to continue with this and worked to construct an alliance of all religious parties and groups of the country to create a single religious, right wing front-the Islami Jamhoori Ittehad (IJI), to counter the popularity of the country's single largest political party-the PPP. Despite all these efforts and desires of the Pakistani establishment, especially the ISI, the PPP emerged as the single largest party in the general elections of October 1988 (Cohen 1994).

After General Zia's death, elections were held on a party basis as per the directives of the Supreme Court of Pakistan. However, after the completion of the election process, the army and the ISI delayed the matter of transfer of power to the winning party for several weeks. Eventually, they forced the PPP to commit to the supremacy of the ISI in the country's internal and external policy-making, in lieu of its position in power. The army made it clear to Benazir Bhutto, the Chairperson of the PPP that the country's foreign policy, especially on the

Afghanistan war and Indian would remain completely in its domain. The country's defense priorities would be defined and planned by the army itself and the civilian leadership would have no say in this regard. The Pakistani Army Chief forced the PPP to retain three of its candidates as ministers handling important portfolios. Shahzada Yaqub Khan, a retired army general was the Foreign Minister. Mahbুলul Haq was retained as the Finance Minister and Colonel Cheema was the Defense Minister. In fact, the restoration of a democratic and civilian regime, even after a decade long brutal military rule of the military dictator General Zia-ul-Haq had not been true or genuine. It was a compromise that the PPP entered into with the army (Cloughley 2006).

After coming into power, the PPP initiated several measures to bring about fundamental changes to the country's political system. However, the army nullified all efforts put in by the civilian leadership. Policy-making with regards to Afghanistan never came under civilian control and when Benazir Bhutto decided to normalize relations with India, she was accused of being pro-India and being responsible for hurting and compromising 'National Interests'. During Prime Minister Rajiv Gandhi's visit to Pakistan, Islamabad showcased protest banners instead of welcome slogans. Although the government had put up welcome banners, they were changed overnight by the Pakistani establishment. The PPP government and especially the interior minister Aitzaz Ashan, was accused of providing India with lists of leaders of the Khalistan movement. It was also constantly pressurized and not allowed to play even a limited political role. The Pakistani establishment was totally averse to the Bhutto government and ultimately it was dismissed in August 1990 on charges of corruption and bad governance. Eventually the Pakistani establishment ensured the return of Islamic parties-the IJI, to the power centre (Nawaz 2008).

Conclusion

The demand of the Muslims of United India for a separate state on the basis of their religious identity (at a time when different nations were fighting for their liberation from the colonial and imperial powers after the World War II on the basis of nationalism) was a unique and deviant incident as far the definition of modern state is concerned. Crucial is the fact that the demand for Pakistan could not obtain same level of popularity in Muslim majority provinces that it enjoyed in the Muslim minority provinces. Muslims belonging to the latter remained under the paranoia of Hindu majoritarianism. After the establishment of Pakistan, there arose a debate on the role of religion in Pakistan. Due to ethnic conflicts and political differences, the Pakistani establishment promoted the concepts of 'Islamic Ideology' and

‘Pakistani Ideology’, which have become tools in the hands of the Pakistani ruling elite for exploiting and denying common people their legitimate rights. Repeated military coups have weakened the democratic process in the country and General Zia-ul-Haq aggravated the situation by bringing the element of religion not only in the state organ but also in its affairs including the economic, political and judicial. Zia’s efforts to overhaul the country’s political structure were supplemented by the Afghan conflict. To ensure the defeat of the Soviet Union and to maintain constant supply to the Afghan war, religious seminaries were established everywhere in the country, which eventually became important centers for producing militant extremists. Due to his policy of persistently discouraging political parties, religious and extremist groups stepped in and the country eventually drifted towards religious extremism. General Zia’s policies not only promoted religious extremism, they also led to a denial of the legitimate rights of the people, resulting further into instability, insecurity and conflict within and outside the country and the South Asian region as a whole.

Unfortunately, the Pakistani establishment continued with these policies even after the death of General Zia. It is due to this that the democratic process could not be strengthened. Extremist groups kept receiving ISI’s covert support and this nexus became pivotal in not only weakening the democratic process within the country, but also in causing tension outside it, even at the regional level.

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Understanding Transnational Television in India: A Critical Analysis of General Entertainment Channels

M R Sathya Prakash & B K Ravi

Abstract

When transnational television channels entered Indian television market with big investments and innovative content, they were accused of bringing in an alien culture and spoiling the local culture. The programming aired in transnational television channels of different genres were viewed as a challenge to Indian culture, and identity. Television content across most of the Indian languages, influenced by Western program formats, has fuelled sharp debates about the kind of cultural values it promotes. It is in this background that the present article attempts to critically examine the structural aspects of transnational television in India. The paper also tries to understand the Indian television market, and makes an attempt to trace the programming trend and marketing strategy of transnational general entertainment channels (GECs) in comparison with Indian television channels. An attempt will be made to examine the programming of transnational GECs to find out whether they are culturally sensitive or interfering. Indian government policy towards transnational channels will also be looked into.

Television in India has been in existence for more than four decades now. For the first 17 years, it spread haltingly and transmission was mainly in black & white. The thinkers and policy makers of the country, which had just been liberated from centuries of colonial rule, frowned upon television, looking on at it as a luxury Indians could do without. In 1955 a Cabinet decision was taken disallowing any foreign investments in media which has since been followed religiously for nearly half a century. Sales of television sets, as reflected by licenses issued to buyers were just 676,615 until 1977.

Television has come to the forefront only in the past twenty years and more so in the last decade. There were initially two ignition points: the first in the eighties when color television

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was introduced by state-owned broadcaster *Doordarshan* timed with the 1982 Asian Games which India hosted. It then proceeded to install transmitters nationwide rapidly for terrestrial broadcasting. In this period no private enterprise was allowed to set up television stations or to transmit television signals.

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Secondly, in 1991, the central government launched a series of economic reforms under Prime Minister P V Narasimha Rao. Under the new policies the government allowed private and foreign networks to start their operations in a limited manner. And this process has been continued by subsequent administrations. This has led to a kind of revolution in broadcasting in India. Foreign channels like *CNN*, *Star TV* and domestic channels such as *Zee TV* and *Sun TV* started satellite broadcasts initially.

Doordarshan, who was leader until then, responded to this satellite television invasion by launching its own entertainment and commercially driven channel and introduced entertainment programming on its terrestrial network. This again fuelled the purchase of sets in the hinterlands of the country, where cable TV was not available. The initial success of the channels had a snowball effect: more foreign programmers and Indian entrepreneurs started their own versions. From two channels prior to 1991, Indian viewers were exposed to more than 50 channels by 1996.

Entry of Transnational Players

With the entry of *Star TV* into India in 1992, on the one hand terrestrial television suddenly paved the way for new satellite based technology in one of the world's largest consumer market; on the other hand it also ushered in transnationalisation of television landscape in India. Later at different stages other global players like Sony Entertainment, Viacom, Disney, and in recent times Warner Brothers, Reuters, have entered into the different segments of the Indian television market. Along with these transnational television channels regional networks like *Zee TV*, *Sun TV*, and *E-TV* are also broadcasting their programs in other countries attracting viewers of Indian origin into their ever increasing audience base. Albeit in a limited sense, these networks have effectively become transnational.

Although transnational television networks come out with better technology, and better production quality with big investments, along the way, they also said to be bringing in an alien culture new to the region in which they are operating. And this has lead to furious debates about the impact of transnational television content on Indian culture, and identity. In fact some sections of the civil society blame these television channels for polluting the 'Indian culture' and disturbing peace in the society.

In an important study on transnational television in India, Melissa Butcher (2003) writes that *Star TV*'s programming and marketing strategy has resulted in a new kind of cultural change in India in the 1990s. During this period number of global cable television and satellite television channels, entered the Indian television market, vying for audiences and consumers and bringing with them predominantly western values and aspirations in the cultural commodity form (Butcher 2003).

Television content across most of the Indian languages, influenced by Western program formats, has fuelled sharp debates about the kind of cultural values it promotes. Television programs like *Sach Ka Samna* (Indian version of *The Moment of Truth*), *Big Boss* (Indian version of *Big Brother*), and the like have attracted extreme reactions, both well meaning and otherwise, from sections of the Indian society. While some set of people argue in favour of the freedom of expression, others are rooting for censorship of such programs by claiming that these shows undermine the Indian values, and culture. Most of these programs are aired in transnational general entertainment television (GEC) channels. Hence, it becomes all the more important to assess the role of transnational television in India and its content.

It is in this background the present article attempts to critically examine the structural aspects of transnational television in India. The paper also tries to understand the Indian television market, and makes an attempt to trace the programming trend and marketing strategy of transnational general entertainment channels in comparison with Indian television channels. An attempt will be made to examine the programming of transnational GECs to find out whether they are culturally sensitive or interfering. Indian government policy towards transnational channels will also be looked into.

Indian Television Studies

In India, studies on television have basically centered on finding out its role in facilitating development. There have been many studies focusing on television and violence, effects of television on children, portrayal of women in television advertisements, and the like. In fact most of the studies on television in India borders on assessing its effectiveness in bringing about change in social behaviour and its role in development. And of course there are rich ethnographies of Indian television audiences, conducted from the early 1990s onwards. Barring few exceptions not much of academic works have been done especially on transnational television's nexus with cultural change.

In the 1980s there was an unprecedented expansion of the TV network in India, and towards the end of the decade TV broadcasts got nation-wide reach. The TV scenario in India today may not be much different from that of the United States. But scientific studies on the effect of TV on society are not undertaken on a regular and systematic basis as in the United States. Some of the important studies on Television in India are listed in the following paragraphs.

SITE studies: The Department of Atomic Energy of the Government of India entered in 1975 into an agreement with the National Aeronautics and Space Administration (NASA) of the USA to conduct jointly a Satellite Instructional Television Experiment (SITE) with a view to provide informal education to the rural population of India through an intimate medium of communication.

Accordingly, the SITE programme was launched on August 01, 1975. This joint venture of NASA, Indian Space Research Organization (ISRO) and All-India Radio (AIR) had the objectives of exploring the potential of satellite for nation-wide communication through the medium of TV and broadcasting instruction programs in the field of agriculture, family

planning, education etc. The SITE program was introduced in 2400 villages in 20 districts of Rajasthan, Bihar, Orissa, Madhya Pradesh, Andhra Pradesh and Karnataka.

At the instance of the Planning Commission, the Programme Evaluation Organization (PEO) conducted an evaluation study of the Program in three phases, viz, (i) Bench-Mark Survey during July, 1975, (ii) Concurrent Observation running in three rounds from August, 1975 to July, 1976, and (iii) Repeat Survey from August, 1976 to November, 1976. The study was confined to those aspects of the programs telecasted for adults only.

Study of 'Hum log' by A Singhal and E M Rogers: Studying on the effectiveness of entertainment media in bringing about change in social behavior, Professor Everett M. Rogers and Arvind Singhal, found through a sample survey that 70 percent of the viewers indicated they had learned from *Hum Log* (We the people)- India's first social- content soap opera broadcast in 1984- that women should have equal opportunities, 68 percent had learned women should have the freedom to make their personal decisions in life, and 71 percent had learned that family size should be limited (10). Among other things, the programme stimulated over 400,000 people to write letters to the Indian Television Authority and to various characters in the programme, stating their views on the issues being dealt with or asking for help and advice.

Melissa Butcher's study on Transnational television in India: Melissa Butcher in her work (2003) has made an attempt at coming to grips with evolution of TV in India, along with the impact of private regional and transnational television network on national network, Doordarshan. She has further, focused on providing detailed summary of newspaper and magazine reports of the television environment in India and the political strategies over time, to sustain the ideological function of such limit images as the Indian youth, the Indian male and the Indian female. Butcher also provides a fairly good description of theory on national and individual identity and how this intersects with Indian mythological constructions of individual and community.

Study of T Mrunalini on the impact of TV on early childhood behavior: Mrunalini's study focused on effective understanding of the impact of television viewing on children's behavior both at home and school. What sorts of impressions are carried over by children of early childhood stage by viewing television? Does the socio-economics of the child influence child's viewing? Is there any association between the employment status of mother and television viewing children of early childhood stage? What sort of negative impact left on the child at early age group by viewing TV? How does viewing these programs influence

children's reaction? What are the preferences of children about TV programs? What types of programs are mostly liked by children of early childhood stage? What types of differences in the behavior of TV viewing children could be noticed by teachers at schools? These are the questions the study tried to answer.


Television and Religion: Focusing on religion and television nexus, Sanjay Asthana writes in 'Media Communication' (2008), "... although studies of television in India have examined the dominant historicist constructions of nation in terms of the discourses of modernization, gender, and rightwing politics, other modes of imagining the nation, particularly through the interplay between secularism and religion, have not been analyzed." In his study Asthana seeks to engage religion and secularism articulated on Indian television.

Indian Television Market

India is a leading market for broadcasting, because of its superior growth prospects. As the literacy rate and level of income are ever increasing, media consumption too is growing in matching numbers. That's probably why more transnational companies are heading towards one of the largest growing broadcasting markets in the world. However, there is still a huge potential for market expansion in India as there is an untapped rural market on the fast lanes of growth with more households buying television sets. According to Pricewaterhouse Coopers (PwC) report on media and entertainment, in 2009 television penetration stood at 124 million within the country.

In India Hindi entertainment television channels have fuelled the growth in the television industry with 46.8 per cent share of total viewership and 57.4 per cent share of total advertising revenue comes from them. Hindi GEC channel market has the highest share among all genres of Hindi channels. *Star Plus*, *Sony*, *Zee TV*, and recently launched *Colors* with a combined market share of more than 90 percent in the prime time slot, are the major players in Hindi GEC market.

However, the TV channel market is growing big time. The major players in the segment are trying to consolidate their positions while new entrants are increasingly posing a threat to them with new marketing and program strategies. With huge advertising revenues and viewership at stake, the channels are fighting it out to outwit others by assessing and re-assessing their strategies. Catering to the taste of Indian viewers is not an easy proposition. A proper insight into the audience tastes and preferences is, therefore, paramount to any successful programme launch.

Figure 1: Growth of TV Households in India (figures are in Millions)

Source: PwC Entertainment and media outlook- 2010

PwC has projected that the Indian television industry will grow by 12.9 percent over the period 2010-14 and is estimated to reach about Rs. 488 billion in 2014 from the present estimate of Rs. 265 billion in 2009. Driven by increase in subscription revenues, due to growth in DTH subscribers, and proliferation of televisions across households, television industry continued to grow at a healthy rate in 2009. Clearly television is becoming an indispensable part of Indian houses. From being a luxury just a few decades back, it is today considered a necessity.

In recent years there is a stark increase in the amount of channels with the introduction of *Colors*, *9X*, *Real* and *NDTV Imagine* in GEC genre, where as channels like *UTV Action*

Movies, Discovery Turbo, Discovery Science, have also made their entry into the television market. The total number of channels stood at 461 in 2009. Regional channels marked the largest increase in 2009, from 114 in 2008 to 135 in 2009. However, advertisement accounts for only 40 percent of the market size in TV, where as subscription contributes 60 percent revenues of the television industry.

GECs in the regional market are undergoing silent revolution since the past few years. It is a known fact that regional space is developing into one of the major markets for global players. According to PwC report, despite economic slowdown, the advertising revenue spent on regional channels grew to 29 percent in 2009. The key regional languages like Malayalam, Tamil, Kannada, Bengali, Marathi and Telugu have managed to capture large viewership contrary to the trend at the national level.

Table 1: List of channels permitted to be down linked to India by Ministry of Information and Broadcasting, Govt. of India

Year	News Genre	Non-News Genre	Total
2000	1	0	1
2001	39	5	44
2002	16	8	24
2003	12	11	23
2004	10	17	27
2005	10	5	15
2006	28	11	39
2007	40	34	74
2008	59	100	159
2009	33	46	79
2010 (Upto March)	9	9	18
Total	257	246	503
<i>Source: Ministry of Information and Broadcasting, Govt. of India</i>			

Most of the broadcasters are extending their regional network thereby offering new content to the customers and focusing on their interests. *Zee TV* and *Star TV* already have a sizeable presence in this regional market. *Sony TV* is also making its presence felt in the regional market. Recently, *Sony TV* has acquired Channel 8, a Bengali language film channel to mark its entry into West Bengal. After *Zee*, *Star* is also eyeing the regional market, specifically the Southern market. South Indian market has around 32 million cable and satellite television households and commands Rs 18.5 billion in advertisement revenues and Rs. 5.5 billion in subscription revenues. *Star* entered the Southern market with Tamil channel *Vijay*, and in 2009 acquired a controlling stake in *Asianet* that has four channels in Kerala, Karnataka and Andhra Pradesh. Clearly, the trend is towards regionalization or localization of national and international players.

Regulatory Measures

Foreign Investment Policy

In the broadcasting sector different proportions of foreign direct investment and foreign institutional investment are allowed in different segments. However Telecom Regulatory Authority of India (TRAI) which looks into the telecommunication, broadcasting and cable services has made recommendation to the government to increase the limits of foreign investment in some segments of the broadcasting sector.

In cable network segment, FDI and FII limit is 49 percent. Within this limit FDI component should not be exceeding 20 percent. This is subject Cable and Television Network Rules (1994). However TRAI has recommended that FDI and FII limit may be increased from 49 percent to 74 percent in this sector.

In Direct to Home segment, FDI and FII limit is 49 percent. Within this limit FDI component should not be exceeding 20 percent. This is subject to guidelines issued by ministry of information and broadcasting. For setting up hardware facilities such as up-linking FDI plus FII limit is 49 percent. This is also subject to Up-linking policy of the government.

For up-linking news and current affairs TV channels, FDI plus FII limit is only 26 percent. On the contrary 100 percent FDI plus FII is allowed for up-linking non news and current affairs TV channels. Meanwhile, TRAI has recommended that FDI limit for up-linking news and current affairs TV channels may be increased from 26 percent to 49 percent. In the telecom sector, FDI up to 49 percent is permitted under the automatic route, while prior Foreign

Investment Promotional Board's (FIPB) approval is required for any foreign investment in the broadcasting sector. However, since some telecom companies are now planning for terrestrial broadcasting through IPTV, there has to be a need for clarity on FDI guidelines on such activities by telecom companies.

Table 2: FDI limit as prescribed by Government of India in the Broadcasting Sector

Broadcasting	FDI Cap/ Equity	Entry Route	Other Conditions
Cable Network	49% (FDI+FII)	Foreign Investment Promotional Board (FIPB)	Subject to Cable Television Network Rules (1994) Notified by Ministry of Information & Broadcasting. www.mib.nic.in
Direct-to-Home	49% (FDI+FII). Within this limit, FDI component not to exceed 20%	FIPB	Subject to guidelines issued by Ministry of Information & Broadcasting. www.mib.nic.in
Setting up hardware facilities such as up-linking, HUB etc.,	49% (FDI+FII)	FIPB	Subject to Up-linking Policy notified by Ministry of Information & Broadcasting. www.mib.nic.in
Up-linking a news and current affairs television channels	26% FDI+FII	FIPB	Subject to guidelines issued by Ministry of Information & Broadcasting. www.mib.nic.in
Up-linking a news and current affairs television channels	100%	FIPB	Subject to guidelines issued by Ministry of Information & Broadcasting. www.mib.nic.in
<i>Source: Compiled from Press Note 7 on FDI consolidated policy, issued in June 16, 2008, by Ministry of Commerce, Govt. of India</i>			

TRAI has recommended that for carriage segments (cable TV, DTH, mobile TV etc.) of broadcasting sector, foreign investment up to 49 per cent should be on the automatic route. However TRAI favors FIPB approval for foreign investment in content segments of broadcasting sector.

In order to prevent concentration of ownership across media TRAI has recommended that after working out the required safeguards for horizontal and vertical integration, the merger and acquisition guidelines for the sector may be issued to prevent media concentration and creation of significant market power.

Undoubtedly, India has a regulated policy on FDI in the media with due checks and balances existing in this sensitive area of foreign investment. One can discount the fact that the Government of India has its own compulsions and necessities in continuing the retention of these limits in FDI in the media sector.

Tax Regime on Broadcasting

Direct Tax: The advertisement revenues earned by Indian telecasting companies are liable to tax on net income basis (as their worldwide income is taxable in India) at the prevailing rates. Foreign telecasting companies are liable to tax in India, only if they have a permanent establishment or business connection in India. The taxability in such case is only on the income, which is attributable to such operations carried out in India.

Indirect Tax: A broadcaster is also liable to service tax for the subscription charges recovered from multi system operators (MSO) and cable operators for providing the feed along with selling of time slots on their TV channels for advertising. Content syndication business (i.e. acquisition and selling or transfer of content rights) undertaken by the broadcaster also attracts indirect taxes.

The broadcasting organization, whose head office is situated outside India, may operate in India through subsidiary or through an agent. Thus for a foreign broadcaster, it is the Indian subsidiary or agent, who acts on behalf of such foreign broadcasting organization, is liable to pay service tax on the revenues earned by foreign principals.

Programming and Cultural Implications

Indian general entertainment is going through a big shift right now. Lot of choices is available to the audiences in the fiction as well as in the non-fiction genre. In fiction, viewers are lapping up shows which are filled with high emotional drama. There are also shows which have significant localization and are set in the regional milieu that have captured the attention of viewers. In the non-fiction category, shows that transcend genres are proving to be successful.

Table 3: Viewership Share across Market Genres in 2009

Market Genre	Viewership Share
Hindi GEC	26.2 %
Regional GEC	24.2%
Hindi Movies	11.7%
Cable	7.9%
Kids	5.5%
Regional Movies	4.0%
Regional News	3.7%
Hindi News	3.4%
Sports	2.8%
Regional Music	2.4%
Terrestrial	2.1%
Music	1.7%
Others	4.3%
<i>Source: TAM Media Research</i>	

Mushrooming of new channels and high demand for differentiated content has propelled the television industry into a phase of rapid growth. As most of the channels produce their own content, production is also taken as a cost. And hence, the revenues are primarily booked from advertising and not from selling content. However, there are few players like Balaji Telefilms, who sell the content to the channels. They form the content industry.

The launch of new channels in recent years propelled the demand for fresh content. As a result, the importance of content ratings has also increased. Ratings are the only quantifiable measurement tools on the popularity of the channels which, in-turn; result in higher advertisement revenues in terms of volume as well as tariffs. Hence, the competition to achieve higher rating points or at least to be among the top three programs in the genres gaining momentum. At present, though there are a few advertising agencies that undertake individual tracking of programs, most rely on these television rating points (TRPs) and gross rating points (GRPs) to make their advertisement placement decisions.

Indian television broadcasting market has been classified into over nine different genres. Among them, Hindi GECs had around 38 percent market share in 2009, from around 34 percent in 2008 in the Hindi speaking market. PwC observes that, regional GECs and Hindi GECs are going neck-to-neck when it comes to viewership share in India.

Colors, the Game Changer

The ease with which *Colors*, the Hindi GEC, a joint venture of US media conglomerate *Viacom* and Indian media house *Network 18*, managed to rise is surprising. When *Colors* was launched in 2008, the skeptics had dismissed it as just another GEC in the already burgeoning space, discounting the possibility of its success. However, to everyone's surprise, *Colors* found its feet in less than a year's time of its launch and within a year, the channel emerged as one of the leaders in Hindi GEC market. Just eight months after its launch, *Colors* was a well-entrenched channel available in 66.8 million homes, with a 24 percent market share.

Industry professionals attribute the reasons behind its popularity to innovative programming, differentiated content and well thought-out distribution processes. Changes in the television- watching habits of consumers have also contributed in favor of the channel. Viewers wanted newer, shorter shows with an international appeal. The days of 52-episode family dramas or religious serials were clearly over.

General entertainment channels were filled with family melodramas, with *Saas Bahu*² soap operas of *Star Plus* ruling the roost not so long ago. With *Star Plus* comfortably leading the general entertainment segment, followed by *Zee TV* and *Sony TV* in second and third position, the stage was set for a new channel to unleash a fresh set of programming. And that's exactly what happened with the entry of *Colors*.

The strategies adopted by *Colors*, played well with the sentiments of the viewers who were looking for fresh contents as against the tedious *Saas Bahu* sagas. In the fiction category, *Colors* introduced the viewers to content wise refreshing serials like *Balika Vadhu* and *Uttaran* and, in the non-fiction; it introduced a number of unique reality shows like *Khatron Ke Khiladi* and *Big Boss*. Moreover, *Colors* picked up a host of core social issues and converted them into real shows, taking the viewers interest to a higher level. Shaken by this, the other top GECs like *Star Plus* and *Zee TV* have also come up with more catchy content in order to win back the audience, thus speeding up the race for the top spot. In 2009, *Star Plus* introduced shows like *Yeh Rishta Kya Kehlata Hai* and *Bidaai* while *Zee TV* launched *Pavitra Rishta*, *Agle Janam Mohe Bitiya Hi Kijo* and *Jhansi Ki Rani* in keeping with the trend.

Leaning towards Localization

As reflected in the programming strategies of some of the above mentioned transnational television channels, there is a clear attempt at localization of the content. In pursuit of winning over the viewers to their fold, even international players are forced into making programs on core social issues. Shows like *Agle Janam Mohe Bitiya Hi Kijo*, *Balika Vadhu*, are basically fictional take on problems of women trafficking and child marriage. Hence, the fear of global media players spoiling the cultural milieu of the country has been disproven in this case, at least in the general entertainment segment.

Star network, despite being a transnational brand has repeatedly managed to outperform its competition in India, including some of the home-grown channels because it has been credited as being sensitive to local preferences and tastes. Although most of the shows in *Star Plus* showcase upper or rich society lifestyle with its stereotypical representation of characters, it has managed to strike a chord among the viewers. Shows like *Kyunki Saas Bhi Kabhi Bahu Thi*, *Kahani Ghar Ghar Ki* held highest ratings for *Star Plus* for almost five to six years in the last decade. *Star Plus*, which is also a leader in GEC segment, is consciously attempting to cater to the cultural sensibilities of the place.

Even the new entrant *Colors*, despite of its transnational origin, has not taken the risk of putting the cultural spin on its programming. It has religiously paid heed to local culture and without hurting the local sentiments, have gone into innovative programming. Its successful shows like *Balika Vadhu*, *Uttaran*, *Laagi Tujhse Lagan* are the case in point in support of the argument. Even Sony TV's new shows like *Saas Bina Sasural*, *Baat Humari Pakki Hai*, despite being different, have not crossed the line.

Leading transnational GECs *Star Plus*, *Sony* and *Colors* have all aired programs adopted from shows of American or European TV channels. Although *Star Plus* hit gold with *Kaun Banega Crorepati* (Indian version of 'Who Wants to Be Multi millionaire') in 2001, the channel faced severe challenge with its program *Sach Ka Samna*, in 2009, as the anchor in the programme asked extremely personal questions on TV. The programme created furore in the Rajya Sabha³ and members alleged that the content appeared in the program was "obscene." In July, 2009, the government issued show cause notice on *Star Plus* for "offending good taste and decency not suitable for unrestricted public exhibition, and for obscenity in words". Even a show like *Big Boss*, aired earlier by *Sony TV* and now *Colors* has attracted ire from some sections of the civil society.

In November, 2009, National Commission for Women (NCW) was upset at the “indecent language” used on *Rakhi Ka Insaaf*, a reality show anchored by actor Rakhi Sawant and was also upset at the “indecent” clothes worn by woman actors on *Big Boss-4*. The chairperson Girija Vyas suggested that these programme to be shifted to 11 pm to 5 am slot. Acting on this, the Information and Broadcasting ministry decreed that both *Bigg Boss* and NDTV Imagine’s *Rakhi ka Insaaf*, be showed during a late night slot between 11 pm and 5 am.

Concluding Remarks

When transnational television channels entered Indian television market with big investments and innovative content, they were accused of bringing in an alien culture and spoiling the local culture. The programming aired in transnational television channels of different genres were viewed as a challenge to Indian culture, and identity.

But on the contrary, leading transnational television channels in the general entertainment segment is consciously attempting to cater to the cultural sensibilities of the place. Moreover, some of the channels like *Colors* have picked up hitherto untouched core social issues and managed to convert them into commercially successful shows. Television channels that have consciously attempted at localization are getting higher TRP ratings. Shows like *Agle Janam Mohe Bitiya Hi Kijo*, *Balika Vadhu*, are basically fictional take on problems of women trafficking and child marriage. Hence, the debates around global media players spoiling the cultural milieu of the country appears to be misplaced, at least in the general entertainment segment.

Some of the examples discussed above clearly illustrate that whenever transnational television channels have tried to cross the line of “decency” specific to Indian culture, they have been forced to shelve such programs in contention. It is also commercially safer on the part of these channels to be sensitive to local tastes, preferences and culture at large. Otherwise advertising revenues earned by these channels may be severely compromised and also the brand image will be at risk with the dwindling viewership.

In 1960, Joseph Klapper, examining the power of media to influence people’s behavior, argued that media generally serve as agents of the status quo, giving people more reasons to go on believing and acting as they already do instead of disrupting society and creating unexpected social change (Baran & Davis, 2008). Media only manages to reaffirm existing social or cultural values. In a culturally sensitive market, it is also ill advisable to go against the native sensibilities. So, invariably media ends up supporting the existing values and rarely takes the

risk of getting branded as alien at the one extreme and radical on the other. In India, although transnational GECs seemed to have had a marginal influence over certain aspects of culture like clothing, and food habits, they have not been able to disrupt the deeply embedded cultural values of the society. As Klapper has theorized, wittingly or unwittingly they are only acting as agents of status quo.

Notes

1. Although commonly and interchangeably referred to as simply satellite television in India, here the term is used to mean television channels, whose major stakes are owned by companies of foreign origin.
2. Hindi words Saas, Bahu are equivalent to mother-in-law and daughter-in-law respectively.
3. Rajya Sabha is the upper house of the Indian parliament. Members are indirectly elected. Lower House is known as Lok Sabha, consisting members directly elected by the people

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Prevention or cure? It is all about a Development Strategy of South Asia

Rajesh K

Abstract

Prioritization is one of the most important aspects of development strategy probably where the developing nations lack their skill and thereby loose there potential for economic development. Though, the spirit of globalization negate the concept of 'local', without having sufficient knowledge or preparation it will not be wise to adopt strategies like health tourism as a development options in developing nations particularly the countries of South Asia. Apart from their deprived economic performance, they share common health challenges with very poor health indicators in the world. Current trend in promoting health tourism ironically become a tool to destroy the health sector of the villages of South Asian countries. This paper empirically analyse the pros and cons of selecting health tourism as a development tool by South Asian countries, with a special reference to India.

Health/medical/wellness tourism refers to the deliberate flow of persons from one country to another country, in the name tourists, where the treatment is cheaply available than their country of origin. Though each one is different in terms of definition, the existence and development of these products (medical/health/wellness tourism) depends upon the health standard and facilities of the destination nations. This article used the term health tourism in a broad concept, which encompasses the essence of all these three elements of tourism. Health tourism is often considered as a by-product of globalization (Reddy and Qadeer 2010). Unlike the other forms of tourism in the case of health tourism, it is not European or American tourist destinations, but Asian and Latin American countries became the focal point (Herrrick 2007), where availability of treatment at lower rates with better facilities are rated as the unique feature. At only 20% of the cost of treatment in the United States (US) and the United Kingdom (UK), these host countries provide “world class” medical care (Reddy and Qadeer 2010). Health tourism in Asian countries including South Asia is expected to grow 20 to 25% each year (Herrrick 2007). South Asian countries of India, Sri Lanka, and Bangladesh launched certain development activities to reap the benefits out of the health tourism development. The objective of this paper is to empirically analyse the prospective and possible outcome of health tourism in South Asia. The paper also traces the profile of South Asia’s economic development and tourism development, especially the health tourism initiatives.

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I. South Asia - at a Glance

The term South Asia here used to denote eight countries i.e., Afghanistan, Bangladesh, Bhutan, India, Maldives, Nepal, Pakistan and Sri Lanka. It has 23 per cent of the world's population and accounts for a mere 2 percent of world output (ADB 2005), which itself indicate the low level of economic development. The overall impression regarding the political environment of these nations among the other regions of the world is negative due to many reasons, ranging from hostility between India and Pakistan, presence of Taliban in Afghanistan, after effects of civil war in Sri Lanka, Maoist uprising in Nepal, etc.

South Asia is the poorest region on the earth next only to Sub-Saharan Africa. (UNESCAP 2009). Along with the high poverty and infant mortality rate, population growth also became an obstacle for development of South Asian region. The country wise details of population, population density, and poverty and Gini index are given in table 1.

Table 1: Population, Population Density, Poverty Rate and Gini index of South Asia

Country	Population in (million)	Population Density	Poverty Ratio below \$1.25/day in 2005	Gini Index
Afghanistan	28.3	43	N.A.	N.A.
Bangladesh	160.3	1120	49.6	31
Bhutan	6.8	14	26.2	N.A.
India	1079.7	361	41.6	36.8
Maldives	3.2	1037	16.2	N.A.
Nepal	28.5	195	47.3	47.3
Pakistan	149.7	210	31.2	31.2
Sri Lanka	20.4	296	23.1	N.A.
World	6345.1	50	--	--
<i>Source: UNESCAP, 2009 and World Bank, 2010</i>				

From table 1 it can be seen that India, the largest country in South Asia have the largest population of 1,080 million, followed by Bangladesh (160 million) and Pakistan (150 million). In terms of population density, Bangladesh (1120) and Maldives (1037) are leading.

Bhutan is the least populated country and is followed by Afghanistan. It can be calculated from the table that the South Asian population density is 410 persons per sq.km. In the case of poverty, with the available statistics, Bangladesh (49.6%), Nepal (47%) and India (42%) lead the number of people below the poverty line, i.e., below \$1.25 per day.

Gini index measures the extent to which the distribution of income among individuals or households within an economy deviates from a perfectly equal distribution (UNESCAP 2009). According to the table, Nepal (47) marked the widest difference among the people in terms of their economic power. It is followed by India, the largest economy in the region, with a score of 36. Even the positions of Pakistan and Bangladesh are better than that of India with a score of 31 each.

II. Tourism Development in South Asia

Realizing the enormous potential and importance of increased cooperation amongst the member countries in tourism, South Asian Association for Regional Cooperation (SAARC)

Table 2: Contribution of Tourism Industry to GDP and Employment of South Asian Countries

Country	Percentage of contribution of Tourism Industry to	
	GDP	Employment
Afghanistan	N.A.	--
Bangladesh	3.7	3
India	5.3	5.4
Maldives	53	--
Nepal	8.2	6.4
Pakistan	6.3	5.1
Sri Lanka	9.6	7.9
World	10.3	8.7
<i>Source: South Asian Yearbook of Trade & Development, 2006.</i>		

have emphasized the need to take measures for promoting tourism in the region (Manadhar and Rasul 2009). SAARC also designated 2005 as the “South Asia Tourism Year”. In 2007, the South Asian region received less than 1.1 percent (9.7 million) of the 898 million visitors from around the world (UNWTO 2008). The tourism sector of South Asia recorded only marginal growth, with the exceptions of some significant growth in India and Maldives. Contribution of tourism industry to GDP and employment of South Asian Countries is given in table 2.

From table 2 it is clear that among South Asian countries Maldives depends more on tourism, where 53% of the income is generated from tourism. Sri Lanka is more close to the world average in terms of the contribution of tourism industry in GDP (9.6%) and in employment (7.9%). All other countries of South Asia are far behind in tapping tourism opportunities. Even a country like Nepal, where the biggest global tourist attraction - the Mountain Everest- is located, lags behind in tourism with 8.2% contribution in GDP and 6.4% in employment. In India, contribution of tourism to its GDP (5.3%) is just half of the world average (10.3%) and in case of Bangladesh it is merely one-third (3.7%).

Country wise details of international tourist arrivals in South Asian countries are given in table 3.

Table 3: International Tourist Arrivals to the South Asian Region

South Asia	2003	2004	2005	2006	2007	% change 06/07
Afghanistan	--	--	--	--	--	--
Bangladesh	244509	271270	207662	--	--	--
Bhutan	6261	9249	13626	17342	21093	21.6
India	2726214	3457477	3918610	4447167	4977193	11.9
Pakistan	500918	647993	798260	898389	839500	-6.6
Nepal (Air)	275438	297335	277346	283819	360350	27
Maldives	563593	616716	395320	601923	675889	12.3
Sri Lanka	500642	566202	549308	559609	494008	-11.7
<i>Source: compiled from UNWTO, 2008 and UNESCAP, 2009.</i>						

From table 3 it is clear that on the basis of tourist arrivals the performances of India (percentage change over the previous year) and Maldives are in a remarkable position. Though statistically Bhutan performed significantly, these claims could be offset by their low volume of tourists. India marked close to 5 million visitor arrivals in 2007, with Pakistan and Maldives also showing their prowess.

III. Present Status of Health Sector in South Asia

In South Asia, there is no centralized system for health care. Many qualified doctors work in private institutions or clinics where care is close to western standards but majority of population has to depend on sub optimal primitive or even no medical care. In many rural areas, there is no specialist treatment, except for service from occasional medical officer. People have to travel long distances by cattle drawn cart or public transport, so that even the sub optimal treatment is also delayed.

Table 4: Infectious Diseases, Infant Mortality and HDI of South Asian Nations

Country	Infectious disease		Infant mortality rate (for 1000)	HDI 2009
	Malaria (in lakhs)	TB (in lakhs)		
Afghanistan	1649	238	165	181
Bangladesh	233	387	48	146
Bhutan	126	363	56	132
India	127	283	54	134
Maldives	--	48	26	95
Nepal	558	240	48	144
Pakistan	74	223	73	141
Sri Lanka	3	79	17	102
World	N.A.	N.A.	47	N.A.
Source: UNESCAP, 2009, World Bank, 2010 and UNDP, 2010				

The south Asian region has one of the poorest health indicators in the world (*Agarwal et al.*, 2008). It houses the largest number of people with micronutrient deficiencies and

diabetes; carries 40% of the world's tuberculosis burden, has high burden of cardiovascular diseases and one of the worst indicators for reproductive health in the world (*Ibid*, 2008). The region is also not free from other issues like AIDS. Though there are gaps in information the number of people living with AIDS in India is estimated to be between 2 and 3 million. Table 4 shows the details of infectious diseases like Malaria and Tuberculosis, infant mortality rate and human development index (HDI) for the year 2009 of South Asia.

Backwardness of health conditions in South Asian countries is clearly revealed from the above table. Afghanistan is worst affected with Malaria, which is followed by Nepal. In the case of tuberculosis Bangladesh and Bhutan are the major sufferers. Infant mortality rate of Afghanistan is very high. Except for Maldives and Sri Lanka, the infant mortality rates of South Asian nations are above the World Average (UNESCAP 2009). Maldives and Sri Lanka are the two nations, which are comparatively in a better position in terms of these three indicators, and the same is reflected in their HDI. Afghanistan stood at 181st positions, and the position of India and Pakistan (the largest economies in South Asia) are 134 and 141 respectively. Bhutan, the highest per capita GDP holder of the region is in the 132nd position.

Table 5: Health Expenditure, out of Pocket Expenditure and Availability of Physicians

Country	Total health expenditure (% of GDP)	Private expenditure on health (% of total expenditure on health)	Out of pocket expenditure on health	Physicians per 1000 population
Afghanistan	5.1	73	97	0.2
Bangladesh	3.1	63	88	0.3
Bhutan	4.3	31	100	0.1
India	4.6	80	94	0.6
Maldives	10.1	16	100	1
Nepal	5.1	70	85	0.2
Pakistan	2.0	84	98	0.8
Sri Lanka	4.2	51	86	0.5
<i>Source: UNESCAP, 2009, p.70.</i>				

Health systems across the region are characterized by limited resources, poor infrastructure, and absence of national health insurance schemes and large burden of diseases. In general, the financial commitment to health care in South Asia is low compared to other parts of the world, Maldives and Sri Lanka being exceptions. Per capita health care access in almost all of South Asia is less than half to what a citizen of China has access (*Agarwal et al.*, 2008). The details of total health expenditure of GDP, percentage of total expenditure on health, out of pocket expenditure on health and physicians available in South Asian countries are given in table 5.

From the above table it can be calculated that health spending as a share of GDP in South Asia is 4.8% whereas in developed countries, it ranges from 8%-9% (*Poullier et al.*, 2002). The table indicates that except Maldives and Bhutan, the countries of South Asia spend a significant proportion of their income as health expenditure. The out of pocket expenditure or the percentage of private expenditure on health is also very high among South Asian countries. People of Bhutan and Maldives spend 100% of their medical expenses directly from their pockets, which indicates the absence of government role in health sector.

The number of physicians available for each nation varies from 0.2 (in Afghanistan) to 1 (Maldives), which shows the significant gap in the supply of medical practitioners.

IV. Health Tourism in South Asia

India, Bangladesh and Sri Lanka are regarded as the forerunners of health tourism. While India and Bangladesh promote health or medical tourism (allopathic treatment), Sri Lanka tries to promote *Ayurvedic* treatments. Whether it is India or Sri Lanka or Bangladesh the targeted countries are from either Europe or North America. Among these nations, India marked significantly its presence in the global health tourism market, therefore the country is often regarded as the hub of health tourism by the tourism promoters of South Asia, rest of them are in primitive stage. Though the contribution of health tourism with respect to GDP is less, the private health sector has been developing (government is promoting) at a faster rate in India. As a result India already receives patients not only from South Asia but also from United Kingdom and America.

"First World Treatment at Third World Prices" is how industry sources define health tourism in India. India's efforts to promote medical tourism started way back in 2002, when the Confederation of Indian Industry (CII) produced a study, in collaboration with the international management consultants, McKinsey & Company, which outlined the immense potential of this

sector. The study forecasts a growth from US \$ 18.7 billion in 2001 to around US \$ 45 billion by 2012 – equivalent to 8.5% of GDP (Basanth and Kuriachan 2008). The International Passenger Survey (2003) conducted by the Ministry of Tourism, Government of India estimates that about 2.2% of foreign travellers visited India with the objective of healthcare and treatment. They have also estimated that about 2 million non-resident Indians visit India every year, of which about 10% come with healthcare objective. This works out to about 200,000 NRI patients visiting India to undergo various treatments. All these put together, the visitors to India with healthcare objective could be estimated at around 300,000 patients (*Ibid*, 2008).

Advantages for medical tourists include reduced costs, the availability of latest medical technologies and a growing compliance to international quality standards. The Indian government is taking steps to address infrastructure issues that hinder the country's growth in medical tourism. The most popular treatments sought in India by medical tourists are alternative medicine, bone-marrow transplant, cardiac bypass surgery, eye surgery and orthopaedic surgery. India is known in particular for heart surgery, hip resurfacing and other areas of advanced medicine. Ministry of Tourism India (MoT) is planning to extend its Market Development Assistance (MDA) scheme to include expenses that cover Joint Commission International (JCI) and National Accreditation Board of Hospitals (NABH) accreditation.

In addition, Indian hospitals are also increasingly turning to international accreditation agencies to standardise their protocols and project their international quality of healthcare delivery. As of October 31, 2007, there are eight hospitals in India accredited to JCI. India is ninth largest country in the world with six JCI accredited hospitals.

V. Results and Discussions

Health tourism can be an example how countries can be benefited from globalization. Positive impacts of globalisation, increasing population rate and growing national income guaranteed the tourism development world wide, which directly promote all tourism related products, including health tourism.

Being one of the largest populist, poorest and lowest health rate regions in the world it may be an economic irony that South Asian nations are highlighted as the hub of health tourism. The average population density for the region stood at 410, whereas it is 17 for America and 100 for Europe (UNESCAP 2009). Even the global population density is far below (50) than that of South Asia (*Ibid*). Similar trend can be obtained in the case of birth rate. While the South Asian birth rate stood at 1.8, it is 0.2 for Europe, 1 for USA and 1.2% for the

entire world. It is in this context that a re-examination of the promotion of health tourism as a development option in South Asia is felt necessary.

Poverty rate and Gini co-efficient rates are very high in the case of South Asian nations. It can be argued that promotion of health tourism could generate more income and thus reduce the poverty rate, but in the case of tourism, there is no guarantee that the benefits can be circulated among the host population.

In terms of HDI all South Asian countries are far behind, the best among these nations is the rank obtained by Maldives. In the case of European nations most of the nations were in the group of first ten. While United Kingdom was in the 21st position, America performed in better manner to score 13th rank in HDI in 2009 (UNDP 2010).

The data on status of health sector can be discussed in relation to health conditions and health infrastructure of these host nations. South Asian region suffers from high levels of disease including Malaria and Tuberculosis. In addition, India along with Nigera, Pakistan and Afghanistan is one of the four countries worldwide where polio has not been eradicated (WHO 2010). The region is also not free from other issues like AIDS. Though in terms of the total population this is a small number, it further points out to the emphasis to address the health of domestic population.

As shown by Technopak (2009) inadequate public health facilities force the people to spend a major portion of their incomes for private health services, as the government's spending on health sector is reducing for the last few years and now stands at the bottom in South Asian region. The bulk of private spending is paid out-of-pocket at time of service. The most problematic aspect of out-of-pocket spending is that the burden is much heavier for the poor than for the rich. This is dramatic in the case of regions with very high private shares of spending, especially for South Asia (WHO 2007).

The doctor to population ratio in South Asian countries (40 per 100,000) is far below the global average of 170 per 100,000 population (Agarwal *et al* 2008). The doctor-patient ratio varies from case to case depending upon various factors like the type of disease, nature of specialization, type of patient care required viz. indoor/outdoor. In India, the doctor-per-person ratio (including practitioners of Western medicine, Homeopathy, and Indian systems of medicine) is one-to-781 (Government of India 2005). However, as per the figures obtained from the Medical Council of India, the allopathic doctor-population ratio at present works out to 1:1722 (*Ibid*). Promotion of health tourism will further widen the gap.

Another observation made by *Technopak (2009)* about the health sector of the country is that forty percent of the primary health centres in India are understaffed. India faces a huge gap in terms of availability of number of hospital beds. With a world average of 3.96 hospital beds per 1000 population India stands just a little over 0.7 hospital beds per 1000 population. Moreover, India itself faces a shortage of doctors, nurses and paramedics that are needed to propel the growing healthcare and health tourism industry. Promotion of health tourism will further deteriorate this situation.

VI. Implications of Health Tourism in South Asia

In real sense, health tourism hides the reality of the countries of health care in South Asia. The present situation of South Asian economy (the inadequacy of infrastructure in medical colleges, increasing number of tourists, poverty, illiteracy, high population density with high growth rate) naturally push the domestic medical expenditure in future. Medical treatment will not be affordable for the people of those countries which encourage health tourism. In other words, health tourism is good for the country's economy and the individuals who are benefited from it. But any country which is benefited by the health tourism should provide the health benefit for the poor and down trodden first and then only open to the health tourism. However in the case of South Asian nations it is far from reality. Therefore there should be a clear cut demarcation line between acceptable limit of health tourism of each destinations especially in developing nations.

Price advantage is a selling point of health tourism in all developing nations, including South Asia. Providing low medical expenses to the rich European and American nations should not be morally acceptable or economically justifiable. First of all, the high medical expenditure of patients from developed countries offset by the insurance coverage and other improved facilities of their countries. The pricing in South Asian countries naturally be poor because all these countries are poor, cost will be moving upwards according to the economic development. Promotion of health tourism naturally inflates the cost upwards, which will adversely affect the poor. Affordability depends only on the individual's purchasing power and not by the national or per capita income (even, in Goldman Sachs's prediction (2003), Indian economy will be third in world by 2050 in terms of GDP but not in the per capita GDP). Considering per capita income as a yard stick for development always been criticized by many economists. In the case of India, as per the latest Forbes report, the cumulative wealth of 50 Indian billionaires has jumped by \$118.9 billion and now stands at about \$227.9 billion (The Hindu 2010). It indirectly made clear that globalization or development increases the wealth of developing nations, but not necessarily, the wealth of all citizens in these countries.

The potential for earning revenues through medical or health tourism will become an important argument for private hospitals demanding more subsidies from the government in future. In countries like India, the corporate private sector has already received considerable subsidies in the form of land, reduced import duties for medical equipment etc. Promotion of health tourism will further legitimise their demands and put pressure on the government to subsidise them further. This is worrying because the scarce resources available for health will go into subsidising the corporate sector (Gupta 2010).

Globalization always raised the criticism that it widens the gap between poor and rich. It may be further reinstated that it provides services in many different levels, it implies that there are people for every strata of demand, they can choose any product on the basis of their income. Migration of medical practitioners from rural to urban can be attributed to this feature. In fact they are moving from low paid rural government sector to the high paid urban private sectors. Globalization and health tourism are promising better prospective to them in the urban areas. Ultimately it adversely affects the government sector, which is already haphazard in infrastructure, which will further worsen the situation of poor people especially in the rural areas.

Medical tourism carries some risks that locally provided medical care does not. Generally foreign nations cautions their nationals to visit India and other less developed nations as these countries lack in health facilities and the home of infectious diseases (Keystone 2008). The vice versa is true especially in the case of health tourism. At present health tourism focuses on the cosmetics treatment, knee surgery, heart surgery etc., but the promotion of health tourism and the competition among the private institutions naturally offer all kinds of treatments, which may adversely affect the health standards of the country.

Many health tourism propagators consider India as the home of surrogate mothers. The situations like faster population growth rate with high population, unemployment and easy way to make money many people in India are willing to offer this 'surrogate mother ship', which is already been criticised in the country. The spread of Infertility clinics across the nation is the result of this new form of 'trade', further encouragement will dither the cultural values of this country.

VII. Prevention or cure: Do we have a choice?

Prevention is better than cure is a fact. Though the fact is known to us, in this globalized era implementation of their choice is not practically possible, because not only the government or the people but also the corporate also play an important role in shaping the

decision making process of these developing options. Therefore, a consensus among these three will be better rather than specifying a particular option.

Apart from that consensus, proper control of the government machinery with rules and regulations is also equally important. One example for such a rule is that each hospital which provides medical assistance to 20 foreigners should definitely treat 100 domestic people. Health tourism destination countries should focus on deriving maximum benefits from their foreign customers and ensure its benefit to the poor people of these nations. In other words, they should subsidise the medical expenses of the people in these nations with the income deriving from health tourism.

Another possible remedy is to promote low demanded domestic health products like *ayurveda and unani* in the name of health tourism. However, it should be in a minimal way, otherwise, it would lead collapse these indigenous products.

VIII. Conclusion

Increasing national and per capita income, improved knowledge and travel facilities promote the tourism development in all nations. The images like low cost destination will help South Asian countries to increase their share in global tourism map, especially in the global health tourism market. Increasing demand of health tourism will further promote the corporate medical system and slowdown the public health care system. As a result, cost of health treatment will be moving upward, which will adversely affect the poor people in the region and thus the sustainability of these economies.

With the present state of development, it will not be advisable for India or any other South Asian nations to adopt health related tourism activities. However, the ban on health tourism or deviating from the global competition is impossible. Even though the common people do not have a choice, at least the government can control the health related tourism products by not encouraging those stakeholders. The focus of public sector health institutions and machinery should focus to improve the health standard of their local people and not on health tourism. In nutshell, in order to overcome the accessibility and affordability issues of the poor, health tourism promoting South Asian countries should reshape the present mode of development system, in such way that it would subsidise the medical expenses of the common people with the income derived from health tourism. It is not easy in the present context of South Asia, however, is not unachievable, with a will.

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Agrarian Radicalism for Social Change in Bihar

Manoj Kumar

Abstract

In 1967, the Naxalbari region of West Bengal turned into a hotbed of agrarian radicalism under the guidance of Maoist philosophy which rapidly spread to various parts of the country, including Bihar, and came to be known as the Naxalite Movement. The state have a glorious ancient history but have been suffering from a number of socio-economic evils (and became one of the backward states of India) which prepared a propitious ground for causing widespread violence in the rural agrarian structure along the caste and class lines, especially since the late 1960s under the leadership of Naxalite organisations. This movement of poor peasantry (belonging mostly to lower caste-classes) spread to central regions of Bihar state and grew intense in 1980s turning rural Bihar into 'flaming fields' which aimed at liberation of masses through anti-feudal struggle basing on the issues of land, wage and social dignity. The paper intends to make an attempt to understand the causes, nature, scope and aims of this agrarian radicalism (the main content of which is the agrarian revolution for success of the People's Democratic Revolution) besides focusing on the causes of the underdevelopment of this state which have generated caste-class contradictions in society of Bihar creating suitable ground for emergence of armed anti-feudal struggle aiming to achieve the goal of equitable transformation and ensure peace and harmony in society on the basis of distributive justice.

Since the beginning of the human civilisation, efforts have been made by the intellectuals and enlightened persons to create a peaceful and harmonious society in which people remained happy. The approaches differed in various phases of development of society which were influenced by the prevailing circumstances and need of those times. The saints and sages of various parts of world, in different historical periods, made efforts in their own spiritual ways, chiefly, by appealing to the moral sense of, especially, the powerful and dominant section of society, and contributed to the process of eliminating or, at least, checking the problems arising due to socio-economic evils. The philosophy of socialism, especially, the Marxian scientific socialism emerged and gained momentum by the late nineteenth century and radical movements began in many countries along the lines of this ideology which aimed at creating an egalitarian society with humanist goals. The success of Bolshevik Revolution in Russia became the source of inspiration and fascination for democrats and communists all over the world.

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India and its various provinces could not remain immune to it. Bihar has been one of the states where radical agrarian movements have been active under the leadership of communist ideology, in particular, the Maoist philosophy of social change, by adopting the revolutionary communist ideology and programme.

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Bihar is considered as being the most condemned, ridiculed, hated and feared state of the country because of its deplorable socio-economic and political situation, abysmally low human development parameters, widespread corruption and violence, caste-class violent clashes and oppressive feudal tendencies (See Das 1992:72-4). The mention of this word, Bihar, evokes a feeling of aversion and hatred in the minds of fellow countrymen and, probably, even among people of other countries so much that many men and women from Bihar, staying or residing out of the state for reasons of their own, either try to hide their identity as being *Biharis* or feel shame and guilt while mentioning their belongingness to the state. Such people, irrespective of their caste and classes, do this to escape the pangs of low self-image and suspicion by others.

The people of this state belonging to various castes and classes migrate to other areas for reasons of their own; poor in search of means of survival and also for better social dignity, while the better-off *Biharis* move to other states mostly for better education and career opportunities as

well as in quest of more peaceful and harmonious social environment with better law and order situation. The word *Bihari* has become a metaphor for a personality with vices. There are instances of calling persons from other states (for example, Tamilians and even Punjabi Sikhs) by using the term, *Bihari* (or *Bihari Ho Kya*), not out of ignorance but with a conscious-prejudiced intension to show the person in a poor light. Has Bihar been the same since the beginning of its history as it is today? The historical records reveal a quite different fact.

The state which is privileged to have a glorious ancient history is suffering from many ailments mostly related to the socio-economic evils that have caused widespread violence in the rural agrarian structure along the caste and class lines, especially since the late 1960s, for equitable social transformation. The nature and magnitude of the problem necessitate a deeper and analytical understanding of the causes of agrarian conflict and suggestions for a suitable way out with a view to ensure peace and harmony in society on the basis of distributive justice and human dignity. This paper intends to examine and focus on the causes of the underdevelopment of this state with special reference to caste-class contradictions and anti-feudal struggle for radical changes in basic socio-economic and political order under the guidance of communist ideology in general and Maoist thought and strategy in particular. The paper will also make an attempt to assess effectiveness and achievement of the Maoist movement the main content of which is the agrarian revolution for success of the People's Democratic Revolution. The radical movement of poor and marginalised peasantry belonging mostly to the lower caste-classes is being bracketed with that of communal or secessionist terrorists, anti-national and anti-social elements posing threat to the internal security of India. The research paper will help understand the causes, nature, scope and aims of this agrarian radicalism of peasantry class on the bases of which suggestions could be made for its solution. This analytical and descriptive qualitative research work is based on the secondary and primary data collected by making use of the published/unpublished literature and the tools and techniques of questionnaire schedule and extensive interview method. The term 'Naxalite movement', 'radical peasant struggle', 'armed agrarian movement' or revolution, 'radical peasant movement', and armed agrarian revolution or resistance have been used synonymously to avoid repetition. Similarly, the terms such as, 'open fronts', 'open mass fronts' and 'mass fronts' have been used interchangeably with the same view.

Historical Background

The state of Bihar has a glorious ancient history. It is the place where two religions emerged, flourished and preached truth, non-violence, compassion and humanity. The region of

present-day Bihar does not derive its name from ancient times. Bihar is the vulgarised form of *Vihara* or Buddhist monastery. It was named Bihar by the Muslim invaders because of the large numbers of Buddhist monasteries or *Viharas*. References to the four ancient kingdoms; Videha, Vaishali, Anga and Magadha flourishing in this region are found in the Upanishads, the Ramayana, the Mahabharata and in the Puranas (Government of Bihar 1959-60: 5). In the post-Mahabharata period, the territory of Bihar was ruled by various dynasties; Shishunagas, Palas, Senas, Nagas, Nandas, Mauryas, Shungas and Guptas (*Ibid*), etc. King Janak, sage Yajnavalkya, archer Karna, Jarashandh of Magadh, scholar and statesman, Chanakya, King Chandragupta Maurya, Ashoka the Great, Samudragupta, the grammarian Panini, the father of Chemistry Nagarjun, the physician Jeevaka, and the astronomer, Arya Bhatta, are some of the names among its illustrious sons (Ranjan 1997:1).

Mithila in north Bihar was one of the most cultured and advanced kingdoms from the time of King Janaka in the epic age that had contributed to the development of philosophy. After the decline of the states of the epic age, Magadha (today's south Bihar) emerged as the most powerful state which had dominated the Indian political scene for a thousand years (GOB 1959-60: 5-6). The ancient kingdom of Magadha, today's southern part of Bihar, comprises districts of Patna, Gaya, and Shahabad (old) where the Naxalite movement is very active.

Monarchy in Videha was replaced by the rise of a republic 'Lichchavi Ganga', presumably, the first republic of the world where administration ran along democratic principles. The famous Chinese traveler Fa Hien mentions hospitals in the city of Patliputra, in which the poor of all countries, destitute, and people suffering from various ailments were treated by physicians (GOB 1959-60:7). The University of Nalanda not only imparted higher education to the students who came from different parts of the world, but also sent its scholars to China, Korea, Japan, Tibet, and Ceylon to enlighten people of those countries.

During the medieval period, the state was ruled by the Khilji, Tughlak, and Mughal dynasties. Sher Shah Suri was one of the famous rulers during this era. After the battle of Buxar in 1764, Bihar was made a part of Bengal Presidency by the East India Company and remained so until 1911 (Alam 1996: 2-3). Bihar played a prominent role in the first Indian struggle for independence in 1857, under the leadership of Kunvar Singh of Shahabad (presently comprising the districts of Bhojpur, Rohtas, Buxar, Kaimur- regions of the active Naxalite movement. Orissa was separated from Bihar in 1936. Once again, Bihar was bifurcated with thirty seven districts (Census of India (Bihar) 2001: 9) and a separate state, Jharkhand, was carved out on 15 November 2000. The areas having mineral resources went to the newly-formed

state of Jharkhand, while Bihar retained a share of land without irrigation and floods during the rainy season, or Kharif crops and droughts during the season of the Rabi Crops (Prasad 2000:1-6).

Agrarian Social Situation

Bihar is a landlocked state. The present state (after separation of Jharkhand) is distinctly divided into two distinct parts; the north Gangetic plain (north Bihar plain) and the south Gangetic plain (south Bihar). The areas of north Bihar plain have very fertile land and many rivers such as, Koshi, Gandak, Ghagra and Bagmati, are the main rivers. The region is densely populated and largely rural and gets affected almost every year by heavy floods causing huge loss to life and property. The infrastructural facilities in this region are in a very bad shape and this part of the state is known for poverty, backwardness and unemployment. A large number of labourers of north Bihar migrate to other parts of the country, like, Punjab, Assam, Delhi, Mumbai, for economic and social reasons (better social dignity)². The river Koshi is infamous as 'a curse for north Bihar' for causing devastating floods. The land in Purnea district is infertile due to the sand deposited by this river while the paddy crop of this area is constantly destroyed by the erratic flow of this notorious river (Singh 2001: 230) The farming in north Bihar is considered gamble because of the uncertainty of the monsoons and the devastating effects of rivers during summer and rainy seasons. The southern part of the state is relatively better in terms of infrastructural facilities, agricultural productivity and urbanisation.

The state of Bihar is predominantly agricultural and industrially underdeveloped. It is the third most populous state after Uttar Pradesh and Maharashtra. The literacy rate is 47.53 per cent (60.32 per cent in case of male and 33.57 per cent in the case of female) (Census of India (Bihar) 2001a: 11). The percentage of the decadal growth rate of population is 28.43 per cent against India's 21.34. The population density of Bihar is 880 per sq. km as against India's 324 (*Ibid*: 12). The 89 per cent of the state population resides in rural areas. The urban population in the state is 10.47 per cent as against 27.78 per cent of India (Census of India (Bihar): 2001b: 125-26). The poverty level at the state level is 42.60 per cent (Government of India: 2001-2002: 239). A major portion of the workers' population is that of the non-workers which is reflected through the table-1 on the distribution of workers.

The agriculture is the source of livelihood for more than 80 per cent of the state population. The growth rate in the state has been very slow. The country's growth rate was faster in the 1990s compared to the 1980s, but Bihar is the only state which has not made any

significant progress during the last decade of 1990s. The decade of 1990s has been one of the most depressing phases for Bihar with almost all socio-economic indicators at the bottom such as, health, education, literacy, and per capita consumption expenditure and gender equality (Indian Express (Mumbai) 2002).

Table 1: Distribution of Workers' Population (Figures in percentage)

Total Workers	Main Workers	25.40
	Marginal Workers	08.48
	Non-Workers	66.12
	Total	100
Category of Workers	Cultivators	29.17
	Agricultural Labourers	48.18
	Workers in Household Industries	03.87
	Other Workers	18.78
	Total	100
<i>Source: Census of India (Bihar) 2001c: ix-x</i>		

The children from poor families are not able to continue their school education as they have to go to work to support their parents. The ratio of teacher to pupil is low and the cases of teachers not attending schools in the rural regions are high. Health care, sanitation, welfare of children and disables are not taken care of properly by the state. As a consequence of extremely bad condition of public health care system, a large number of private health care clinics have come up, which are costly and, therefore, unaffordable for the poor. The social security measures and the old-age pension scheme are also in bad shape (Sharma et al.: 1999:51). The poverty, the stagnation in agricultural and industrial growth, rising population pressure and the increasing caste class contradictions force the people either to migrate or take up arms against the oppressive and exploitative system. The rural areas of Bihar have been under the grip of unrest and violence due to social and economic evils.

The Causes of Socio-Economic Backwardness

The factors of caste rigidity and the system of permanent land settlement or Zamindari system have been the most responsible causes for the socio-economic degeneration of society

of Bihar which widened the social and economic disparities leading to violent clashes between the dominant upper caste-class and the oppressed section under the leadership of radical communist movement. The oppressive system of Zamindari made the life of peasantry class miserable and even after enactment of land reform legislations (in the post-independent India) to abolish this tyrannical system and ensure distributive justice, landed gentry made every effort to defeat the objectives of measures (to improve the life of poor and marginalised). The regions or the cities close to the sea like, Calcutta, Bombay and Madras, which emerged as ports for trade and business, benefited from modern scientific education and the growth of metropolitan culture leading to transformation in their social, economical and cultural spheres because of their contact with the west countries as a result of which social evils and feudal tendencies weakened in those areas which did not happen in case of Bihar. The territory of Bihar remained under the strong influence of caste bigotry and Zamindari attitude and behaviour (Das 1992:26).

The state has been industrially backward as the people of Bihar have been keen on government jobs or professional occupations rather than investing money in setting up industrial units. The possession of landed property was considered more secure and a symbol of social status. The Zamindars too did not take interest in development of industry as they considered Zamindari income to be far more secured than were the risky returns from the industrial investment (Das 1992:31). In the decade of 1950s, Bihar was economically better-off in terms of energy, irrigation, and industrial aspects and growth rates compared to the average national growth rate (Prasad 2000:1). In the subsequent years, the state kept going down as attention was not paid to the agricultural sector which is the backbone of its economy. The lack of infrastructural facilities such as, the irrigation, electricity, roads for transportation, capital investment, agricultural marketing, high quality seeds and fertilisers including the population pressure on agricultural land, the traditional method of farming and the lack of a scientific approach are main causes for depressing situation of poor agro-economy of the state.

Besides the above factors responsible for economic backwardness of Bihar, the lawlessness, lumpenisation and widespread anti-social violent activities make Bihar one of the most backward states of India. The violence is in very air of Bihar; violence by anti social criminals, shoot-outs for taking tenders of contracts for roads and bridges constructions, kidnappings, violence in buses and streets, and the violence between the dominant landed caste-classes and the underprivileged poor peasantry belonging mostly to lower castes. The violence is widespread in the society of Bihar. The people have become insensitive to the phenomena of massacres. At the peak of terrorism in Punjab in 1986, 400 persons were killed whereas in

Bihar, the number of those killed was 3600 (Ranjan 1997: 6). It is ridiculous that a society whose culture was shaped by the two great saints, Buddha and Mahavira, where Ashoka the Great renounced violence and adopted the path of non-violence and peace, where Mahatma Gandhi started his first Satyagraha has become a symbol for violence and other social evils. The dominant class asserts their power by indulging in violence and condemnable activities such as, stopping long-distance buses on the highway and stalling trains so that their family members and friends can walk leisurely to catch them (Das 1992: 72-4.). The incidents of kidnapping and the practice of *rangadari tax* or illegal exactions by criminal elements are routine occurrences. Even doctors come out in streets and express anguish at the kidnapping and killing of their colleagues and demand justice from the government through state-wide strikes and by paralysing the medical services.

Corruption is rampant in government offices, banks and in various institutions. It is difficult for the common people to get a loan from the bank without paying a certain amount of commission as a bribe to please bank officials and clerks. The coalition of old and new landed interests, contractors, black marketeers, smugglers, mafia bosses, corrupt politicians and bureaucrats rule the state (Das 1997: 4; Sharan 2005: 16). The society of Bihar is infamous for caste violence, electoral violence, mafia rule, and torture in custodial institutions. The killings of poor peasants belonging mostly to lower castes especially, scheduled castes in the name of being Naxalites, have become almost like a routine and mere statistics. The caste-class conflict in Bihar can be said to have originated from the inhuman treatment meted out to lower caste tenants during the Zamindari system which has been continued by the dominant landlords even after the abolition of this system. The powerful landlords behaved like the erstwhile Zamindars. The poor peasants had high hopes of owning land as an outcome of the implementation of the land reform measures which could not happen because of the circumvention of the land reform legislations by dominant landed class forcing a large number of poor and landless either to migrate to other areas in search of *roti* and *izzat* (employment and dignity) or take to arms and join radical peasant movement (Das 1992: 79). The main social composition of radical agrarian movement in Bihar is poor toiling masses, mainly belonging to lower caste classes.

The Caste Class Contradiction in Agrarian Bihar

The caste rigidity and feudal oppression are special features in the society of Bihar. The caste system which is based on the *Varna* ideology, conditioned the consciousness of the lower castes into believing and accepting their inferior status in the caste hierarchy as being a divine will and this system has been prevailing for over three thousand years (Akalank 1991: 19). The

Varna system has lasted so long because of religious sanction behind it which has kept the society, especially the Hindu community divided into hierarchical order in which the caste identity of a person has close connection with his socio-economical status. This exploitative system was evolved by Brahminical ideology with the help of scriptures and rituals to perpetuate their supremacy and to keep the lower castes in bondage for ages (*Ibid*: 66). The lower castes have always suffered discrimination in all walks of life. Caste plays an important role at every level of social life in Bihar, right from the allotment of party tickets and the formation of state ministries to appointments to numerous boards, committees and commissions and this seems to be accepted as something legitimate by a large number of people (Karanth 1996: 107) Caste is a principal factor in the Bihar politics which is explicit at every stage right from the nomination of the candidates by political parties to voting behaviour of the people for the formation of the government. In almost all castes, powerful caste leaders have emerged who have provided tacit support and protection to the criminals of their castes. Decisions even regarding educational posts like the appointment of principals and vice-chancellors are made usually on the basis of the caste dominance of the appointees (Tripathi et al. 1999: 142). The influence of caste runs deep in almost all walks of life in the rural as well as the urban areas. Even a criminal is not considered a criminal but a saviour of the caste to which he belongs (Pandey 1985: 83).

The social hierarchy on the basis of caste can be broadly categories into three broad sections; forward or upper castes, middle castes or backward castes and lower castes. The forward or upper castes comprise the Brahmins, Bhumihars, Rajputs and Kayasthas. The middle caste is also described as the intermediate castes. It comprises of the upper and lower backward castes. Dominant among the upper section of backward castes are the Yadavs, Kurmis and Koeris who have emerged as the neo dominant rural powers and politically powerful in Bihar. A large number of them are middle peasants and tenants. The depressed backward castes are mostly agricultural labourers. The lower castes are generally landless and poor peasants, especially among all are agricultural labourers. Upper castes are the privileged sections of society in Bihar to which most of the big landlords belonged. The poor among them engage physically in agricultural activities, but they side with their castes on the issue of clashes with the other lower/ backward castes or on the issue of caste oppression. Upper middle castes are largely agriculturists. A large section of sharecroppers are found among them while few of them are landlords. They have progressed economically and politically and are purchasing land from the upper caste landowners who are now shifting to non-farming sectors. They are the neo-dominants in rural areas and dominate the political scene of Bihar. The lower Sudras are backwards in almost all fields.

The scheduled castes and tribes are largely poor and landless peasants who earn their livelihood by working in the fields of others or are engaged in other works as labourers. They suffer discrimination in almost every aspect of their life. The Doms and Halalkhors are in the worst condition and live generally at one end or outer parts of their villages having poor access to water and roads. Their entry into temples and direct access to wells of drinking waters are prohibited even today in rural areas. They are at the lowest rung of the social ladder and have joined the radical agrarian movement in large numbers. They are the main revolutionary force of the movement. Caste and class seem to be co-related in Bihar as the upper castes are generally economically well-off and the lower castes are poor. They are actively involved in the Naxalite movement fighting against the socio-economic exploitation by dominant landlord class. With the development of consciousness among the lower castes, the conflicts began occurring between the privileged sections (upper castes) and underprivileged lower castes, which was a natural outcome, because of the inherent unjust inequalities of the caste system. The upper castes enjoyed higher social, economic and political status and privileges whereas the lower castes, especially scheduled castes were denied such privileges.

With the significant economic and political rise of the upper section of the backward castes, especially the Yadavs, the Kurmis, and the Koeris, which was clearly noticeable in the 1967 elections when a large numbers of members belonging to these castes entered the Bihar legislative assembly, the caste conflicts emerged at two levels; the upper caste versus upper backward castes (and also with lower castes as the political consciousness had developed among them as well) and the upper middle castes versus the lower castes, especially Dalits. These neo-emergent dominant upper intermediary castes had started organising themselves in the early twentieth century for social reform within their castes and improve their social position. In the early 1930s, they joined together and formed the 'Triveni Sangh' to fight against social oppression by the upper castes and to make improvements in their social, economical and political life (Choudhary and Srikant 2001: 69-83).

In the changed social situation after independence, the upper section of intermediate castes became neo-dominants by the dint of making improvements in their social, economic and political position. They had suffered oppression and exploitation earlier at the hands of dominant upper caste landlords and have now become the oppressor of the lower castes. The Yadavs, especially because of their numerical superiority and muscle power, have emerged as the new rich powerful peasants, in rural areas and have grabbed lucrative construction contracts and various dealership licenses. A large number of them joined the scheduled castes and tribals to fight against their common enemy, upper castes, especially in areas where they (Yadavs)

have suffered oppression by the latter, for examples, in the regions of Aurangabad and Palamu. A bulk of the poor and agricultural labourers belonging to the Yadav caste has joined the Naxalite movement (Gupta 1992:1304-6). The regions of south Bihar, where economic condition and consciousness among the backward castes and the lower castes were relatively better and higher, became the battle ground for socio-economic and political transformation.

In the society of Bihar, caste and class are interwoven. The three basic divisions in agrarian Bihar are; the non-cultivating landlords, cultivating tenants and agricultural labourers corresponding, broadly, to the upper castes, middle castes and lower castes. Most of the big landowners belonged to the upper castes, tenants to the middle castes and agricultural labourers to the lower castes, especially Dalits. When the lower and backward castes resisted oppression by dominant landed class, they were brutally attacked. These attacks should not be seen as caste atrocities but a class struggle (Sinha 1977: 2037-40). The upper castes are the upper classes in the overall sense of the term and lower castes are the lower classes. The backward caste has middle position in social hierarchy and so is its position in the class structure (Sharma 1986: 29-30). The caste conflicts, generally, occur between the upper castes and scheduled and also between the backward castes and Dalits which can be considered as struggle between the rich and poor.

One of the major problems or the causes of caste-class conflict in Bihar was deprivation of social dignity to the lower caste men and women. The issue of sexual exploitation of women belonging to the lower castes by the dominant landlords and their henchmen belonging mostly to the upper castes became one of the main issues of the radical peasant movement. The lower castes were not allowed to sit on a cot in front of their own house and defiance to it invited a severe punishment to them amounting even to loss of their lives (Louis 2002: 90). The upper section of the backward castes, especially Yadavs and Kurmis became new perpetrators of the lower castes. The attacks on poor and landless lower castes by the dominant upper and middle caste landlords increased in those areas where the former had started organising themselves to resist the oppression by the latter often leading to violent incidents and mass killings (Urmilesh 1999: 96-7). These socially and economically oppressed lower castes and Dalits were mobilised by the Maoist organisations in the late 1960s.

The peasant movement of the 1930s and 1940s focused mainly on the problems of tenants and had demanded abolition of the Zamindari system as this system was considered to be the root cause of all socio-economic evils in the life of peasants. But the issues of poor and landless peasants belonging mostly to the lower castes were taken up effectively by the Maoist

organisations since the late 1960 which were not paid proper attention to either by the peasant movement of 1930s or by the Communist Party of India and Communist Party of India (Marxist). The peasant masses, under the guidance of Maoist thought, have struggled on the issues of land, wage and social dignity or *izzat*, which were enshrined in the constitution of India but the state could not ensure their effective implementations; thus compelling the toiling peasants to resort to radicalism to assert their constitutional fundamental rights.

The Radical Agrarian Movement

The underprivileged frustrated sections of Indian society belonging mostly to the lower castes, especially scheduled castes (most of them are agricultural labourers and few of them the marginal farmers) formed the core social base of the radical agrarian movement and have effectively challenged the traditional dominance of the upper castes and classes and questioned the authority and legitimacy of the existing political system. These deprived peasants, who have been forced by the existing social situation to adopt even extra-constitutional means to assert their right of livelihood and social dignity (guaranteed by the constitution but not ensured), are described by the government- media-capitalist-bureaucrats interest groups and some sections of intelligentsia as being the anti-national and the single biggest threat to the internal security of the country. There are historical records of upsurges and insurrections by the suffering peasants in the country during British rule against the exploitation and oppression of Zamindars (Banerjee 1980: 23). The peasant movements of Telangana, Tebhaga and Punapra in the 1940s were led by the communist leaders to achieve humanist goals. In the 1967, radical members of the Communist Party of India (Marxist) (CPI (M)) began mobilising the Indian peasantry under the guidance of Maoist thoughts and found the strategy of Chinese communist revolution suitable in Indian situation as they considered the social environment similar to that of pre-liberated China.

The Naxalite Movement and Its Ideology

In May 1967, a radical agrarian movement emerged in Naxalbari region of West Bengal under the leadership of the Maoist faction of the CPI (M). Later this movement spread rapidly to different parts of the country and came to be known as the Naxalite movement deriving its name from the place of its origin, and its participants the Naxalites. Initially the term 'Naxalite' used to be considered a vulgar word for a communist revolutionary but later it was recognised as a political term for those radical Maoists who believed in the seizure of state power and transformation of society through armed revolution accepting the Naxalbari

movement as a milestone in the history of the revolutionary communist movement in India. May 25 is celebrated as the 'Naxalbari Day' as ten agitating peasants were killed in police firing in Prasadajot village under the Naxalbari police station on this day in 1967. This incident was described as the 'beginning of the peasant war of liberation'³. This incident of Naxalbari region became a source of inspiration for the radical communists, and those who believed and participated in armed agrarian movement came to be known as the Naxalites.

According to the Naxalites (also known as the Maoists), the proletarian revolution is applicable to western countries where industrial means of production determines classes in society but in an agricultural country like India, the radical agrarian movement is the only suitable option, as the most oppressed and exploited poor and landless peasantry are the main revolutionary force in Indian situation. The Maoist strategy was adopted for the success of Indian revolution on the basis of the assumption of a similar Indian situation prevailing at that time to that of the pre-liberated China. The Chinese path of communist revolution was considered to be suitable to India without making an effort to study the prevalent social reality of the country objectively and independently. Their slogan, "The Chinese chairman is our chairman and China's path is our path" clearly indicated their strong belief in the Chinese path of revolution (See Chakrabarty 1990: 3-14). Thus the Naxalite movement was highly influenced by the Chinese revolution.

Ideology is the science of ideas which determines an orientation for action or strategy. The revolutionary ideology aims at radical changes in social, economical and political structure of society. A Marxist revolutionary adopts the method of dialectical materialism for an analysis of social situation against the perspective of class struggle. For Mao, ideology was not merely a dogma but a guide for action. He believed that there is a continuous development of theories by putting them in practice which must keep on developing to meet new situations (Mohanty 1977: 10-2). The Naxalite movement is agrarian in nature and peasants are its main revolutionary force. Therefore, this movement is also known, synonymously, as the radical peasant struggle or the radical agrarian movement.

The Naxalite movement focused on the agrarian revolution as the main task of the people's democratic revolution in India. The contradiction between the feudal elements and poor peasants was said to be the principal one. The rural areas were made the centre of armed agrarian struggle as feudal oppression was considered to be at its peak in countryside areas. The strategy of formation of base areas by conducting protracted armed peasant struggle and encircling the cities with an ultimate aim of capturing state power to build a socialist society

was adopted. The peasant movement occurred mostly in areas where the *Zamindari* system existed, because this exploitative system widened the gap between the landlords and peasants-tenants and produced a legion of poor masses. The feudal oppression sharpened not only class contradiction but also generated caste hatred, as the exploited poor masses belonged to the lower castes, who were treated as sub-humans by exploitative Zamindars belonging mostly to the upper castes.

The Naxalites described Indian society as being semi-feudal (as powerful landlords dominated the socio-political scene) and Indian state as being semi-colonial (because of India's tacit support to US aggression in Vietnam and Czechoslovakia). The electoral politics was rejected as it was seen as being a method to deceive people. The working class, small and marginal peasants, middle peasants and a progressive section of rich peasants, including progressive intelligentsia and national bourgeois were considered to be allies, and imperialistic forces, landlords and big monopolists were described as being class enemies. The emancipation of toiling peasantry was considered a possibility only on the success of the anti-feudal struggle by adopting the radical agrarian programme. This objective was thought to be achieved by defeating feudal forces, liberation of rural areas and joining with the working class.

In Bihar, social issues have been dominant areas of people's struggle for social change besides the issues of wages, and surplus land. The people belonging to poor lower castes have been fighting for their human dignity or *izzat* under the leadership of Naxalite organisations more than their struggle for economic gains. It is because of the dominance of the issue of struggle for social dignity which has earned the name for the radical peasants' movement as being an *izzat ki larai*⁴. The violent clashes between radical peasants and the private armies of landlords have led to a number of massacres, especially after the 1980.

In Bihar, the Naxalite movement became active in 1968 in Mushahari block of Muzaffarpur district under the local leadership of Raj Kishore Singh and Satyanarayan Singh, a state leader of All India Coordination Committee of Communist Revolutionaries (AICCCR), Bihar unit, which was later reconstituted as the Communist Party of India (Marxist-Leninist) in May 1969. The movement spread rapidly to many villages of Mushahari block and to other districts of Bihar. Many landlords and moneylenders were killed at different places and many left their villages out of fear. In the early 1970s, however, the movement declined because of severe state repression and internal bickerings. When it was fading away everywhere, the Ekbari village of the Bhojpur district in Central Bihar (united) became the main centre of the agrarian conflict and spread to many blocks of the district. The movement faced severe state

repression during nation-wide emergency in the mid 1970s and almost vanished from the scene (Mukherjee 1980). But towards the late 1970s, it not only re-appeared with a new vigour after the decline of the Bihar Movement (also known as the 'Total Revolution' led by a veteran socialist leader, Jayaprakash Narayan) and formation of Janata government at the centre, but also spread very rapidly to many districts of central Bihar. This radical peasant struggle grew very intense in the 1980s under the leadership of various Naxalite organisations pursuing the line of armed agrarian revolution. The violent acts carried out by the Naxalite factions, such as, the Maoist Communist Centre (MCC), the Communist Party of India (Marxist-Leninist) Liberation (CPI (ML)) Liberation, the CPI (ML) Party Unity and private *senas* (caste-based private armies of landlords of upper and upper-backward castes to suppress Naxalite Movement) like Kunwar Sena, Bhoomi Sena, Lorik Sena, Brahmarishi Sena, etc., turned Bihar into 'flaming fields' causing frequent violent clashes between the dominant landed class and underprivileged sections of poor and landless peasants.

Usually, the peasant agitations emerge in socio-economically backward and underdeveloped areas but in case of Bihar, the relatively better-off part of the state, the south central region became the main battleground between dominant feudal forces and poor masses. The region has fertile agricultural land with higher productivity and, affinity for land is relatively more in this region because of the land value. One of the main causes of the growth of the radical agrarian movement in this part of the state is the change in agricultural situation and the relation between the landowners and labourers after the construction of Sone Canal. The availability of irrigation facility increased the productivity of land making the cultivation profitable as a result of which, the landowners, who used to lease out their lands to tenants, engaged themselves in agricultural activities. The production increased but not wages which strained the traditional organic relationship between the landowners and agricultural labourers belonging mostly to lower castes, resulting in sharpening of caste-class contradiction and migration of landless and poor peasants to non-farm sectors (Das 1983: 245-6). The polarisation of privileged sections and underprivileged sections along the lines of caste and classes led to violent conflicts between them.

The grip of Brahmnical ideology was not as strong in this region as was in northern Bihar and the lower castes too had access to education creating in them the feeling of self dignity and general awareness. The people belonging to middle castes followed *Kabirpanthi*, *Nanakshahi* and *Dasnami* that preached against unjust nature of caste system (Prasad 2002: 195-99). The teachings of these sects contained seeds of resistance. The areas of Magadh (in central Bihar) have a history of more exposure to war and violence compared to other regions

of the state. Militant nature of the people of this region could be seen in the light of its historical background.

This region was under the influence of the peasant movement of 1930s, involving the districts of Gaya (divided and the districts of Aurangabad, Jahanabad and Arwal were created), Patna, and old Shahabad (this district was divided and new districts like, Bhojpur, Rohtas, Kaimur and Buxar were formed) and had generated consciousness among people residing in these areas. The participation of agricultural labourers and poor peasants in this movement was nominal as their issues were not taken up seriously by the Bihar Provincial Kisan Sabha (BPKS). These poor masses belonging mostly to the lower castes, joined the radical peasant movement in the late 1960s led by the Maoist organisations (Prasad 1994: 175-90). In the 1933, the Yadavs, Kurmis and Koeris joined together and formed an organisation, the *Triveni Sangh* in Shahabad district to create awareness for socio-cultural reforms within these castes and to oppose the oppressive upper caste-feudal elements which developed consciousness among them regarding their socio-economic and political condition. The Sangh was active in the areas of central Bihar and created consciousness among the backward castes regarding their socio-economic condition imbining in them the spirit of resistance. The lower castes (or classes) were comparatively better-off in this part than their counterparts in north Bihar. They were capable of managing their living without the support of the landlords, unlike their counterparts in northern region of the state, who were mostly dependent for their livelihoods on landlord class (Singh 1995: 95-6). Their relatively better-off economic condition helped them oppose the exploitation and oppression by the upper caste landlords.

The landlords of this region were more notorious for socio-economic oppression and exploitation compared to other parts of the state. The poor and landless lower castes were badly treated by the powerful landlords and their women often sexually exploited. The rape was so widespread in the Nema village of Patna district that it was a difficult task to marry off girls in this area (Das 1983: 241). The big landowners of this region behaved as those of old Zamindars and perpetrated excesses on poor lower castes, thus creating a situation for agrarian clashes. The restoration of dignity to lower caste women became of the main issues of the Naxalite movement.

The disappointment and disillusionment of the aspirants of the radical socio-economic change due to failure of the 'Bihar Movement' and the collapse of the Janata Party government at the Centre, including the failure of the land reform measures encouraged and accelerated the Naxalite Movement in Bihar. Mainly, the caste-class contradiction and failure of the reform

measures as well as the administrative apathy to needs and problems of the poor became rallying points for mobilisation of the underprivileged sections under the leadership of Naxalite organisations. Many ex-activists of the Bihar movement found the path of Naxalite movement as the only suitable option.

The Radical Peasant Organisations and Their Struggle

Many Naxalite groups operate in Bihar. Except the Maoist Communist Centre (MCC), most of them are splinter factions of the Communist Party of India (Marxist-Leninist) (CPI (ML)) which emerged after the decline of the movement in the mid-1970s. The main among them are; the CPI (ML) Liberation, the (MCC) and the CPI (ML) Party Unity (the latter merged with People's War Group (PWG) of Andhra Pradesh and formed the CPI (ML) PW in January 1998)⁵. The MCC is considered an ultra left group for its belief and practice of violent means while the CPI (ML) Liberation has been described as being *Sarkari Naxalites* for its shift towards parliamentary path of electoral politics since 1985. All of these groups have formed their open mass fronts while keeping their underground activities alive. Main areas of their activities are Bhojpur, Patna, Jehanabad, Aurangabad, Gaya, Rohtas, Nalanda, Nawada, Palamu, Hazaribagh, Garhwa, Chatra, Giridih, Ranchi (latter six districts in Jharkhand), etc.

By the end of the 1970s and the early 1980s, almost all factions of the Naxalite organisations began reviewing strategical and tactical policies as a result of which, an open mass movement was considered a necessity along with the underground activities for progress of the People's Democratic Movement. In accordance with the changed policies, the formation of open fronts was emphasised to create awareness and mobilise the masses which would be subordinate to the underground organisation. This resulted in intense agrarian conflicts between the 'haves' and 'have nots'. The underground factions such as, the MCC and the Party Unity, faced the severe state repression in 1980s, as they had rejected the constitutional path and adopted the means of armed resistance. These parties focused on the need of combination and consolidation of secret activities, mass fronts and armed actions in order to effectively respond to the state oppression and protect the gains made by the movement (Sanjiv 1996: 52-3).

The activists of the AICCCR (All India Coordination Committee of Communist Revolutionaries) assembled at a secret place in Calcutta and formed the CPI (ML) in May 1969 to lead the revolutionary peasant movement. The Party assessed Indian society as being semi-feudal and semi-colonial, dominated by the oppressive feudal forces and comprador bureaucratic capitalists. The contradiction between the feudalism and toiling masses was

viewed as being the principal one and the agrarian revolution was made the basis of the People's Democratic Revolution in India. The rural areas became the centre of the peasants' radicalism where oppression and exploitation by the feudal elements were believed to be at its peak. The analysis of Indian situation and the strategy adopted by the party was greatly influenced by the Chinese communist revolution and its leaders, including the media. The movement under its leadership spread to many parts of India by the end of the 1969 but declined in the early 1970s due to intra-party differences and state oppression leading to the split of this party into many groups. The peasant radicalism and revolutionary violence in the villages of the Mushahari block almost faded away but the villages of Bhojpur district became new areas of agrarian unrest and violence. The CPI (ML)-Charu Mazumdar Group-anti-Lin Piao faction⁶ became active in Bhojpur district which was later renamed as the CPI (ML) Liberation⁷. The Liberation group mobilised a large number of poor and landless peasants belonging mostly to lower castes, especially, the scheduled castes or Dalits, and effectively challenged the hegemonic position of oppressive landlords belonging mostly to the upper castes.

The CPI (ML) Liberation reviewed its strategy and adopted the tactics of developing people's mass movement using the legal and constitutional means while keeping the underground activities intact. The party formed the Bihar Pradesh Kisan Sabha (BPKS), a peasants' open front in the early 1981 to take up the issues related to the poor and landless peasants and mobilise them for a people's democratic revolution. A political mass front, the Indian People's Front (IPF) was also formed in the 1982, in which many revolutionary and people's organisations were merged. These open fronts helped the party in establishing contacts and interact with various democratic and progressive forces at the national level. The party decided to participate in electoral politics through the IPF and began contesting elections since mid-1980s while according priority to the underground party activities. Both of these fronts (BPKS and IPF) helped the party expand its areas of influence to many districts of Central Bihar and the socio-political dominance of powerful landlords was challenged. By the 1987, the movement spread to 27 districts of Bihar (Urmilesh 1999: 75). The radical peasants fought against feudal landlords and their protectors, criminal gangs, private armies and politicians. A number of landlords and criminals were killed and large tracts of land illegally occupied by the powerful landlords were confiscated which was distributed among the poor and the landless. In retaliation, severe repression campaign was launched by the State and poor peasants were also killed in the name of being Naxalites or their supporters.

The Maoist Communist Centre (MCC) came into existence in 1969 and remained an independent party until its merger with other Naxalite groups and formation of the CPI (Maoist). The MCC did not join the CPI (ML) as the former held the view that the situation was not ripe for formation of the third revolutionary communist party because a clear demarcation was not made between the revisionist and the revolutionary line through ideological and revolutionary class struggle, and the formation of the People's Army (AIRSF 1996: 23-4). The MCC became active in south Bihar in the late 1960s and began mobilising peasants. Despite the severe state repression, the party remained active, particularly, in Gaya and Hazaribagh districts. The party launched annihilation campaign in January 1973, by killing an oppressive and infamous landlord, in Kasma *Panchayat* of Gaya district. The MCC formed its open fronts in various sections of society, such as, the Krantikari Kisan Sabha (KKC), the Krantikari Buddhijivi Sangh (KBS), the Jan Pratirodh Sangharsh Manch (JPSM), etc., and expanded its base since the early 1980s (Louis 2002: 6). The MCC was considered the most dreaded of all Naxalite factions because of its violent activities.

The armed activist of the party attacked landlords and police at many places and killed many of them. More than forty peasants belonging to the Rajput caste were killed by the armed members of the MCC in 1987 in the twin-village Dalelchak-Baghaura. The MCC also lost many of its active members in fake encounters that were a part of the repressive campaign launched by the state in the name of various operations like, the 'Operation Flash' and 'Operation Lalkhand', etc (Sanjiv 1996: 54; *The Hindustan Times* (Patna) 23 January 1996; *The Hindustan Times* (Patna) 2 July 1996). At many places, the party confiscated lands and crops of dominant landlords for distribution among poor and landless. The MCC punished the anti-social elements in a cruel manner, for example, the chopping off their nose, ears, hands, etc., even for trivial acts of theft. The party launched rectification campaign to review and rectify its past mistakes and methods of work, and also emphasised on the need of consolidating unity within the party and also with other revolutionary communist groups for success of the armed agrarian movement. This self-critical and correcting method helped develop the strength of the party and widen its areas of operation.

The CPI (ML) Party Unity was formed in the early 1980s, by the Naxalites who were released from jails in the post-nation-wide emergency period after formation of the Janata Party government at the Centre. The party began mobilising peasants in Bhawanichack-Sikaria region of Gaya District and from there its activities spread to other areas of the state. The Party Unity formed its mass front, the Mazdur Kisan Sangram Samiti (MKSS) to develop revolutionary consciousness among the peasants for social transformation. The front was

banned after the incident of Arwal Massacre in which twenty three poor peasants, presumably, the supporters of the MKSS, were killed in police firing after they had assembled for a meeting in a ground of library in Arwal block of Jehanabad district (AIRSF 1996: 57, 64-5). The incident was described as being similar to that of Jalianwala Baugh (Amritsar, Punjab) massacre in April 1919.

The armed squads of the Party Unity began selective annihilation of the Bhoomi Sena leaders and imposed economic blockade on them. A large area of land belonging to the Sena leaders remained uncultivated. The crops of the Sena leaders were burnt which terrified the Sena leaders, who, then, surrendered and accepted the conditions laid down by the party. The ultimate aim of the party was to capture state power through prolonged class struggle to build a socialist society (Louis 2002: 183). It focused mainly on the issues of fishing rights, protection of dignity of women belonging especially to lower castes, and elimination of anti-social activities. The party protested against the police repression in which it received the support of the IPF. Many of its members and supporters were killed in police repression and attacks by the private armed gangs of landlords. The armed members of the party attacked police camps and looted their arms, cartridges and police uniforms. The firearms of landlords were also snatched away and a campaign was launched to punish criminals and corrupt politicians (*The Times of India* (Patna) 17 October 1996). The party withstood joint repression by the landlord-police combine, captured land illegally held by landlords which was distributed among poor and landless. The wage rate was enhanced and the dignity of women restored, especially in areas of its influence. In the 1998, the CPI (ML) Party Unity merged with the PWG of Andhra Pradesh and a new party, the CPI (ML) People's War (PW), was formed. This new party later joined with the MCC and formed the CPI (Maoist) in September 2004. The new party is active in many states of India.

The armed peasant guerrillas are also known as the 'Lal Sena' (Red Army). It is considered by the poor people as their own army. Almost all Naxalite groups formed their own armed squads to fight against oppressive police and landlords' forces to protect and promote the interests of toiling masses. The 'Lal Sena' fights against the reactionary forces and also safeguards the gains made by the toiling peasantry. The armed guerrillas of 'Lal Sena' killed many infamous feudal landlords and notorious anti-social elements, including armed goons of private armies. The MCC is widely known for its 'Blood for Blood' policy, particularly due to massacres of upper caste men in the cruelest way by slitting their throats. The armed guerrilla of this party killed 42 Rajputs in Dalelchak-Bagaura village of Aurangabad district in the 1987, 37 Bhumihars in Bara (Gaya) in the 1992, and 34 Bhumihars in Senari village of Jehanabad in

the 1999 (Singh 2006: 29-30). The thieves and anti-social elements were punished cruelly even for their trivial crimes or thefts, in the name of eliminating social evils.

The Party Unity and the MCC believed in armed revolution and annihilation of class enemies. The armed actions and violence were accorded priority over the socio-economic programme by these groups. The CPI (ML) Liberation reviewed its strategical-tactical policy and adopted a line of development of the mass movement and selective annihilation. This faction resorted to violence only when it became a necessity at certain stage as a result of people's upsurge against the class enemy⁸. The armed squads of the CPI (ML) Liberation annihilated many members of the Ranvir Sena in areas of Bhojpur district in retaliation to the mass killing of poor and landless lower castes carried out by the Sena men. Armed peasant guerrillas belonging to various groups attacked the police stations and camps and took away rifles, carbines, cartridges, police uniforms, torches, helmets and chest belts (Urmilesh 1996: 136; *The Times of India* (Patna) 16 June 1996; *The Hindustan Times* (Patna) 10 October 1997; *The Times of India* (Patna) 11 November 1997). The radical peasants have effectively challenged the hegemonic position of the powerful landlords bringing about significant changes in spheres of social, economical and political fields. They have struggled on the vital issues of social dignity, seizure of surplus lands and crops of feudal landlords, elimination of anti-social elements with a final aim of capturing state power and build an exploitation free society.

The repressive violent acts carried out by the private goons of powerful landlords in connivance with state administration and the radical assertion of peasants on the issues of land, wages and social dignity or *izzat* have led to a number of violent clashes and carnages such as, the Rupaspur- Chandwa massacre in the 1971, the Belchi massacre in the 1977, the Arwal massacre in the 1986, and the Bara massacre in the 1992, etc. Despite their repression by the private armies of landlords and the state police, the radical peasants under the leadership of open fronts of the Maoist factions confiscated lands which were in excess of ceiling limits and distributed among the poor and landless. The wage rate in areas under the influence of Naxalites was increased from approximately 800 grams to 2.5-3.0 kilograms, and the equality in wages between male and female workers restored (See Louis 2002: 211-3; Bhatia 2005: 1542-3). The wage rate has been kept flexible considering affordability of the poor, small and middle peasants, and also paying- capacity of rich peasants and landlords. One of the causes of Bathani *Tola* massacre (Bhojpur) in the 1996, in which 21 agricultural labourers belonging to Dalits and Muslims communities were killed, was the disputes over wage rate. Though wage rates were enhanced in areas of intense movement but overemphasis on wage rate kept the

small peasants away from the Naxalite movement as they were not in position to afford the enhanced rates of wages.

One of the core issues of the radical agrarian movement has been the issue of restoration of human and social dignity to lower castes men and women. Because of the dominance of this issue in the movement, the anti-feudal struggle of peasants has been described as being the *izzat ki larai* (struggle for dignity). Besides this, the peasants have also struggled for elimination of social evils, thefts and crimes, by mobilising poor peasants, small traders and businessmen as they often suffered because of these anti-social activities (See Louis 2002: 222-4). The movement achieved reasonable success in restoring the social dignity of lower caste women and men as well as in eliminating the anti social elements to certain extent.

The radical agrarian movement grew intense in the 1980s causing violent conflicts between the deprived sections of poor peasants and reactionary forces of feudal landlords which were projected as a caste war and the problem of law and order by the state government and the media. These conflicts were treated as an issue of law and order and not as a manifestation of socio-economic problems. The massacres of Kansara, Parasdiha, Darmia, Dalelchack-Baghaura, Chhotaki-Chhechhani, Bara, Sankarbiga, Senari, Miyanpur, and several others were carried out in a sequence violence and counter violence between the dominant caste-classes and the underprivileged caste-classes. Besides the violent clashes between the radical peasants and private armies of landlords, the interfactional conflicts among Naxalite factions too led to a number of killings in which the poor peasants, supporters of the agrarian revolution were killed.

The radical resistance of oppressed caste-classes to repression by feudal forces in villages of central Bihar into a war field led to indiscriminate killings. The radical peasants have confiscated lands illegally held by the landlords and forced the latter to enhance wage rates and the dignity of lower caste men and women restored. The factors of caste, religion, have been impeding the progress of the movement. However, the killings of upper caste-poor and marginal farmers by armed squads of the Naxalite factions are against their own advocated revolutionary, democratic and humanist principles of the class struggle.

Challenges and Prospects

The tendency of governments to bracket Naxalites with those of other categories of terrorists and the state's 'security centric' approach is problematic for both. The identification of Naxalites with terrorists is a part of official tactics to defame and malign the Naxalite

movement on one hand; while on the other, the state's approach of looking at the struggle of poor peasantry from law and order perspective prevents it from recognising and understanding various socio-economic problems faced by the marginalised sections of society. The report of the Expert Committee (EG), constituted in 2006, by the Planning Commission, recognised the Naxalite movement as a political movement with strong base among the landless and poor peasantry, and tribals, who consider the movement as a struggle for social justice, equality, protection and development (*EPW* 2008: 5). The expert group, while identifying causes of the emergence and growth of Naxalism in the country, which included landlessness, the failure of land reforms, non-payment of a minimum wage, control of the powerful and dominant class on the community property resources, concentration of wealth in the hands of a few causing sufferings to others, the denial of justice and human dignity to deprived sections, particularly, scheduled castes and scheduled tribes, as well as their increasing marginalisation and alienation, because of denial to their basic human rights, including large-scale displacement and the ineffectiveness of resettlement and rehabilitation policy, made suggestion to adopt a multipronged approach. It recommended measures to improve the socio-economic conditions and also protect the interests of marginalised sections by implementing the provisions of legislations enacted for their protection and development. Though the report suggested strengthening of the police force to effectively counter the Naxal extremism, the emphasis was laid on the redressal and development measures than the repressive tactics.

The question which arises is: whether the central and state governments are going to positively respond to these suggestions and accord priority to development and redressal issues over the repressive measures, unlike the previous trends? It seems unlikely, as the nature of the governments seem deep rooted in law and order perspectives. One of the instances of the governments' obsession with security approach is reflected in the speech delivered by the Prime Minister of the country, Mr. Manmohan Singh, during the Chief Ministers Conference on the issue of internal security in December 2007, in which he described the Naxalites as being the single biggest security challenge, a virus, that had to be crippled and crushed. State support to private armies in Bihar and Salwa Judum in Chhattisgarh, including the stand taken by big political parties like the Congress and Bhartiya Janata Party, reflect a repressive attitude of the state and central governments as well as the existing political party culture. The state is becoming more aggressive and repressive which could be noticed in its tendency to arm police force with draconian powers by enacting various legislations in the name of providing safety measures to the citizens of the country. Simultaneously, it launches a number of welfare and anti-poverty programmes claiming to represent people and promote their interests but, in true

sense, it serves the interests of bourgeois class more while creating illusion of benevolence among the poor.

The state, conventionally, particularly in democratic set up, has been playing balancing roles between various contesting groups (and stakeholders, such as, big capitalists, civil society and toiling masses) functioning along different ideologies and programmes by adopting measures in pursuance to the nature and provisions of existing socio-political order, within which it works. In the post-1990s period of globalisation, liberal policies and privatisation, the capitalist forces have pumped huge amount of money as capital investment in various sectors in the name of development, while the civil society organisations, particularly, the NGOs have been spreading their wings of influence and power which has been made possible due to the 'blessings' of state and its growing tendency to share power with the former. The rise in power of civil society, the huge capital investment of big bourgeois in various sectors, emerging dominance of market based economy, growing economic gap between the rural and urban regions, the decline of feudal forces in rural areas and the emergence of new form of aggressive-exploitative and oppressive capitalist forces in urban locations, including increase in the feeling of relative deprivations among people, especially marginalised sections, necessitate rethinking for a new approach to analyse the changed social situation so as to identify the main contradictions in Indian society and adopt a compatible strategy for transformation of existing socio-economic order.

Now the other question arises as to how is the Naxalite movement going to cope with this situation? Will the movement survive the onslaught of new form and methods of market based capitalist economy (which are provided with tacit support of the state) or fizzle out in the days to come under the pressure of combined repressive forces of state and capitalists, including the vacillating character of the civil society organisations? Will the movement collapse as it happened in the early 1970s? What is the nature of the movement? The movement active in different parts of the country is rural based armed struggle whereas the capitalist elements are growing more powerful in urban areas? Are the Naxalites capable of countering the state repression facing a strong military equipped with modern weaponry and technology at its disposal? What is the fate of this movement? Is the armed struggle a viable option at this juncture? Is the strategy adopted by the Maoists compatible to the concrete situation of the country? Will the traditional approach to the class analysis of society and adoption of strategy and tactics lead to victory of the movement with its weak mass support, killer image, strategy of armed struggle with the help of smaller number of ill equipped 'Liberation Army', compared to that of the state with its sustained popular image? What is in store for the movement? How

are they going to achieve their goal of creating a humanist egalitarian society with the help of an armed class struggle? Will the movement succeed and achieve the objective of transforming Indian society along radical socialist lines or is it destined to collapse and become, at the most, a reformist movement, instead of a revolutionary one? It is difficult to answer these questions at this moment but one thing seems almost clear that the possibility of a revolutionary success with the help of strategy of armed struggle in the existing situation, keeping in view the national and international scenario, appears to be far and distant. The image of the movement created among the public is that of more terroristic than revolutionary, because of its over emphasis on the armed actions. The boycott of elections (including disrupting voting process through the use of violent means observed during general elections, particularly, elections held in April 2009) and other constitutional means having potentials to help in development of a mass movement, empower people and cause decline in the dominant political position of the bourgeois class, add to the problems and constraints that the movement is already facing. The Maoists need to introspect and rethink on the issues relating to their analysis of Indian situation, the ideological- strategical, including tactical policies so as to advance the movement to a higher stage, leading to a substantial success by effectively taking on the exploitative and oppressive imperialistic-capitalistic forces.

Summary and Conclusions

The state of Bihar has had a glorious history. The state derived its name from the *Viharas* (Buddhist monasteries). Bihar, historically, a place of great empires and emperors, place of birth and activities of great men, a place where two religions, Buddhism and Jainism emerged and preached truth, non-violence and humanity, has become the metaphor of all socio-economic evils. Bihar is hated, ridiculed and condemned because of its backwardness in almost every aspect of its social, economic and political life, with high population density, low percentage of literacy rate, higher poverty level, corruption, crimes and violent social environment. The caste rigidity and the system of Zamindari have been the factors responsible for backwardness of this state. It was the system of Zamindari or the system of permanent land settlement which made the life of tenants and peasants miserable, and generated a number of social, economic evils. The infamous system sowed the seed of caste-class conflict in society of Bihar by creating a large number of poor masses while sharpening the caste fanaticism and antagonism as people belonging to lower castes were treated in an inhuman manner. No effort was made to enhance productivity and industrialisation in Bihar during the British regime, as the Zamindari drew its income from the area of land and not from its productivity. The Zamindars preferred to spend on frivolous activities of show and pomp rather than investing

their money in the development of industry as returns from the industrial investment were considered risky. Thus landlocked state of Bihar remained deprived of the benefits from its contact with the colonisers unlike the states and cities near the sea which benefited by the development of modern education and metropolitan culture as a result of which the rigidity of caste and feudal tendencies declined, initiating socio-economic and cultural reforms.

The caste rigidity and feudal oppression have special features of society of Bihar. The society of Bihar can be broadly divided into three categories of caste and class. The first category comprises the upper castes that have been traditionally dominant in every field of social life. Most of the big landlords belonged to this category. The second is the middle castes or the intermediary castes comprising mainly, the Yadavs, Kurmis and Koeris who form the upper section of middle castes (also known as the backward castes). The middle castes have middle position in caste hierarchy of society, so is their position in terms of class structure. They are comparatively better-off than the lower castes. The Yadavs, Kurmis and Koeris have emerged as the neo-dominant rural power in Bihar, after making improvements in their economic, political and social life. They have been the beneficiaries of the land reforms measures. They, after becoming dominant in society of Bihar, have begun oppressing lower castes like the dominant upper castes. The third in the social hierarchy are the lower castes who are largely agricultural labourers. The scheduled castes (Dalits) among them are in worst condition. They are usually the victim of oppression by the powerful upper castes and also the backward castes. They constitute the main social base of the radical agrarian movement. They have challenged the dominant position of feudal landlords and have successfully struggled on the issues of social dignity, surplus land and wages under the leadership of the Naxalite movement.

The Naxalite movement emerged in Naxalbari region of West Bengal and spread to various parts of India, including Bihar. In Bihar, Mushahari block of Muzaffarpur district became the stormy centre of the peasants' radicalism against the oppressive feudalism and unjust socio-economic structure. The movement spread to many villages of Mushahari block and also to other districts of the state but was suppressed by the repressive state measures. When it was dwindling almost everywhere, Ekbari village caught the fire of revolution and then spread to other rural areas of Bhojpur district. The movement grew intense and a number of infamous landlords were put to death. The movement was weakened by the severe state repression during the nation-wide emergency period but it again became active in the post emergency period and spread rapidly to various rural regions of central Bihar, making it the battleground of violent conflicts between the feudal forces and the poor and landless peasants.

Despite the state government's strategy of 'repress and reform' with cooperation of the central government, the radical agrarian movement of poor peasants has been expanding to new areas instead of declining as expected by the strategists and bureaucratic planners. One of the main reasons of its growing and expanding is that governments have been treating the Naxalite activities as being a problem of law and order instead of recognising it as being a product of socio-economic unjust system. The innocent poor and landless peasants were harassed, tortured and imprisoned, in the name of being Naxalites, which generated more hatred and feeling of antagonism towards the state. The wrong and improper implementation of land reform measures developed more frustration and anger among those who had expected to benefit from welfare schemes and reform measures of various kinds. The failure of the land reform measures due to lack of strong political will, insincerity of government officials and manipulations by landed gentry have been factors responsible (to the great extent) for the spread of Naxal-related violence. The socio-economic objectives of the land reform legislations could not be achieved, as a result of which, large numbers of frustrated and disappointed poor masses belonging mostly to the lower castes joined the Naxalites-led agrarian movement.

Various Naxalite factions, mainly the MCC, CPI (ML) Liberation and Party Unity mobilised the poor and landless peasants and helped them challenge the hegemonic position of traditionally dominant feudal landlords. The peasants fought on the core issues of social dignity, land and wages. The radical resistance of poor against the feudal and state repression invited more repression, making rural areas of Bihar a killing ground in which persons belonging to both sides were killed. Despite the attacks by private armies of the feudal landlords and state police, the movement has been expanding to new areas. The radical agrarian movement or the Naxalite movement is a socio-economic conflict, and therefore, should not be treated merely as a law and order problem or caste conflict. The poor and landless peasants belonging mostly to the lower caste-classes, especially the Dalits have been its main social base and have participated in the movement in large numbers on the core issues of land, wage and social dignity. Unless the government adopts and implements a suitable socio-economic programme with sincerity and ensures improvement in the life of suffering poor peasantry, mere use of repressive methods and illusory reform tactics are unlikely to check the Naxalite-related problems.

The situation may improve if the state government implements land reform legislations effectively, ensure the protection of poor tenants and sharecroppers, improves the socio-economic, cultural and political conditions of the poor lower castes as well as, improves economy of the state with distributive justice. The fake encounters, harassment to the poor and

innocents, and violation of civil rights must be stopped. The surplus land must be acquired by the government and distributed among the poor and landless. The provision of infrastructural facilities and supply of agricultural inputs, such as, credit loan, high quality seeds, fertilisers, including the provisions of transportation, agricultural marketing and protection of remunerative prices will certainly reduce the pain and suffering of the poor peasants, improve their living standards and thus wean them away from indulging in violent activities. Besides this, provisions for education, health care, employment, house for the poor, special protection to the marginalised social groups, development of backward regions and other measures for development of agro-economy and overall economy of the state will prove effective in containing the violent agrarian radicalism and in restoring peace and harmony in the society.

The measures to improve socio-cultural life of the untouchables (Dalits) and ensure their right to social dignity (by uprooting the practices of untouchability) must be undertaken. Official corruption and nepotism that cause frustrations among the deprived sections must be curbed. The disputed cases related to surplus land and the non-compliance of tenancy act must be disposed off speedily in the interest of deprived castes- classes. Besides these, the provisions for social security and medical assistance to the marginalised sections will improve the social situation. Unless the distributive justice is ensured and socio-economic life of deprived people is improved, it seems difficult for the state to contain the Naxal violence, merely, by launching a repressive campaign against the agitating radical peasants.

Notes

1. Bihar was divided and a new state Jharkhand was formed on 15 November 2000. This study is mainly focused on the current phase of the Naxalite Movement from 1980 to 2000.
2. Informal interview with migrant labourers at various occasions.
3. See Gupta, B.D., *The Naxalite Movement*, New Delhi, Allied Publishers, 1974; Ghosh, Sankar, *The Naxalite Movement: A Maoist experiment*, Calcutta, Firma KL, Mukhopadhyay, 1974; Mohanty, Manoranjan, *Revolutionary Violence: A Study of the Maoist Movement in India*, New Delhi, Sterling Publishers, 1977; Jawaid, Sohail, *The Naxalite Movement in India: Origin and Failure of the Maoist Revolutionary Strategy in West Bengal 1967-1971*, New Delhi, Associated Publishing House, 1979; Sen, S., Panda, D. and Lahiri, A. (eds.), *Naxalbari and After: A Frontier Anthology*, volumes I & II, Calcutta, Kathashilp, 1978; Ram, Mohan: *Maoism in India*, Delhi, Vikas Publications, 1971; Johri, J.C., *Naxalite Politics in India*, Delhi, Indian Institute of Constitutional and Parliamentary Studies, 1972; Banerjee, Sumanta, *op.cit.*; Banerjee, Sumanta, *India's Simmering Revolution: The Naxalite Uprising*, London, Zed Books Limited, 1984, for details on early phase of the movement.
4. The issue of caste- based oppression and exploitation became one of the major factors for mobilisation of toiling masses belonging mostly to lower caste-classes. The radical peasants had to use their firearms to ensure their social dignity. Interview with Shri K.D. Yadav, Central Committee Member and senior leader, CPI (ML) Liberation, Patna, 12 December 2002, and also with other activists.

5. In September 2004, the MCC and CPI (ML) PW merged together and formed a new party, the CPI (Maoist). The new party is active in more than nine states of India, especially in Chhattisgarh, Andhra Pradesh, Bihar, Orissa, Jharkhand, Maharashtra, Madhya Pradesh, Uttar Pradesh and West Bengal.
6. Lin Piao, an important leader of the Chinese communist revolution, the next prospective Chairman of the Communist Party of China, after Mao Zedong, was killed in the 1971, in a conspiratorial manner, by his rivals. The announcement of his death was officially made by the party after two years and was described as being a traitor and was denigrated, which resulted in confusion and factionalism in the CPI (ML) in pro and anti-Lin Piao groups. See Chakrabarty: 1990: 118-22, for details.
7. Interview with Shri Prabhat Choudhary, Central Committee Member, CPI (ML) Liberation, Patna, 12 December 2002.
8. Interview with K.D. Yadav, Senior leader, CPI (ML) Liberation, Patna, 13 December 2002.

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India and Peace Initiatives in the Indian Ocean: A Post Cold War Perspective

Suresh R

Abstract

During the cold war period most of the countries in the Indian Ocean region were apprehensive of the superpower presence and rivalry as it posed a threat to their security. It was in this context that nonaligned countries took the initiative to make Indian Ocean a peace zone. They were successful in their attempt to pass a resolution by the UN General Assembly in 1971. The UN declaration calls for elimination of external power presence in the context of superpower rivalry in the Indian Ocean. However the cold war politics made the declaration an annual ritual without making any progress to implement it in both letter and spirit. The regional conflict also helped the external powers to continue their military presence in the region unabated. The disintegration of Soviet Union marked the end of cold war and superpower rivalry. The ensuing globalization process and advent of new forms of threat to international peace and security prompted the nations to move away from traditional concept of security. Today no nation can ensure its security singlehandedly. Peace and security has become a cooperative effort at the regional and international level. In this context peace through the elimination of external power presence is neither feasible nor possible. This paper is an attempt to examine India's response towards peace initiatives in the Indian Ocean during the cold war and post cold war periods.

In the early 1970's most of the Non-aligned countries of the Indian Ocean region were apprehensive of the great power military presence and rivalry in the Indian Ocean, because they felt that it could threaten their security and reduce their independent action. The idea of a peace zone in the Indian Ocean was mooted in the 1964 Cairo Conference of the Non-aligned countries and was given a concrete shape in the form of a resolution at the 1970 Lusaka Conference of the Non-aligned countries.¹

Peace Zone

A peace zone can be defined as a geographical area from which the danger of war has been eliminated or within which the danger has been reduced significantly. It implies two interrelated things; measures to insulate the area from the danger of war originating from outside powers, and steps to promote peaceful relations among the countries of the region.²

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The peace zone in a region envisages that the danger of war from a region may be eliminated or within which that danger be reduced or contained(Bull 1974: 178) if the countries in the region agree for (i) initiating measures for the elimination or considerable reduction in the presence of outside powers, based on their common belief that outside power presence is one of the major causes of tension or danger of war and (ii) promoting peaceful relation among them based on their belief that once the outside powers have withdrawn or considerably reduced the presence from the region they should not perceive any threat from countries within the region. However, it is very difficult to achieve both of these conditions in the Indian Ocean region because the security requirement of one country is seen as a threat to the security of another country.

Peace initiatives in the Indian Ocean during cold war period

During the cold war period the Non-aligned countries in the Indian Ocean region took the initiative to make Indian Ocean a peace zone. They were successful in getting the UN General Assembly to pass a resolution in December 1971, which called upon the members of the UN to make the Indian Ocean a zone of peace (IOZP) through the elimination of great power military presence conceived in the context of great power rivalry and competition.³ The 1971 UN General Assembly resolution on IOZP was mainly an approach towards peace in the region by insulating the area from the great power military presence, as majority of the littoral and hinterland countries of the region which were members of the Non-aligned Movement felt that peace could prevail in the region by the elimination of outside great power military presence in the Indian Ocean.⁴

Peace initiative in the Indian Ocean from 1971 to 1989 under the shadow of Indo-Pak conflict

Towards the end of 1960s, India took the decision to seek the co-operation of the countries in the region to make the Indian Ocean a zone of peace by insulating the area from outside great power presence. At the same time, India had also strengthened its naval capability. India, a Non-aligned country, supported the Lusaka Summit resolution on Indian Ocean peace zone as it was in tune with India's security perception.⁵ Pakistan, an ally of the US, was in favour of the US presence in the region. Ironically, when the IOZP resolution was adopted by the UN General Assembly in December 1971, India and Pakistan were involved in an armed conflict ending up with the Indian army occupying the whole of East Pakistan. The dismemberment of Pakistan as a result of the conflict enhanced the fear of Pakistan about India in the South Asian region of the Indian Ocean. India, on the contrary, felt that outside military

presence in the region, especially the US presence posed a threat to its security as it distorted the natural power hierarchy in the region. India strongly supported the 1971 UN resolution on IOZP as it felt that if implemented it not only ensures India's security but also enhance its power position in the region. India could effectively meet any threat from China, too, with the friendly help from Soviet Union even if the Soviet forces withdraw from the Indian Ocean as the Soviet Union shares a border with China and the Sino-Soviet rift continues. Paradoxically, though Pakistan supported the IOZP resolution in principle, it desired the US military presence in the Indian Ocean as it felt that only the US presence would ensure its security. Though Pakistan was unhappy that the US did not prevent the dismemberment of Pakistan it felt that even the security of West Pakistan would have been endangered after the Indian forces had occupied East Pakistan but for the US clear warning to India not to proceed further in West Pakistan.

In the UN General Assembly meetings of 1971 which discussed the IOZP proposal, Pakistan raised the issue of the threat posed by India to its security. Pakistan desisted from raising the regional issues in 1972 General Assembly meeting as there were some improvements in the Indo-Pakistan relation with the signing of the Simla agreement. However, the Simla spirit did not last long and Pakistan once again reverted back to focusing on the threat from within the region, in the 1973 Ad hoc Committee on Indian Ocean meeting and the First Committee meeting of the UN General Assembly. In the Ad hoc Committee meeting Pakistan enthusiastically raised the issue of the regional threat to peace as the Committee was mainly constituted to find ways and means to implement the IOZP resolution with due regard to the security considerations of the littoral and hinterland countries in the Indian Ocean.⁶ India's response towards the IOZP ranged from a strong support to the 1971 UN declaration as it envisaged the elimination of great power military presence in the Indian Ocean to a covert acquiescence to the Soviet thrust in the Indian Ocean in the absence of any progress towards the implementation of the declaration.

In 1974, the nuclear explosion conducted by India led Pakistan to introduce a parallel proposal to the Indian Ocean zone of peace in the form of South Asia as a Nuclear Weapon Free Zone.(SANWFZ) Pakistan maintained that the acceptance of its SANWFZ as the first step towards making Indian Ocean a zone of peace.⁷ Pakistan was successful for the first time in incorporating in the IOZP resolution of 1974 the necessity to look into the regional issues of the littoral and hinterland countries of the Indian Ocean. It continued to focus on the threat emanating from regional dominant power, India, and proposed a code of conduct to ensure an effective system of security within the Indian Ocean region.⁸ The code of conduct among other

things, envisaged that military balance between dominant regional powers and weaker regional states should be maintained at a reasonable level in order to create an atmosphere of mutual confidence. India opposed the code of conduct and made it clear that any addition to the 1971 UN resolution on IOZP was unacceptable to it.⁹ In 1976, Pakistan termed the 1971 UN resolution on IOZP as impractical and undesirable and abstained from voting for the first time.¹⁰ India while supporting the 1971 UN resolution on IOZP, strongly opposed the continued US presence in the Indian Ocean.

A minor change in India's response towards the great power military presence was discernible when the Janata government came to power in 1977. The Janata government opposed equally both the US and the Soviet military presence in the region. When General Zia-ul-Haq assumed power in Pakistan in July 1977 he reverted back to Pakistan's earlier stand of voting in favour of the IOZP resolution though it continued to harp on regional threat to peace in South Asia.

The 1979 Littoral and Hinterland States Meeting in its final document incorporated the major items in Pakistan's code of conduct proposal, namely, the denuclearization of the Indian Ocean littoral and hinterland states, non-use of force and peaceful settlement of disputes, and agreements on the balancing of the military strength between the major littoral powers and the weaker regional states.¹¹ While Pakistan was happy with the inclusion of these items in the final document of the Littoral and Hinterland States Meeting, India was not in favour of its inclusion. India was against extending the territorial limits of the peace zone to the national boundaries of the littoral and hinterland states.¹²

The 1977-78 US-USSR talks on arms limitation in the Indian Ocean and the response of India and Pakistan towards it well reflected once again the divergent approaches of India and Pakistan in making the Indian Ocean a zone of peace. India supported the superpower talks on arms limitation and termed it as a step towards the eventual elimination of great power military presence from the Indian Ocean. Pakistan, contrary to this, was opposed to the superpower talks on arms limitation as it considered that mere elimination of great power military presence or the limitation of it did not ensure the security of the smaller countries in the region against the threat emanating from dominant regional powers. Pakistan demanded the reduction of the military forces of dominant powers within the region.¹³

The Soviet intervention in Afghanistan in December 1979 and Pakistan becoming one of the frontline states in the US counter strategy to contain Soviet expansionism in the Indian

Ocean region led to Pakistan's strong support to the US presence in the Indian Ocean. Pakistan felt that its security was threatened by the Soviet troops stationed in Afghanistan as well as the presence of dominant power India. India's silence on the Soviet action in Afghanistan intrigued Pakistan. Hence Pakistan, in addition to the code of conduct demanded the Soviet troop's withdrawal from Afghanistan as a precondition to any initiative to make Indian Ocean a zone of peace.¹⁴ Unlike India, Pakistan was opposed to the early convening of the conference on Indian Ocean. India was concerned about the security threat posed by the militarization of the Indian Ocean and the US supply of sophisticated arms to Pakistan. Hence, India pleaded for an early convening of the conference on the Indian Ocean in order to implement the 1971 UN resolution on IOZP.¹⁵ By 1981, as the security environment in South Asia aggravated with the increased superpower involvement, India was even agreed to consider the security concerns of the smaller countries in the region, once the reduction of great power military presence in the Indian Ocean was achieved.¹⁶

Despite change of government in India and Pakistan in 1985 and 1988 respectively, both governments continued to maintain their respective stands on IOZP without any change. India continued to maintain that the sole purpose of IOZP resolution was the elimination of great power military presence in the Indian Ocean. Pakistan, on the contrary, maintained that the SANWFZ and other items included in the code of conduct were the necessary preconditions to make Indian Ocean a zone of peace. These stands of India and Pakistan were also reflected in the 1989 NAM, Commonwealth and UN General Assembly meetings.

During the period under study India's major contention was that the great power military presence was the cause of regional disharmony and tension, hence it wanted the great powers to withdraw from the Indian Ocean. Pakistan's contention was that the regional disharmony was the cause of great power military presence and hence it wanted the resolution of regional issues first, before considering the elimination of great power military presence.

Thus, it is clear that India tried to enhance its power position not only by supporting the elimination of great power military presence as envisaged in the 1971 UN resolution on IOZP but also by keeping its nuclear weapon option open. Pakistan supported the US presence as it perceived threat from India. Pakistan believed that a just solution to regional issues including the Kashmir problem based on the UN resolution can be possible only with the US support. The divergent stand taken by countries in the region also helped the superpowers to continue and enhance their military presence in the region. Simultaneously the cold war situation as a result of superpower rivalry also augmented the regional disputes.

The Post Cold War Peace efforts in the Indian Ocean

Peace efforts in the Indian Ocean underwent a major turn in the post cold war period. The context in which the countries in the region initiated the IOZP has considerably been changed. The superpower rivalry has come to a close with the disintegration of Soviet Union. However, a change in the international power structure, from bipolar system to unipolar or multipolar or nonpolar¹⁷ systems does not necessarily ensure peace in the Indian Ocean. The threat perceived by countries in the region in the context of great power rivalry has ended. The presence of the external powers continues in the Indian Ocean region. With the change in the international power structure, the threat perceptions of the countries in the region have also underwent a marked change. In this context, it is important to examine the relevance of IOZP proposal which mainly focus on the elimination of external power presence from the region.

Is the Indian Ocean as a Zone of Peace a dead proposal?

In the post cold war period, it appears that the UN declaration on Indian Ocean as a Zone of peace, has lost its relevance and hence it is a dead proposal. However, the military presence of external powers continues unabated in the Indian Ocean region. In the post cold war period several new developments have taken place. The most significant development is the process of globalization. As a result of globalization the economic integration of nation-states gained momentum. The ideological confrontations give way to economic competition, and global economic integration. The ideology of globalization spread all over the world. Other issues including pure military security are being sidetracked. Interdependence has become the watch word of developed and developing countries, as individual countries have lesser role to play in international politics. Transnational and Multinational Corporations have begun to play a decisive role in international politics which was the exclusive domain of nation states during the cold war period. These non state actors are more powerful than nation states in terms of resources and areas of operation. Another notable feature of the post cold war scenario was the decline in the leverage enjoyed by developing countries in the cold war period. Though cold war politics had many adverse impacts on developing countries it provided them enough bargaining power in a situation of ideological confrontation. In the post cold war scenario, the process of globalization has made nation states more dependent on each other. Smaller countries feel free to act according to their will as the cold war imposed disciplines have disappeared.

It appears that in the changed international context, the 1971 UN resolution on IOZP has lost its relevance. Today nation states are forced to act in a more concerted way to resolve international problems in the fields of economy, environment and security. The problems such as global economic slowdown, environmental degradation and international terrorism demand a global solution. In such a situation it is neither feasible nor possible to keep away external powers from any region. Thus in this changed context, it is significant to initiate an alternative proposal to maintain peace in the Indian Ocean.

Again in the post cold war period, the shift in the international power structure from bipolar to unipolar or multi polar has also influenced the perceptions of countries in the Indian Ocean region about the external power presence. The sponsor of the IOZP, Sri Lanka now perceives the external power presence inevitable in the region. Likewise one of the strong supporters of the 1971 UN resolution on IOZP, India has no hesitation to work in tandem with the US to monitor peace in the region. This change in the perception of countries in the region about the outside power presence made the IOZP a dead proposal.

India and Indian Ocean

The significance of Indian Ocean was predicted by Sir Alfred Mahan way back in 1890s when he stated Indian Ocean as the Ocean which decides the destiny of 21st century. India as an emerging power in the region has special significance.¹⁸ The importance of Indian Ocean to India has long been recognized. India occupies a central position in the Indian Ocean region, a fact that exercises an increasingly profound influence on India's security environment. Writing in the 1940s, K. M. Pannikar, like Mahan, argued the importance of the Ocean to India that "while to other countries the Indian Ocean is only one of the important oceanic areas, to India it is a vital sea. Her lifelines are concentrated in that area, her freedom is dependent on the freedom of that water surface. No industrial development, no commercial growth, no stable political structure is possible for her unless her shores are protected" (Panicker 1945). In tune with the above observations the first Prime Minister of India; Jawaharlal Nehru observed "History has shown that whatever power controls the Indian Ocean has, in the first instance, India's sea borne trade at her mercy and, in the second, India's very independence itself." This perception was also well reflected in the Annual Report (2004-2005) of India's Defence Ministry, which noted that "India is strategically located vis-a-vis both continental Asia as well as the Indian Ocean Region."²⁰ Again the Indian Maritime Doctrine asserts: "All major powers of this century will seek a toehold in the Indian Ocean Region. Thus, Japan, the EU, and China, and a reinvigorated Russia can be expected to show presence in these waters either

independently or through politico-security arrangements." There is, moreover, "an increasing tendency of extra regional powers of military intervention in [IO] littoral countries to contain what they see as a conflict situation." In accordance with this perceptions India has framed its post cold war Indian Ocean policy.

India's Indian Ocean policy in the Post Cold War Period

India's maritime policy also underwent a sea change in the post cold war period. The policy of exclusive engagement and elimination of outside powers has given place to overt engagement with extra regional powers. This has been well reflected in India's joint military exercises along with the US, Japan, France, and Australia. India no longer considers the external power presence as a threat to its security. Rather it considers a joint effort is required to wipe out the major threat to India and international community posed by international terrorism. It is not possible for any single nation whatsoever powerful to address the menace of international terrorism singlehandedly. India began to realize the importance of a realist approach in framing its foreign policy objectives and pursuing it through increased naval power and active collaboration with extra regional as well as intra regional powers. This policy shift in India's stand is visible in the maritime doctrine as well as in the Navy's vision document published by the Indian Navy.

It essentially encompasses:

- (i) Shaping a favourable maritime environment in the IOR for operations in peace as well as during conflict.
- (ii) Preventing incursions by powers inimical to India's national interests by actively engaging countries in the IOR littoral, and rendering speedy and quality assistance in fields of interest to them.
- (iii) Engaging extra-regional powers and regional navies in mutually beneficial activities to ensure the security of India's maritime interests.
- (iv) Projecting the Indian Navy as a professional, credible force and the primary tool for maritime cooperation.

India has also ear marked the area which falls within its immediate concern. "India's growing international stature gives it strategic relevance in the area ranging from the Persian Gulf to the Strait of Malacca...." While enumerating the basic features of India's post cold war

Indian Ocean policy the Prime Minister, Man Mohan Singh has stated: "India has exploited the fluidities of the emerging world order to forge new links through a combination of diplomatic repositioning, economic resurgence and military firmness."

It appears that India has adopted a three pronged strategy to protect and promote its national interest. Firstly through diplomatic means, India has pursued a policy of cooperation with all major players in the Indian Ocean, including extra regional powers. This policy would help India to increase its international stature. The Indo-US civilian nuclear agreement can also be viewed as an attempt to do away with nuclear isolation. The process of globalization has also accelerated better and cordial interaction with outside powers as the movement of people as well as commodities would further cement relation between nations.

India has developed a friendly and cordial relations not only by bilateral exchanges with nations but also through engagements in regional organizations, such as ASEAN, EAS, SCO, BRIC, ASEM, IBSA, APTA, and IOR ARC. India is vigorously pursuing the objective to become a developed nation by 2020. This requires the Indian economy to maintain an annual average growth rate of 8 percent per annum. India has framed the "Look East" policy in pursuance of this objective. Now the look east policy is a vital part of India's foreign policy. More than an external economic policy or a political slogan, the look east policy was a strategic shift in India's vision of the world and its place in the evolving global economy. It was also a manifestation of India's belief that developments in East Asia are of direct consequence to its security and development. Therefore India actively engaged in creating a bond of friendship and cooperation with East Asia that has a strong economic foundation and a cooperative paradigm of positive inter-connectedness of security interests. India became a member of the ARF in 1996 and considered it as an experiment in fashioning a pluralistic, cooperative security order reflective of the diversity of the Asia Pacific region. India has also successfully clinched a free trade agreement with the ASEAN which come into force from 1 January 2010; this would further enhance the Indo- ASEAN trade from the present \$ 30 billion to \$ 50 billion by 2010. India is also a member of the East Asia Summit (EAS) which includes the ASEAN members and India, China, Japan, Republic of Korea, Australia, and New Zealand. It focuses on energy, environment, climate change, and sustainable development. The look east policy of India has included not only vigorous interaction with ASEAN but also improved relation with China. The ultimate objective was to evolve an Asian Economic Community on the lines of EU.

India has also pursued a policy of strengthening its economic and military power. It appears that in order to increase the national power India not only declared itself as a nuclear

weapon power but also augmented its non nuclear defense capabilities manifold. The maritime doctrine of India focuses mainly on building blue water navy. India's role in ensuring the security of Indian Ocean region has been recognized by major players in the region mainly because of the major shift in its external policy through a pragmatic approach. As a result India was not hesitant to cooperate with any regional and extra regional powers. India has undertaken several innovative steps towards economic resurgence of the country. India's initiative to interact with nations at the bilateral and multilateral levels through various regional groupings appears to be based on this policy.

India's foreign policy has been adapted to the demands of the rapidly changing global, regional and domestic environments. The main drivers for reshaping India's foreign policy appears to have been the sustained dynamism of the Indian economy, emergence as a responsible Nuclear Weapon State, global expectations of India's role on the international stage and the capability to shoulder both regional and global responsibilities. India's engagement with the world community has grown to ensure a peaceful and supportive international environment that contributes to India's development goals. India advocates the need to evolve a new paradigm of cooperation, relevant to the contemporary world, in which global threats are addressed by global responses, and multilateralism becomes the preferred norm for addressing global challenges including terrorism, environmental degradation and economic meltdown.

Conclusions

In international politics peace zone means two important things. In the negative sense it means absence of war among nations and in the positive sense it involves promotion of cooperation. During the cold war period the ideological confrontations and the resultant superpower rivalry led to the predominance of military security in international relations. The competition to increase spheres of influence augmented regional conflicts. The end of ideological confrontation marked a shift from pure military security to economic security and other dimensions of security. The emergence of new forms of threat to security of nations including international terrorism, environmental degradation and economic meltdown demands a concerted effort from nation states both developed and developing. In this context the question of elimination of external power presence does not arise. Instead a cooperative effort is required to find solutions to these global problems.

India's Indian Ocean policy during the cold war period was mainly a response to the superpower rivalry and competition in the region. Therefore India had supported the 1971 UN

General Assembly declaration which proposes the elimination of external power presence conceived in the context of superpower rivalry. India's major contention was that the great power military presence and rivalry are the cause of regional conflicts. India as the dominant power in the region was more concerned about outside power presence than on regional balance of power. However with the end of cold war a marked change in India's approach towards peace in the Indian Ocean is visible. In the post cold war period India pursue a policy of engagement with major players in Indian Ocean including the US. In the era of globalization, peace through engagement and cooperation of regional and outside powers is more durable than insulating a region from external power presence. Moreover, solutions to international problems such as terrorism, environmental degradation and economic slowdown demand a concerted action by all peace loving nations both regional and extra regional.

Notes

1. The concept of peace zone in the Indian Ocean was given a concrete shape in a formal resolution at the Lusaka Conference of the Non-aligned countries held on 8-10, September 1970. The resolution called upon "all states to consider and respect the Indian ocean as a zone from which great power rivalries and competition as well as bases conceived in the context of such rivalries and competition, either army, navy or air force bases are excluded. The area should also be free of nuclear weapons." Two Decades of Non-alignment: Document of the gathering of the Non-aligned Countries 1961- 1982, Ministry of External Affairs, Government of India, New Delhi, 1983 p.56
2. The International Encyclopedia of Social Sciences defined peace as 'non war'. Two concept of peace should be distinguished; negative peace and positive peace. Negative peace is defined as the absence of organized violence between nations and positive peace is a pattern of cooperation and integration between nations. The International Encyclopedia of Social Sciences Vol.11 (New York, 1972) p.487.
3. UN Doc A/C.1/26/PV.1849 1971
4. For detailed analysis of the see Suresh R, Indian Ocean as a Zone of peace: A Comparative Study of the Responses of India and Pakistan From 1970 to 1989, Ph D thesis, Pondicherry University, Puducherry, Aug 1994.
5. The then Indian Prime Minister Indira Gandhi, endorsing the Lusaka resolution regarding the peace zone in the Indian Ocean said; "We would like the Indian Ocean to be an area of peace and co-operation. Military bases of outside powers will create tension and great power rivalry." Text of the speech, Review of International Affairs, Vol.21, No.491, 20 September 1970, p.22.
6. Report of the Ad hoc Committee on Indian Ocean 1973, General Assembly Official Records XXVIII Session, Supplement No.29 A/9029.
7. Report of the Ad hoc Committee on the Indian Ocean, 1974, General Assembly Official Records, XXIX Session, Supplement No.29, A/96 29) p.6.
8. Foreign Affairs Pakistan, Ministry of Foreign Affairs, Islamabad, December 1975, pp.16-22.
9. Suresh R n.4
10. Foreign Affairs Pakistan Ministry of Foreign Affairs, (Islamabad) February 1976, pp.12-25.

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12. UN Doc. A/C.1/34/PV.40, 1979
13. UN Doc. A/C.1/31/PV.42, 1976
14. UN Doc. A/C.1/35/PV.34, 1980
15. Foreign Affairs Record Vol.28, No.8, 1982, p.224.
16. Richard N. Hass, The Age of Nonpolarity What will follow US Dominance, Foreign Affairs Volume 90, Number 1 May/June 2008 He argues that the principal characteristic of twenty-first-century international relations is turning out to be nonpolarity: a world dominated not by one or two or even several states but rather by dozens of actors possessing and exercising various kinds of power. This represents a tectonic shift from the past.
17. Suresh R n.5 p 157
18. Annual Report 2004-2005 Ministry of Defence, Government of India, New Delhi 2005
19. India's Maritime Military Strategy, Ministry of Defense, Government of India, New Delhi. Also see The Indian Navy's Vision Document, May 2006. www.indiannavy.nic.in

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Micro-Credit: A Strategy for Economic Upliftment of Women in Bangladesh

Salma Mobarek

Abstract

Bangladesh is a small country but it has high density of population. Nearly 40% of its population lives below the poverty level. Among them rural women are poorer. Out of the total population 48.9 % are women, of whom nearly 86 % live in rural areas. The poverty reduction strategy of the government of Bangladesh targeted to reduce the rate of poverty to 50 % by 2015. Micro-credit has been considered to be an effective tool to achieve this goal. This study was an attempt to get an overview about the role of Grameen Bank (GB) and BRAC in increasing awareness among women. In this regard, an attempt had been made to focus the activities and impacts after receiving micro- credit from the GB and BRAC. The populations were the rural poor households' credit recipients of five selected branches of GB and BRAC under Godagari Upazila in Rajshahi district of Bangladesh. Bangladesh is called the birth place of micro-credit, which is a major tool of women's self employment generation as well as mainstreaming in the economic development process. In the study, it was found that GB and BRAC are playing a vital role in improving the economic status of the rural poor women of Bangladesh.

1. BACKGROUND OF THE STUDY

1.1 Introduction

Women represent around fifty percent of the world population and in many regions of the developing world; their contribution is immense in all the sectors of development. But still in today's world, women's position is not the same as their counterparts. Due to gender based discrimination and socially constructed sub-ordination women have inferior status everywhere in all the aspects of life-be it political, economic or social (Begum 2005). The most extreme example of this discrimination can be seen in the third world countries. Bangladesh is a glaring example of this lowered status of women as well as of all sorts of gender based segregation. More than 60 million people of Bangladesh live below the poverty line among them 74% are women (khan 1998). Now it is a dire need to let them raise their voice regarding human rights,

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decision making process, and moreover socio- cultural and economic issues. One of the best ways of enabling women development is access to credit, so that they can start to earn money. For the reason, micro-credit has been promoted to help the poor specially the women to take self-employment on tiny or micro scales with a view to empowering women in Bangladesh.

When income flow begins, then the right of food, shelter and everything also becomes a reality. Rural poor women have little or no property of assets to offer as collateral which is required in formal banking system, micro-credit has responded to the predicament by offering collateral-free loans (Pramanik 2001). The Grammen Bank led the way, starting in the mid - 1970s. Now there are hundreds of micro-credit providers of different operational size throughout the country. The large ones include Grameen Bank, BRAC, ASA and PROSHEKA. Among them Grameen Bank and BRAC have earned respectable status for Bangladesh in the international arena because of its poverty reduction strategies through which poor rural women are moving in the path of empowerment and economic development and for that reason the researcher concentrated on this area.

2. OBJECTIVES OF THE STUDY

The main objective of the study is to identify the role of micro-credit as a strategy for economic upliftment of women in Bangladesh.

The specific objectives were

- 2.1 Assess micro-credit beneficiaries economic development - having of land, sources of income, monthly income, decision making power for utilization of microcredit and improvement in lifestyle were considered after being involved in the microcredit programme.
- 2.2 Identify the problems faced by them in using of micro-credit.

3. RATIONALE OF THE STUDY

Micro-credit programme plays an important role in socio-economic development of rural poor specially for women. This study will help the selected organizations to know about the impact of micro-credit on women empowerment. The result of this research work will help government, policy makers, practitioners, researchers, NGO's professionals to take accurate policy and programs for the betterment of the borrowers as well as can make the borrower conscious. It will also provide input for formulating effective policy and programs for the micro-credit recipients to identify the various problems related to micro-credit and their effective solutions.

4. METHODOLOGY OF THE STUDY

Both the qualitative and quantitative methods and three different data collection instruments were used in the study. There are three possibilities for any study. It can have all quantitative data, it can have all qualitative data, or it can combine both types in any proportions. In this study the method, which the researcher used is a combination of quantitative and qualitative methods.

4.1 Rationale of the Selection of the Study Area

In this study, Godagari Upazila under Rajshahi district of Bangladesh has been selected for some reasons. Several numbers of NGO's specially selected two NGO's Grameen Bank and BRAC were working and providing micro-credit to landless women, divorced women, and widow women for many years. Another reason is, the researcher visited Godagari Upazila in several times in her life.

4.2 Selection of Respondents and Sample Size

By collecting a list from regional Grameen Bank Manager and BRAC officers' five branches were selected from Grameen Bank and five branches from BRAC. Among 12000 micro credit recipients approximately 2% households were the sample size of the study. All the sample size (200) was selected randomly by simple random sampling method using random number. From each selected branches 20 micro-credit beneficiaries were chosen.

4.3 Data Collection Tools and Analysis

4.3.1. Primary Data

To collect primary data for the study several methods such as questionnaire, in-depth interview as well as Focus Group Discussion (FGD) were used. Collected data was analyzed and interpreted through statistical techniques-SPSS

1. Questionnaires

Both quantitative and qualitative data from the micro-credit recipients (the main target group) were collected by means of a structured questionnaire. Most of the micro-credit beneficiaries were not educated, so the researcher asked them about their views and filled up the questionnaire herself and by some investigators. The draft structured questionnaire was pre-tested with 20 micro-credit recipients of Grameen Bank & 20 micro-credit recipients of BRAC in actual field situation before finalizing the questionnaire for collecting data.

2. Interview

Interview is a research method designed to understand the informant's perspectives on their lives, experiences or situations expressed in their own words. Primary data was also collected through the in-depth interview methods. Interview was done with some family headed person like father, husband, brother, elder son, legal guardian who most of the time take decision or influence the decision making process regarding micro-credit. The interview was based on an interview guideline.

3. Focus Group Discussion

To validate quantitative information focus group discussion was made with Union Parishad (The local self govt. of grass root level of Bangladesh) chairman and members, secretary, school teacher, aged person, village quack, and NGO personnel to get their reaction about micro-credit as a strategy for economic empowering of women in Bangladesh.

4.3.2. Secondary Data

Secondary sources were simply published books and articles by scholars. In this study different types of books, journals, reports, official records and documents included organizational documents reports etc were collected.

5. KEY CONCEPTS OF THE STUDY

5.1 Micro-Credit

The word credit' comes from *Latin word' credo'* meaning I believe or to trust. Hence "credit" entails some one, the lender, to believe or trust some one, the borrower with funds to be used by the borrower for his /her purposes, to be repaid to the lender with interest at a later stage on agreed terms and conditions. Micro credit is the extension of very small loans (micro loans) to those in poverty designed to spur entrepreneurship. These individuals lack collateral, steady employment and a verifiable credit history and therefore cannot meet even the most minimal qualifications to gain access to traditional credit. Micro credit is a part of microfinance, which is the provision of a wider range of financial services to the very poor.

Micro credit is a financial innovation that is generally considered to have originated with the Grameen Bank in Bangladesh. (Parvin1995). Due to the success of micro credit, many in the traditional banking industry have begun to realize that these micro credit borrowers should more correctly be categorized as pre-bankable; thus, micro credit is increasingly gaining credibility in the mainstream finance industry and many traditional large finance organizations are contemplating micro credit projects.

5.2 Strategy

Strategy is a term that comes from the *Greek word 'Strategia'* which means '*the art of the general or generalship*'. Strategy is a military activity par excellence in which high ranking officers plan the overall conduct of war (Nichols 2000). According to The Oxford English Dictionary it is 'the art of projecting and directing larger military movement and operations of a Campaign. In this study, strategy is a tool, way or paths for empowering women in Bangladesh

5.3. Economic Upliftment

Economic Upliftment means women's access to savings and credit & given them a greater economic role. When women can take decisions regarding credit and savings, they will optimize their own and the household's welfare. The investment in women's economic activities will improve employment opportunities for women. When women's economic activity and control over income resulting from access to micro-finance will improved women's skills, mobility, and access to knowledge and support networks. In a nutshell, women's Economic development can be defined as women's control over material and intellectual resources, gaining decisions making authority, to increase women bargaining capacity. In fact, women economic development is the freedom of women to undertake economic activities and spending income according to their own choice, leading to their active participation in various household decisions and beyond. In the study the collateral free GB and BRAC micro-credit was considered as a strong weapon, strategy, tool for economic empowerment of women in Bangladesh.

The model of micro-credit was firstly initiated by Dr. Akther Hamid Khan of BARD, Comilla which is known as Comilla Model then this model was spread by Grameen Bank. The model of micro-credit was highly appreciated and accepted by the UN and the UN declared 2005 as "International Micro-credit Year". In Bangladesh a lot of NGO's are working with different programmes. Micro-Credit is common programme of the NGO's in Bangladesh. Grameen Bank and its founder Dr. Mohammad Yunus jointly got the Nobel Prize in 2006. Micro-credit of BRAC and GB has changed the livelihood of rural people specially the women as women are the micro-credit recipients in the rural areas of Bangladesh.

6. DATA ANALYSIS AND DISCUSSION

6.1 House-hold Land

House- hold land is an important indicator for economic development and empowerment. So, the researcher tried to find the amount of land of the respondents for understanding their economic status.

Table 1: House-hold Land of the Respondents after Receiving Credit from GB and BRAC

Household Land (In Acre)	GB		BRAC		Grand Total	
	Frequency	%	Frequency	%	Frequency	%
0.02-0.10	63	63	71	71	134	67
0.11-0.20	18	18	07	07	25	12.5
0.21-0.30	04	04	02	02	06	03
0.31-0.40	03	03	06	06	09	4.5
0.41-0.50	0	0	0	0	0	0
0.51-0.60	0	0	0	0	0	0
0.61-0.70	02	02	02	02	04	02
0.71-0.80	01	01	0	0	01	0.5
0.81-0.90	0	0	02	02	02	01
0.91-0.99	0	0	0	0	0	0
1.00-5.00	05	05	07	07	12	06
6.00-10.00	02	02	02	02	04	02
10.00+	02	02	01	01	03	1.5
Total	100	100	100	100	200	100
<i>Source: Field Survey, 2009.</i>						

Analyzing the table it was found that 67 % respondents had 0.02-0.10 acre land and 12.5% respondents had 0.11-0.20 acre land. Most of them told that they were landless or had very small amount before their involvement in micro-credit activities during focus group discussion and personal interview.

6.2 Sources of Income

Sources of income play a vital role for the socio- economic development. The researcher intended to find out the sources of income of the respondents before receiving micro-credit from GB and BRAC for justifying their status before and after.

Table 2: Sources of Income of the Respondents Households before Receiving Credit from GB and BRAC

Income Source	GB		BRAC		Grand Total	
	Frequency	%	Frequency	%	Frequency	%
Van Puller	06	4.58	05	3.62	11	4.09
Agriculture	14	10.69	25	18.12	39	14.50
Maid Servant	01	0.76	00	00	01	0.37
Ricks puller	08	6.11	05	3.62	13	4.83
Resp. Service	03	2.29	06	4.35	09	3.35
Husband Job	32	24.43	25	18.12	57	21.19
Husband Business	42	32.06	43	31.16	85	31.60
Sons Job	03	2.29	03	2.17	06	2.23
Husband Mission	09	6.87	08	5.80	17	6.32
Livestock Firm	04	3.05	04	2.90	08	2.97
Own Business	02	1.53	03	2.17	05	1.86
Father in laws Service	01	0.76	00	00	01	0.37
Day Labour	03	2.29	09	6.52	12	4.46
Electrician	03	2.29	02	1.45	05	1.86
Total	131	100	138	100	269	100
<i>Source: Field Survey, 2009.</i>						

Analyzing the table it was found that before receiving credit 31.60% respondents' source of income was husband's business and 21.19% respondents' source of income was husbands job and rest of the sources of income were from agriculture, van, rickshaw, own business, livestock firm, day labour and electrician.

Table 3: Sources of Income of the Respondents Household after Receiving Credit from GB and BRAC

Sources of Income	GB		BRAC		Grand Total	
	Frequency	%	Frequency	%	Frequency	%
Van Puller	05	2.96	05	2.28	10	2.58
Agriculture	16	9.47	32	14.61	48	12.37
Maid Servant	01	0.59	00	00	01	0.26
Rickshpuller	08	4.73	07	3.20	15	3.86
Resp. Service	03	1.78	04	1.83	07	1.80
Husband Job	23	13.61	22	10.05	46	11.60
Husband Business	5	32.54	65	29.68	120	30.93
Sons Job	05	2.96	06	2.74	11	2.84
Husband Massion	17	10.06	08	3.65	25	6.44
Livestock Firm	22	13.01	31	14.16	53	13.66
Own Business	07	4.14	28	12.79	35	9.02
Father in laws Service	01	0.59	00	00	01	0.26
Day Labour	03	1.78	09	4.10	21	3.09
Electrician	03	1.78	02	0.91	05	1.29
Total	169	100	219	100	388	100
<i>Source: Field Survey, 2009</i>						

Researcher tried to find out the sources of income of respondents after receiving credit. Interestingly, often receiving credit 'husband' remained their main source of income. Almost 31% respondents' source of income was husband's business. But a mentionable fact is that after receiving credit women established their livestock firm and own business. Agriculture also became another source of income.

6.3 Monthly Income before and after Receiving Micro Credit

Income is an important indicator for respondents' household economic development. The researcher tried to find out monthly income of the respondents before joining in micro-credit activities.

Table 4 : Monthly Income before Receiving Micro Credit

Monthly income (in Tk.)	GB		BRAC		Grand Total	
	Frequency	%	Frequency	%	Frequency	%
1000-2000	06	06	02	02	08	04
2001-4000	30	30	27	27	57	28.5
4001-6000	20	20	28	28	48	24
6001-8000	04	04	06	06	10	05
8001-10000	06	06	06	06	12	06
10001-12000	0	0	04	04	04	02
12000+	04	04	07	07	11	5.5
No comments	30	30	20	20	50	25
Total	100	100	100	100	200	100
<i>Source: Field Survey, 2009</i>						

After analyzing the table, it was found that before joining in micro-credit activities most of the respondent's 28.5% told that their monthly income was in 2001-4000.

Table 5: Monthly Income after Receiving Micro Credit

Monthly Income	GB		BRAC		Grand Total	
	Frequency	%	Frequency	%	Frequency	%
1000-2000	02	02	0	0	02	01
2001-4000	12	12	07	07	19	9.5
4001-6000	31	31	29	29	60	30
6001-8000	11	11	14	14	25	12.5
8001-10000	07	07	08	08	15	7.5
10001-12000	02	02	03	03	05	2.5
12000+	10	10	20	20	30	15
No comments	25	25	19	19	44	22
Total	100	100	100	100	200	100
<i>Source: Field Survey, 2009</i>						

After analyzing the table, it was seen that many respondents income have risen. It is shown that 30% respondent's monthly income increased up to 4000-60000, 7.5 % respondents' income raised 80001-10000 and only 01 % of the respondents' income was 1000-2000. Not only 15% respondents' income raised upto 12000+. It was very important indicator for economic upliftment..

6.4 Making Decision in Using Micro Credit

Information on taking decision for using micro credit is very important since if the respondents could not take decision on for using micro-credit, empowerment would not be possible. Women respondents must have right to use the micro-credit. So, the researcher tried to find out who takes decision on using micro credit.

Table 6: Taking Decision for Using Micro Credit

User	GB		BRAC		Grand total	
	Frequency	%	Frequency	%	Frequency	%
By Herself	40	33.90	50	41.32	90	37.66
Father-in-Law	01	0.85	02	1.65	03	1.25
Mother-in-Law	0	0	0	0	0	0
Relatives	01	0.85	0	0	01	0.42
Husband and Herself, the Both	71	60.17	63	52.07	134	56.07
Others	05	4.23	06	4.96	11	4.60
Total	118	100	121	100	239	100
<i>Source: Field Survey, 2009</i>						

After analyzing the table, it was seen that 37.66% of the respondents could take decision for using micro-credit. In focus group discussion and interview they viewed their husbands gave importance on their (credit recipients) opinion, so they can take decision on using micro-credit. It was also appreciable that 56.07% respondents took decision jointly.

6.5 Improvement in Life Style

Micro-credit play a vital role for women socio-economic development, as it effect on all aspects of their life. So the researcher attempted to find out their improvement of lifestyle.

Table 7: Improvement in Life Style after Involvement in Micro Credit Activities

Improvement Status	GB		BRAC		Grand Total	
	Frequency	%	Frequency	%	Frequency	%
Yes	89	89	98	98	187	93.5
No	11	11	02	02	13	6.5
Total	100	100	100	100	200	100

Source: Field Survey, 2009

After analysis the table, it was found that 93.5% of the respondents told that micro-credit have improved their life style. Only 6.5 % had shown negative response.

7.0 Problems Faced in Utilization of Credit.

Various studies show that operations of Micro credit program have increased workload to the beneficiaries of women. Not only this, it also creates some problems in the family. So the researcher tried to find out problems faced by the respondents in utilization of credit. The following table shows the findings. Most of respondents were found very active and sincere for utilization of credit. Nevertheless, they faced some problems.

Table 8: Problems Faced in Utilization of Credit

Facing Problems in Utilization of Credit	GB		BRAC		Grand Total	
	Frequency	%	Frequency	%	Frequency	%
No	25	25	27	27	106	53
Yes	75	75	73	73	94	47
Total	100	100	100	100	200	100

Source: Field Survey, 2009

After analyzing the table, it was found, 53% of the respondents told that they didn't face problem on utilizing micro-credit and 47 % of the told that they face problem on utilization of credit. In these points they told that sometimes their husband, son, father in law took away money and that why they face problem in proper utilization of credit.

7.1 Difficulties to Pay Back Loan in Time

Paying loan in time is very important issue for micro-credit since it needs to pay back their loan in time weekly and if they don't pay in time they face various types of problems. So the researcher tried to get information on facing difficulties to pay back loan in time.

Table 9: Difficulties to Pay Back Loan in Time

Facing Problems in Utilization of credit	GB		BRAC		Grand Total	
	Frequency	%	Frequency	%	Frequency	%
Yes	02	02	01	01	3	1.50
No	98	98	99	99	197	98.50
Total	100	100	100	100	200	100
<i>Source: Field Survey, 2009</i>						

From the above table it can be seen that 98.50% of the respondents' told that they didn't face difficulties to pay back loan in time and only 1.50 % told they faced difficulties to pay back loan in time. They mentioned that with that credit they repaired their houses, bought television, dining tables, gold, arranged marriage ceremony of daughters etc. So without cash money they faced problem to pay back loan in time. That also created some personal and social problems. So the GB and BRAC policy should change for the betterment of women micro-credit beneficiaries.

Recommendations of the Study

- ❖ The present study indicated that the interest rate of Grameen Bank credit programme seems to be high when compared to other financial institutional sources such as commercial Banks. Most of the credit recipients have given their negative expression about the interest rate of Grameen Bank, and BRAC. Actually they were not satisfied with the present interest rate. Considering the objectives of Grameen Bank and BRAC credit programmes and the target group it may be recommended that the Grameen Bank and BRAC authority should give a second thought for reducing the interest rate in future and also should need to change the credit repayment time i.e. monthly installment in lieu of weekly installment.
- ❖ Some of the borrowers opined that they could improve their income if proper counseling and training were imparted to them in income generating activities through the credit. So, GB and BRAC authorities should take necessary steps in this regard.

- ❖ The present study revealed that most of the credit recipients have successfully utilized their credit in non-agricultural purposes like poultry, livestock, and homestead gardening. So, Grameen Bank and BRAC authorities should need to increase the amount of credit from the beginning for investment in non-agriculture purposes.
- ❖ After micro credit disbursement, the Grameen Bank and BRAC authorities should need to visit to the recipient's house at least one's time in every three months. As a result, proper credit utilization will be insured.
- ❖ It was found during focus group discussion that beneficiaries often face problems of marketing. Though this is mainly due to the attitude of the society which can not be changed easily. GB and BRAC authorities can help them in marketing their products.
- ❖ New research should be conducted regularly to investigate the comparative study on impact of micro credit in the society specially on rural poor women's economic development. Socio-economic factor is very important here since during focus group discussion and observation it was found that educated, medium age; married respondents are more sincere and hard working than the others.

CONCLUSION

The micro-credit program of GB and BRAC has benefited the poor women in more than one way. Micro-credit has enabled the poor women to undertake diversified economic activities which generate flow of stable income round the year and thus has strengthened survival strategy of the poor women. With micro-credit, the poor households now owned assets, can use it to meet contingencies without having to sacrifice their independence, security and peace of mind. Lastly, it can be said that micro-credit is empowering the rural women economically in Bangladesh.

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Influential Factors in Women's Empowerment in Rural Bangladesh

Islam Md. Rafiqul

Abstract

The empowerment of women has been recognized by the world community as integral to economic health and social justice. The key objective of this empirical study, therefore, is to determine the degree to which women are empowered in Bangladesh by considering the following five influential factors Viz; women's economic decision making ability, household decision making ability, freedom of mobility, political participation and non-governmental organization activity, and social awareness. The study elucidates the relationship between socio-demographic variable of women and their empowerment. The study was conducted in Gazipur, a district in the central region of Bangladesh. The participants in the field survey conducted in August 2009 included 130 women representatives from different villages in Gazipur. A random sampling method was used for collecting data. The Statistical Package for Social Science was the main tool for data analysis, while one way ANOVA and frequency tables were also used. For the analysis, women's economic decision making, household decision making, freedom of mobility, political participation and non-governmental organization (NGO) activity, and social awareness were selected as independent variables, and total women's empowerment was selected as the dependent variable. The results show that the majority of women in Gazipur have a relatively low level of freedom of mobility and from the socio-demographic variables such as women's age, education and family economical status had effect on empowerment. The results of this research can be used to promote empowerment of women in the globalized world.

Keywords: Bangladesh, Development, Empowerment, Factors, Women.

Status of Women's Empowerment in Bangladesh

The United Nations and its agencies have encouraged the world community to abandon gender stereotypes and to strengthen the status of women within their family and in society as a whole. The economic and social changes which took place in Bangladesh during the past 20 years had a great impact on empowering women, which is one of the most crucial concerns of the Millennium Development Goals of the United Nations. The United Nations' stance is supported by research activity which shows that when women do well, the economy does well. And many studies recommend that countries should take steps to ensure the participation and involvement of women in all spheres of life.

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Women's empowerment is "a process whereby women become able to organize themselves to increase their own self-reliance, to assert their independent right to make choices and to control resources which will assist in challenging and eliminating their own subordination" (Keller & Mbwewe, 1991). The empowerment of women is an essential precondition for the elimination of world poverty and the upholding of human rights (DFID, 2000). According to the United Nations (UN), there are five components of women's empowerment:

women's sense of self worth; their right to determine choices; their right to have access to opportunities and resources; their right to have the power to control their own lives, both within and outside the home; and their ability to influence the direction of social change to create a more just social and economic order, nationally and internationally.

Hashemi and Schuler (1993) defined empowerment of women through the use of the following six spheres: (1) sense of self and a vision of the future, including resisting negative behaviors of the husband; (2) mobility and visibility, including how women are treated when they are traveling; (3) economic security, including cash income, new skills and knowledge; (4) status and decision-making power within the household, including making purchases on their own; (5) ability to interact effectively in the public sphere, such as joining credit programs, and (6) participation in non-family groups, such as credit programs and solidarity movements.

Bangladesh is a country in which women have very low social status. And, they are not recommended to engage in economic activities. In this sense this country seems not to satisfy the above components and spheres of women's empowerment. The women have had only limited involvement in development issues in Bangladesh of the 21st century. For example, studies conducted by the World Bank also demonstrate that rural women in Bangladesh have limited access to household decision making, physical and financial assets. While having very low level of individual assets, they are heavily loaded with work, and are restricted in terms of mobility. They possess inadequate level of skills and knowledge, thus being very vulnerable to male dominance in any social sphere (Sebstad and Cohen 2000: 44).

Traditionally, a Bangladeshi woman derives her status from her family and her primary role is to maintain her family as a social institution and economic entity. Under the influence of the cultural and religious environment, disparities certainly between men and women in education, health, employment and income opportunities, and control over assets, personal security and participation in the political process in Bangladesh. However, the Bangladeshi government pays a continuous attention to ensuring that development is not limited to economic and material aspects, but also embraces the social and human aspects of development. At the 2005 world summit, governments of all nations including Bangladesh agreed that "progress for women is progress for all."

In order to better understand the factors influencing women's empowerment in rural Bangladesh, it is necessary to obtain their opinion on the topic. Still, it is important to take into account the fact that their answers may not necessarily be always accurate and honest and the fact that many of them may not understand the meaning of the term "empowerment" itself. Therefore, they were asked numerous questions regarding their power of economic decision making, household decision making, freedom of mobility, political involvement and NGO activity, and social awareness knowledge. Based on those questions, this study attempted to learn more about the actual level of women's empowerment in rural Bangladesh.

Research Objectives

The objective of the study is to measure the women empowerment index and to explore empirically the links between women empowerment and such socio-demographic variables as age, educational attainment, family household item, marital status, etc. in Bangladesh.

Variables of the Study

In general, there are two types of variables. An independent variable is varied or manipulated by the researcher. The other type is dependent variable, which is the value, or the "output" of the function. There are many independent variables in this study that are grouped according to the factors that influence women's empowerment. A preliminary study was made in this regard that helped us to identify some variables that influence women's empowerment in Bangladesh, including age, education, economic status, marital status, and religion.

Methodology of the Research

This study used quantitative approach in the inquiry process to understand and explain empowerment which could be investigated and measured objectively. As has already been reported else where quantitative approach is more objective and independent from research biases (Punch 2000) in comparison to qualitative approach. Survey research design, is a procedure in quantitative approach which helps the researchers to administer a questionnaire in order to identify trends in the attitudes, opinion, behavior or characteristic of population (Creswell 2005). In this study, on the premise that the empowerment as the major issue of the study is measurable and accountable with its elements, the survey technique using questionnaire was implemented.

For collecting primary data, survey questionnaires were distributed to 130 randomly selected women from different villages in the Gazipur district. The household survey was based on a convenience sampling technique with a structured questionnaire. For measuring women's empowerment, a five-dimension index was identified and then the dimensions were measured in accordance with the construction method of human development indices (UNDP 2005). Descriptive and inferential statistical methods were used for analyzing the data.

Analysis and Discussion

The reliability of the questionnaire suggests that alpha is .768, which indicated that the information was reliable.

Table 1: Respondents' Profile

Variables	Frequency	Percent
Respondent's age		
21–30	44	33.8
31–40	53	40.8
41–50	25	19.1
51–60	8	6.2
Respondent's educational qualification		
None	45	34.6
Primary/Madrassa	50	38.5
SSC/Dakhil	29	22.2
HSC/Alim	6	4.6
Bachelor/Masters	0	0
Having brick wall in house		
No	86	66.2
Yes	44	33.8
Having fridge in house		
No	109	83.8
Yes	21	16.2
Marital status		
Married	122	93.8
Widow	6	4.6
Divorce	1	.8
Single	1	.8
Religion		
Others	0	0
Buddhist	0	0
Hindu	16	12.3
Muslim	114	87.7

Table 1 shows that most of the respondents were in the age group of 31–40 years, which represents 40.8% of the total. The majority of the respondents were married, which represents about 93.8% of the total respondents. These data show that a considerable number of the respondents were mature enough to make decisions. Most of the respondents had no brick wall (66.2%) or refrigerator (83.8%) in their house, which indicates the low level of their economic situation.

The table shows that 34.6% of the respondents had no educational qualification and 38.5% of the respondents had primary or Madrasa education. Out of 130 women respondents, there was no university graduate. This table also shows that 87.7% of the respondents are Muslim and others are Hindu. This is similar to the nationwide Muslim–Hindu average in Bangladesh.

Women's empowerment is multidimensional, and consequently it is very difficult to evaluate. It comprises the entire complex of interactions, roles, rights and statuses that surround being male versus being female in a given society or culture (Mason 1997). However, in this study, the researcher, tried to measure women's empowerment by constructing a women's empowerment index in accordance with Mason and Smith (2003). The particular aspects or dimensions of empowerment that they identified are economic decision making, household decision making and freedom of mobility. The researcher also considered another two dimensions for the index: political participation and NGO activity, and social awareness. The index of each dimension was constructed where minimum and maximum values were chosen. Performance in each indicator was expressed as the minimum and maximum value between 0 and 1 in accordance with the construction method of the Human Development Index (UNDP 2005).

The Women Empowerment Index (WEI) is then computed in a simple average of these five indices according to the formula below:

$$WEI = 1/5(\text{economic decision making index}) + 1/5 (\text{Household decision making index}) + 1/5$$

(Freedom of mobility index)+1/5(Political involvement and NGO activity index)+1/5(Social awareness index).


$$IV_{ij} = \frac{(X_{ij}) - \text{Min}(X_{ij})}{\text{Max}(X_{ij}) - \text{Min}(X_{ij})}$$

Where, (X_{ij}) , $\text{Min}(X_{ij})$, $\text{Max}(X_{ij})$ and IV_{ij} are, respectively, the actual value, minimum value, maximum value for the dimension index.

Economic decision-making: Control over daily household expenditures by women means they have more power over the family (Malhotra, Vanneman, & Kishor 1995). In Bangladesh women are undoubtedly more anxious for economic decision making. Although they are anxious for economic decision making, they still depend on their husband or parents to gain access to money.

As shown in Figure 1, most of the respondents decide how to spend money in the family (58.5%), have the final say on large household purchases (64.6%), have the final say on making household purchases for daily needs (63.8%) and contribute to the total familial expenditures (11.5%). Hence, it appears from the data that the women have more power over the family in the terms of economic decision making. The economic decision making power index is calculated as 0.46, which can be said to be low in accordance with the Human Development Report (UNDP 2005).

Figure 1: Economic Decision Making




Household decision making: Decision making is the main theme of empowerment, especially in case of household head level (Mason & Smith 2003). In a household, if both

husband and wife are on the head level, they can participate in their decisions equally. It is natural that housewives are generally main decision makers about household affairs, but the women in Bangladesh are unsure about their equal position.

As seen in Figure 2, most of the respondents have high empowerment as measured by their final say on own health care (86.2%), final say on child health care (67.7%), final say on food to be cooked each day (31.5%) and final say on family planning (33.8%). As the majority of the women made decisions about household affairs, it can be concluded that they enjoyed empowerment in the sector of decision making for household affairs. The household decision making power index is calculated as 0.52, which is medium in accordance with the Human Development Report (UNDP, 2005).

Figure 2: Household Decision Making




Freedom of mobility: Freedom of mobility is one of the most influential factors of domestic empowerment for women. To activate a society, freedom of mobility is necessary

because it allows women to participate in all activities. Such mobility beyond home may have important implications for exposure to information, development of interpersonal skills, increasing self-confidence and opportunities to take independent action (Syed et al., 1993).

Figure 3 shows that most of the respondents are not empowered in terms of freedom of mobility. Seeing final say on visits to family or relatives, the answer of 40.8% is positive. Also, on going outside the village/town, only 25.4% of the respondents answered “yes”. For going to a health center or hospital, almost 50% of the respondents are allowed and going to a shopping center or market, only 10.8% of respondents are capable. So, it can be said that various right in freedom of mobility are enjoyed by a small percentage of women. As can be seen in Figure3, the freedom of mobility index is 0.248, which is low according to the Human Development Report (UNDP, 2005), too.

Figure 3: Freedom of Mobility




Political participation and NGO activity: Needless to say, women’s political participation is one of the fundamental rights which influence empowerment of women (Basu, 1996). Women’s equal participation in political life plays a pivotal role in the general process

of the advancement of women. It is not only a demand for simple justice or democracy but also a necessary condition for women's interests to be taken into account. Without the active participation of women and the incorporation of their perspective at all levels of decision-making, the goals of equality, development and peace cannot be achieved (FWCW 1995:1).


Women's participation in various social and political activities is one of their basic rights. Figure 4 presents the percentage distribution of respondents' views about their political involvement and NGO activity. Although only 2.3% of the respondents had the political party membership, 100% thought that political involvement was important. Very few women were involved with a local organization and play active roles in their organizations. On the other hand all respondents were involved with NGOs, from the participations of which they said that and many indicated that they benefited. In Figure 4, the political and NGO activity index is 0.49, which is medium according to the Human Development Report (UNDP 2005).

Figure 4: Political Involvement and NGO Activity



Social awareness: It is said that most of the women in Bangladesh cannot enjoy empowerment, partly because they do not have enough social awareness. But in this study the results indicated that most of the women have high social awareness. Regarding development and health care knowledge, 66.9% and 62.3% of the respondents received training respectively. Nearly 100 percent of the respondents wanted to send their children to school, and 66.9% of them learned gender awareness through the media.

Figure 5: Social Awareness




Total empowerment index

Total empowerment index is composed of all the five empowerment indices. The total empowerment index is calculated 0.571 (Figure 6). As per the United Nations Development programme of framing Human development indices, the value of index 0 is deprived of development and value 1 is showing the full development, value between 0 to .5 having minimum level of development, .6 to .7 is medium level of development & .8 and more have

high development. In this research, the same method is used for differentiating the human trait “empowerment” in an index form. It shows that women in Gazipur district are empowered and their empowerment index indicates a minimum level of empowerment.

Figure 6: Empowerment Index



Socio-demographic Factors

The empowerment of women is a process with several dimensions. Not all of these dimensions rise and fall in relationship to each other. In addition the above factors do not completely explain the current status of the empowerment of women. However, there are several socio-demographic factors that may exert influence on women's empowerment.

Analysis of variance (ANOVA) was utilized in order to examine the mean differences that might exist among the empowerment of women in the various groups according to certain personal and socio-economic characteristics. For this statistical analysis is appropriate for addressing the study objective, as it examines the mean differences in empowerment among respondents according to age, educational attainment, economic status, marital status, and religion. The results obtained demonstrate that there were no significant differences in the

means of women's empowerment in terms of the socio-economic status variables that were assessed, with the exception of age, educational attainment, and economic status.

Age

Table 2: One way ANOVA summary table of age of respondents and its scores

Age	N	Mean	SD	F	P	η^2
21	2	12.00	2.82	1.068	.391	.253
22	1	9.00				
23	5	11.20	2.68			
24	8	10.25	2.91			
25	8	11.00	3.11			
26	9	11.22	1.71			
27	5	10.60	1.14			
28	2	13.50	3.53			
29	3	10.67	1.52			
30	1	13.00				
31	4	8.00	5.34			
32	5	10.40	2.60			
34	14	10.93	1.77			
35	10	11.40	2.01			
36	4	12.25	2.87			
37	7	12.00	1.00			
38	6	12.17	1.16			
39	1	13.00				
40	2	12.00	.00			
41	2	14.00	1.41			
42	3	11.33	2.08			
43	6	12.33	1.63			
44	1	13.00				
45	4	13.25	.50			
46	5	12.40	2.07			
47	2	10.50	4.95			
50	2	14.00	2.82			
51	1	9.00				
53	1	10.00				
54	3	12.33	2.51			
56	2	11.00	2.82			
60	1	15.00				

One-way ANOVA was adopted to determine the mean difference in terms of the degree of women's empowerment based on the age of respondents among four groups. The respondents were classified into 32 age groups; the results are shown in Table 2. The results indicated that there were significant differences in the means of empowerment according to the age of respondents among 32 groups, $F(31, 98) = 1.068$, $P = .391$. The eta-squared of .253 confirmed that the mean difference of women's empowerment among the 32 groups was highly significant.

The results suggest that older women have more freedom and empowerment than younger women. Older women have more life experience, better understanding of how to obtain what they want or need, closer relationships with their husbands, or, because they have fulfilled certain social obligations to their husbands and husbands families (for example, bearing children), they are more trusted than are young wives, over whom tighter controls are maintained (Tareque et al., 2007).

In Bangladesh, the enrollment of rural girls in school is extremely low, with some of the rural women lacking the opportunity to acquire knowledge from educational institutions. These women acquire knowledge from their families, relatives, and friends, as well as from society. Therefore, older women have had more time in which to acquire knowledge. Through this knowledge, older women attempt to cultivate friendship with their husbands, and to free themselves from the most common worries that arise from family life.

Older women can foster mutual relations with family members and can participate to a greater extent in decision-making processes, thereby heightening their empowerment status.

Education

The one-way ANOVA was also employed to investigate the impact of respondents' educational levels on their degree of empowerment. Respondents were divided into five groups according to their education backgrounds (never, primary, SSC, HSC, and bachelor). The results are shown in Table 3. The results of the ANOVA test indicated there were significant differences in the means of empowerment of respondents between the five groups and educational attainment, $F(3, 126) = 5.697$, $P = .001$. Based on Cohen (1988), criteria (.01=small effect, .06 moderate effect, and .14, large effect) the eta-squared of .119 indicated that the mean difference of women's empowerment between the groups demonstrated a large effect. Analysis of means showed that the primary group, with $M = 12.12$, $SD = 1.934$, had the highest performance in terms of empowerment, compared to the other education groups.

Education has long been recognized as an essential factor for social change and development in any society. Hence, harmonious development without female education is considered as a fallacy. Moreover, it has been properly said that to educate a woman is to

educate her whole family. Therefore, the emphasis on female education means to equip them with multiple roles as citizens, housewives, mothers, contributors to family income, and builders of the new society.

Table 3: One way ANOVA summary table of educational attainment of women and its scores

Educational level	N	Mean	SD	F	P	η^2
Never	45	10.33	2.74	5.69	.001	.119
Primary	50	12.12	1.93			
SSC	29	11.93	1.79			
HSC	6	11.33	2.16			

Economic status

Parents' economic background and household wealth are also very important determinants of women's empowerment. Naturally, women born into wealthy families should have better opportunities for educational attainment and health care facilities from childhood. When it is time for marriage, it is expected that women who have wealthy family backgrounds will select rich men as husbands.

To measure the impact of familial economic status on women's empowerment, a one-way ANOVA was applied in this research. Respondents were divided into two groups, one pertaining to the condition of their house (brick wall) and the other pertaining to a household item (refrigerator).

The result of the ANOVA test is shown in Table 4, and reveals that there were significant differences in the mean levels of women's empowerment between the two groups divided by the condition of their houses, $F(1, 128) = 20.35$, $P = .000$. The eta-squared of .137 indicated that the mean difference among the groups was high and significant.

Table 4: One way ANOVA summary table of house condition of women and its scores

House condition	N	Mean	SD	F	P	η^2
No brick wall	86	10.80	2.41	20.35	.000	.137
Brick wall	44	12.64	1.68			

Additionally, Table 5 demonstrates that there was a significant difference in the mean levels of women's empowerment between the two groups and the household item, $F(1, 128) = 4.708$, $P = .035$. The eta-squared of .063 indicated that the mean difference among the groups was high and significant.

The results suggest that rich women are more empowered than other women are.

Table 5: One way ANOVA summary table of household item of women and its scores

House hold item	N	Mean	SD	F	P	η^2
No fridge	109	11.23	2.40	4.70	.032	.063
Have fridge	21	12.43	1.80			

Marital status

Bangladesh is a typical patriarchal society. Women are dependent on men throughout their lives, from their fathers to their husbands, brothers, or sons. A woman faces disadvantages in terms of access to education, health care, and finances when she lives in her father's house. After marriage, because a member of her husbands family the situation does not change, either. She remains disadvantaged from the day after.

One-way ANOVA was also performed to investigate the difference in the mean score of women's empowerment as related to the marital status of respondents. The statistical test in Table 6 indicates that there were no significant differences in the means for respondents' marital status among the four groups, $F(3, 126) = .159$, $P = .924$, as depicted in Table 6. The eta-squared of .004 confirmed that the mean differences among the four groups were small and insignificant.

Table 6: One way ANOVA summary table of marital status of women and its scores

Marital status	N	Mean	SD	F	P	η^2
Married	122	11.45	2.36	.159	.924	.004
Widow	6	11.17	2.63			
Divorce	1	11.00				
Single	1	10.00				

Religion

Religion is often considered as an important factor in terms of women's empowerment (Jejeebhoy and Sathar 2001; Mason et al. 2002). The respondents' religions constituted another socio-economic variable in this study. An ANOVA test was performed to assess the differences in the mean scores of women's empowerment between two groups of women, sorted by religious affiliation. Based upon the statistical test, it was revealed that there were no significant differences between the means of the two groups of respondents' sorted by religion, $F(1, 128) = .991$, $P = .321$, as depicted in Table 7. The eta-squared of .008 confirm that the mean differences among the two groups were small and insignificant. The results indicate that religious affiliation does not have a significant influence on women's empowerment.

Table 7 One way ANOVA summary table of religion of women and its scores

Religion	N	Mean	SD	F	P	η^2
Hindu	16	10.88	2.39	.991	.321	.008
Muslim	114	11.50	2.34			

Discussion

Using the above basic statistic data, it is possible to determine certain relationships among women's ages, economic status, and educational levels and their empowerment.

In terms of what constituted the most important factors, they were found to be those factors that are related to matters of financial choice, freedom of mobility, and political involvement. In this study, only 2.3% of women had any type of political membership. Freedom of mobility was also limited, as the absolute majority of women's would not leave the house for any reason without a chaperon. The freedom to participate in financial decisions in terms of purchase of large and expensive household goods was somewhat correlated with educational level and age: Yet, given the fact that the husbands still made the routine decisions by themselves, this may reflect only a lack of self-confidence on the part of the males (who tend to seek support from their women's when making decisions accompanied with the expenditure of a large amount of money) rather than any willingness they might have to empower women.

In addition, it is assumed that education impacts knowledge, democratic aspirations and the willingness to be empowered. Age also plays an important role in many societies, as it correlates with respect, seniority, and wisdom, which also provide opportunities for empowerment. The study revealed some interesting correlations between the 2.3% party

membership and a 100% willingness to participate in politics. Also, it revealed that women either would not leave the house, for any reason at all, without a chaperon, or they would leave it for any purpose whatsoever.

The questionnaire was arranged in such a way as to better assess the status of the women within Gazipur society and to better understand their problems as well as and their available freedoms. Usually, in a free and democratic society, age should not be related in any way to empowerment, since any woman, of any age (above 21 years), in such a free society, should have the absolute freedom and empowerment to do whatever she might choose. Marital status should also have no influence upon women's empowerment:

By the same token, in democratic societies women would not be hindered in their empowerment aspirations by any factors whatsoever. As for Bangladesh however, all of the unmarried women appear to be the responsibility of their parents, who tend to be very controlling to the point that they would not even let them out of the house freely. Likewise, the majority of women who cover their heads and/or faces in the presence of other men are younger and unmarried women. In other words, while it may appear as though husbands in Bangladesh are very traditional and controlling, it is actually a woman's family members who are inclined to control her from early childhood onward. Only through marriage or as growing older (over 35 years, roughly) do they become more trusted in terms of making financial decisions and allowed not to cover their faces in the presence of other men.

It was also surprising to discover that not only Muslim women cover their heads inside their homes in the presence of other males. Even, Hindu women do so. From this veil issue, religion did not appear to have much influence on the degree of women's empowerment. In fact, even women who had a religion other than Islam were not allowed to leave the house without a chaperon. This may suggest that religion is not actually an important factor inhibiting women's empowerment, because the presence of a multitude of religions could not find any correlations in terms of any advantages or disadvantages. Yet, it is imperative that the information be interpreted properly. No religion was more likely than another to correlate with a woman's increased freedom to leave the house alone or not to cover her face in the presence of other men, let alone to make any other important decisions. Here, we may need to go beyond the religious level and examine the society-wide and culture/tradition-wide levels. For example there is a case that, even if a particular religion does permit women to do a certain thing, the culture and the traditions of Bangladesh will not. As a result, women and men may be prompted to "do in Rome as the Romans do", so as not to violate any social norms and customs. In other words, if the society concerned generally disapproves of the freedom of women's movement, having a lone woman on the street could make her stand out as an object of mockery or perhaps even assault by members of the conservative society.

Education, economic background, and NGO activities have positive effects on women's empowerment and are the areas on which it is necessary to focus in order to provide women with even greater freedoms in the future. Education clearly had positive effects on empowerment, just as economic background did. The richer their family, the more empowered the women were. NGO activities also appear to be positively correlated with women's empowerment. Furthermore, NGO activities and easy access to overall information result in a desire for education of their children regardless of gender. Therefore, one may expect to be more educated women and men in the next few generations, which will surely lead to the women bright future that become even more empowered.

Rooms of improvement

The study was done to explore the actual status of women in Bangladesh. But it would be much improved, if it had also explored the backgrounds of the males in the same households. This information is critically vital to understand the various aspects within a family. For instance, if a woman comes from a richer family compared to her husband, she will likely have more freedoms than a woman coming from a poor family. Poor husbands may be more liberal in their treatment of rich wives. By the same token, more educated husbands may be more liberal in the treatment of their wives. In other words, the answers to some questions appear rather random: Yet, if we had information pertaining to the financial and the education status of the men (husbands), it would likely be easier to draw parallels and to understand certain freedom that women's enjoy (or do not enjoy) in various households. Also, it appears that women in rich families are more empowered than those in poor families. This does not necessarily indicate a monetary reason for empowerment (in fact, poor husbands may be naturally interested in having their wives leave the house and earn money) but rather may be a result of low levels of education on the part of the husband, who therefore cannot make much money, and who, as most people with little education do, stick to conservative, patriarchal values, which in turn hinder women's empowerment. Likewise, more money may correlate with empowerment, not because there is a brick wall and a refrigerator in the home (the markers of wealth) but because the husband is educated enough to earn an enough amount of money and because he has better access to information and shares western values.

This study also would benefit from an assessment of Bangladesh males. Even if the philanthropic organizations were to collect enough fund through charity and provide each Bangladeshi family with a refrigerator and a brick wall, it would not mean that all Bangladeshi women would be empowered overnight, despite the fact that statistics demonstrate a significant relationship between money (as indicated by the presence of a brick wall and a refrigerator) and empowerment.

Conclusions

There are various factors influencing women's empowerment in various ways. As demonstrated by the responses to the questionnaire, education, economic status, and age of a woman were likely to be positively significant in terms of some aspect of empowerment. Husbands were more likely to consult educated and older women's regarding various issues necessary for decisions on purchases, healthcare, and NGO involvement.

It is indisputable that the, more educated they are, and the richer families they come from the more empowered the women are. In reverse, younger women suffer greater discrimination. But they are more interested in gender-awareness. While the study did identify certain correlations, certainly much more work was necessary to be done with respect to assessing the educational levels and economic status of husbands in particular. Nerveless, it seems that the factors assessed in this research should help the improvement of women's empowerment in rural Bangladesh.

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Theoretical Considerations of Political Integration and the Indian Experience

Thongkholal Haokip

Abstract

The gaining of independence by several Asian and African countries in the mid-twentieth century and their efforts to politically integrate their constituent units has led to the new wave in the study of political integration. The failure of some nation-states in Africa and the continuing resistance to integration till date by several ethnic groups in the Afro-Asian countries necessitates the re-examination of the various theories. There are diverse sources of political integration theory which needs to be pulled together for defining the boundaries and characteristics of political integration, and present some tentative hypotheses for analysis. This piece of work examines the problems of political integration and attempts to put together the different theories political integration. With such hypotheses an attempt is made to examine the Indian experience.

The study of political integration has been one of the major concerns of political scientists. The term is widely used among various fields of political science, such as international relations and international organisation, local and urban government, and operates in the international, national and regional or sub-national level. There is a new wave in the study of political integration during the post-war years as the newly independent countries of Asia and Africa has to rigorously go through this process in their drive for nation-building.

The rationale of political integration is that there is a need to create a “territorial nationality which overshadows - or eliminates - subordinate parochial loyalties” (Weiner 1965: 52). These local allegiances, or the similar primordial attachments, impede development since the national leaders, aspiring to expand the functions of the political system, need the loyalty of all sections the population. It is, therefore, one of the challenges to the political system to bring about “the process whereby people transfer their commitment and loyalty from smaller tribes, villages, or petty principalities to the larger central political system” (Almond and Powell 1966: 36).

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Defining Political Integration

The term integration, as pointed out by Myron Weiner, “covers a vast range of human relationships and attitudes - the integration of diverse and discrete cultural loyalties and the development of a sense of nationality; the integration of political units into a common territorial framework with a government which can exercise authority; the integration of the rulers and the ruled; the integration of citizens into a common political process; and, finally, the integration of individuals into organisations for purposive activities.” Myron Weiner gives five broad definitions of the term integration. According to him integration may refer to:

...the process of bringing together culturally and socially discrete groups into a single territorial unit and the establishment of a national identity, the problem of establishing national central authority over subordinate political units or regions which may or may not coincide with distinct cultural or social groups, the problem of linking government with the governed, the process in evolving a minimum value consensus necessary to maintain a social order, the “integrative behaviour”, referring to the capacity of people in a society to organise for some common purpose (Weiner1965: 53-54).

Integration is, as maintained by most scholars, a matter of degree and the national state representing only a more or less stable balance of centripetal and centrifugal forces (Harrison 1956: 141). The term integration is defined in two senses, sometimes as a process and sometimes as a condition. Ernst B. Haas uses it in the former sense and defines political integration as the “process whereby political actors in several distinct national settings are persuaded to shift their loyalties, expectations, and political activities toward a new centre, whose institutions possess or demand jurisdiction over the pre-existing national states” (Haas1958: 16).

Karl W. Deutsch uses the term integration both as a process and a condition and defines political integration as “the attainment of a sense of community, accompanied by formal or informal institutions or practices, sufficiently strong and widespread to assure peaceful change among members of a group” (Deutsch 1954: 33). Such an integrated community, which Deutsch terms it as “security-community”, may or may not be a sovereign state and called it an “amalgamated” community. Philip E. Jacob and Henry Teune describe political integration as a “relationship of community among people within the same political entity” who are held together by “mutual ties...which give the group a feeling of identity and

awareness” (Jacob and Teune 1964: 4). In these two definitions it can be pointed out that political integration is the uniting of distinct national entities.

James S. Coleman and Carl G. Rosberg, jr., define political integration as “the progressive bridging of elite-mass gap on the vertical plane in the course of developing a participant community” (Coleman and Rosberg, jr. 1964: 9). Political integration also means the existence of one political entity having some form of jurisdiction over both areas. A strict definition of political integration is the predicted change in political relations between communities by a movement toward ultimate union into a new, more comprehensive and coherent political community. All the above definitions are attempts to define “what is which holds a society and a political system together” (Weiner, 1965: 54).

In simple words, political integration is the integration into the government, the political parties and the pressure group life of a country (Goldman, 1964: 28). In the theoretical treatment of political development and political stability, the concept of political integration is usually employed in a sense that approximates Deutsch’s definition (Lijphart 1971: 3), where the focus of interest is on integration within states, or, in other words, on the question whether an amalgamated community is integrated or not (Mye 1968: 871). Political integration is said to occur “when the linkage consists of joint participation in regularised, ongoing decision-making” (Lindberg, 1970: 649).

Problems of Political Integration

With the gaining of independence by countries of Asia and Africa during the middle of the twentieth century, the task of nation-building has been left with these countries. The first and foremost problem encountered by them was the issue of integrating the vast chunk of people who had been loosely administered with varying degrees by the colonial powers. In large and multi-national nation-states, the problem of integrating people inhabiting different regions with varied language, religion, culture and ethnic communities, the task is an arduous one. As Leonard Binder, while analysing the crisis of political development in new nation-states, pointed out: “the greatest task facing the new nation will be to build a nation out of a collection of tribes or of isolated communities” (Binder 1971: 46).

The problem of integration has been faced by most nation-states in one form or the other. The problem of political integration, according to Myron Weiner, is the “process of bringing culturally and socially discrete groups together into a single territorial unit, and the establishment of a sense of loyalty to that unit” (Weiner, 1968: 27). Claude Ake broadly defines

the problem as follows: “how to build a single coherent political society from a multiplicity of ‘traditional societies’; how to increase cultural homogeneity and value consensus; and how to elicit, from the individual, deference and devotion to the claims of the state” (Ake 1967: 486-499). Historically, the problem of integration has been “restricted to the determination of the nature and diffusion of nationalism in a particular transitional polity and the impact that nationalism had on the developmental process” (Alam 1981: 2).

The emergence of nation-states with a fixed territory is a relatively new phenomenon. The sovereignty of these states is generally marked by an exclusive control over their territory. The control over territory is usually accompanied by a movement to infuse the feeling of a common nationality. However, there needs to be first of all territorial integration before any other forms of integration can possibly take place. There are instances where “nation” precedes “state” formation as in the case of Israel. But most of the modern nation-states in Asia and Africa are a by-product of colonial rule, where the emergence of territorial nation-state precedes the emergence of a nation.

There are serious problem of territorial integration, where the new governments tries to take control over border areas which were loosely administered by colonial governments. Moreover, “there are also areas occupied by recalcitrant tribes who forcefully resisted efforts toward their incorporation in the larger nation-state” where “the colonial rulers generally did not establish a central authority over the entire territory under their *de jure* control” (Weiner 1965: 52-56). Thus, the areas under indirect control by colonial governments have been placed under the direct control of the new governments. In the establishment of most new nations, the establishment of a territory precedes the establishment of loyalties from the subjects.

The problem of integration faced by each nation-state differs from others in nature as well as in degree. It varies from country to country “because of the ambiguity as to what constitutes a nation which is to be integrated” and also because of the “differences between the countries in their history and ethnic composition” (Emerson 1966: 96). Even developed countries of the west face the continuing resurgence of such integrational problems and there are instances of the break-up of multi-national nation-states. Therefore, the solution to the problem of integration cannot be uniform even among the developing countries. Some of the most common problem in integration involves the “problems of national identity, territorial control, the establishment of norms for the handling of public conflict, the relationship between the governors and the governed, and the problems of organising individuals for the achievement of common purposes” (Weiner 1965: 52). Nonetheless, students of comparative

politics develop some theoretical framework, where much of the theories developed out of concern for nation building in pluralistic societies.

Theoretical Considerations

The primary prerequisite of political integration is the existence of political culture. According to Sidney Verba, political culture “consists of the system of empirical beliefs, expressive symbols, and values which defines the situation in which political action takes place” (Verba 1965: 513). Verba pointed out that not all beliefs about political culture are relevant to the concept of political culture; but the concept refers to only those beliefs which affect politics in a fundamental way. In almost all the theories of political integration cultural homogeneity, especially a homogeneous political culture is often regarded as a prerequisite for political integration, which in turn is a prerequisite for political stability, especially in democracies (Lijphart 1971: 4-5). It is also further argued that shared culture may not be a prerequisite for unification but a requirement that has to be fulfilled before the process can be advanced.

Claude Ake stresses the requirement from the members of the political system to identify with and trust one another. He said that “without some basic mutual trust among members of a civic body there can be no stable expectations about the modes of acquisition and exercise of political power, no coherence and predictability in political life” (Ake 1967: 487). He further argues that if the different cultural entities within the political system are so profoundly dissimilar that they cannot communicate with one another, mutual trust and a sense of collective identity cannot develop. Therefore, one of the essential preliminary requisite for political integration is the broadening and intensifying of “social communication”. The improvement of the communicative facilities of a new state depends, in turn, on social mobilisation-“the process in which major clusters of old social, economic, and psychological commitments are eroded or broken down and people become available for new patterns of socialisation and behaviour” (Deutsch 1961: 494). Social mobilisation involves a huge change of an old way of life and therefore generates tensions.

Claude Ake hypothesise that, “the political system driving for integration maximises its chances for achieving a high degree of integration and remain stable, in spite of short-run destabilising effects of the drive for integration, if it is an authoritarian, consensual, ‘identific’, and paternal.” Ake said that the pursuit of integration underscores the need for authoritarianism as the quest for integration aggravates political instability by attempting to

make people relate to national symbols rather than to tribal ones. Thus, in order to maintain a minimum of political stability it is crucial that the government be strong enough to deal with the centrifugal forces that the drive for integration will activate and the government must also be able to decide and act quickly (Ake 1967: 489).

Ake further theorise that leaders of a new state must not concentrate power in their own hands but foster social transformation and be innovative as they are committed to integration of their culturally pluralistic societies. They must destroy or modify certain habits of mind and undermine certain traditional symbols of collective identity; they must induce the people to accept new norms, new goals, new motivations; they must readjust patterns of social and economic relationship and to this effect they must supply the initiative for reliving it. As socio-cultural gap between the elite and the masses is one of the most striking features of the newly independent state which poses the threat of mutual alienation between them, the political style and the way of life of the ruling elite must be calculated to dramatise its concern for and identity with the masses so as to lessen this threat. Political leaders need to eschew corruption, conspicuous consumption, and social snobbery and give their politics a distinctly “populistic” one. Ake believes that “the ultimate cure for the inherent instability of the new states lies mainly in the modification of the political behaviour of its elites.” He argues that the “government should be a coalition of the leaders of the major social, religious, professional, and ethnic groups...Consensus is sought not at the grass-roots level but at the leadership level by enlisting the support of leading personalities from all major social groups.” Political integration is said to occur “when the linkage consists of joint participation in regularised, ongoing decision-making” (Lindberg 1970: 649).

John Wood criticise Verba and Ake’s equation of political integration with the achievement of national identity or a value consensus. He said that these psychological phenomena are no doubt important to the “making whole” that integration connotes, but they are dependent aspects insofar as the fundamental political process is concerned (Wood 1984: 68). Wood further pointer out that Verba and Ake wrongly suggest that integration implies a homogenisation of political values, conformity of political purposes. Etzioni also views that homogeneity of political values among subunits does not guarantee political integration anymore than heterogeneity precludes it (Etzioni, 1965 25-27). Political integration cannot be assessed by measuring sameness. Rather, some measure of political interaction and exchange among the integrating units must be devised.

Deutsch's communication theory stress on communication among persons, cities, ethnic groups, language communities, and countries. To him the success or failure of political integration depends in part upon the compatibility of autonomous responses as well as ... on the distribution and balance of range of social transaction, and of the streams of experiences to which they give rise (Deutsch 1954: 4). As political integration does not just happen anywhere a core area of "larger, stronger, more politically, administratively, economically, and educationally advanced" political units is usually present to lead the process (Deutsch, *et al* 1957: 58). In their study of the North Atlantic area, Deutsch and others found that "mutual compatibility of main values" was an essential condition for both amalgamated and pluralistic security communities. They conclude that political communities occur whenever groups not only exchange a high proportion of communications but also share a superordinate goal and a "we-feeling".

Referring to Deutsch's approach as too broad, Ernst Haas excludes transactional and institutional criteria from his initial formulation, though he considers them as potentially helpful factors (Haas 1966: 20). Haas specifies that integration is a process which takes place in a period of time "between the establishment of common economic rules and the possible emergence of a political entity", and which must consist "of increasing politicisation, of shifting loyalties, of adaptation by the actors to a new process of mutual accommodation" (Haas & Schmitter 1966: 266). Thus, the goal of the political community is "a condition in which specific groups and individuals show more loyalty to their central political institutions than to any other political authority, in a specific period of time and in a definable geographical space" (Haas 1958: 5). Whereas the functional theory of David Mitrany stresses the role of non-political international organisations as promoters of integration whenever experts replace politicians as key actors, Haas refines Mitrany's functionalism by arguing that there is a need for both political and nonpolitical actors, since technical organisations can only expand in number and in scope so long as they have political support (Haas 1964: Chapter 2). According to Haas, political integration is a process where the goal is the eventual formation of a political community.

William Riker, on his work on federalism and coalition formation, propound the "bargain" concept, a tool with which to analyse the exchange of rewards and loyalties between political actors of the core and the periphery (Riker 1964: 42). Political bargains may be public or secret, explicit or undefined, confirmed or anticipated. They may be amicably negotiated or arrived at under stress. In integrational terms, the bargains forge new links among hitherto separate units, and facilitate the building of new loyalties to a larger system. The term "counterbargain" implies competition among bargain-offers and alternative integrational

formulas. The later may appear at the onset of the integrational process or at the later stage if, in the view of at least one bargainer, the initial bargain has been debased or broken. Marxist conceive successful political integration as a method of state-building has performed two critical state functions: provision of the political infrastructure for the expansion of productive forces in protocapitalist and capitalist societies; and an appropriate means for legitimating the power necessary to maintain the social relations integral to these societies (Cocks1980: 4).

The bulk of integration theorists have dealt with only the contemporary world. They argue at some length about the appropriate definition of their dependent variable, whether there is more or less integration, how one is to measure it, whether different dimensions of integration change at different speeds, and whether some measures are better predictors of the future of the phenomenon than others. Michael Haas has summarised the objectives of the various approaches as an:

attempt to discern preconditions for the achievement of higher levels of integration, variables that account for the maintenance of existing levels of integration, and factors that promote increases from present to future levels of integration. Key variables in all three research avenues, when reversed, may tell us about factors accounting for backsliding in integration (Haas1958).

According to Ernst Haas, integration theories are “becoming obsolete because they are not designed to address the most pressing and important problems on the global agenda of policy” (Haas 1976: 178). Rapid changes in technology and communications have thrown the process of integration itself into doubt. Growing international interdependence has created a turbulent world with crucial problems whose solutions are international rather than regional, global rather than European (Haas1975: 18-20).

Political Integration in Asia and Africa

Most of the nation-states in Asia and Africa had been under colonial subjugation. In the post-independence years these countries inherited a vast array of problems which needs to be tackled and among one of them which needs to be solved at the outset was the problem of political integration. These countries also inherited from the colonial rule certain features of administrative and legal system, forms of government and fixed territory, which help in their efforts to build their state and nation.

Several approaches to the problem of political integration were followed in Asia and Africa. One of them is avoiding the problem altogether by retaining the essential “steel frame” feature of colonialism - open or disguised (Coleman 1955: 46). This process has been followed in the Belgian and Portuguese territories. A similar result has been achieved in federation of Rhodesia and Nyasaland by means of the wide devolution of power from imperial government in the United Kingdom to the European settlers in Africa. Another approach is found in the role played by powerful political leaders, nationalist movements and political parties, and territorial political institutions, as an instruments and new modes of integration. Charismatic leadership exercised by Kwame Nkrumah, Jawaharlal Nehru, Mahatma Gandhi, Sardar Vallabhai Patel, etc. were a factor in the successful transition from a British colony to a stable parliamentary democracy. The political movements of the Indian National Congress, Northern Rhodesia National Congress, Sierra Lone People’s Party, etc. have been instrumental in enlarging the scale of political activity. Moreover, territorial assemblies and legislatures, centralised bureaucracies, and other territory-wide institutions have been structures that have fostered, indeed, forced progressive integration.

Common language, which is the one of the most important factors favouring political integration, is absent in most of the countries of Asia and Africa. Linguistic regionalism remains a formidable obstacle in the path toward integration in Asian countries. Although these countries lack a common language efforts were made to introduce a national language in the interests of integration, and in order to counteract “linguistic regionalism” (Harrison 1956: 143-144). There are instances of the introduction of English as a second language in some countries of Southeast Asia. Language as a key factor in the integration of Southeast Asian societies naturally features prominently in educational policies, which are themselves virtually concerned with integration-political, social and cultural.

The impact of British conquest and occupation has resulted in bringing into the open the issue of minorities where it has “left a difficult legacy by accentuating the distinctions and differences between various groups”. They also “left a valid tradition of effective political hegemony with control” from the centre of administration and “a sketchy but uniform system of statewide education and modern communications network which ultimately should prove to outweigh the difficulties they created and left” (Thet 1956: 161-162).

The Indian Experience

The British rule significantly brought about an enduring political consolidation in India. The effect of the British rule, plus modern innovations in transport and communications, in promoting a working sense of Indian unity was of vital importance. The maintenance of law

and order, administrative unity, the introduction of a common body of social and political concepts and values, the appearance of English as a lingua franca, fiscal and economic integration, all served to link together the disparate elements which made up the Indian society as did the common national struggle against British rule (Emerson 1960:12).

The imminent withdrawal of the British from India after the end of the Second World War led to the appearance of different plans for autonomy by most of the princely states. On the eve of British withdrawal from India two forces operated: pan-Indian nationalism seeking an integrated independent India, and the separatists seeking its independent existence. At first, the Indian National Congress leaders were not against giving the Right to Self-determination and even the Right to Secession to the aggrieved components and agreed to prepare a federal constitution with residuary power vested in the units. However, alarmed by the rising number of claims the Congress did not agree to any proposal by any unit to secede from the Indian Union. Even though the Congress conjured that it cannot think in terms of compelling the people in any territorial unit to remain in the Indian Union against their will, the post-independent India wanted to inherit as much as the British India.

With the imminent lapse of paramountcy, a number of schemes were envisaged, demanding sovereign homelands, responsible governments, a state within the Indian union and threat to join Pakistan or Burma. The task of the new government was to prevent the disintegrative forces, integrate them with the mainland and protect the territory handed to them by the British. A States Department was created which was headed by Sardar Vallabhai Patel and V.P. Menon as secretary, to carry out the arduous task of integrating the princely states and all dissident groups. Sardar Patel said that: "Our first task was to prevent the balkanisation of the country and to stop any possible inveiglement of the States by Pakistan was to bring the States into some form of organic relationship with the Centre" (quoted in Menon 1956: 485).

British India was granted independence on August 15, 1947 as the separate dominions of India and Pakistan. The British Government dissolved its treaty relations with more than six hundred princely states, which means that, "The rights of the States which flew from their relationship to the crown will no longer exist and that all rights surrendered by states to the paramount power will return to the states" (Menon 1956: 83). The vacuum which arises from the lapse of political arrangements between the States and the Crown was to be filled in either with the states entering into federal relationship with succeeding Government or Governments in British India or enter into particular political arrangements with or without them. The states

were given freedom whether to associate with India or Pakistan or to stand alone. The British Government did not put any pressure on the states in deciding which dominion they desire to accede. Most of the states acceded to India, and a few to Pakistan. Hyderabad and Manipur opted for independence, although the armed intervention of India brought Hyderabad into the Indian Union and the coerced tactics led Meitei Maharaja into signing a merger agreement with India.

The integration of Indian states took place in two phases, with a skilful combination of baits and threats of mass pressure in both. The primary “bait offered was that of very generous privy purses, while some princes were also made into Governors or Rajpramukhs” (Sarkar 1983: 451). One of the most difficult in the process of integration was that of the integration of states with the neighbouring provinces or into new units. By August 15, almost all states has agreed to sign an Instrument of Accession with India acknowledging central authority over the three areas of defence, external affairs and communications. The gaining of independence was “a culmination of long-drawn, multi-stream process of transformation, unification and integration of the Indian people into one political entity” (Nag 1999: 74). By January 26, 1950 when the Constitution of Indian Republic came into force all states and outlying areas were fully integrated.

Many princely states were merged with the neighbouring Governors’ provinces of British India to form Part A states under the 1950 Constitution. A large number of princely states which were governed by a rajpramukh were combined into “states union”; and together with the three biggest principalities, Hyderabad, Jammu and Kashmir and Mysore, they acquired a separate existence as Part B states for a while. For strategic and other reasons, former Chief Commissioners’ Provinces and other centrally administered areas, except Andaman and Nicobar Islands, were Part C states. The Part C states were Ajmer-Merwara, Bhopal, Bilaspur, Coorg, Delhi, Kutch, Himachal Pradesh, Manipur, and Tripura. With linguistic reorganisation the distinctions between Part A, B, and C states ended, and a complex recombination of ex-princely and ex-British territory was carried out.

Therefore, the ultimate geographical, political and economic integration of India was achieved. Great credit can be given to Sardar Patel for the rapid integration of Indian states. The Indian nationalism of the freedom struggle was responsible for the integration of people belonging to different religion, languages, and cultures into a single political entity.

Conclusion

The mode of political integration in India involved negotiations, promises, baits and even force. In the formation of a new and sovereign India, the integration of more than six hundred princely states and other loosely administered areas enjoying varying degrees of autonomy, was a great challenge to the new government and it posed serious obstacles to the unity, cohesion and stability. While some princely states willingly joined the union, most of them made a stiff opposition to the integration process. As hypothesised by Claude Ake, in most of the process the Indian state adopted an authoritarian approach in integrating the Northeastern states, where different techniques were used to coerce the constituent units to come to terms.

In the context of the history of political integration in Northeast India, it is found that the integration with the Indian union politically remained a serious issue of concern for the people. These attempts at assimilation of the region and its people with the Indian mainstream have resulted in resentments amongst different ethnic communities. Some areas like Manipur and Naga Hills refused to merge with India and expressed desire for withdrawal from the Union. The manner in which the merger was brought about has left a residual bitterness that the insurgent groups successfully tap into. A number of insurgent groups regarded the merger as illegal and unconstitutional, and many among the Manipuri intelligentsia are bitter about the way it was effected (Baruah, 2000). The Meitei and Naga insurgent groups resented the forceful integration of their land and continued their armed struggle. The Kukis in the hill areas of Manipur, who are known to have fought the British (1917-1919) to secure their freedom, too resented the forceful integration of their land.

In previously separate principalities like Manipur, political integration should involve overcoming parochial loyalties and residual loyalties (Wood 1984: 66); however the transitional government's approach failed to overcome these loyalties. As in the case of Gujarat, political integration in stages could have been adopted in Nagaland so as to permit the time for adjustment to the constraints and opportunities to the new system and develop a homogeneous political culture. The late realisation that such integrationist policy was erroneous has led the government to concede autonomy demands of ethnic groups, which led to creation of separate states. However the formation of new states had a cascading effect leading to new demands from other smaller ethnic groups vying for different levels of autonomy.

Since the eve of India's independence smaller ethnic groups in the hills of Northeast

India too asserted their desire for separated administrative units. The Kukis were fully aware of the various aspects of the vexing problems of the hills and the valley, and therefore pledge to be under Manipur if only conditions are satisfactory. After independence the Kuki National Assembly (KNA) demanded a separate state for the Kukis within India. In this regard the KNA submitted several memoranda to the Central Government. The dormant political demands were revived as an insurgent movement in the late 1980s due to the intolerable atrocities committed by the Naga rebels and what the Kukis termed it as the policy of “ethnic cleansing”.

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